

A HANDBOOK OF
SOCIOLOGY

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A HANDBOOK OF SOCIOLOGY

by

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and

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PREFACE

TO THE FIRST ENGLISH EDITION

An increasing interest in Sociology has been shown in this country during the last few years, not only among sociologists and the students in the various branches of the social sciences, but also among the general public. In particular, members of the professional world, such as teachers, ministers, social workers, doctors, lawyers and many others, have shown a desire for a more fundamental sociological orientation. Thus the need for a Handbook of Sociology became more than evident.

The present book should meet that need. It gives a comprehensive survey of the whole field and bases its conclusions on the large body of empirical research which has been done during the last decades. The authors view social life as the interaction of four factors: the biological organism, geographical environment, group processes and cultural heritage. They discuss the principal conclusions of biology, psychology, geography and other disciplines in so far as they are relevant to sociology, and then proceed to the presentation of the fundamental facts, basic concepts and theories which form the body of sociology proper.

Though originally an American book, no doubt one of America's best handbooks of recent date, it should be adequate for English readers, as the American material is primarily illustrative and not integral to the argument. A completely rewritten book, drawn against an exclusively British background, was quite out of the question at the present juncture. But, short of this, everything has been done in the English adaptation of the book to supplement the American material with English data and remodel the text and adjust the bibliography to English demands. The bibliography is not intended to exhaust the great amount of literature available on most of the topics. It should serve only as a guide to further reading in various directions. The sections "Topics for Further Discussion and Study" have been relegated to the end of the book in an Appendix. Those who want to organise discussion classes may find them useful.

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March, 1946.

PREFACE

TO THE FIFTH ENGLISH EDITION

The publication of a completely revised American edition has provided the opportunity for further changes in the English version.

The rapid developments in sociology in recent years are reflected in the introduction of considerable new material in the American text. The chapter on Role and Status has been deleted and a new chapter added on Social Stratification.

In editing the text for the English reader, some material has been deleted to make way for English illustrative matter, and for references to the substantial developments in English social researches over the last decade. The bibliography has been revised to include English texts and brought up to date. The questions for study also include revisions aimed to direct the attention of students to problems of interest to English sociologists.

STEPHEN COTGROVE.

1964

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PART I : INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

SOCIOLOGY AND SCIENCE

This book is concerned with the scientific study of human society. Hence the initial chapter deals with the scientific method as applied to sociology. The discussion is deliberately selective and suggestive, emphasising a few big ideas in ways calculated to stress their great importance.

WHAT SCIENCE IS

SCIENCE IS KNOWLEDGE

The briefest definition is : Science is knowledge. And the significance of science lies in the significance of knowledge as compared with beliefs, superstitions and misinformation. For instance, we once thought that the culture of a people is an index of their racial ability, that the Eskimos and other peoples with less advanced cultures have less innate mental ability than the Europeans. We know now that this is false—a conclusion of first-rate importance for the harmonious living together of the peoples of the world.

Our mental stock of ideas has been badly cluttered with false notions. We once believed that killing a bull before battle would bring victory, or that an albino had the mysterious power of telling where to dig a well to find water. When we think of all this useless or harmful mental debris that has burdened us through the long dark centuries, it is a great comfort to turn to the certainty of the knowledge upon which we can rely. When we read in the newspaper of the crash of an airliner against a mountain-side, with all occupants killed, or when a report tells us that the visitations of poliomyelitis are on the increase, it is comforting to turn to the knowledge that in England and Wales, in the period 1940-50, the average expectancy of life at birth was 68 years, and that our span of life has been increasing rather than diminishing. Knowledge not only brings certainty, or approximations thereto, but knowledge dispels the fear that comes from uncertainty.

IDEAS AND KNOWLEDGE ARE NOT THE SAME

It is important to know that knowledge and ideas are not the same, for not all ideas are knowledge. There is an idea that a one-world government will prevent war ; but we do not know that this idea is true. There is an idea that whether a person can go insane or not is determined by the time he is five years old. Perhaps some day this

idea may be proved and become knowledge. Or again, it may be disproved. Perhaps only a small minority of hypotheses existing at any one time will ever be proved. During the 1930's, remedies for the deep depression of that decade were sent in to Washington, generally to the President, at a rate, for a time, of 300 a day. Practically all of them were worthless.

Not all ideas are concerned with proof or disproof. Some ideas are set going for amusement, or are dreams or wish fulfilments. Others are used to persuade, or to frighten, or to discipline, or to create an attitude of reverence. Ideas are the material for intellectual activities ; and very fascinating they are when no limitations on method are imposed and various emotional attitudes are permitted. Thus we like to discuss what is the good life, the purpose in the universe, the nature of wisdom, etc.

Ideas are material for the social scientist as truly as for the intellectual who is not a scientist.¹ The social scientist needs imagination which will yield fresh insights and hypotheses. But social scientists *qua* scientists deal with ideas for the sole purpose of ascertaining whether they are or can be turned into knowledge. Thus the scientist is much more restricted in dealing with ideas than the intellectual non-scientist.

SCIENCE DEALS WITH DATA

How does the social scientist tell whether ideas can become knowledge or not? Sometimes the many ideas extant are confusing and we want to know how to tell what is knowledge and what is not. Thus there are many theories of juvenile delinquency: the feeble-mindedness theory, the neurosis theory, the broken-home theory, and the learning-by-association theory. How can we prove which, if any, of these theories can be turned into knowledge? The basic procedure is to collect facts on each theory and see whether the evidence supports the theory. Scientific work is then concerned with data as well as ideas. But data are not always easy to obtain. The data of most physical sciences are relatively simple and can be encompassed in a laboratory ; but in sociology data are usually obtained by field work, the collection of documents or of statistics. Often the acquisition of data is very costly and time-consuming. Sociology has suffered in the past, and is handicapped to-day, for want of data to many questions.

Often we are under some pressure to reach a conclusion without having adequate evidence, as for instance in voting or in adopting a policy for an organisation. As voters or executives, or merely as human beings in a crisis, we must often decide or act on incomplete evidence. We cannot wait until a scientist reaches a conclusion. The

¹ Robert Redfield, "The Art of Social Science", in *American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1948, and Jessie Bernard, "The Art of Science, a Reply to Redfield", *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1949.

motto of a scientist is "suspended judgment", while the motto of the executive is "do it now!"

When the data are inadequate or not conclusive, bias, usually deriving from emotion, enters into any conclusion we reach and lessens its accuracy and reliability. Sociology deals with subjects toward which many of us react with considerable emotion, as we do to sex, family, crime, and poverty. These are subjects on which we often do not have good data. Hence in dealing with these subjects, if we do not have conclusions based on data, and are not indifferent, we are very likely to be prejudiced: that is, we pre-judge the issue.

THE DISTORTING EFFECT OF BIAS

The effect of bias is to distort. This influence is clearly seen in the case of prediction, which, when it can be applied, is a singularly good test of knowledge. How prediction may be biased could be seen by a simple experiment. When, before the final examination, each student in a class was asked what he thought his final mark would be, the class as a whole predicted more high marks for themselves than they actually received.¹ This behaviour is an indication of what is customarily called wishful thinking.

The purpose of science is to add to our knowledge by describing reality accurately. In the foregoing experiment reality was the actual marks the class received. The prediction of the grades the members of the class would receive was a distortion of reality in the direction of high marks. We thus say that the picture of reality the class carried in their heads was different from the actual picture of reality. Much of life consists of acting on a mental picture of reality. A challenge to all of us is to see that the picture of reality we carry in our heads resembles as closely as possible the actual picture of reality.

It should be noted that for many purposes we do not want the pictures we carry around in our heads to be like the pictures of reality. Thus at times we wish to carry dream pictures in our heads. There is a legitimate function for day-dreaming if not carried to excess. We can afford to day-dream in our recreation, but not in our sociology. The purpose of the theatre and of the novel is to create fiction, which is different from reality. So too the artist may insist that his art is to be his impressions rather than a photograph. Impressionist art is therefore a distortion of objective reality, while the purpose of science is to furnish an exact reproduction. Therefore art and science point in different directions. We may want to be artists some of our lives and to be scientists only part of the time.

WHAT SCIENCE IS NOT

Science then is not an art. Science calls for thought, though we can do much thinking that is not scientific thinking. The purpose of

¹ W. F. Ogburn, "Studies in the Prediction and Distortion of Reality", *Social Forces*, December, 1934.

science is to produce knowledge—not to produce wisdom, or understanding, or control, or ideas. Science differs from ethics, though the knowledge that comes from science should be helpful to us in our conduct. Different value systems and ethics are, of course, factors which, together with our knowledge, influence our conduct. Which is better, to live in a town or a large city? There are subjective factors in our choices, just as there are in a preference for the colour yellow over purple. Knowledge might affect the values underlying our preference for life in a big city or a small town. Even with that knowledge there would remain values based upon subjective experience which would lead one person to prefer a city and another to choose a small town. Though scientific knowledge may greatly affect the values we choose, as to whether, for instance, we are liberal or conservative, the object of science is not to create values. This point is sometimes expressed in terms of the distinction between means and ends; that is the function of science is often to furnish the means for achieving more effectively the goals set by our values. Tolstoy thought science was futile because it could give no answer to the questions—the only questions he deemed important—“What shall I do and how shall I live?”

In scientific sociology, the researchers often choose to try to discover new knowledge that will help the human race. Thus sociologists try to find out what causes crime. This represents a choice of subject matter with which to work. One may work with a given subject as a scientist, or in some other way; for instance as a propagandist. The scientific sociologist chooses to work in a field primarily to acquire knowledge. This knowledge may be used in various ways. For instance the knowledge of the causes of crime could conceivably be used to increase crime. Sociologists hope it will be used to decrease crime. Indeed, the sociologist may step out of his rôle of research scientist and, taking the rôle of citizen, educator, writer or statesman, use this knowledge of the causes of crime to try to reduce the amount of crime.

There is, however, such a thing as pure science; that is scientific work undertaken without reference to its practical use. For instance, Hertzian waves were discovered without any reference to their use. Later they became the basis for the radio. Pure science, without any known practical use, is not as common in sociology perhaps as in mathematics or physics or biology. Much knowledge about pre-literate peoples is accumulated without reference to application, though the knowledge could be, and increasingly is, applied in the administration of colonial governments.

KNOWLEDGE IS ENDURING

Scientific knowledge, if it is reliable, should be enduring. Ideas and theories are often overthrown, proved untrue; but knowledge

endures. Knowledge is often refined, but this does not mean that the knowledge was disproved. For instance, in England in 1927 there were 665,000 births and 485,000 deaths. The population thus increased by 170,000. "Yet, incredible as it may sound, those 665,000 births of 1927¹ meant that each woman during her lifetime would give birth to but two children,"² not enough even to maintain the population. But no knowledge was overthrown. It was simply refined by learning that in 1927 there was an unusual percentage of women of childbearing age, and that with a normal percentage the population would not have increased.

Sometimes theories or ideas or beliefs are claimed to be knowledge. A cure for cancer was for a while announced every few weeks. To counteract the claim of knowledge where there are only hypotheses, sociologists try to hold rigorously to proof. Hence the insistence on verification, on a satisfactory answer to the question, "How do you know it?" Though few are as cautious as the scientist who upon hearing the remark of a fellow railway traveller that the sheep they could see from the train window had already been sheared, replied that they had been sheared on this side certainly.

While scientific knowledge is enduring, very often sociological knowledge is not invariably true in all places and at all times. Thus the months of most marriages in England are in the spring and early summer. But at one time most marriages occurred there in the autumn.³ Much knowledge in sociology is therefore not capable of being generalised, as is the knowledge in physics, such as Newton's laws of motion which seem to be true everywhere. Some sociological knowledge is, however, very widely applicable. For instance the knowledge that the birth rate in cities is lower than in the rural regions is true in the Orient and was true in the Middle Ages.⁴

Even though the findings of sociology are often limited in time and space because a cultural factor varies, still, sociology, like all sciences, endeavours to discover laws that are generally applicable, regardless of variations in culture. Such a law, for instance, is the generalisation that the social practices of a community are deemed right by the group because they are in the *mores*; not that the practices are in the *mores* because they are in the right.

SCIENCE AND SOCIOLOGY

Description. Much sociological knowledge is straightforward description of phenomena as, for instance, in a survey of a community. But not all people observe correctly. Even census takers must be trained. So must historians and sociologists.

¹ Robert R. Kuczynski, *The Balance of Births and Deaths* (New York, 1929).

² *Ibid.* ³ Dorothy Thomas, "Changes in Marriage Seasons", *Economica*, 1924.

⁴ A. J. Jaffe, "Urbanization and Fertility", *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1942.

Selection. A big problem in description lies in what to describe. When the phenomena to be described are complex and varied and numerous, everything cannot be described. Hence selection. Descriptions of Russia by a capitalist and by a communist might both be accurate but quite different.

Verifiable Descriptions. Scientific observations should be recorded in terms that are verifiable. For instance, the statement that "the population of India is increasing to ominous proportions" cannot be verified for there is no measure of "ominous". It is an opinion. On the other hand, the following statement can be verified: "From 1944 to 1954, the population of India increased by 47,000,000. In this decade India added to her people a population the size of France."

Description of a Sample. Since scientific work in sociology is often very expensive, social scientists resort to describing a sample instead of the whole. This sample should be large enough and representative. For instance, if we were describing opinion in the United States, it would be unwise to obtain data just from the daily press of the large cities. We would want to design a sample to include farm journals, labour papers, and other centres of opinion. And we would want to examine enough cases from each of these groups, to be sure that what we have seen is typical. Description in science requires skill and training.

MEASUREMENT OF RELATIONSHIPS

A large percentage of scientific work in sociology is more than description of phenomena. Much work concerns the relationship between two or more phenomena, as, for instance, the relationship between business conditions and the marriage rate. A common problem of this type is to ascertain the cause of a phenomenon. There is a great diversity of opinion on what we mean by cause, and not all writers employ the same definition.¹ It is desirable, then, for those who use this book to know the authors' conception of cause.

Variables. Much work in sociology consists in trying to find the causes of a phenomenon such as war, crime, divorce, etc. The phenomenon of which we wish to find the cause is often a change from some prior or different condition. Thus war is a change from peace. In U.S.A., the number of divorces after World War II was one to every three marriages, while before the war, in the 1930's, it was one to every six marriages. In all these cases there has been a change. Hence we speak of it as a variation, and the phenomenon is called a variable. The variation for which we wish to find a cause or causes is the variation from peace to war (in the above sense), the increase in the divorce rate, or the decline in the number of cases of manslaughter.

¹Robert M. MacIver, *Social Causation* (Boston, 1942).

Some of the increase in divorces after the war was caused by the many hasty marriages and some separations which the war occasioned. A postwar prosperity also contributed to the increase in divorces, since we know there are more divorces in prosperity than in depression. So we say a cause of the increase in divorce after the war was a change from peace to war. A change in one variable is explained by a change in another variable. When we study causes of a phenomenon, we study the relationship of two (or more) variables.

A Constant not a Cause of Change. If a variation is explained only in terms of another variation, it follows that a variation cannot be explained in terms of a constant, that is, a factor that did not change. Thus one cannot explain the phenomenon of the magnificent achievements of tennis players from California in recent years as caused by climate, wonderful though the California climate may be. Climate cannot be a cause because it is a constant. The climate of California was the same in the nineteenth century, when there were few top-flight tennis players from California, as it is in the twentieth century when the galaxy of tennis players has been brilliant.

If the variable to be explained were the superiority of the tennis players from California over players from, say, Scotland, then it would be possible to consider climate as a cause, for the climate of California differs from the climate of Scotland and hence climate in this case is not a constant. We do not know, of course, that such a hypothesis would be proved correct.

While a constant cannot be a cause of a change in a variable, it may nevertheless be a factor in the variable. Thus the pugnacity "instinct" cannot be a cause of war because this biological factor is a constant, for the pugnacity drive in the population was the same in the peace years 1931-2 as in the war years 1941-2. Yet this biological drive is a factor in war, since if it were absent we would not have wars. A phenomenon may have a large number of constant factors while at the same time a change in the phenomenon may have a much smaller number of causal factors.

MOST SOCIAL PHENOMENA HAVE SEVERAL CAUSES

Modern society is complex and full of changes. Therefore, logically, a social phenomenon is likely to have many causes. Yet the human mind in its love of simplification often thinks in terms of only one cause. But phenomena usually have many causes, some of more importance, of course, than others. The causes of migration, for instance, are numerous; they may be economic opportunity, population pressure, religious persecution, transportation facilities, or the business cycle.

Chains of Causes. When in the search for causes we ascertain relationships between variables. The first step is to determine whether

there is concomitant, or simultaneous, variation between the two variables. If we find the crime rate in cities of a certain size about the same in cities that grow rapidly as in those that decrease or grow slowly, we conclude that the rate of growth of cities of a certain size and within certain limits is not likely to be a cause of crime increase, for the crime rate is constant when the rate of growth varies for large numbers of cities.

On the other hand, if the sex ratio (number of men per 100 women) of cities is high in cities with a high crime rate and low in cities with a low crime rate, there is concomitant variation; and we next inquire whether concomitant variation involves causation. Concomitant variation does not necessarily mean that the two variables are causally related, for they may be independent of each other and the concomitant variation may be due to other factors. Thus it has been shown that teachers' salaries are positively correlated with the consumption of beer in the United States, but no one believes a causal relationship is involved. They both increased in times of prosperity.

Moreover, when we suspect a causal relationship between two variables, the mere fact of concurrent variation does not of itself tell us which variable is cause and which effect. The sex ratio and the crime rate vary together, but this does not tell us whether the high sex ratio is the cause of the high crime rate or whether the high crime rate is the cause of high sex ratio. It seems absurd to think that a high crime rate would cause an excess of men in a city, although it might conceivably do so by inducing women, to whom crime is obnoxious, to migrate. On the other hand, it may be that an excess of men would bring about an increase of crime, for we know that many more men than women are arrested for crime.

The variation in stature of fathers is correlated positively with the variation in stature of sons. Tall fathers have tall sons. But the correlation does not tell us which is the cause. From the statistics we have as much right to say the variation in the sons' stature causes the variation in the fathers'! But we argue that heredity is the cause, since the stature of a father is attained before a son is born. But there may be a third factor causing both, namely nutrition. For children of rich fathers are taller than children of poor fathers.

If we pursue the causes still further and try to find out why men commit more crimes than women, we move on into another link in the chain of causes. This sequence of causes may be illustrated in the case of divorce, where a chain of causes may be traced as follows: More divorces occur in childless families than in families with children. There are more childless families in the cities than on the farms. Cities have appeared in great numbers where there are railways and factories. Railways and factories came only with the invention of the steam engine. It may therefore be said, depending on which link we choose in the chain of causes, that the absence of children causes

divorce, or that cities are a cause, or that the increase in divorce is due in part to the invention of the steam engine. But it should be remembered that there are also variables other than the presence or absence of children, which are correlated with divorce and which in turn have their own chain of causes.

ASKING QUESTIONS

Curiosity is often expressed rather vaguely and inadequately. For instance, we may be curious to know whether the family influence is declining in society. But what do we mean by family influence? We may mean the influence of the parents upon the children, or of parents and some children on a child. Or we may want to know about the influence of the family on some other member, say the wife and the mother. She may be spending more time outside the home. Or we may be curious about the declining influence of the family as an institution on public opinion, or on education, or on the protection of dependents.

Good scientific thinking requires not only that we write and speak definitely, but also that we ask our question in such form that it can be answered scientifically. This is not true of the question "Is family influence declining?" Family is not defined, nor is influence. Nor do we know to what period or country the question applies. The question is therefore too general, too comprehensive. The first step is to break it down into a series of questions dealing with the kinds of family, say urban or rural, with different types of influence, etc.

The formulation of the questions should be in measurable terms, that is, terms into which data may be fitted. Thus the following question is in such form that it can be answered if data are available: Has the control of the parents in Chicago over the behaviour of their children been less effective during and since World War II than in the 1930's as shown by the opinions and/or reports of school officials in selected districts?

SCIENTIFIC WORDS

A word is a collection of sounds or visible markings. But the word refers to something. For instance, the word *dog* refers to an animal, with four legs and a tail, that barks. The word *democracy* refers to a set of beliefs or actions concerning government by the people as a whole, rather than by a minority without the consent of the people. We therefore have two concepts, words and their referents.¹

In scientific sociology the referent should be clear to the sociologist, and he should also make sure that he and his listener or reader have the same referent in mind when a word is used.

¹ C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning* (London: Routledge, 1936).

Individuals may differ widely in the referents they have for the same word. In general these differences are much greater for abstract nouns than for concrete ones. A dog to some may be a hunting dog ; to another a pet lap dog. But no one will think the referent for *dog* is any other animal. The referents to communism, however, vary widely. To some communism is any set of radical beliefs to the left of an extreme conservative position. To others—communism is the belief that the means of production should be run by a government which in turn is run by the people, a majority of whom are wage or salaried workers. Some see in communism chiefly a dictatorship by working-class leaders. To some the essentials of communism lie in the ruthless method of taking productive property away from others by force and without due compensation, and turning it over to the dictatorship of a clique. And so on.

Some of the differences among the referents held by various people are due to confusing the phenomenon under consideration with other phenomena with which it is correlated. Thus democracy is defined in the dictionary as "government by the people, the principle that all citizens have equal political rights". There are those to whom the referent for democracy is a classless society. To the Russians it is said to be a society of economic equality. If we take as correct the referent quoted in the dictionary, then we often find a government by the people correlated with a reduction of social classes and a weakening of class barriers. Let us call a government by the people : X, and a classless society : Y. Because we find X correlated with Y, we are not warranted in calling X, Y. The business cycle is correlated with the marriage rate, but we do not make the mistake of calling the business cycle the marriage rate.

Referents should not include all the free associations which go with the word to which a referent is sought. Referents often are varied and confusing when an attempt is made to describe the spirit of something. Referents are often ideals, what we would like them to be rather than what they are. Thus the conceptions of democracy as a classless society or as a society where economic rewards or opportunities are equal, are idealisations that do not exist, for there are no large literate societies where incomes are equal or classes are lacking. The referent we carry around in our heads should be recognised for what it is.

SOCIOLOGY AS A SCIENCE

The question is sometimes asked : Is Sociology a Science ? A correct answer cannot be dichotomised into the two categories, yes or no. Rather the answer should be in terms of degree, the degree to which sociology is a science. A science is to be judged by three criteria : the reliability of its body of knowledge, its organisation, and its method.

Reliable Knowledge. As to its body of reliable knowledge, sociology for a young science has made a very good beginning in such studies as population, the family, group behaviour, the evolution of institutions, the processes of social change, and in various other areas.

Much knowledge in sociology is restricted as to time and place, and hence is unlike many of the generalisations of physics, as for instance the law of the expansion of gases. There are many more variables in sociological data. Still, sociologists seek generalisations that are universal, and they have had some success, as, for instance, in finding that societies always regulate marriage in such a manner as to prevent incest, though incest may be variously defined.

A very good test of the reliability of knowledge is the test of prediction. While prediction in sociology is liable to error, in many cases the error is small as in the prediction of some social effects of invention or the prediction of the social effects of the business cycle.

In some areas of sociological study reliable knowledge is difficult to obtain. These may be areas where measurement is rare, or where observation depends upon feeling tones, rather than upon the objective recordings through the eyes. Thus symbols, like those used by the psychiatrist in analysing dreams, are rather treacherous material. Of course other areas such as religion and art are not very amenable to scientific method.

Many publications classified under the title of sociology consist only of ideas, not knowledge. These are essays, ethical discussions, wise pronouncements, interpretations, theories, programmes, valuations, etc. Their importance, of course, may be even greater than that of science.

Though the researches of sociologists may yield reliable knowledge, that knowledge is not always used. Thus broken homes, crowded city streets, unhappy parents, and poverty increase juvenile delinquencies. But to control juvenile delinquency by eliminating divorces, unhappiness, poverty, and cities is a difficult undertaking.

The Organisation of Knowledge. A miscellaneous collection of facts such as is found in *The World Almanac* is not science. But the interrelationship of the elements in chemistry, into organic and inorganic compounds, is a science. The value of organisation lies not in a symmetry or pattern whose appeal is largely aesthetic, but in its value for the discovery of more knowledge.

The organisation of a science rests upon the relationships which the parts of knowledge bear to each other. In sociology there are many interrelationships, enough to afford many leads and tools for more discoveries, but not yet enough to yield a very adequate synthesis for the whole field. A larger collection of knowledge; it is expected, will eventually provide such a synthesis.

Method. Primitive peoples had a body of knowledge about weapons, tools, traps, clothing, and housing that was reliable. Those

who do not call this knowledge science, assert that the primitive peoples did not have the scientific method which we associate with the beginnings of science under Bacon, Copernicus, and Galileo. What is this method?

Primitive man is supposed to have discovered and learnt things, more or less accidentally, by trial and error. Scientific method is less wasteful and quicker. It begins with an idea that is thought to have more than 50 per cent probability of being true. This idea after analysis is stated in measurable terms as a hypothesis. Evidence is then sought to see whether the hypothesis can be proved. Verification may depend upon a laboratory experiment, upon statistics, or upon some other evidence.

The laboratory experiment which has been a great aid to many natural scientists is not very common in sociology. But sociology has the equivalent of the laboratory experiment, as becomes clear if we inquire what is the essence of a laboratory experiment. Surely not a room with gadgets. The laboratory experiment is generally a device to measure the relationship of two variables while other factors are eliminated or held constant. Thus an experimenter gets an idea that a food may prolong life. He decides that a good bet is Vitamin A. So he divides at random 100 rats of common stock into two groups of 50 each and gives the experimental group four times as much Vitamin A as he does the control group. But in the laboratory all other factors of food, temperature, and light are the same, that is, are held constant. The result is that old age and death are postponed by 15 per cent of the normal life span through the greater consumption of Vitamin A. The variables of longevity and Vitamin A are related, when other variables are held constant.

In sociology we do essentially the same thing, not in a laboratory, but with statistics. For instance, if we want to know whether families with low incomes have more infant deaths, we do not get 50 rich mothers and 50 poor mothers and put them in a room and watch the babies die. Instead we collect statistics. But first we must hold constant the type of feeding, the customs associated with ethnic groups, and finally the race. By studying and varying the factor of income and infant deaths, and by keeping other factors constant, it is shown that by increasing income alone we can save the lives of babies.

Sociology has quite adequate methods. The difficulty lies in getting the data, for the process is very costly. One United States Census alone, that of 1950, cost \$90,000,000.

The youth of sociology as a science shows itself in the amount of approximate instead of precise knowledge. Thus there is a good deal of approximate information on family relationships and the personality of children. Much sociological work consists in making knowledge more precise and thus adding to the growing stockpile already in existence.

Sociology is the Scientific Study of Social Life. Nearly all sociologists study the social life of human beings, but there is an animal sociology, which deals with the social life of lower animals such as chimpanzæes or insects such as bees, whose social activity has a truly remarkable organisation.

This definition is brief. We want to know what social life is. Common to the various types of social life are the interactions of individuals. But when such interaction occurs between two or more persons, it often occurs more than just once. Over a period of time, it may be repeated millions of times. Thus we use the same salute in greeting each other. Parents follow a fairly uniform pattern in teaching their children to walk. Women prepare food after men bring it home or supply the wherewithal to buy it. These repetitions become manners or etiquette, social institutions such as the family, or communities based on division of labour, all of which we call social organisation. So sociology by studying social life comes to study social organisation.

Each new crop of babies does not have to create these interactions anew. Rather these different ways of interacting are in existence, in practice, when babies are born, and they learn manners and institutional ways of doing things, instead of creating them. So tradition, or as it is frequently called, culture, becomes very important for the social life of any group.

People usually act through social organisation not just for the fun of it, but for some serious purpose such as getting food or clothing. But whatever the objective, through social organisation they create a variety of things such as music, words, morals, buildings, vehicles, tools, wealth. The study of these special products (the ways of producing and of using them) is the subject matter of special disciplines such as education, religion, economics, technology. But sociologists do not consider them as outside their field, since they are results of social life and condition ways of social living. Thus the steam engine was produced first to pump water out of the tin mines of Cornwall, but later on social life was revolutionised when the steam engine was used in factories and on railway.

One of the products which comes from social interaction is a set of habits formed by the very young. Some teachers are hard disciplinarians and the young become rebellious. Some children must struggle for recognition and become aggressive. So different social interactions produce different personalities. Sociology, then, in studying social life, studies interactions, not just as psychological behaviour but as social organisation. Social organisation is the heritage of the newly-born and creates products, one of which is the personality of the young.

How Sociology differs from other Social Sciences such as Economics. From this discussion you will think that sociology is a very broad subject.

If you read the preceding paragraphs carefully you will note that one of the products of interaction that sociologists study is wealth. Though sociology and economics both study industry, they do so differently. Economists study economic institutions such as factories, banks, trade, and transportation exclusively and are not concerned with the church, the family, or the courts. They probe quite thoroughly in this field. In a course in economics you may hear discussed the effect of the bank rate of interest on factory production, about which you would not hear in a course in sociology.

Social life is so complex in modern times that division of labour is needed to study it. So we have economics, concerned with economic institutions ; political science, specialising in government ; education, studying the schools ; and the law, devoted to the courts and legislation.

On the Map of Sociology there are several Special Developments. We have seen that the main task of sociologists is to develop knowledge which will explain society and social behaviour. They have certain fields which they cultivate as assiduously as the economists do the economic field or the political scientists the political field or the educationalists the field of education. Some of these sociological fields are major. One is the family. Another is population, where some of the specialists are called demographers. The community is also the province of sociology. These special areas have been taken over by sociologists mainly because of their general sociological importance. For instance, the family as a social institution is the most important factor in transmitting culture to the very young and also in teaching children the ways of social life. Second in this respect is the community, which has throughout history and prehistory been the general locale of human social life. The 'sociologist' studies population because the individual is the unit in the group and the size and density of populations are most important bases for the number and variety of social organisations.

Other parts of the map of sociology where sociologists are active are such social problems as crime, poverty, race relations. While these problems are all concerned with the basic factors of social life, the emphasis in dealing with them is strongly on action to ameliorate or eradicate them. In this endeavour, sociologists are joined by workers with varied training in other subjects such as social work and law and public administration.

Though there are specialised social sciences, there are also studies which are general and broad in scope. Such, for instance, is history, which includes economic topics like trade, political-science subjects like elections, and many other social matters like wars and religious activities.

Sociology is a General Science like History and Anthropology. So there are general subjects as well as specialised ones. Sociology is a general

subject and studies many widely different social institutions. The concern of sociology with economic institutions, which is in particular the province of economists, may be with the social aspects of economic activities—for instance, the effect of factory production on cities, or the effect of business prosperity upon the number of marriages. Sociology is therefore particularly interested in the relationship of economic activities to other social institutions.

As a general science, sociology is also especially fitted to deal with characteristics that are common to all groups, all societies. Thus, in sociology there has been much study of social classes, of social prestige, of rank, and discrimination and power. These phenomena are found widely distributed: there are social classes, for example, in a factory, in schools, in churches, in government, and in the army. Hence, social status can be better studied by the general science of sociology than by economics alone or by education, theology, political science, or military science.

There is another general science that is somewhat like sociology. It is anthropology, which deals with widely distributed phenomena such as customs, and also treats several different institutions, such as religion, the family, the clan, and tribe. But usually anthropologists have restricted themselves to the study of primitive preliterate peoples, such as the Eskimo or the Bantu.

History, the other general study, differs from sociology in that it is concerned with describing unique events, such as the battle of Okinawa, or unique movements, such as the industrialisation of England. Sociology does not deal so much with unique happenings. Proper names like Eisenhower and Churchill do not turn up very often in sociology books. Also only a limited portion of sociological works is given over to description. In sociology the object is not so much to describe as to search for causes and explanations. A very common question in sociology is, why?

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. Can science be applied to values?
2. What is the difference between pure science and applied science?
3. To what extent is quantification an essential of science?
4. How does a "cause" differ from a "correlation"?
5. What do we mean when we say, "A constant factor can never be a cause of a change"?
6. What is the relation between sociology and (a) history, (b) economics, (c) anthropology?

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CHAPTER II

FACTORS IN THE SOCIAL LIFE OF MAN

We have begun our definition of sociology by saying it is the study of social life, of group interaction, of social behaviour. Our next step is to explain why social life in one place is different from another, why social interaction in Japan, for instance, is different from that in Europe, and why the social behaviour of New Yorkers is different from that of the Navaho (when it is different).

The Factors of Biological Heredity and Natural Environment. The next step in the extension of the concept of sociology is the explanation of social behaviour in terms of heredity and environment. The social behaviour of chickens and of cats is quite different, even when they have the same environment. Hence their different social interactions are due to differences in heredity.

But the activities of societies differ also because of differences in natural environment. For instance, the social life of bees ceases during cold winter months, to become again quite active in the warm springtime. In this case the heredity is constant and it is the environment that changes.

In principle therefore societies differ because heredity is different or because the physical environment changes. The climate of the United States has not changed appreciably since Columbus, though some years are hotter, colder, drier, or wetter than others. If climate is constant, then it is not a factor in any social changes that have occurred. The differences in the social life of Manhattan Island at the time it was bought from the Indians and now are not due to changes in the natural environment.

The other cause of societal variation, namely, variations in heredity, is in reality more noticeable between species than in a single species. Thus the social life of crows is different from the social life of sparrows in the same environment. But within a species there is not much difference between the heredity of one segment of a population and that of another segment. One flock of crows has much the same social life as another flock of the same species of crow. The hereditary contribution also does not change much over long periods of time. Crows behave much the same now as they did in our great-grandfathers' day.

The Influence of Heredity. Can differences in human societies be explained by differences in heredity? This is one of the great problems of sociology, one of the unfinished sections on the sociological map. There has been a good deal of work done on it, however. It should be noted first that human beings whether broad-headed or narrow-

headed, tall or short, like the common crows are only one species. The different races of men are not different species. The races of mankind certainly differ—because of heredity—in such matters as hair form, pigmentation, and stature. But we do not know how significant these differences are for the social life of the various races. Does the straight round hair of the Chinese make Chinese society different from that of Negroes with flat wavy hair? Do we know for certain of any hereditary trait that makes the societies of Negroes different from that of Chinese?

We also note that peoples with the same hair form have societies as different as those between the Negroes and Chinese. Communities of the same race may be greatly different. For instance, in some remote spots of Europe and on isolated islands off the European Coast, the social life suggests that of a primitive people, vastly different from the social life of great cities such as London, Stockholm, and Edinburgh, peopled by the same race.

It seems probable that the hereditary capacity for social life of one large segment of the human species does not differ very much from that of another large segment. Hence variations in human societies are not likely to be explained satisfactorily by variations in heredity. Human sociology is different from animal sociology. Differences in the social interactions of various species of lower animals are almost wholly due to differences in heredity. The variations are due to heredity but the social life itself is due both to heredity and to environment; that is, to the integration or adjustment of the two. No society is a product of heredity alone, for animals must live in an environment. No society is a product of environment alone, though an aggregation of pebbles is.

One other distinction between heredity and environment may be observed. The contribution of heredity to society among the higher animals including men is passed on from parents to offspring through the mechanism of the genes carried in the egg of the female and in the sperm of the male. The contribution of the natural environment to society is passed on, that is, is continuous, through processes outside the genes of the individual members of that society.

The Concept of Culture. We now take another step in our pursuit of a conception of sociology. This we do by examining further the nature of environment, that which surrounds us, that into which we are born. Environment consists of a lot of things. One class of these we call nature, and is symbolised by earth and air, sun and rain, flora and fauna. But the environment of human beings is more than this environment of nature. As an illustration we note that the natural environment of the Indians in early Massachusetts was the same as that of the Puritans who settled among them. But the children of the Puritans were brought up in a different environment from that of the Indian children. The language was different, as was the religion,

the agriculture, the housing, the family, the marriages, the law, the schooling.

This type of environment needs a name. Herbert Spencer called it the superorganic in contrast to the natural environment of inorganic and organic materials. It is a very impressive term, for it suggests the birth of cosmic orders. For when the earth was young, there was only inorganic matter. After incalculable time the organic was born and evolved into man ; and eventually there appeared the superorganic which after a slow start has gained momentum, fashioning a fabulous civilisation.

The term "superorganic", however, has not come into general use. Instead we use the word *culture*, a translation of the German *Kultur*, which has about the same meaning as the superorganic, and hence is quite different from the "culture" a young lady expects to get when she studies the arts and music. The word culture is a word like science or democracy whose definition gives a meagre conception of its meaning. One may think about culture for a lifetime and still find something new in it.

Cultural Variability. It varies over short periods of time and is thus unlike human heredity and unlike the natural environment. If Thomas Jefferson could visit the United States to-day, he would find a greatly different culture from the one he knew when he was president. We might want to get Jefferson's opinion on the United Nations, or the atom bomb, since Jefferson was both a diplomat and a scientist. But Jefferson would not know what the terms meant.

Culture also varies from region to region at the same time and with the same race. It is different in a village in India among peasants with bullock carts, wooden ploughs and cow dung used for fuel, from what it is in nearby Bombay with electricity, universities, libraries, radios, apartment houses, and paved streets. Hence culture is a potential explanation of why social life differs from one place to another.

Though we note that culture is highly variable from place to place and from time to time, we need first of all to observe that culture is an accumulation which a new generation inherits. It is a heritage into which a child is born, as he is born into a natural environment. A Turk is different from an Egyptian because he is born into the Turkish culture and not the Egyptian. The way a child acts and interacts is not determined by instinct as is the case of a wasp. A child does not create anew his ways of acting. He learns them. The rules and procedures are there when he is born, and they tell him how to act. These ways of acting are customs, laws, folkways, moral codes, language, institutions. And part of this heritage consists of objects which man makes or uses or to which he reacts, such as factories and transportation systems. These, too, help to shape his social life. Culture has been accumulating—and changing—for a very long time.

It goes back to the ice ages and beyond. So culture helps to explain the social life of human beings at any place or time.

There is still another factor that helps to explain the social life of men. It is the group. And here we invite you to take another look at the sociological map we are showing you.

GROUPS AND CULTURE

The first concept of the group to be impressed with is that it is a medium through which we learn culture, use culture, and change culture. The family is the group which starts us on our way to learning culture, and the school is another group which helps us to acquire it, as does the neighbourhood. We use culture through innumerable groups.

Though culture and the group are two factors in the social life of men, they are not two separate parts as stone and wood are separate parts of a building. They are more intricately integrated, more like a chemical mixture than a mechanical mixture. For instance, though the group is the medium through which we acquire and use culture, the group can only do this in the way culture directs it to do. Thus through language, a cultural product, the family group teaches the child morals, another cultural product. But the family is not a group outside culture. The way the family group functions is a part of culture. It is culture that enables the family to teach a child culture. Though the human group is composed of biological entities, they are not entities without a culture, as are insects. The human groups are biological entities functioning culturally as well as biologically.

From the discussion in the foregoing paragraph, group interaction appears to be a part of culture. And so it is. But group interaction is also limited by biological capacities. For the learned group activities of the cats could never attain the extent of the group life of cloven-footed animals. If human beings were descended from the cats, their group activity would be different from what it is. Also group interaction takes directions pointed by biological needs such as obtaining food and mating, for example. But these biological determinants of group activity do not help in explaining changes in social life from place to place or from time to time, though they do help to explain the different types of group activity in any one place at a given time—for instance, group action in the family and group action in the factory. In meeting needs as in mating and in getting food, a group follows cultural as well as biological directives.

GROUP AND THE INDIVIDUAL

There is another reason for emphasising the group in studying sociology. It is the relationship of the group to the individual who is a member of it. Groups are supposed to be good for us either

immediately and directly, like a social club, or remotely and indirectly, like a commission for the conservation of natural resources. So groups are important for the effect on their members. An individual becomes like the people he associates with. Every mother knows this who sends her child to Sunday School and tries to keep him from associating with a gang of street-roving delinquents. Hence the importance of the freedom to choose one's associates or the groups one joins.

The group is especially important in shaping the personality of little children. This is done, for instance, by the use of praise and blame—a form of group interaction—or by the child identifying himself with some other person and thus imitating or playing the rôle of another. It is also said to be highly desirable for a boy to identify himself with an older male rather than an older female.

These group processes, such as co-operating, fighting, loving, assisting, and imitating, which influence the development or change of personality, are all found among lower animals but among human beings these activities occur in ways set by culture. Thus boys do not in fighting just bite and kick and scratch and pull. They box or wrestle in ways in which their culture teaches them. Men do not only fight for food or females but for a variety of purposes in response to various stimuli and for various reasons.

The interaction of individuals within the group is the subject matter of social psychology, a most interesting and important division of sociology. For instance, one of the most important reactions of an individual to his fellow group members is the great desire for a reputation. Another response to the group is the love of power, the struggle for which fills the pages of history. We also crave social status, and to show it we strut before those of lesser rank. Sensitivity to the opinions of others is at the base of many of these reactions; it makes us conform to social pressure, which builds norms to which we conform.

The adjustment of these interactions makes for group efficiency and their maladjustment makes for failure and friction. The story of our institutions—our family, church, government, etc.—turns on the fitting together of these psychological actions.

However, these institutions cannot be read from a blueprint of our psychological mechanisms. Our psychological heritage does not dictate a single type of family. Nor can we predict our religious or economic institutions from a psychological inventory of man. The great variety of our institutions and customs is due to our capacity to learn. We can learn to use our eyes, ears, hands, to do many different things; and we can learn to interact with our fellow men in many different ways. So psychological behaviour becomes social psychological behaviour operating in a culture.

Variability of Groups. We have said that the explanatory value of culture for social life is great because of its great variability, as

contrasted with heredity in a single species or with natural environment in a single place. The explanatory value of groups is also important, for groups vary greatly, too. Populations may range from the very dense to the very sparse. Communities may extend from the very large to the very small.

Social life, the object of study of sociology in its widest meaning, is explained by four factors, heredity, natural environment, culture, and the group. But the variations in social life are explained rather inadequately among human beings by variations in heredity and natural environment, for in these two factors there is not much variation over time and not much hereditary variation for one large segment of population as compared with another. Variations in social life among human beings, and especially in the United States at the present time, are explained largely by variations in culture and in the group, even though all four factors are essential to sustain human social life.

Since social life, the object of study of sociology, is explained by these four factors, sociology utilises any knowledge that is helpful in that explanation, even though that knowledge comes from other sciences such as biology, geology, meteorology, psychology, anthropology, technology, or economics. Why exclude any knowledge that is helpful in explaining social life?

THE ORDER IN SOCIETY

We are now ready to look at more details on our sociological map, but we are drawing this map only to give a perspective, not to look at details. These will be seen in later chapters. We may indicate, however, the nature of these details. They concern the parts of culture and the parts of the group.

There are many kinds of Groups and many parts of Culture. For instance, some groups such as communities have many sub-groups. There are neighbourhoods, factories, families, religious groups, social classes, occupational groups, clubs. A group may have a leader and followers and committees. In factories there are managers, office workers, foremen, skilled and unskilled workers.

Similarly the accumulated heritage we call culture consists of many parts. The ways of behaving in the army are different from the ways of acting in a church. But the army and the church, the school and the family are parts of culture, as are law, philosophy, painting, music, ethics, etiquette, books and language, each of which leads to variations in social life.

Social Organisation is the Relationship of parts of Society. These various parts are related one to another. The managers have their relations to the foremen. The school and family are related. The groups are related one to another; the parts of culture are related to each other; and the parts of culture are related to sub-groups.

Furthermore, culture is related to natural environment and groups are related to heredity.

Social life was defined as the interaction of individuals. When a person acts, he usually does only one thing at a time or a few things. At another time he does something else. His time thus becomes organised. So, too, most acts are repeated, not done just once. They thus become a habit or if enough persons act in the same way, a custom. Customs become clustered around some function or purpose. When these customs are related to basic needs and are widely spread over time and place, like the customs of rearing children, we call them an institution, in this case the institution of the family. Social organisation is fundamental to culture and is found everywhere in groups. So the study of social life becomes the study of social organisation.

Adjustment is a Key to Social Planning and to an Appraisal of the Sociological Map. An organisation is a whole, consisting of parts arranged in some order. Since organisation involves parts which are inter-related, the adjustment of parts is a basic principle of organisation. It follows that a key to organised social life is adjustment, and hence adjustment is a basic idea of sociology.

To Leonard Hobhouse, the great English sociologist, harmony was an integrating principle. By harmony he meant a good adjustment between the parts of culture. Adjusting means fitting the parts together. The emphasis is on the fit. Hence adjustment implies the criterion of goodness of fit. It suggests either a goal or a measurement. The North and the South were not well adjusted in 1860, although both were integral parts of the whole, the United States. Between 1861 and 1865 this integration split wide open. So a world government, unless there be a good adjustment among the constituent nations, may fall apart.

In the study of social problems a central idea is maladjustment. Crime is evidence of a bad adjustment to the social order. Such problems as suicide, poverty, and war are dealt with in sociology under the heading of social disorganisation. Since organisation is a functional arrangement of parts, disorganisation is maladjustment.

Adjustment is a key concept in the understanding of social relations. But there are several difficulties in using adjustment as a test of structure. One is the appraisal of adjustment as good or bad. These are moral terms and are not defined for each situation. Hence they are often expressions of opinion. For instance, there is a difference of opinion whether the adjustment of athletics to college education in the United States in the middle of the twentieth century is good or bad. But because the judgment of adjustment is often hasty, a matter of opinion, and not based on adequate evidence, the concept is not thereby invalidated. Because moralists use the term, it does not follow that scientists cannot use it.

Adjustment is sometimes difficult to measure. It is not always easy to get convincing evidence, for instance, as to whether the laws of monopoly and competition are well adjusted to business or not. Sometimes adjustment is not a crucial matter. The functioning of a dwelling is not greatly affected by the colour of paint used. Another illustration is the adjustment of occupation and religion. A hunting people and an agricultural people can have the same religion with only minor adjustments. The same is true with language. All parts of culture do not have to be precisely fitted as do the parts of a watch. Though in some instances the degree of relationship of certain parts is of little importance to the functioning of an organisation, in other cases it is of major importance. Thus the adjustment between religion and science is closely related to the functioning of these groups. Also, just because an organisation can function somehow with varying degrees of adjustment of parts, it should not be concluded that one adjustment is not better than another. Even the colour of paint may affect the functioning of that dwelling as a house. And, because some parts of an organisation are more closely related than other parts, that does not mean that no parts need to be in adjustment for the effective functioning of a given structure.

Adjustment as a principle of organisation may be viewed from the standpoint of the four factors in the social life of man. Adjustment between hereditary structure and natural environment is necessary for life, including social life. There are no communities of men under the seas or in the stratosphere. Culture helps mankind to adjust to natural environment in various parts of the earth, making it possible for large numbers of people to live at Thule, Greenland, and in the Panama Canal Zone. We can now produce indoors any climate we desire, though the price may be high.

The adjustment of culture and heredity is of great significance as seen not only in bodily illness but in mental sickness. Nervousness and neurosis are generally evidences of maladjustment between culture and inherited nature. The adjustment of culture and the group has much to do with happiness and human welfare. We use the word happy with reference to the family more than with respect to any other group, and so adjustment in marriage has much to do with happiness or unhappiness. So, too, the adjustment of religious groups is related to the spiritual welfare of a people, which is not unconnected with the release from strain and tension, commonly found in neurosis.

We conclude that the sociologically integrating concept of adjustment is a guidepost to planning, reform, and progress and is a criterion of social evolution. We have examined the chart which tells what sociology is and which gives a broad perspective of the field. We are ready now to take a closer look in the rest of the book at the four factors, at the different parts of culture, and at the different social organisations and their relationships to one another.

SUMMARY

Human social life is the product of four factors : biological heredity, natural environment, the group, and culture. Variations in one or more of these factors account for differences in social behaviour. In a given society, over time, variations in natural environment and in biological heredity are not as great as variations in culture and therefore do not contribute as much to changes in man's social life. The group also has great potentialities for variation and is, like culture, a highly important explanatory factor.

Human society is composed of many kinds of groups and many different parts of culture, related to one another in some kind of system. Since ordinarily these parts are in balance or are in process of achieving balance, social adjustment is a basic concept in sociology and a key to social planning. In subsequent chapters of this book, adjustment as a principle of organisation is examined in relation to the four factors in the social life of man.

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. What is the sociological significance of the observation that variations in heredity are greater between than within species?
2. What is the importance of the fact that natural environment and biological heredity do not change over short periods of time as much as culture?
3. What functions other than the transmission of the social heritage has the group?
4. Why is the group such an important factor in explaining social variability?
5. What makes the interrelationship of parts a significant concept?
6. Limitations of the concept *social adjustment*.
7. A comparison of the cultural heritage of a child born in New Guinea with that of a child born in London. (See Margaret Mead, *Growing Up in New Guinea*.)

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PART II : SOCIETY

CHAPTER III

THE RÔLE OF CULTURE

THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF CULTURE

One of the best ways to understand culture is to learn something about how it began and how it grew. It is not known precisely how this planet on which we live originated, but certainly there was once a time when there was no life on the planet. In the beginning all was inorganic matter. Then, in the course of a long span of time, life appeared. To the inorganic sphere an organic realm was added. Life assumed a multitude of forms. Cellular structure was organised into such types as insects, reptiles, birds, and mammals.

LEARNING

There was in these early beginnings no learning. One animal could not learn from another, any more than one flower learns how to bloom from another plant. The pea vine climbs round the pole not by learning but in response to the movement of the sun. Responses of animals which are not quite so rigid and specific and which are more complicated are seen in so-called instinctive behaviour, still controlled by heredity.

The ants have complex behaviour patterns based upon the division of labour, differentiation of status, and different classes of workers ; but all these patterns are inherent in the structure of each ant. These patterns never change, except as the ant may change. Professor Wheeler¹ examined ants preserved in the Baltic from the lower Oligocene period fifty to seventy-five million years ago. On the basis of the evidence he concludes that "ants . . . had at that time developed all their various castes just as we see them to-day. The larvae and the pupae were the same. They attended plant lice, kept guest beetles in their nests and had parasitic mites attached to their legs in the same peculiar positions as our living species." Apparently the ants have not learned anything of significance in fifty million years. Indeed, one might say that the ants have little need to learn much. They have achieved their elaborate social organisation by adaptation through heredity, and not through any individual learning.

Learning among Animals. Animals developed gradually the capacity to learn, not only in a random way through experience, but systematically from those of their own kind through imitation and communication.

¹ William M. Wheeler, "Social Life of Insects", *Scientific Monthly*, vol. 14, pp. 497-525, June, 1922.

Certain gregarious animals seem to transmit continuously through their group life some behaviour which the young learn by imitation, such as methods of the hunt and of the stampede, and possibly some slight modifications of fighting and sex behaviour. It is common knowledge that mother cats teach their kittens how to catch mice and rats. If the mother cat kills rats in the presence of her kittens before they are four months old, her kittens are almost twice as likely to develop into rat-killers as they are if they witness no rat-killing until several months later. Kittens raised with rats as companions killed none of them, nor any of their kind, and only 16 per cent of other varieties.¹ Learning plays a large part in determining whether or not a kitten will be a rat-killer.

¹ The capacity to learn is a function of the physiological system, especially the nerves and their organisation. Hence, considerable learning is found among the vertebrates that have a very highly developed system of nerves with a central cord. The monkeys and apes learn best of all, though elephants, horses, and dogs also have great capacity to learn. These long beginnings of learning are thus dependent upon biological evolution: the more elaborate the nervous system, the greater the learning capacity.

Relation of Learning to Culture. With the transmission of behaviour by learning, and especially by established learning through the group, a really new order of phenomena begins. It is called the superorganic. From such simple beginnings has grown the magnificent superorganic of to-day which we call civilisation. For instance, from such a transmission as the notes of song from one bird to another, learning has developed a transmission *via* radio of the sound of the words of a speaker to a hundred million listeners in every land of the globe. From the simple ability of a kitten to learn from watching the movements of its mother in catching a mouse, has grown the ability to record movements on film and to see what is happening many miles away by television. From remembering on the part of one wolf how other wolves avoided danger has grown the art of fixing in print what has happened in the past, so that we can "remember" what happened in Greece 2,500 years ago by consulting our great libraries, which tell us also about the origin of the sun and the stars and what happened long before the memory of man or animals existed. We learn how to build aeroplanes that fly across oceans and round the globe; we learn to catch the power of falling water and light thousands of homes; we learn to sing a music more intricate than a young bird learns; we learn to compute the distances to the stars and transform the light from distant suns into power for man's use. All these things would be impossible if there were no transmission by learning, if the only transmission were by the fertilised egg.

¹ Z. Y. Kuo, "Genesis of Cat's Responses to Rats", *Journal of Comparative Psychology*, vol. 11, pp. 1-35, October, 1930.

Thus, to the organic and the inorganic is added the superorganic. These are the three great realms of phenomena that make up the earth and what takes place on it. In general, the study of the inorganic is the province of the physical sciences such as chemistry, physics, astronomy, geology. The organic is the field for the biological sciences, zoology, botany, and psychology. The superorganic falls to the social sciences, though there are, of course, interrelations of these three great planes of phenomena.

THE DEFINITION OF CULTURE ~

One of the earliest definitions of culture placed its origin with the coming of man, rather than with the coming of the vertebrates. The frequently quoted definition of Tylor¹ says that "Culture is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities acquired by man as a member of society". Redfield² also speaks of culture as "an organised body of conventional understandings manifest in art and artifact, which, persisting through tradition, characterises a human group". Other students of culture, intent on making culture a distinctly human trait, object to calling any of the behaviour of the lower animals culture.³ What we have here, they say, is the projection of a subjective state, like the song of a bird or its ability to fly. In the case of man, objects are created which are distinctive from man himself. The heart of culture, they say, is to be found in the invention and use of tools, that is, in artificial, objective instruments. Culture, as Tylor defines it, is far more than material culture. But even though the material aspect of culture is emphasised for humans, it is not absent from the world of the lower animals. Köhler tells how one of his apes inserted a small stick into a larger stick and used this device to secure a banana suspended outside his cage.⁴ The combination of the two sticks to make a longer stick qualifies as an invention.

The essential point in regard to culture is emphasised in the definitions of both Redfield and Tylor. Tylor speaks of culture as being "... capabilities acquired by man as a member of society", and Redfield thinks of culture as "... persisting through tradition". The essential factor in this acquisition through tradition is the ability to learn from the group, which lower animals have in varying degree.⁵

The Importance of Language. The speaking and understanding of a

¹ E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (New York: Brentano's, 1924, seventh edition), p. 1.

² Robert Redfield, unpublished lectures, Social Science Series, University of Chicago.

³ Clarence Marsh Case, "Culture as a Distinctive Human Trait", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 32, pp. 906-20, May, 1927.

⁴ Wolfgang Köhler, *The Mentality of Apes* (London: Routledge, 1927), pp. 130 ff. (Translated from second revised edition.)

⁵ Cf. Hornell Hart and Adele Pantzer, "Have Subhuman Animals a Culture?" *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 30, pp. 703-9, May, 1925; also Read Bain, "Culture of Canines", *Sociology and Social Research*, vol. 13, pp. 545-56, July, 1929.

language was the big event that helped to make the culture of man so magnificent an achievement compared with that of the lower animals. A language that could, merely through delicate variations in sound, transmit an idea such as "the flood came and destroyed the houses" was an achievement far superior to the transmission of states of emotion by a small variety of cries. A highly developed language gives a capacity for conveying ideas about a tremendous variety of things. A language also perpetuates knowledge over many generations.

Among apes, although there is no indication of anything approximating to language, there is some evidence of the beginnings of symbolic experience in their gestures, emotional cries, and calls. Of these elements of communication, Learned¹ identified thirty-two related to food, drink, other animals, and persons. Since a young ape cannot learn a language, even when he is taught, while a human infant can, we infer that the capacity for language rests upon a biological development, although its exact nature is still obscure. The sharp break between the crude communication of the highest apes and the language of man does not, however, imply that language was developed suddenly.²

The fact that the lower animals do not have language makes understandable the vast difference between the superorganic of the lower animals and that of man. The difference is so great that by comparison the culture of the lower animals seems slight, even negligible, so that it is customary to say that culture originated with man. On the whole this statement is true enough.

EARLY HUMAN CULTURES.

Time Table of Early Cultures. Since we are discussing the early beginnings of culture, it is important to get some idea of time, which we ordinarily express in years. But about years the experts differ widely. So the practice is to use geological and climatological phenomena such as glaciers, about which there is less dispute. These periods are presented in greater detail on later pages, but we indicate here a few points to guide the reader.

Men, and near-men, are not found until the Pleistocene, the geological period of the ice ages which followed the Pliocene. There were four glacial periods when a huge ice cap such as is found now over Greenland covered the northern part of the United States and the northern part of Europe. The first of these began 500,000 years ago. The long interglacial period between the second and third glacial periods existed about half-way through the Pleistocene, and extended from approximately 300 to 200 thousand years ago. It is during the last glacial period that most of the data about early man

¹ R. M. Yerkes, *Almost Human* (New York and London, 1925), pp. 137 ff.

² For the best knowledge we have on the origin of language, see the chapter on language in Franz Boas *et al.*, *General Anthropology* (London, 1939).

and early cultures are found. The middle of the last ice age was about 50,000 years ago. The recession of ice, which proceeded irregularly over 25,000 years, brings the end of the Pleistocene some 10,000 years ago. This time schedule is summarised as follows in years which are approximate only.

500,000 years ago	The beginning of the Pleistocene
250,000 years ago	The middle of the Second Interglacial Period
50,000 years ago	The middle of the Last Glacial Period
10,000 years ago	The end of the irregular recession of ice

It was a long climb upward. If, for brevity, we use only one measure to indicate the evolution of man, the size of the brain case seems to be preferable to any other. Although the size of the brain is not a very exact measure of the inherited mental capacity of any one individual, brain size is a valid index of learning ability when we compare species of animals, in general. The smaller-brained animals have less learning capacity than the large ones. And it seems very probable that growth in learning ability from ape to man has roughly paralleled the growth in brain size.

It must have required a long time to evolve a brain size from 510 cubic centimetres (the measure of the brain case of the average gorilla) to 1,500 cubic centimetres (the approximate size of the skull of man). Skeletons have been found in South Africa of an extinct species of ape, the erect Australopithecoid, whose several brain cases approach in size the maximum attained by the gorilla (600 to 650 cubic centimetres). The famous Pithecanthropus, of whom several new specimens have been found, had a brain case that ranged from 775 to 935 cubic centimetres,¹ some 35 per cent larger than the brain of the Australopithecoids. A little larger still were the skulls of Sinanthropus, found near Peking, which ranged from 915 cubic centimetres to 1,255 cubic centimetres.² With Sinanthropus there is evidence of the use of fire and the earliest find of man-made stone implements in conjunction with skeletal remains of man. These choppers are large with an edge at a not-very-sharp angle. They are better fashioned than the coliths, the earliest tools, only some of which may have been made by man. Thus fire and the earliest known man-made tools and creatures with skulls around 1,050 c.c. in size belong in the middle Pleistocene of 200,000 to 300,000 years ago.

The Culture of the famous Neanderthal. The next stage in the evolution of man, about which we know much for certain, concerns a man whose skull was around 1,550 c.c.³ or slightly larger than modern man's.⁴ This skull was nearly 50 per cent larger than the skull of

¹ James H. McGregor, "Human Origins and Early Man", in Boas, *op. cit.*

² William Howells, *Mankind So Far* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1945), pp. 142-50.

³ *Ibid.*, Chapter 13.

⁴ We do not think much significance should be attached to the greater size of the brain of Neanderthal man for several reasons. The variation is slight. The

Sinanthropus and existed perhaps 200,000 years later. One may guess from the large brain that the Neanderthals had a well-developed language through which to transmit their culture, which is called the Mousterian culture.

In this culture, for the first time there appears an extensive use of stone implements made from flakes of flint. Prior to the Mousterian flints, there had been an evolution of flint-making, many specimens of which have been found, but with few skeletal remains accompanying them. These pre-Mousterian specimens were generally cores of flint, shaped like the two hands placed palm to palm but not so large. Neanderthal man apparently had not learned to make implements of bone. He laid his dead out in such a way as to suggest religious rites. Presumably those who lived at the edge of the glacier wore clothing. There have not come down to us, of course, facts about his family, his child-rearing, his government, his customs, his clothing, or the position of women in his society. If our own society were destroyed and buried under earth for 50,000 years only metals and very hard objects would remain. With nothing more than these to guide him, it would be difficult for an archaeologist 50,000 years hence to tell much about our social, political, and economic life.

The Biological Factor in the early Evolution of Culture. The evolution of the brain case from 850 c.c. to 1,550 c.c. possibly required 300,000 years or longer. Though skulls with capacities of 600, 800, 1,000, 1,200, and 1,400 c.c. have been found in various parts of the world, this does not mean the various specimens were in a single evolutionary line. There were probably several different lines with all becoming extinct except that line which evolved into man. Indeed *Homo sapiens* may have existed long before the period (25,000 years ago) that dates the earliest finds of Cro-Magnon man. The evolution from a brain 500 c.c. in size (when man's progenitors certainly had no language) took much longer than 300,000 years. Man was using tools, however, with a brain of only 1,050 c.c. The tool was a crude chopper, flat on one side and with a poor edge. To reach the flaked flints of the Mousterian culture may have taken 200,000 years. Man's culture was not evolving rapidly, and it probably was dependent on his biological evolution. In other words, the biological factor may have been a very important one in the growth of culture until the late Pleistocene when, we know, *Homo sapiens* existed. We call this early modern man Cro-Magnon man.

The Mesolithic Culture during the Recession of the Last Glacier. A young Cro-Magnon man of 25,000 years ago, if alive to-day and dressed in modern clothing, would pass unnoticed on a college campus except

erosive forces of nature may have favoured the survival of large skulls. Also we know the brains of wild dogs are bigger than those of domestic ones of the same species.

for the observation that the football material was unusually good. Besides being big, he had a big head, 1,650 c.c.,¹ a hundred cubic centimetres larger than modern man's.²

Since he lived later, more of his culture has been preserved. He made extensive use of bone, horn, and ivory, as indicated by harpoon throwers, harpoon heads, and needles. His jewellery was pierced shells or teeth. The famous coloured drawings in the caves of Spain and France were made by the Cro-Magnon. His statuettes of women emphasise fertility, and there are aspects of hunting and trapping portrayed.

The material culture of the Eskimos of the present and that of the Cro-Magnons of the Magdalenian era are very similar. The culture of the Magdalenian era is now called the mesolithic, a stage following the paleolithic and preceding the neolithic. If the Eskimos were blotted out for 10,000 or 15,000 years, the hard remains might be mistaken for a variation of the Magdalenian culture. The similarities of the material cultures suggest that there may have also been similarities in the non-material culture,³ such as in social customs, family life, religious practices, etc.⁴

The Comparison of Cultures. The study of the origin and development of the superorganic should lead us to be more cautious in comparing and ranking cultures. For instance, is the culture of the Eskimos a simple, crude culture? Yes, by comparison with the twentieth-century culture of Great Britain, but by comparison with that of the lower animals it is tremendous, the result of a long, long period of development. The culture of the Eskimos must also be very advanced compared with that of the manlike creature who was just developing a crude language a half-million or a million years ago. The distance in years from the culture of that creature to that of the men of the last Ice Age is many times as great as the distance between the Ice-Age culture and that of the twentieth century. The latter span is only about twenty or twenty-five thousand years, whereas the span of time from the beginnings of a crude language to the last Ice

¹ A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., 1938), Chaps. 4 and 16.

² The Cro-Magnon men were big, around six feet or more. Hence their stature may have been a factor in the size of their brains.

³ Hobhouse has shown not very close correlations between the material cultures and social institutions of the existing preliterate cultures. For slight variations, this conclusion is correct. But over wide variations there are correlations. For instance, the size of communities is bigger when people manufacture with mechanical power than when people hunt animals with stone tools. Also, among most peoples whose pursuit of food is hazardous, there are fewer men than women, with accompanying family situations.

⁴ Peter Freuchen in his book *Ivalu* writes an actual biography of an Eskimo woman, his wife, who grew up without any knowledge of the white man or of his culture. If we could find in one of the caves of the last ice age a biography of a Cro-Magnon ancestor, one wonders whether it would be much different from the life of Ivalu.

Age is perhaps to be measured in many hundreds of thousands of years.

THE CULTURE OF THE ESKIMO

Material Culture. The Eskimos live in snow houses which a clever native can build between the end of a day's journey and supper time. Their shape is like half of a ball. This snow house is so warm with only a lamp to heat it that the Eskimos strip to the waist when inside. Yet the snow does not melt. The Eskimos achieve insulation by suspending skins from the snow roof, with a wide layer of air between the warm skins and the cold snow blocks. Ice may be used as a window.

For transportation the Eskimo uses a sled on land when the snow is hard. If no driftwood is to be had, and bone is not available, he can make a sled out of frozen salmon and walrus hide. The salmon are placed end to end, rolled up in skins and left out to freeze. The whole roll is later lashed together into the sled. To reduce the friction, a little water is laid on which quickly freezes, producing a slick, flat, smooth runner, which also protects the leather from wear. With trained wolves to pull the sled, the Eskimo can travel much faster than a horse and trap can on bad roads.

For water transportation the Eskimo has a long light skin boat, completely covered with waterproof skin, except for the opening which is about as big as a small barrel hoop. When an Eskimo is seated in this boat with his skin coat strapped round the hook-like opening, the boat can be turned over by a wave or a walrus and then righted without dislodging the occupant and without getting any water inside.

These effective methods of travel are very useful, for the Eskimos are few and widely scattered. All the Eskimos in the world could be seated in the White City without filling it to capacity. Yet the Eskimos are scattered over a territory 800 miles wider than that from New York to San Francisco and north and south over a distance greater than that from Canada to Mexico. The Eskimo is a great traveller. He must travel a good deal to get the desired food. But he also likes to visit, even if it requires long trips.

The Eskimo shows his ingenuity also in his hunting. His enemy, the wolf, is difficult to hunt. One way to hunt him is to bend a piece of whalebone, sharp at both ends, and enclose it in a morsel of fat, which is then frozen. The wolf swallows the food at a gulp. It melts in his stomach, the whalebone punctures his stomach, causing death. Or the Eskimo may place blood on the point of a sharp knife, which attracts the hungry wolf. Licking the knife the wolf cuts his tongue. As the blood on the knife increases, he licks it more, so that eventually he drops from weakness.

The Eskimo has constructed a clever device for following the course

of a wounded sea animal in flight. Tied to the harpoon, which remains in the animal, are several inflated bladders which tend to float like a buoy on the surface of the water. To slow up the flight of the wounded game is an object like a large tambourine, attached to the bladder float, and this offers resistance to movement through the water, as a parachute slows up the speed of a falling object in the air. This resistance saps the strength of the walrus.

The above inventions are those of Ice-Age men who had only bone and stone to work with. The Eskimos display much mental ability in the field in which they operate.

Non-material Culture. The Eskimos also have a religion. We do not know, of course, what the religion of the Cro-Magnon man was. The chief deity of the Eskimos is a goddess named Sedna, who lives at the bottom of the sea with her father. Sedna is in control of the sea mammals, the whale, the walrus, and the seal, which are the most important food supply. Sedna also controls the weather.

The religious leaders or priests are known as *angakut*. They are very powerful, since they deal with Sedna over such important matters as storms and food supply. They are vested with other powers by supernatural creatures known as *inua*. Thus the *angakut* are enabled to perform miracles, such as healing the sick or injured, or driving away a famine. The simple Eskimo hunters thus have a cosmology and religious leaders. The formation of such religious ideas represents a high degree of intellectualisation of concepts. There are also houses for religious services. These are great houses of snow dedicated to some special supernatural creature who is thought to be unusually helpful to human beings. These great snow houses are for singing and dancing, which are the chief forms of worship. The dancing in the long winter night proceeds according to ritual, leading up to the climax of dancing frenzy.

There are various religious rules. The seals are supposed to have originated from Sedna's fingers, hence atonement must be made for every animal killed. All work must stop while the seal is cut open, and for every walrus killed the rest period is three days. There are special regulations for women during certain periods. They are not permitted to eat raw meat, must cook in certain pots, and cannot take part in the festivals. In case of violation of these taboos, a black object which is visible to the animals of the hunt is supposed to attach itself to the culprit. Seeing this they run away, and thus the food supply is threatened. To prevent famine, a public confession is necessary, whereupon the guilt is expiated. Thus there are regulations, laws, and a system of punishment at this stage of the super-organic.

There are also codes of moral conduct among the Eskimos, though they are quite different from our own. The hospitality to a lone traveller always includes food and shelter, and in some cases may

include a female sleeping partner. Such a custom is followed only with the consent of the parties concerned, namely both the husband and the wife. If such hospitality is extended, its rejection is considered an insult to the woman and the host. The man is head of the house and sexual irregularities without his consent are severely punished. Thus there are rules of behaviour in sex matters, and in no sense is there promiscuity. An elderly Eskimo, unable to hunt or be of use, often goes away to die alone, or voluntarily asks to be left behind when the family moves on, particularly if the food be short and one more person to feed is likely to be a danger to the group. Or, failing voluntary action, the group may decide to leave the old one behind to die alone.

The Eskimos seldom fight, though there are blood feuds between families and local groups, as among nearly all primitive peoples. The family makes a reprisal for an injury to one of its members. Instead of fighting, the Eskimos settle some disputes by a combat of ridicule and repartee. The affair is settled in the presence of the group by a satirical contest conducted in song, the lines of the song being improvised as the duel proceeds. The audience recognises the merits of the points made, and one of the contestants is soon recognised as clearly the victor and the other the vanquished in this contest of wit and argument.

The Eskimo people have good health. Disease was rare, if not unknown, before the coming of the white man, despite the fact that the Eskimos are not very clean in their habits. The environment with which they must cope is difficult enough to discourage anyone, yet the Eskimos are acknowledged by all observers to be a very happy people, with little irritability, grouching, or nervousness.

Eskimo social organisation is based upon the family and village community. The males of the family are the producers of food and the builders of houses, while the women prepare the food and make the clothing. Sharing of food or goods among the families of the group is common. Since the villages are made up of very few families, there is a common bond between the different families much as between the different members of the family. Hunting parties are made up of men from different families. There is very little organised government. Power is vested in two types of leaders, the *angakut* and the best hunters. Leadership is not hereditary or definitely organised. It simply gravitates to the capable.

Cro-Magnon men were wonderful artists, their work being quite comparable to that of modern artists. The Eskimo art is less notable, though they do excellent work, as seen most strikingly in their dress and in their carved ivory. The patterns and designs of dress for males are in general more artistic than our own. The furs of modern women are no more beautiful in colour and design than those of Eskimo women. The latter are skilled in carving figurines and can make a beautiful,

delicate necklace out of a single piece of ivory without a break in a single link.

This thumbnail sketch presents a few items in the culture of the Eskimo. It is much more elaborate and complex than here indicated. Volumes have been written on their religion alone,¹ and might be written on their art or any other phase of their culture. But enough has been presented to show how bare an indication the chipped stones and worked bone are of the other features of culture. By the time of Cro-Magnon man in the last Ice Age, not only was there a man as highly evolved biologically as modern man, but it is probable that the superorganic had all the essentials of modern culture, that is, tools, houses, clothing, religion, law, ethics, philosophy, art, language, family, economic and social organisation.

THE ORIGIN OF CIVILISATION

Culture was growing more rapidly at the dawn of history than it had been during the Ice Ages, if we may judge from the material remains. The people along the Euphrates and the Nile at this time found themselves inheriting a much more highly developed superorganic than did the men of the Old Stone Age. Writing became perfected after a long period of improvement at the beginning of history. In America it had reached the pictograph form among the Maya by the time of the coming of the whites. Writing was of tremendous importance for the growth of the superorganic. Since culture originated with the transmission of ways of behaviour by learning from the group, it is readily seen that writing, which facilitates transmission, is in the same general order of importance as speech itself.

History begins with writing, as does civilisation. Civilisation may be defined as the latter phase of the superorganic. Actually the word civilisation is derived from the type of social organisation. Preceding civilisation, society in Europe and western Asia was organised on a kinship basis, with different clans recognising varieties of kinship. With the development of villages and larger communities, kinship was greatly reduced as a factor of social organisation and relegated largely to the family, as in the case with us to-day. Groups were organised on a civil basis as cities are at the present time. Hence civilisation. In the Mediterranean region, civil societies became prominent about the time writing was perfected and the highly developed material culture that accompanied it. Thus civilisation is generally considered to have begun at the time of writing and the advent of the metals; but as the elaborateness and complexity of the preliterate cultures have come to be appreciated, it is realised that the distinction between civilisation and primitive society is not so clear cut as was once thought.

During the period of written history, there has been a considerable development of metals, particularly the invention of the steel-making

¹ Knud Rasmussen, *The People of the Polar North* (London, 1908).

FIGURE 1. Chronology of Important Inventions

(The dates are approximate. A difficulty in fixing the date of origin of important inventions lies in the fact that they generally do not arise abruptly but rather have a long period of evolution. For instance, writing was perhaps 2000 to 3000 years in developing.)

	Lower Paleolithic 500,000 B.C.	Upper Paleolithic 13,500 B.C.	Neolithic 6500 B.C.	Bronze Age 2000 B.C.	Iron Age 1000 B.C.	Modern 500 B.C.
Fire	-----					
Flint implements						
Wooden handles						
Bone implements	----					
Painting and Carving						
Religion	----					
Polished stone						
Bow and arrow						
Pottery						
Domesticated animals						
dog						
cattle						
horse						
Weaving						
Agriculture						
hoe						
plow						
Use of metals						
copper						
iron						
bronze						
Writing						
Calendar						
Smelting						
Printing						
Firearms						
Glass						
Steel						
Electricity						
Chemistry						
Steam engine						
Wireless communication						
Internal combustion engine						
Synthetic materials						
Electron tube						

process in the nineteenth century and the use of alloys in the twentieth. Glass was also perfected. Extremely important was the addition of power machines. Primitive cultures had the draught animal, the

lever, and the sail. Early in civilisation appeared the windmill. But most important was the steam engine. Later came the internal combustion engine and the electric motor.

Cultural Evolution. To help obtain an idea of the proportions of time required for the evolution of culture, geologic time can be scaled to the units of a great clock. Suppose the culture of the Pithecanthropus of 500,000 years ago be placed at midnight, the time of the beginning of a new day, and our present culture at midday. Each hour on the clock then represents about 42,000 years. The Mousterian culture of Neanderthal man flourished about eleven o'clock in the morning, while the culture of Cro-Magnon man flowered about twenty minutes to twelve. There was a stretch of about eleven and a half hours of cultural growth from Pithecanthropus to Cro-Magnon. Several days must have passed since the superorganic was at the stage now possessed by the great apes, and weeks since its very early beginnings. The Greeks of the Golden Age of Pericles are only about three minutes away. A few seconds after twelve noon, television may be so perfected that we can see what is happening at any spot on the planet. Our work may be done for us by robots in automatic factories. By five minutes after twelve the superorganic may have obtained a magnificence we do not even dream of now; and the mind of man is utterly unable to grasp what culture may be by the middle of the afternoon.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND CULTURE

IS CULTURE BIOLOGICALLY DETERMINED?

An important question concerns the relation of culture to the biological nature of man. Does man's inherited nature dictate the organisation of the superorganic? Does his sex instinct dictate that in the superorganic there shall be a family? Does the biological nature of children determine that there shall be games to play? These questions cannot be answered offhand. A tentative answer would be that our inherited disposition gives a general direction to the shape of the superorganic. Our sexual nature seems to indicate that there would be some kind of organisation of behaviour around the sexual activities. But, if so, the dictation is not invariable as to detail. There are many different kinds of families in the world: monogamous families, polyandrous and polygamous ones, family systems with and without divorce, families with concubinage, large family systems and small family systems. By looking at a thousand infants at birth in some international hospital it would not be possible to tell from their anatomy or from psychological tests on their behaviour what types of families they would form, whether they would be monogamous or polygamous, stable or unstable. Such a prediction would be more reliable if we knew in what cultures they would grow

up ; if we knew that one was to be a Mormon, another one of the polyandrous Todas, still another a Roman Catholic. From this illustration it appears that the superorganic, not the inherited nature of man, determines the particular social organisation of the family.

The Superorganic may be Injurious to the Organic. If the superorganic is a direct expression of man's inherited nature, then there should be no clash between culture and the biological needs of man. Some culture traits, however, are definitely harmful to the organic life of man. Thus peoples in India eat polished rice and acquire as a result a definite disease of the nervous system known as beri-beri. If they ate wild or unpolished rice, the disease would disappear. They thus, through their social heritage, learn a habit that is definitely harmful physiologically. The bearing of children when the mother is young, yet mature, is biologically appropriate. Yet many women postpone marriage or bearing children until late in life, well past the best biological period. This they do for various cultural considerations, for instance to learn a profession. The best biological age for marriage does not coincide with the best cultural age. So learning means inhibitions and control. The more learning there is the greater the opportunity for disciplining or modifying the natural expression of the biological impulses. There is a longer period of learning for the offspring of man than for any other animal. John Fiske called it the prolongation of infancy. In fact, man goes on learning all through life, although the period of greatest education is in infancy, childhood and youth. There is abundant opportunity for the superorganic to modify the natural behaviour of human beings.

The Variety of Customs for a Single Physiological Function. That the tendencies to action of our biological nature may be variously trained is evidenced by the great variety of customs that exist round a particular physiological function, such as, let us say, anger.¹ The Crow Indians were a very warlike people ; the Eskimo are peaceful ; the Greek states almost fought themselves to death. In America, the English colonists fought with a patriotic fervour in their revolt against Great Britain, while some of the soldiers on the side of the British were Germans who fought for a wage. During the eleventh century it was feared that Iceland could never be settled because of the rate at which the settlers were killing each other, but in the nineteenth century the murders in Iceland could be counted on the fingers of one hand. Fighting may occur among individuals spontaneously with loss of temper or heightening of emotion. On the other hand, it may be regulated rigidly by a code, as in duelling. Under this code a person may only fight another of his own class ; with others he cannot fight, no matter what the grievance or how intense the anger. The choice of time, place, and weapons is strictly regulated,

¹ Lillian Eichler, *The Customs of Mankind* (Garden City, New York, 1924).

and various assistants are appointed to conduct negotiations and to carry out the rules. In contrast, among gangsters in the modern American city the approved method was for a small party to take the enemy out for a ride in an automobile, shoot him down without giving him a chance, then dump his body on the roadside.

Gangsters and vigilantes agree that certain offences warrant death, but they do not have the custom of a trial by court. The family feudists prefer to fight out an issue rather than to bring it to court. Also there are persons who prefer to settle a dispute by fighting rather than to let the court handle it, particularly if it involves anything that may touch the reputation of women or some intimate family matter. Some societies consider fighting to be a manly virtue, a natural and at times necessary type of behaviour. Many fathers go to great pains to teach their children how to fight. In other groups fighting is considered a type of rowdyism, close to the barbaric, that brings nothing but trouble, and that does not help much in making friends, promoting sales, co-operating with fellow employees, or getting along with the boss. Passive resistance among the followers of Gandhi in India is considered to be a great virtue. The Quakers also approve the idea of no physical resistance. Fighting is generally not considered proper among women, though in some types of Negro life in the United States, fighting among women, or between men and women, is considered all right or else not so severely condemned as among white women. The impulses to anger are probably not greatly different in women from what they are in men, and temper has as much of a drive with females as with males.

Cultural behaviour in regard to fighting shows great variations among different peoples over the world and also among the same peoples at different periods of history. Original nature does not dictate any single type of fighting nor does it determine that fighting shall occur with any definite frequency, or indeed that it shall occur at all. Evidently the different cultures determine the details of how original nature shall behave in regard to pugnacity.

FOLKWAYS AND NORMS

These types of behaviour, if they are organised or repetitive, have generally been called customs. There are many kinds of customs, some of which are called manners, others etiquette. Some years ago an impressive book was written on customs with the title of *Folkways*.¹ Since then, "folkways" has become a common expression to designate customs. Sumner, the author, emphasised the variety of customs and their binding nature. These two qualities he expressed very forcefully, and the term folkways has since come to suggest variety and values.

The Variety of Folkways. The folkways of eating are interesting to consider, because of the biologically imperative nature of eating as

¹ William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston, 1906).

contrasted with fighting. Eating is biologically necessary, while fighting may not be, although it seems to have been necessary for survival in the past. As regards eating, it is well known that the body system requires carbohydrates and fats for energy, protein for tissues, calcium and phosphorus for bones and teeth, iron for the blood and many other acids and minerals. Among animals without appreciable culture the appetite is a good general guide to the bodily needs. When swine were offered a free choice of a variety of foods on a "cafeteria" system in separate containers, so that the pigs could eat as much of each as they wanted, the diet they chose was one that provided the necessary nutriment. The precise amounts needed, however, were not estimated.¹ Rats, when given a free choice, ate three times their optimum requirements of calcium and sodium chlorate and not enough vitamin A. As for human beings, newly weaned babies were offered a free selection of thirty-five foods, and are reported to have secured the variety necessary to supply their various chemical needs. In the list of thirty-five foods, however, sugar, cakes, sweets and jam were not included, so it is not known what the choices would have been had these attractions been included. There is also the question whether the chemist conducting these experiments has measured precisely all the many acids, vitamins, minerals needed.

The experiment with the newly weaned children suggests that there is a "natural wisdom of the body" which is a reasonably good guide to the selection of a balanced diet. Yet people in many places show a variety of food preferences not based on positive food values. There is plenty of evidence of acquired tastes for foods that are either harmful or of less value than others. Such are the tastes for tea, coffee, alcohol, tobacco, hashish, coco leaf, and betel nut. Many persons prefer the deficient white bread to the rich whole wheat bread. The Orientals prefer polished rice to the unmilled product. The products of the cow were not eaten in China. Cow's milk with its valuable properties is viewed with prejudice by some peoples, with much the same feelings we have about excretions. Horse meat is eaten in continental Europe, but not in the United States. Ants and insects are eaten by Indians in Brazil, but not in Europe and America, though snails are. Prejudices in foods bear little relation to food values, and are often quite irrational. A child may not eat a food because he does not like its colour. Since individual prejudices in regard to food are so irrationally formed and have so little reference to food merits, it is easy to see how social prejudices in regard to foods could arise and be fixed into customs. Primitive people do not kill the animal that is the totem for the clan, for instance the turkey, though it may be a very good food and even though other food in the vicinity may be scarce.

¹ E. V. McCollum *et al.*, *Newer Knowledge of Nutrition* (New York, 1939, fifth edition), Chap. xxv.

Culture has a way of setting up different customs in regard to fundamental biological behaviour such as eating and fighting. The same wide variety of folkways is shown in other activities, such as those centring round marriage, birth, death, sex, kinship, worship, labour, trade, production, dress and art. Many varieties of the super-organic are possible. One cannot take a blueprint of our inherited traits and read off therefrom the structure of the social institutions and customs. Blurred outlines of the major parts of culture and its limits may be seen, but the native impulses are not a guide to particular customs.

Norms and the Binding Power of Customs. Some practices we follow automatically, such as putting on our shoe on the right foot first. There is no compulsion by society to follow such a practice. On the other hand, there are very many customs that members of the community wish us to follow. Such, for instance, is the removal of hats, especially if they be large ones, in theatres. Such a practice is called a social norm. A social norm is thus a type of social behaviour that is socially valued and a departure from which is socially condemned, and perhaps punished severely. There are dinners at which a white tie and a coat with long tails must be worn by the men. At a State dinner an ambassador must be seated closer to the host than a minister, and the minister may not precede an ambassador in entering the dining-room. In old New Orleans unmarried girls could not go to a party wearing a coloured dress. It had to be white. Customs are often followed with less deviation than are laws or the Ten Commandments.

How widely a culture regulates behaviour through the medium of the group is shown in the following list of acts that are controlled in twenty-five different cultures of preliterate peoples.

TABLE I
ACTS OF BEHAVIOUR CONTROLLED BY TWENTY-FIVE DIFFERENT
CULTURES ¹

Per cent of Cultures Controlling	Kind of Behaviour
100	eat, vocalise, talk, coitus, incest, give, marry, be formal, be named, mourn, harm others, harm self
96	enter, clothe self, steal, mutilate self, murder
92	adultery, in-law incest, take, cleanse self, touch, work
88	suck, drink, hinder food quest, pollute food
80	look, respect others, name others, protect self
76	sleep, help others, be intimate, protect others, kill animals
72	urinate, premarital coitus, obey others, purify self, seclude self, disrespect others, insult others, mutilate others without pain
68	approach, clothe others, punish others

¹ Adapted from G. S. Ford, "Society, Culture and the Human Organism", *The Journal of General Psychology*, vol. 20, pp. 167-8, January, 1939.

TABLE 1—*continued*

Per cent of Cultures Controlling	Kind of Behaviour
64	avoid retaliation, hinder manufacturing, defaecate
60	cannibalism, wail, cry, pay others. cure self, hunt, fish, till, etc.
56	sit, cleanse others, be angry
52	inhale, sing, be hospitable, conceal self
48	learn cowardice, assume prerogatives, quarrel, play, invite bad luck
44	spit, prepubertal coitus, dance, ornament self, cure others, express grief, bewitch others, fight, punish self
40	smoke, massage, facilitate delivery, teach others, disobey others, be obscene
36	chew, perspire, conceive, walk, be lazy, induce barrenness, be friendly, pacify others, deceive others
32	consume narcotics, vomit, rape, thank others, conceal genitalia, carry, confess guilt, accidental homicide, abortion, infanticide, manufacture, destroy goods
28	bite, flatus, marital coitus, step on, point, divorce, induce fertility, purge self, exhibit bravery, anger others, kill self
24	dream, suckle, betrothal adultery, remain, avoid, hear, hinder delivery, express pain, hinder war, aid food quest, violate mores and taboos
20	lick, whistle, sodomy, lie, accompany, be greedy, be independent, be kind, transvestitism, increase breast milk, purify others, confine self, betray others, commit treason
16	cough, prostitution, stand, grasp, scratch, fear, discourage sucking, ornament others, ridicule others, mutilate others
12	eat condiments, kiss, sneeze, whisper, laugh, homosexuality, run, be dignified, remove breast milk, greet others, ask permission, atone for crime
8	become intoxicated, shout, think, masturbation, extramarital coitus, seduction, bestiality, crouch, jump, be jealous, be sex greedy, be just, warn others, plunder, arson
4	taste, smack lips, sniff, grimace, tremble, stretch, sleep walk, sleep talk, give birth, abnormal sexual practices, faint, exhibitionism, crawl, swim, climb, tickle, hand clapping, wink, hate, be obstinate, be sulky, be irresponsible, be dependent, be loving, be industrious, be thrifty, encourage sucking, beg pardon, exhibit disgust, boast, frighten others, be frightened
0	salivate, belch, hiccough, breathe, flush, blush, shiver, yawn, menstruate, nocturnal emission, sadism, masochism, kick, blink, be curious

Table 1 shows how widely the biological activities of the human animal are regulated as a price of his living in a group and having the advantages of a culture. The very limited cultures of dogs or monkeys make no such demands on behaviour. The advocates of complete freedom of action of the individual will peruse this list with interest.

There are some norms upon which a very high evaluation is placed. Such, for instance, is monogamy in modern society. These very highly esteemed norms Sumner called *mores*, the Latin word for customs. Since a consideration of the mores shifts the emphasis from culture to the group, they will be considered in a later chapter on Social Control.

SUMMARY

This chapter has shown that there are two distinct ways in which the behaviour of organisms may be determined, (1) through heredity, and (2) by learning from the group. In the case of man, heredity contributes such behaviour as sucking, swallowing, and blinking, while behaviour like talking English, wearing a felt hat, and driving a car is learned from others. The processes involved in the acquisition of these two types of behaviour are fundamentally different. The first is a biological process of transmission by means of the fertilised egg; the second is a psychological and social process, involving transmission by means of a system of communication, based on the capacity of man to learn.

Behaviour transmitted by learning from one generation to another is called culture. The beginnings of social learning and culture are to be found far back in the animal world, but the absence of speech, even among the higher apes, limits greatly the amount of the acquisition. Man alone has a substantial culture.

Man did not always have a culture as rich and complex as the one he now has. Starting hundreds of thousands of years ago with practically no material culture, that is, with sticks and cracked stones, and with relatively little non-material culture, man has achieved the amazing technology and social organisation he now enjoys. The evidence of growth has been presented in this chapter to show how culture has come to assume the commanding place it occupies in human experience. Culture touches and affects man's life in numerous significant ways, as will be shown in subsequent chapters.

A culture consists of inventions, or culture traits, integrated into a system, with varying degrees of correlation between the parts. A useful classification of parts is in terms of material and non-material culture. It is the material culture that looms large in our day; it is changing most rapidly and forcing the other parts of the superorganic, such as family life and religion, to make adjustments to it. Both material and non-material traits, organised around the satisfaction of the basic human needs, give us our social institutions, which are the heart of a culture. The institutions of a culture are interlinked to form a pattern which is unique for each society.

The transmission of the social heritage could not take place without the continuity of life, and the capacity for learning, provided by heredity, but culture itself is only in a very general way an expression of the inherited nature of man. Heredity sets limits and indicates broad trends, but does not dictate the details of culture. If culture were a direct expression of man's biological nature, then culture would be in complete harmony with biological nature. But evidence has been given to show that there are many harmful customs in different cultures. Moreover, a great variety of customs, often contradictory from one culture to another, exists for a given physiological function, like anger or eating. These established customs, or folkways, regulate the biological activities of man and dictate how he will behave. Particularly binding are the mores, customs that are regarded as essential to group welfare. For a practice to be established in the mores is for it to be regarded as right and proper, even though the practice is harmful to health

or to life itself. What is deemed right at one time may be deemed wrong at another in the same society. The superorganic is, then, an order of phenomena different from the organic and goes its way with a certain amount of independence from the organic.

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. Discuss the implications of the statement that Aristotle was the last man to be familiar with all the knowledge of his time.
2. What is the significance of the fact that man alone has a substantial social heritage?
3. What is the effect of rapid changes on the *mores*? Give examples.
4. How does culture aid or hinder man in his adjustments?
5. How can you show that customs are not dictated by man's biological nature?
6. What are the principal parts of culture?

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CHAPTER IV

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE BIOLOGICAL FACTOR

Does our biological inheritance determine the outline of our culture? Our society has many animal functions. We must eat; and, like all other animals, we spend much time getting and preparing food. Like the higher vertebrates we sleep, procreate, and train our young.

While we are like all other animals, we also differ from them; we are more like the apes than we are like cats, canines, or cattle. Indeed it might be said that we are simians but with a very large brain and the ability to talk. Our society has certain characteristics due to inheritance from this particular biological species, *Homo sapiens*.

Does our animal inheritance dictate the type of behaviour we engage in? Certainly not the way it does in the case of bees and ants whose pattern of acting for a single species is relatively unvarying. Man's predispositions are less fixed. The co-ordinations of the nervous and muscular system are incomplete at birth. Previously we have said that man differs from other animals in his large brain and in his ability to talk. We also add to these two, a third characteristic, his greater ability to learn, which rests upon the fact that his nervous system is less completely co-ordinated at birth.

Man's neural flexibility is reflected in the variety of his cultures. As the last chapter reported, there are many norms that exist with respect to any single biological function, such as sex or eating. Man's genetic structure does not determine all the particulars of his culture. Man's culture, which is the accumulation of his learned ways of behaving, is related to his animal capacities, even though his ability to acquire different habits is very great indeed. We are probably partial to stairs rather than ramps because we are bipeds; ramps suit quadrupeds better. So, too, if man were a furry animal, he probably would never have invented clothes, or even the bath tub.¹

There are Traits common to all Cultures. Interest has frequently been shown in activities that are found in every known society, present or past. Such activities have been thought of as biologically determined, since they are found everywhere. But this need not be so. Language is found everywhere, yet a group of children growing up from birth without others speaking a language, would not themselves have a language. A language is learned.

A list of activities common to all societies, whether existing now or in the historical past, is valuable information. It indicates the

¹ Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1936), Chap. 9.

great utility of these activities and also suggests that they are practices to which man is well adapted and for which he has a need. We also wonder whether we can get along without such universals. Murdock has compiled a list based upon an inventory of all known cultures.

The customs, practices, and activities shown in Fig. 2 are arranged alphabetically and hence appear miscellaneous ; but they can be

age grading	games	music
athletic sports	gestures	mythology
bodily adornment	gift giving	numerals
calendar	government	obstetrics
cleanliness training	greetings	penal sanctions
community organisation	hair styles	personal names
cooking	hospitality	population policy
co-operative labour	housing	postnatal care
cosmology	hygiene	pregnancy usages
courtship	incest taboos	property rights
dancing	inheritance rules	population of
decorative art	joking	supernatural beings
divination	kin groups	puberty customs
dream interpretation	kinship	religious ritual
education	nomenclature	residence rules
eschatology	language	sexual restriction
ethics	law	soul concepts
ethnobotany	luck superstitions	status differentiation
etiquette	magic	surgery
faith healing	marriage	tool making
family feasting	meal times	trade
fire making	medicine	visiting
folklore	modesty concerning	weaning
food taboos	natural functions	weather control
funeral rites	mourning	

FIG. 2.—Social Practices found in Every Culture.

From G. P. Murdock, "The Common Denominator of Cultures", in Ralph Linton (ed.), *The Science of Man in the World Crisis* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1943).

grouped in various ways, as around social norms, activities found or not found among apes, or the customs of social institutions. A large number appear to be only remotely related to what we generally think of as biological factors, as, for instance, interest in cosmology, or eschatology, or magical practices, though many may be grouped around bodily functions, such as sports, obstetrics, sexual restrictions, weaning, hygiene, and modesty.

To summarise, the biological contributions to society may be thought of as two. One is to set limits to cultural behaviour and the other is to favour certain types of behaviour to which man's biological nature is better adjusted than others, and to develop very rarely those

activities which are inimical to individual adjustment to environment. While our biological nature does not dictate all details of our culture, it does show a preference for certain types of activity and it sets limits on others.

Is the Tendency to live in Groups Inherited or Learned? Of the many different biological bases of human society, one that especially interests sociologists is the tendency to live in groups. This tendency has been called the gregarious instinct. Such instincts are found in sheep and other animals that herd together. Instinct leads to quite complicated behaviour patterns as in the case of birds who build nests without having watched other birds do so. But among human beings the habit of referring to complicated patterns of behaviour as instinct has been abandoned for the reason that man's behaviour is not fixed very definitely by heredity and maturation, but becomes definite only through learning.¹ So instead of referring to instincts, as in the lower orders of animals, in the case of mankind we speak of inherited tendencies or predispositions.

That heredity is a factor in gregariousness we infer by comparing certain carnivores, as for instance cougars, with certain herbivores, such as caribou. The societies of caribou are great herds often numbering many thousands while the cougars live in small family groups. The supply of meat for the cougars necessarily determines that their numbers in a group will be small, while the vegetation permits large groups of caribou. Man is most closely related to animals who can eat either meat or plant food, and who live in groups larger than those of cats but smaller than herds of cattle.

The hereditary structure peculiar to gregariousness is not as obvious as is the fact that the stomach is the seat of hunger and the glands the seat of sexual desire, though contributory factors to hunger and sex do come from various other inherited structures such as the heart and the nervous system. The absence of any obvious hereditary structure for gregariousness is not an indication of the absence of inheritance. There is in the case of nest-building by birds no single biological structure peculiar to the making of nests.

Gregariousness is basically a response to the stimuli of other persons, which actually means responding in a great many different ways to stimuli involving love, hate, ambition, fear, the opinion of others, etc. Our responses to persons are much more varied and numerous than the few ways in which we usually respond to, say, a fire or a tree. Gregariousness involves memory and the organisation of personality we have built up around the idea of self.

We learn to react to others. Even in very early infancy we respond to a mother's warmth, pressure, touch, and smile, and later to her words with their delicate gradations of sound. Thus we learn

¹ L. L. Bernard, *Instinct: A Study in Social Psychology* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1924).

to respond with love, hate, fear, and admiration to particular persons in particular situations. While these responses are learned, there are inherited predispositions, that is, structures that tend to behave in one way more than another. For not all animals can learn such rich and varied responses as can man. The social responses of the dog are more limited; even more limited are those of the cat. Birds are much less responsive in learning, though a bird can learn to modify its song when it hears other birds sing. Upon this remarkable hereditary gift of social potentialities to *Homo sapiens*, human societies are built.

Though mankind differs from felines, canines, equines, and other animals in the hereditary capacities, so far as we know there is no hereditary variation of gregariousness among peoples. There is no known evidence to make us think that the Chinese, for instance, are not as sociable as the Europeans. How much hereditary variation in this capacity there may be among individuals we do not know. It may be that there is very little; just as there is very little difference, if any, among normal individuals in their ability to speak a language. Any child without defect can learn to pronounce the words of any language, if he begins early enough. If this is the situation, then the degree of sociability of an animal of the human species is largely a matter of learning and experience.

On the other hand there may be some hereditary variation in the anatomy of man underlying sociability, though such variation seems rather difficult to prove. For instance, it is said that those with relatively large roundish bodies are more inclined to sociability than those with narrow chests and slender trunks, who, it is claimed, are less good at mixing with their fellow beings.¹ Assuming that these findings regarding the relation of sociability and body form are valid, we are in doubt about the direction of causation. It has been argued that fat people are socially disadvantaged, and may compensate for their handicaps by developing pleasant, sociable personalities.

We conclude then, on gregariousness, that human society is based upon animals that inherit great capabilities for social interaction, and it is this inheritance that makes our rich social life possible. This indebtedness to our animal ancestry for our ability to learn from and respond to others in a great variety of ways is common to all large groups of mankind, and there is no known evidence that one race or people inherits a greater capability for social interaction than another.

¹ W. H. Sheldon, with the collaboration of S. S. Stevens, *The Varieties of Temperament* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942).

THE ADJUSTMENT PROBLEM

The Idea of Adaptation. The idea of adjustment to environment was stressed by Charles Darwin, and the term *adaptation* is widely used in biological literature. Darwin based his theory of change from one species to another on the fact that the adjustment was better for animals with a certain type of colour or a particular size and that those with a different colour or size died sooner or in larger numbers. Thus nature selected a certain type of variation for survival. Those that were maladjusted to environment did not live. All through nature, there is an adjustment between the animal or plant and the environment. The polar bear is adjusted to the arctic and not to the tropics.

Man the animal lives in all of the zones of the earth and in every continent. Therefore we infer that, with the aid of his inventions, he is in general adjusted to his natural environment. One test of adjustment is survival and one test of maladjustment is death. These are extreme tests. What we need is a more refined measure of adjustment, one that will indicate degrees of adjustment between such extremes as life and death. Thus a man may live in different occupations or communities, but he may be better adjusted in one than another as measured, say, by health, or nervous strain. Robert Louis Stevenson lived in England and Samoa but was better adjusted physically in Samoa.

There are not only degrees of adjustment but there are degrees of strength in man. Some are never ill and some are sick much of the time. Many Englishmen may be as well adjusted in England as in Samoa. There are also degrees of difference in cultures. The cities of the Middle Ages with their narrow streets, open sewerage, and fire hazards were different from our cities with modern plumbing, quarantine service, and fast-moving vehicles. When we speak of the adjustment of biological man to his culture, we are not dealing with two unvarying entities, but with two variables, units of each of which are often widely different from one another.

The Adjustment of Culture to Man the Animal. The idea of adjustment is more common to biological than to sociological literature. But we use in sociology the term social disorganisation; and measures of the health of a community imply the idea of adjustment as do insanity rates and birth rates. Lack of adjustment is also implicit in war and in violent revolution and in serious crimes, though not necessarily biological maladjustment. The sociologist Hobhouse has used the idea of harmonious relationship as we are here using the word adjustment.

What is Adjustment? In biology there is a simple objective test for lack of adjustment, namely, death, about which all may agree.

But in society we do not always agree on what is good adjustment, because man differs from other animals in having a complex culture, with values besides those of physical health and survival.

Sociology studies values but in its own operations seeks to be value-free. It seeks an objective concept of adjustment. From this standpoint, adjustment is relative to a given social situation or social structure. Whatever is compatible with that structure and contributes to its maintenance may be said to be in adjustment with it. Some sociologists use the concept of function and say something is functional if it contributes to the maintenance of a given structure, dysfunctional if it does not. One can, of course, attack the legitimacy of the given structure in terms of one's own values. Thus one may be opposed to slavery. However, sociologists can analyse more or less objectively the consequences of this factor or that for the institution of slavery.

Biological Man as a Standard. Not all persons would agree that a proper goal is to adjust culture to biological man. Herbert Spencer said that the first requisite is to be a good animal, and that education in health has a priority over all other types of education.¹ Many religious persons would place moral goals before biological ones, and would not agree with Spencer that the first need of man is to be a good animal.

Society has its codes of conduct which are not always in conformity with biological needs. For instance, a proper biological age for marriage is probably in the early 'teens, but the best cultural age for marriage is probably in the fifties or sixties—an age that would presumably give us the wisdom to meet the problems that harass a modern family. We compromise by marrying in the early twenties. Some social standards work for complete biological maladjustment, namely, the death of the individual, as in the case of war, or capital punishment for crime.

Cultures have sometimes been very much maladjusted to biological man. Our clothes are not always well adapted to our anatomy, as for instance shoes; or to body temperature, as for instance heavy clothing in summer. Only a very small percentage of the population of modern cities in the western world reach the age of thirty without broken arches in their feet or twisted toes or growth protuberances. And the world often applauds a man for making a great success even though his health breaks down in doing so.

Some of our social practices could be made to conform to biological needs without a great deal of difficulty, as is the aim of dress reform and some factory legislation. In other cases the task is difficult. For we could not have social life without restraint and repression of natural impulses, such as those implied in the Ten Commandments. In these cases there arises the problem of how to apply the general

¹ Herbert Spencer, *Education* (London: Williams & Norgate, 1911).

principles of moral law in a given concrete situation, and where to draw the line between healthy restraint and the repression that destroys reason.

THE QUALITY OF MEN

In the previous section the improvement in the adjustment between mankind and cultural environment has been discussed from the point of view of changing the culture. In succeeding sections we wish to look at adjustment from the point of view of changing mankind.

If men were all alike and were always the same, there would not be any possibility of modifying man to fit him better to his environment. But human beings differ one from another. We next consider their variation.

Differences between individual men and women play an important part in social life. These differences are also designated by the somewhat colourless term, *variability*. How important variability is in society is recognised by any employer. The teacher sees its importance when he reads the examination papers of his students. The football coach is keenly aware of the differences among the players on the team.

THE NATURE OF VARIABILITY

ATTRIBUTES

Variability is of two kinds. A trait may vary in degree or it may vary in kind. A good illustration of the latter type of variation is the sexual characters. There are two kinds, male and female, with no intermediate types, except in pathological cases, at least so far as objective measurable characteristics at present show. Some of the secondary sexual characteristics of the male, such as body contour, may vary in the direction of that of the female, but there is a big gap between the two types. Variation of this kind is said to be discrete, or discontinuous.

CONTINUOUS VARIATION

Variation in stature presents a very different picture. If 1,000 soldiers were lined up in order of height, from the shortest to the tallest, a line joining the tops of their heads would make a smooth, gently sloping curve. Variations of this nature are termed differences in degree, rather than kind, and are seen to be continuous if a large sample of the population is measured. The statistics of so many soldiers would be difficult to present in a book if the individual heights were thus arranged in order.

TABLE 2

HEIGHTS OF SOLDIERS *			
Height in Inches.	Number of Soldiers.	Height in Inches.	Number of Soldiers.
60-60.9	197	67-67.9	3,017
61-61.9	317	68-68.9	2,287
62-62.9	692	69-69.9	1,599
63-63.9	1,289	70-70.9	878
64-64.9	1,961	71-71.9	520
65-65.9	2,613	72-72.9	262
66-66.9	2,974	73-73.9	174

* G. C. Whipple, *Vital Statistics* (New York, 1919), p. 377. Reprinted by permission.

Usually the statures of many cases are grouped as in Table 2, which shows the statures of 18,780 soldiers. In this sample there are 197 soldiers with statures between 60 and 61 inches. These data can be shown in a picture by plotting the graph shown in Fig. 3.




FIG. 3.—Frequency Curve of the Heights of Soldiers.

This smooth curve, representing the heights of the 18,780 soldiers given in Table 2, approximates to the well-known normal probability curve. Nearly all of the biological traits, when measured for sufficiently large numbers of people, are distributed somewhat like the heights of soldiers. Psychological traits also seem to follow such a distribution. Taken from Frederick C. Mills, *Statistical Methods* (New York, 1938, Revised edition, p. 87).

The curve has somewhat the contour of a bell; hence it is frequently referred to as a bell-shaped curve. This type of curve is loosely referred to as a normal probability curve, since when it is perfectly symmetrical it is very much like the mathematical normal probability curve. We may say that the probability of a soldier being near the middle of the scale is great and the probability of his being near either end of the scale is very small. Almost all biological traits, when measured and plotted in large numbers, exhibit this type of curve.

The concept of variation as continuous, rather than discrete, seems hard to grasp. We tend to think of persons as being either quick or slow, good or bad, forgetting that these terms refer to traits found at the extreme ends of a continuum. When we say that persons are bright or dull, we are merely picking out the extremes, forgetting the average. Such classifications are far from accurate, for most variables are continuous and not discrete. The habit of classifying into only two categories is a serious distortion of reality and is inaccurate reporting.

WHY A BELL-SHAPED CURVE?

There has been considerable speculation as to why so many biological data when measured and plotted take the form of the bell-shaped curve. One theory claims that the chances of death are greater for the extremes and less for the average. Some evidence seems to support this hypothesis. The death rate for the very small and the very large is much greater than that for average-sized men.¹ Weights of new-born babies, however, also conform to the normal probability curve, thus giving rise to the hypothesis that heredity is the determining force in producing this bell-shaped variability pattern.

It should be noted, however, that variability also results from the operation of environmental influences. La Piere² found that of 100 car drivers who approached an important street crossing in a residential district which was unguarded by stop signs or a policeman, 1 driver stopped completely, 21 slowed up considerably, 65 slowed up a little, 12 went on as before, while 1 driver speeded up a little. The behaviour of these drivers, which conforms to the normal probability curve, could hardly be ascribed to any genetic factors. It would seem to be essentially the result of social experience. Environment, then, produces variability even as does heredity.

Any Population is a Result of Selection. We say there are all kinds of people, good and bad, tall and short, etc. But in any one society some kinds are represented more than others. Thus in the military

¹ *Statistical Bulletin* (New York, May, 1937).

² R. T. La Piere and P. R. Farnsworth, *Social Psychology* (London, 1936), p. 400.

forces of a country, only those with good eyesight and hearing are selected for service. The frail and physically handicapped are rejected. Similarly, among the primitive hunters of wild foods we find only those with strong backs and legs, with good eyesight and hearing. Also these hunting peoples must have good judgment about the weather and the movements of animals; otherwise they would not survive. This observation is interesting, because our ancestors were primitive hunters for hundreds of thousands of years; and our legs and eyes and ears are as good as they are because of the selection of our forebears through the long millennia of the past by the elimination of those weak and poorly endowed.

The selection of the good or the bad which affects the quality of a population of a society is of two kinds, natural and social.

Selection by Nature. Natural selection by common usage means elimination of certain variations by nature, through excessive cold or heat, by parasites, by attacks of wild animals, etc., such as is experienced by all life in the wild state.

Selection by nature is not confined to the selection of *individuals* for survival. Nature also selects some *groups* for survival and eliminates others. Thus, among termites the group contains specimens that do not breed at all and would thus be eliminated if selection were solely on an individual basis. But these sterile termites help the colony to survive because they are effective workers. Group selection by nature is effective in such insects as bees, ants, and termites.

Group selection is also observed in human groups. Peoples have been exterminated by wars, and combat is more effective when the group is well organized. Not all rulers or inventors who have strengthened their group organisation have been men of brawn and good health. Steinmetz, the inventor, was a hunchback and would have had difficulty in surviving as a primitive hunter.

Social Selection. The second type of selection is social rather than natural, although society exists among wild animals even where their culture is rudimentary. So the social and the natural do not make a perfect contrast. What is meant by social selection is usually a cultural selection, that is, a social selection operating through the media of culture. Thus the hangman's noose and the tuberculosis hospital are agencies of culture operated by the group which have a selective effect.

The contrast between natural selection and social selection appears when we observe that our society selects for survival individuals who would perish in the natural state. Thus dentists, physicians, surgeons, ophthalmologists assist many individuals to live who would have died in the wild state. The rôle of mutual aid in selection both among humans and in animals without much culture was impressively set forth many years ago by Peter Kropotkin in a book called *Mutual Aid*.

The observation that social selection is less rigorous than natural selection and hence permits individuals living in a culture to survive who would be eliminated in a wild state without such social aids may be only a part of the picture. For society may be more ruthless in selecting than nature. For instance, in modern human societies the competition and mental strain are sometimes very great ; and it may be that many become neurotic or psychotic who would not in simpler societies. Hence in some areas, social selection may be more rigorous in modern cultures, eliminating those who cannot stand the nervous strain. Also, because of the complexity of modern society and the difficulty of coping with problems of change, our society may select for intelligence and good judgment.

Sexual Selection. We have said there are two forces of selection, natural environment and social. The illustrations cited have been of a selection based upon death or survival. However, a selective force other than death is breeding, usually called sexual selection, which operates as both natural and social selection. If a man or a woman has no children, the qualities which they bring to society are not passed on by heredity ; and their elimination is as definite as selection by death.

Sexual selection may improve the stock. When male moose battle each other during the mating season for the possession of females, it is the stronger who wins. The flight of several drakes after the duck serves a selective function. Peasants tend to prefer strongly built women who can work hard and produce healthy children. The qualities youth look for in mates have much to do with the future quality of the race. Such choices are often governed by fashion, as in figures or in face or hair colour, rather than by considerations of greater biological value.

Planned Selection. The effect of culture and mutual aids of society on individuals who could not live without such help has raised the possibility of improving the quality of the people by discouraging the least fit from marrying and encouraging only the most fit to marry and have children, thus counteracting the softening effect of socio-cultural aids which permit the weak to live and pass on their strain. This idea is called *eugenics*, launched by Sir Francis Galton. Galton would replace the *laissez-faire* of nature by biological planning. The idea of eugenics is older than Galton. The farmers who bred sheep practised it. The high state of our agriculture is based on selective breeding. Eugenics for horses is a fine art. But we cannot mate men and women the way a farmer mates studs and mares. Hope rather lies in voluntary choices. But romance is concerned also with music and poetry, moonlight and roses, and with aesthetic tastes, social manners, and common spiritual values.

Eugenics, in the few years since the idea of applying selective breeding to human beings was conceived, has been an admitted

disappointment. It fails as a science because we do not have knowledge about the genes which a man or woman carries. For instance, a man and a woman each with a Ph.D. degree could have a feeble-minded child, if each carried a gene for feeble-mindedness. Planned selection is beset with difficulties. An amusing story, whether true or not, is told of Isadora Duncan, the famous dancer, who was so enamoured of the idea of eugenics that she proposed that she bear a child fathered by Bernard Shaw, saying how gifted the offspring would be with his mind and her body. To which Shaw replied, "But suppose the child had my body and your mind!"

Eugenics fails also as a social science because we do not know enough to obtain the controls necessary. These controls are simple for a farmer who deals with bulls and cows. Far different is the situation in human society. A farmer breeds for milk or beef, but multiple are the goals of human breeding, and about them there is much disagreement. These goals are the products of values as well as of science. Then there is the resistance of our mores of freedom and the absence of wisdom in exercising controls. The immature nature of eugenics, both as a biological and a social science, does not mean that at some distant date eugenics may not become one of the most important of all human endeavours.

Some of the fervour of social scientists for eugenics has been reduced by the rise of the idea of culture, about which Galton knew little. Briefly this idea of culture is that what a man does is determined in many areas of activity by what he learns rather than by the genes which he inherits. The genes determine the eye colour, but an Einstein born in an illiterate culture would have been illiterate all his life and would never have produced his famous formula $e = mc^2$. Within limits for man living in a culture, there is often little correlation between structure and function. Culture can be changed greatly without any change in the hereditary structures of man.

In other words, we can go far along the road of cultural progress without eugenics. At one time it was thought that our social progress over a few centuries was due to biological progress. But now we know we do not need biological change to have social change. This statement does not mean, of course, that eugenics is not of profound importance and that it may not at some distant day be practised to a considerable extent.

In conclusion on natural selection, the basic assumption of the selectionists is only partly true. Selection is by no means the only factor affecting the quality of the population. The quality of a human population is affected by schools, for instance, by scientific medicine, and by nutrition, as will be discussed in a later paragraph.

Mutation and Intermixture. There are still other factors affecting the quality of peoples. One of these is mutation, which is a variation, outside the limits of normal variation, that breeds true. But mutations

are rare, require a long time to get established in a population, particularly in large communities. Then, too, most mutations appear to be harmful or of little survival value.

Of another factor, intermixture, more is to be expected. Society has been very much concerned with race intermixtures, as seen in its interest in Eurasians, mulattoes, mestizos, and half-breeds ; and in some quarters the prestige of so-called "pure" races is high. Mixed types must therefore be seen both in terms of their biological consequences and in terms of their social implications.

From the biological side, the breeding of brothers and sisters, as occurred in royalty in ancient Egypt and in the Inca nobility of Peru, or the breeding of cousins in our culture, increases the probability of accentuating certain traits, some of which may be good, as, for instance, quickness of reaction, or bad, as, for instance, weakness in hearing. Intermixtures have their various qualities, some considered bad, others good. Hence breeding outside family lines lessens the chances of such accentuation of particular traits. In small bands or communities of only a few families, such as have existed throughout most of man's stay on earth, there was much inbreeding, which tended to establish certain traits. In a large city like New York there is less chance that this will happen.

Races are great conglomerations of families with different inheritances, but all the human races constitute only one species. Intermixtures of races for most traits should be much like the intermixture in large city populations. At the present time populations in all countries, of whatever race, show great intermixtures of racial types if not of races. Thus the Scandinavians in Norway are not all blue-eyed, fair-haired, and long-headed. Many are dark-eyed, black-haired, and round-headed. There are also many combinations of these traits. So we say all peoples are far from being pure types but represent much intermixture due to frequent wanderings and conquest throughout the long past.

Intermixture, particularly of widely different races, may be harmful, not to the biological product, but to the social product. If society, or part of it, condemns the intermixture of the "bloods" of whites and American Indians or of Chinese and Negroes, holding one race to be inferior to another, the lot of the offspring of such intermixtures may be very hard indeed, for they may carry ineradicable physical markings of the race held to be inferior. Or they may be considered good by the race labelled inferior if they carry the markings of the so-called superior race. Society condemns some mixtures and praises others.

THE INFLUENCE OF ENVIRONMENT

Improving Environment offers great possibilities of bettering the Quality of Peoples. The possibilities of improving the capabilities of mankind

are greatest through modifying the environment, as farmers do with fertiliser and superior foods and as trainers do with practice and the learning process.

American men and women are getting taller and heavier. Men born in the United States in the late 1920's average at least an inch taller at specified age than those born about 1900 who, in turn, are an inch taller than those born in the 1870's. The average height of men who have reached their maximum growth is now nearly 70 inches, compared with about 69 inches around 1925 and 68 inches or less around 1900.¹ The Army reports that the number of men who are five feet ten inches and over has increased 45 per cent since 1918, and the number over six feet, 70 per cent.² This increase in size is not due to selection, for the children are larger than the parents. The causes of this increase in size are thought to be two: the decrease in childhood diseases and better feeding. Professor Boas³ has shown that on the average the retarded growth due to illness in infancy and childhood is not wholly recovered. Several studies in the United States and in England in the early part of the twentieth century have demonstrated that the school children in poor neighbourhoods were smaller than the children in neighbourhoods with high incomes, where presumably the diet was better.

The prevention of disease is made possible in large part by the discovery of the germ theory of disease; and the attainment of greater growth is due in the main to the discoveries of the rôles of vitamins, amino acids, and minerals in the diet. Of these two very great discoveries the first is primarily a preventer and the second primarily an improver. Credit for the increase in stature in the United States should also be given to the general rise of income and living standards, without which it would not have been possible to capitalise on the new discoveries.

The possibility of improving the average quality of the human race through nutrition is large. For instance, the absence of vitamin B₁ (thiamin) from the diet has the effect of producing listlessness and pessimism.⁴ It is sometimes referred to as the morale vitamin, for the apathy was dispelled in the human guinea pigs when thiamin was restored to the diet. For these reasons bread for United States soldiers in World War II was impregnated with thiamin. Fluorine (in water) reduces the chances of the decay of teeth. The absence from the diet of laboratory animals of vitamin B₂ has produced cataracts leading to blindness, as has also the absence of vitamin C and one of the amino acids, tryptophane, found in proteins. The student

¹ *The New York Times*, September 17, 1961.

² *Science News Letter*, September 11, 1954, p. 170.

³ Franz Boas, *The Growth of Toronto Children* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1898).

⁴ M. K. Horwitt *et al.*, "Studies of Vitamin Deficiency", *Science*, vol. 104 (2705), pp. 407-8, November 1, 1946.

must remember that in biological activities there are many factors and that diet does not depend upon just one element. The minerals, amino acids, and vitamins are to be had in our traditional foods, though not all our diets are adequately supplied and balanced.

More dramatic are the results from the acquisition by the body of additional hormones. Very spectacular is the effect on growth of one of the hormones of the pituitary gland. Giants, beyond the known normal limits of growth, can be produced by this hormone. Thus rats and dogs have been grown to twice their normal size by injections of the growth hormones of the pituitary. The injection of another hormone of the pituitary has brought on sex maturity in rats in one-half the time of its normal development. The smoothing of the transition to old age has been effected by sex hormones of each sex.

The changes due to these modifications of environment are only for the lifetime of the individual. The effects are not inherited, and if they are to be retained, the favourable environment must be repeated for each generation.

Influences of Culture Environment. Important as are the variations in physical structure brought about by environment, more important still to sociologists are those variations in the form of mental and personality differences brought about by the cultural environment. In these fields we find as great human variability as we do in the biological realm. One man is a law-abiding citizen, another is a criminal; one a militarist, another a pacifist. It is difficult to indicate any genetic basis for these variations, and in many cases it is almost impossible in the light of present knowledge to assess properly the relative rôles of heredity and environment in producing these differences. This problem is a highly important one to sociologists, for if they are to understand and perhaps eventually be able to predict various aspects of human variability, they must have a thorough knowledge of the causes involved. A knowledge of the various biological factors, as well as social factors, causing human variability is of vital importance.¹

RACE DIFFERENCES

Anatomical variations occur not only among individuals but also among great groups of men called races. While these differences exist and many are observable, there is much debate as to whether these anatomical differences are associated with different types of mental and emotional behaviour. Physical anthropologists are beginning to depend on genetic traits such as blood groups, which are not visible, in defining races. Thus, 35 per cent of the people in Bangkok have type B blood, whereas only 8 per cent of the people in London have type B.¹

¹ William C. Boyd, *Genetics and the Races of Man* (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1950), p. 224.

THE NATURE OF RACE

The concept of race has at times played dramatic rôles in history, leading even to persecutions and wars. Despite the furore it has caused, there is a tremendous amount of ignorance on the subject. The Greeks classified all mankind as either Greek or barbarian, and the Jews pigeon-holed everyone as Jew or Gentile. Yet none of these are racial groups. Race has frequently been confused with language, as well as with religion and nationality. There is an Aryan language, but no Aryan race. It is true that a certain people, thousands of years ago, brought the Aryan language into Europe, and for this reason they are sometimes called the Aryan race. But this is a careless usage, for many different racial types, such as the Swedes, Swiss and Spanish, speak Aryan tongues to-day. The use of a particular language gives no indication of one's race. American Negroes speak the English language, but that does not make them English. Many Germans seem to consider those speaking the Germanic language as members of the "German race", but the German state is composed of two different racial sub-types. The North Germans are more of the Nordic type, whereas the South Germans are Alpines, with round heads, dark hair, and dark eyes.

Culture generally has been confused with race. The fact that the Eskimo and the Magdalenian peoples living in the last Ice Age in France had much the same cultures has led at least one author, Sollas,¹ to argue that they were of the same race. Yet many races may share the same culture, as is true of the Hawaiians, Japanese, and whites in Hawaii; or one race may have two cultures, as is true of the Negro in Africa and in America. Culture must not be confused with race.

The great confusion frequently arising on these points is the result of failure to realise that race is distinctly a biological concept, whereas language and religion are cultural. The term *race* is used to describe the inherited resemblances and differences of large groups of human beings. There are great branches of the human species, just as there are such great divisions among cows as Jerseys, Guernseys, and Holsteins. Among men, there are the white, yellow and black races.

THE CRITERIA OF RACE

(Mankind cannot be classified into races simply by observing either superficial or single physical traits such as colour or size.) We cannot look at the bodily characteristics and safely assort various peoples into races. If this were done the Ainu of Japan, with their white skin, might erroneously be classified as members of the white race; and the dark Hindus of India might not be classed as Caucasian, which they are. There are several reasons why such simple classifications do not delineate races. Racial resemblances and differences are

¹ W. T. Sollas, *Ancient Hunters and their Modern Representatives* (London, 1915, second edition), Chap. xii, "The Eskimo", pp. 488-521.

genetic, not merely somatic. Resemblances among peoples may be due to selection, environmental influences, or interbreeding and not due to resemblances inherent in the germ plasm.

In distinguishing races it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to be certain that the differential characteristics are due to heredity and not in part to environmental modifications as well. Several criteria of race are needed. Such attributes as stature and weight, which can be greatly modified by the environment, are of little value in identifying races. Hair form and eye colour, on the other hand, appear to be more stable genetic factors. When anthropometry was first developing, it was thought that head form was the best criterion of race, since the skull approaches its full growth early in life and was thought to be little influenced by the environment. But with the discovery by Boas,¹ referred to previously, that the cephalic index may be materially altered by the environment into which the individual is born, this trait has been abandoned as the principal criterion of race, and now simply takes its place along with a great many other criteria. If, on the basis of these criteria, a group of people diverges greatly from other groups, we call it a separate race. Our concept of the main races must be broad enough to cover the smaller variations which may be occasioned by a particular environment. While there are small variations within a race, a classification of races tends to separate out the broader biological differences found in mankind.

CLASSIFICATION OF RACES

Major Racial Types. On the basis of the above criteria we may divide the human family into three main races. The Negroes, with their black skin and curly hair, are considered a separate race by all writers. They also include the Melanesians, who have a lighter skin and slightly different nose, with the Negro group. The Mongoloid, or yellow, race has lighter skin and straight black hair. In this group are also the American Indians, who migrated to the Americas about ten or fifteen thousand years ago and have become somewhat differentiated from the parent stock. The majority of researchers class the whites as a separate race, but a few tend to consider them an off-shoot of the Mongoloid race, since white people bear resemblances to the possibly ancestral Mongoloid type. The Ainu of Japan and the Australoids seem to be types that overlap with other races. When a group of people remains alone in an isolated region over a long period of time, mutations may occur, and the process of natural selection may cause the new traits to become established in the population. Since races probably originated in this way, it is not surprising that there is some overlapping and that a very simple taxonomy is not possible.

¹ Franz Boas, *Changes in the Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants.*

Sub-races. Each of these great racial divisions of mankind may also be divided into sub-races, though there is considerable disagreement among authorities as to just what these sub-divisions should be. In Europe, the coasts of the Baltic Sea and adjacent territories are the home of the tall, fair-haired, blue-eyed, long-headed type generally called Nordic. Around the rim of the Mediterranean lives a shorter, black-haired, oval-faced, long-headed type, known as the Mediterranean. In central Europe, like a wedge with its point in Great Britain, is a short, broad-headed people labelled the Alpine type,¹ characterised by wide cheek bones, dark hair and eyes. The Hindus, with their darker skin, but otherwise European characteristics, are also classified as a sub-type of the white race. Each sub-type is a complexity of different family strains. So also are the black and yellow races divided into sub-races.

Evolutionary Advancement of Different Races. Great efforts have been put forth by many writers, spurred on, no doubt, by racial pride, to determine the race that has evolved furthest from its anthropoid ancestors. Various claims, not very well substantiated, have been made to show that the white race has evolved furthest. On the average, white people have larger craniums than do Negroes, but there are greater differences within the races than there are between the races. On the other hand, the heads of the Eskimo people are slightly larger than those of the whites. But the Eskimo ratio of size of limbs to body is closer to the anthropoid ratio than is that of the whites or Negroes. Again, the whites are hairier and hence more like the apes than are the other races. The lips of the Negro are more different from those of the apes than are those of any of the other races. This evidence does not justify a conclusion that one race is further removed than another from anthropoid origins.²

RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN MENTALITY

Behind a large part of the present-day interest in race lie assumptions regarding the mental superiority of certain races. Psychologists and sociologists have attacked the question of racial superiority directly by giving mental tests to members of the different races. These tests do not measure inherited mental capacity. They might give some clues, were it not for the fact that they require that the subjects have a uniform background, else the results are not comparable. Such a uniform background is impossible to obtain if we would study races in varying localities and cultures. In the effort to get away from these differences in cultural background, recourse has been had to tests composed of diagrams and pictures; but the subjects are not equally accustomed to using pencils, and perhaps more important, to taking tests at all.

Differences in Test-intelligence. Some of the results from testing

¹ Carleton S. Coon, *The Races of Europe* (New York, 1939).

² F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, pp. 115-16.

different races are as follows. Chinese and Japanese do quite well on our tests, having an average score of 99, as compared with 100 for whites. American Negroes of the Southern States do less well, while the American Indians (Mongoloids, like the Chinese) do the poorest, averaging only 75.¹ These differences in all probability reflect variations in culture, rather than inherited racial ability. If these tests measured racial differences we should not expect the average scores of the Chinese and the American Indians, members of the same race, to vary so greatly. It has also been found that Negroes educated in the North do much better on the tests than those in the South. Klineberg² found that those American Negroes who have been in the Northern States but a short time got about the same rating as the Negroes of the Southern States, which suggests that there is no particular selective factor of an intellectual nature involved in Negro migration. He also found a positive correlation between increase in I.Q. and the number of years of schooling in the North. From these studies it will be seen that no claim that one race is mentally superior to another is justified.

Skull Capacity and Intelligence. Skull capacities have been measured in an effort to show one or another race to be superior. While the Negro's skull capacity on the average is smaller than the white man's, when the distribution curves for skull capacities for both races are plotted on the same scale it is found that there is a great deal of overlapping.³ There are more differences within a race than between races. Furthermore, a slight difference in cranial capacity cannot be interpreted as an indication of difference in innate intelligence. Over great ranges, such as from the chimpanzee to man, these differences in skull capacity are undoubtedly significant, but to draw conclusions on the basis of small variations is a dubious practice. No significant correlation in modern man between size of skull and intelligence quotient has been discovered.⁴ It would be foolish to select University students on such a basis.

Structure and Function. In discussing the important question of racial differences, men are wont to forget the vital fact that structure is inherited, but behaviour is not. Anatomy, but not physiological function, is used as the criterion of race. The basic structures that are inherited set limits to functions, but environmental differences, particularly cultural differences, determine how these structures will be used within the limits allowed by heredity. Furthermore, the variability of function is much greater than the variability of structure.

¹ T. R. Garth, *Race Psychology* (New York, 1931), p. 83.

² Otto Klineberg, *Negro Intelligence and Selective Migration* (New York, 1935); *Race Differences*, 1935.

³ T. Wingate Todd, "Cranial Capacity and Linear Dimensions in White and Negro", *American Journal of Physical Anthropology*, vol. 6, pp. 97-102, April-June, 1923.

⁴ Karl Pearson, "On the Relationship of Intelligence to Size and Shape of Head, and to other Physical and Mental Characters", *Biometrika*, vol. 5, pp. 105-46, 1906.

The size of lungs does not vary much from one individual to another, but the lungs may breathe much faster at one time than at another, depending upon the particular stimulus. High altitudes and excitement bring about much more rapid breathing.

Different structures may vary considerably in the degree to which their functioning can be modified. The organs of speech are at one extreme end of this variation. Any people can learn to speak any language; the organs of speech in no sense dictate the language spoken. Since language is learned it can be varied greatly and hence is no criterion of race. Races with superior education do not necessarily have superior inherited mental abilities. We must be careful not to interpret cultural differences as the result of differences in race, since culture is passed on as part of the social, not the biological, heritage.

Culture and Racial Mentality. The type of culture possessed by the members of any particular race is frequently considered an index of their racial ability. This idea flows from the assumption that people create their own cultures; that the type of civilisation they possess is a direct result of their inherited capacity. This view was widely held when social thought was dominated by the idea of biological evolution, and little was known about the growth of the superorganic.¹ But it will be seen in a later chapter² that while no appreciable biological changes have been observed in man in the past ten or fifteen thousand years, his culture has changed tremendously. Other factors besides inherited mental ability, such as inventions and diffusion of ideas from one culture to another, play important rôles in determining the level of a culture.

Conclusions on the question of racial abilities must be carefully drawn, for the subject is rife with emotion and the evidence is shaky. We may say that there may be inherited mental differences among races, but that it has not been proved; nor has any high degree of probability for such differences been established. There are differences in inherited capacities among family lines, but races are made up of millions of families and each race has its mental defectives and its geniuses. That men are created unequal is clear. That races are so created may be true, but the fact remains to be proved.

RACE PREJUDICES

We have seen that the test for race is heredity, and hence race is a biological conception. Yet the social reaction to racial differences gives it great social significance. Wars have been fought between races, as, for instance, between the American Indian and the whites. There is much injustice to one race caused by another, as, for instance,

¹ W. T. Sollas, *Ancient Hunters and their Modern Representatives* (London, 1915).

² Chapter XXIII, "The Processes of Socio-cultural Change".

in race slavery. There are also serious discriminations against a race based upon rights, opportunities, and status.* Man's inhumanity to man is often based on race. The emotions involved in these relationships are commonly called race prejudice.

Race prejudice is simply prejudice applied to race. We have reviewed the evidence on race which is biological. The evidence on prejudice is sociological; and prejudice is manifest in many other phenomena than race, as, for instance, religion. There have been religious wars, perhaps more of them than racial wars. There has been religious persecution, quite comparable to persecution of race.

Prejudice is therefore a general attitude that can be aroused by any group, whether racial or not. Attachment of prejudice to race has, however, the striking characteristic that race carries a label that is visible and can be inherited, as, for instance, colour. A race cannot change its physical insignia as readily as a people can change a religion, their manners, their clothing, their tastes, or even their language. Furthermore, the identifiable insignia serve as stimuli to arouse prejudice, which tends to be directed against all members who carry the insignia, no matter how widely the members of the race differ in other characteristics, such as, say, education or income.

Race prejudice often rests upon erroneous beliefs about hereditary inferiorities. One racial group which is obviously inferior to another is likely to be inferior because of differences in learning and in experience, which are often believed erroneously to be hereditary.

Aside from these observations, racial prejudice as a social phenomenon can best be studied from the point of view of prejudice in general, about which there is an extensive literature, too extensive to be summarised here. However, some pertinent observations may be made.

Prejudice in General. Prejudice means to *prejudge*. We prejudge readily when emotion forces us to a conclusion without much thought. Indeed, strong emotion can at times block thought and blind us to observation. Once prejudice takes root, even familiarity with the facts may not eradicate it. Conclusions based on emotion are difficult to change, as psychoanalysts testify.

There have been several recent studies of the nature of prejudice by sociologists and psychologists.¹ Some of these inquiries have concerned the individuals who are most susceptible to prejudice. These are generally the intolerant type. Since aptitudes for tolerance and intolerance are often set in early life, the factors affecting them are worth noting.

¹ Notable are: Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc., 1954); M. F. Ashley-Montagu, *Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race* (2nd ed.; New York: Columbia University Press, 1945); Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, *The Dynamics of Prejudice* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950); Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946).

Tolerant children are likely to come from homes with a permissive atmosphere. They feel welcome, accepted, loved no matter what they do. Punishment is not harsh or capricious. . . . The keynote in their lives is security rather than threat . . . their egos find sufficient gratification without resorting to repression and without the guilt that leads them through projection to lay blame on others. . . . Since moral conflicts are, on the whole, satisfactorily handled, there is less rigidity and less disposition to be harsh with the errors other people make. . . . This greater mental flexibility of the tolerant person is shown in the rejection of two-valued logic. . . . He seldom agrees that "there are only two kinds of people, the weak and the strong". He does not bifurcate his environment into the wholly proper and the wholly improper. For him there are shades of grey.¹

Dogmatism or the closed mind denotes the disposition to evaluate information in the light of its source. The open mind refers to the disposition to evaluate information and its source separately. According to various researches, a closed belief system is a consequence of threat. Persons high in dogmatism tend to be high in anxiety.² These findings are probably appropriate to an open, secular society, or to a sub-culture such as a university. They seem less applicable to a sub-culture governed by predominantly sacred or authoritarian norms.

Group Selfishness. Other studies on prejudice are concerned not with the individual but with group behaviour. Notable are the concepts of the *we-group*, sometimes called the "in-group", and the outsiders, or *out-group*. Thus in ancient Palestine the Jews were the in-group and the Gentiles were the outsiders. Similarly there were Greeks and barbarians. The members of the *we-group* have a somewhat exalted opinion of themselves, which is called *ethnocentrism*, and display towards members of an out-group a selfish, callous attitude or one of aggressive ruthlessness. Their code of conduct towards outsiders is quite different from their code of ethics among themselves. Thus the members of the *we-group* are prejudiced against the members of the out-group. If the members of the two groups are of different races, the prejudice is called race prejudice.

Another characteristic of this behaviour of the in-group towards the out-group is that individual variations in the out-group are minimised by the members of the in-group. Thus all "Chinamen" are alike or treated as if they were alike. So prejudice is extended to every member of the out-group whether he be honest or a knave.

The ubiquitousness of Ethnic Prejudice. Even in Israel, a nation predominantly of Jews, a nation established as a refuge for victims of religious and ethnic prejudice the world over, prejudice has been

¹ Gordon W. Allport, *op. cit.*, p. 426. By permission of Addison-Wesley Press, Inc., publishers.

² Milton Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind: Investigations into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1960).

revealed between specific ethnic groups of immigrants.¹ An unwillingness to associate informally is expressed most frequently on the part of all groups against North African Jews. This is the most visibly different immigrant group in point of size and in low socio-economic status. Such evidence suggests the universality of certain types of prejudice whenever in a society there is sufficient "free-floating anxiety" to warrant an acceptable target for the displacement of aggression.

Underlying group or race prejudice are group egotism and group selfishness that are about as common among groups as egotism and selfishness are among individuals and about as difficult to eradicate. However, it may be noted that prejudice and discrimination are not the same thing. There is a usual but not necessary connection between them and either may occur without the other. Prejudice can be held in bounds by law and custom and can be kept from being manifested at least in the form of injustices and the grosser discriminations.

Prejudice, when imbedded in deep-seated sentiments and traditions, is slow to change. When 30 ethnic groups were ranked in terms of social distance, by samples of Americans in 1926, 1946, and 1956, the ranking in terms of upper-third, middle-third, and lower-third remained unchanged except for the Russians, although there were shifts within the three classes. The upper-third included ethnic groups bearing the closest resemblance to the raters, that is, North European and lightest in colour.²

SUMMARY

Man has evolved from the simians and his culture has the limitation of the capacities of his species. The predispositions of his species also have a selective value in choosing types of cultural behaviour.

Of these predispositions, the tendency towards gregariousness is especially important for sociology which deals with society. Gregariousness is a label for certain of man's learned responses to others, responses which are almost infinitely varied and which relate to sociability.

The first law of life in the biological world is adaptation to environment, and man does not escape this law. But man's environment is culture as well as nature. A better adaptation can be had by changing (a) man or (b) culture.

To change culture to fit biological man, we must know biological requirements and have a high regard for them.

To change man to fit culture there are three methods: (a) selection, (b) mutation, and (c) modification of environment before maturation has been reached.

¹ Judith T. Shuval, "Emerging Patterns of Ethnic Strain in Israel", *Social Forces*, vol. 40, pp. 323-30, May, 1962.

² Emory S. Bogardus, "Racial Distance Changes in the United States during the Past Thirty Years", *Sociology and Social Research*, vol. 43, pp. 127-35, November-December, 1958.

Selection within limits could improve the quality of the human race, as it has done the quality of cattle, if we had the knowledge, the agreement on goals, and the techniques of social control. Some day eugenics may be an applied science. Beyond the limits of the species we can go only if there are mutations, which are very infrequent.

The most profitable method of improving the constitution of man is to regulate the environment of infants and children through diet and control of disease.

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. In what ways have the biological concepts influenced our thinking about society?
2. What are the strengths and weaknesses of eugenics?
3. What evidence is there for the influence of racial factors in social change?
4. How is race sometimes confused with culture?
5. What light is thrown by recent studies on the causes of race prejudice?
6. Are there any contemporary social problems for which a study of biology is relevant?
7. How important is the hereditary factor in criminal behaviour? How would you explain that certain societies are practically without crime?
8. A comparative study of the personality traits of women in three different modern societies.

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CHAPTER V

THE GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR IN SOCIETY

We want to know what influence climate and geographical location have upon the social life of mankind. Did the climate of the Hawaiian Islands help to produce a great civilisation there? We look not so much to the highlands of Guatemala with its attractive climate for a magnificent flowering of civilisation but rather to such cities as New York, London, Paris. High mountains, stimulating though the altitude may be, are seldom the locale of the origins of great civilisational achievements. The earliest civilisations were in the warm climate of the lowlands of great river basins such as those of the Nile, of the Euphrates and the Tigris, and of the Indus. Perhaps it was not the climate that produced the great civilisations of Egypt, Mesopotamia, and India, for the climate and location were approximately the same there a thousand years before the rise of these civilisations and a thousand years after their decline.

We wish to assess the factor of climate as it affects society.

GEOGRAPHICAL INFLUENCE ON PHYSICAL LIFE

Does Climate affect Races and thus through Races influence Societies?

There is a popular belief that climate produces races and races in turn produce civilisations. Thus the hot sun of central Africa produces dark-skinned peoples, and the civilisations of tropical Africa are the achievement of its people. There are thus two propositions. One is that climate affects physical type. The other is that society is the production of physical type.

Regarding the first proposition, climate and geographical location do have some influence upon anatomy. Thus the Eskimos have narrow openings in their noses, which help a little to warm the inhaled cold air as it passes close to the warm skin. Dark skin is found in tropical countries, and the pigmentation gives some protection from the sun. On the other hand, different physical types may live in the same locality yet remain different in structure, as, for instance, the short dark Lapps and the tall fair Norwegians.

Not all the differences in physical types among human beings are the result of geographical location. Many are the result of biological mutations, minor ones, such as hair form. These mutations occur in the genes, the carriers of hereditary traits, which are pretty well protected from most climatic influences, though they may be affected, for instance, by radiation.

The climatic influences on biological type do not appear to be profound. That is, man lives in all climates yet is one species; and

the observable variations are not great. The pygmies, though a small people, average around five feet in stature. The cross section of the hair of some people is round, and of others elliptical. Pigmentation of eyes varies. But these differences are not known to be due to climate.

The second proposition is that physical type creates societies. Thus Galton argued that it was the hereditary genius of the Greek people that created the wonderful Greek culture in the age of Pericles. Though this belief is common, we may still question whether it is true. In Chapter XXIII we have shown that the society of any particular people results from culture traits coming from many different peoples living in many different parts of the world. We also show in this same chapter that though societies have capable leaders of their institutions and though their new inventions are made by their own inventors, nevertheless factors other than hereditary mental ability (which may be present everywhere) are necessary to develop these institutions and the new inventions, mechanical or ideological.

But even though physical types should be effective in creating societies, it would not follow that it is that part of physical type that results from climatic influences which is responsible. Pigmentation of skin and the size of the opening of the nose may have little to do with the quality of the society in which peoples with these traits live. The head form, which Boas showed to be capable of modification by environment, though not necessarily by climate, might be expected to be more closely related to mental achievement than colour of skin. Yet no correlation has been found between shape of head and the IQ. The distribution of long- or round-headed Indians is not correlated with the cultures they carry. For instance, the Mayans were round-headed with a cephalic index of 84, while the Incas were long-headed with an index of 79. Yet both had highly developed cultures. Some of the very simple cultures of California were carried by round-headed Indians, while the ones of Tierra del Fuego, also with a very simple culture, were long-headed, like the advanced Incas.

In conclusion, there is evidence that climate and geographical location modify in a limited manner physical types ; but we have not found evidence that these variations in physical characteristics due to natural environment have any effect upon the group life or the culture of the peoples affected.

Is it possible, however, that the behaviour of peoples can be affected by climate directly, without a modification of physical type? This question we next examine.

GEOGRAPHICAL INFLUENCE ON SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR

Effect of Climate on Energy. Some of us claim to feel more energetic in the spring-time than in the winter, yet we have the same bodily

structure in the spring as in the winter. Any differences we feel in the mountains and on the seacoast are not due to changes in our anatomy, but rather to our energy or the way our bodily structure acts. The differences in the way we feel at the seacoast or in the mountains may be due to the fact that we may be there on a restful vacation. In the spring we may feel better because we are out of doors more or take more exercise. It is generally admitted though that persons reared and living in the mild climates of the temperate zones feel lethargic in hot moist climates. Yet the natives, born in the tropics and adjusted to the climate, may display as much energy as a person reared in and adjusted to the temperate climates. On this point, a reliable observer reports, "In the more moderate tropics which generally prevail, I have spent much time trying to ascertain the widespread belief that white men degenerate in the tropics. I found cases where there was a falling off of efficiency, but more cases where there was little or no falling off . . . and many cases where there was an actual increase in strength and efficiency."¹

But social life is not solely a function of energy. Social life consists essentially of interactions between individuals, usually influenced by social or cultural norms. It is made up of such behaviour as is found in leadership, imitation, status maintenance, discipline, social pressure, team work, competition, co-operation, abiding by rules, respecting the rights of others, quarrelling, fighting, stealing, cheating, marrying, and rearing children.

Regional Sources of Energy and Level of Culture. One of the theories of energy and achievement is based upon the glands of internal secretion, such as the thyroid, the pituitary, and the adrenals. The thyroid, whose basic chemical element is iodine, affects the utilisation of oxygen. Persons with a deficiency of iodine develop goitre. There are a number of geographical locations where there is a shortage of iodine; Switzerland, Derbyshire, the borders of the Great Lakes in the United States, and the northern Willamette Valley in Oregon. In Oregon, as elsewhere, iodine is now supplied in the drinking water and in table salt, but before this practice was begun, the civilisational achievements of Oregon were not meagre. Its civilisation was not low, certainly no lower than that of South Carolina, where there is so much iodine in the soil that it is called the iodine state. Perhaps the deficiency of iodine is compensated for in some degree by the exercise of the other glands. Though it is said that only a few grains of iodine separate an Einstein from a gibbering idiot, the influence of this source of energy is not discernible in the cultures of Oregon and of South Carolina.

¹ R. E. Danforth, "Under His Own Vine and Fig Tree", *Scientific Monthly*, vol. 36, p. 539, June, 1933.

THE EFFECT OF CLIMATE UPON SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR

The influence of change of climate on behaviour is most clearly seen in physiological functioning such as breathing, blood pressure, rates of growth, and sex behaviour. These functions derive largely from localised organs, such as lungs, heart, pituitary glands, and gonads. There is, however, no localised organ for social behaviour. It involves a large number of organs of the body, such as the nervous system, the eyes, ears, mouth, vocal cords, and glands of internal secretion. The integration of the functioning of all these organs into social activity means that the latter is greatly dependent upon learning and conditioned responses. It does not seem probable that changes in geographical conditions would modify social behaviour as readily as they do the physiological functioning of specific organs.

Social behaviour is learned behaviour, different from automatic behaviour such as breathing, or the beating of the heart. Since social activity is learned, it can be varied by the learning process. We may speak of different languages involving different rhythms and accents, depending on how we learn. The variations in behaviour due to climate may be in turn varied by learning or culture. For instance, a computer doing multiplication may work two per cent slower on days when the temperature remains the same than on days when it changes, but if he learns how to use logarithms, he may do the computations one hundred times faster.* The change due to learning overshadows the change due to climate.

Not only may the climatic influences be obscured by those of learning, but the cultural influences may be so numerous and so powerful as to make the effect of climatic change quite negligible. There are, for instance, many factors other than climate that stimulate factory production. Production may be affected by the piece-rate system, by practices of cutting price rates, by personnel managers, by the business cycle, by advertising, by trade unions, by social legislation, by employment methods, by labour turnover policies, by bonuses, by plant lighting, by distribution of rest periods, by anticipation of holidays, by regulation of hours of labour, by the organisation of the plant with reference to the flow of goods, and by various motivation factors. It can easily be seen that climate does not operate simply and directly on social behaviour.

To cite another illustration, the air in high mountainous regions may be stimulating, but the mountain climate doesn't determine how the energy may be spent. It doesn't convert the accelerated heart beat, breathing and adrenalin flow into cultural activity. Industrial production in a mountainous country like Norway or Switzerland may be much less than in a low flat country like England, which has better transportation facilities and more coal mines. The climate of high altitudes may be favourable for mental work, but more research

work may be done at sea level if the universities are located there, for a sound research "atmosphere" depends upon stimulating mental contacts with other research workers as well as upon barometric pressure. The inhabitants of a great town like Birmingham walk with a livelier step than those in a small hamlet located in the same geographical region.

Though the cultural environment be more important than the natural environment as a source of variations in social behaviour, the question may still be asked: Is the natural environment responsible for our social heritage? Is culture the result of geographical influences? Our next concern, then, is to study the relation of geographical location to the superorganic.

GEOGRAPHICAL INFLUENCE ON CIVILISATION

The great civilisations of the world to-day are found in the temperate zones. Could the skyscraper buildings, the aeroplanes, telephones, universities and medical centres of Europe and America have been produced in any other climate or region? Does this great social heritage, to which the reader is heir, rest in last analysis upon climate? The usual statement is that the temperate zones have a more energising climate than the polar and tropical zones with their severe cold and heat, and that this stimulating climate operating on man has led to the achievement of these great civilisations. This assumption, it may be observed, omits the racial theory of the origin of civilisation, which is also a popular notion. It stresses climate as a feature of geography to the neglect of the resources of the soil.

CLIMATE AND CIVILISATION

A comparison of a map indicating the temperate climate of the world and a map showing the location of the most important civilisations reveals marked similarities, as may be observed from two maps prepared by Huntington.¹ Some question might be raised as to the accuracy and fairness of the measurement of energy and health and its representation on a range from pure black to pure white. Some question might also be raised in regard to the use of the terms "high" and "low" civilisation. The civilisation of warlike Europe may not be considered by moralists as high as that of peaceful and orderly Iceland, which the map rates lower. But leaving aside these questions and the moral valuations of civilisations, the maps do roughly differentiate temperatures and set off the areas with complex technological civilisations from those with simpler ones. But the striking similarity does not prove that one is the cause of the other, or that the climate is the cause of the civilisations. It may be observed, for instance, that in the north-eastern part of the United States, there is now a very advanced material culture. Three hundred years ago, when inhabited

¹ Ellsworth Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

by the American Indians, this same area was much less advanced ; yet there has been no appreciable change of climate during that time. If climate caused the high civilisation at one time, why not at another ? Before the coming of the white man to the Americas, the material and scientific culture was much more advanced among the Mayans in Yucatan and Central America than among the Indians of the northern United States. The Mayan culture was achieved mainly in the hot, tropical lowlands and not in the neighbouring highlands of from 4,000 to 8,000 feet, where the climate to the white visitor is delightfully cool and stimulating. The Mayans had a culture quite comparable to that of early Egypt. They had more and larger pyramids than Egypt, though they were not used for burials. They invented a calendar which had months with an equal number of days. They also invented the zero, which was not achieved by either the Greeks or the Romans, but was brought to Europe by the Arabs after the fall of Rome. The Mayans did not use metal tools or weapons and had no wheel or domesticated beast of burden. The fact that the locale of the advanced Mayan culture was the tropical lowlands instead of the high cool mountains is an interesting datum to set off against the idea that the tropics are too hot to develop a high civilisation.

Central America and Yucatan have, according to Huntington's map, a much less energetic climate than the north-eastern part of the United States, where the technological culture was crude compared with the Mayan. Also at that time the culture of most of the California Indians in that remarkable climate was about the lowest of any in the Americas. At one time the culture of Egypt was relatively much more advanced than that of Denmark, which on the climate map under discussion is a much greater source of energy than the valley of the Nile.

Factors other than Climate affecting Culture. In explaining the map showing the distribution of civilisation, factors other than climate must be considered. For instance, in the twentieth century the extent of civilisation is certainly dependent upon the resources of the soil, especially the energy resources. Energy is a much discussed climatic influence, yet the total energy of the coal supply of the United Kingdom is much greater than that of its population. The fact that the United States and Britain have abundant coal is one reason for their cultural advance.

Another factor is the state of inventions. Until the steam engine was invented coal was not of much use. The coal meant nothing to the Anglo-Saxon. Furthermore, the machines that use coal, such as the steam engine, are made of steel which is in turn made of iron, which is not a climatic factor. Though coal, oil, falling water and iron ore are not climatic factors, they are products of geographical location. If the distribution of civilisation were the result of geographical influence alone, civilisation should have been spread

over the Americas in the fifteenth century in the same manner as it is now found in the twentieth. Clearly, important factors other than climate are needed to account for the variations in civilisation. These factors are considered in Chapter XXIII.

The Uncreative Rôle of Geographical Environment. The culture of Scandinavia fifteen hundred years ago was not very greatly different from some of the advanced cultures of the American Indians. In some ways it was not so advanced as that of the Mayan Indians at that time. The Scandinavians had cattle and metals, but they used the bow and arrow. Their housing was crude, and superstitions were common. To-day Sweden, Norway, and Denmark have as advanced a culture in many respects as is to be found in the world, with all the modern developments of science and technology, and with a high development of co-operative organisation and progressive legislation. Yet during this time the geography round the Baltic Sea has not changed appreciably.¹ The growth of the culture could not be due to changes in geographical conditions. Some other causes must be sought.

Again, there are peoples living in essentially the same climate who have widely different cultures. In the south-western part of the United States the Hopi and the Navaho Indians have lived for centuries in the same locality, but their cultures are quite different. The houses of the Hopi are built of adobe and may rise for several stories like apartment houses. The Navaho live in single-room dwellings, shaped much like the Eskimo domed snow house, but built of branches of trees. The Hopi are agriculturists and harvest crops. The Navaho are nomads and graze sheep. The religion and family life of the two groups are quite different. Since under the same physiographic conditions we find vastly different cultures, we must conclude that climate plays no precipitating or creative rôle in building the social heritage.

NATURAL RESOURCES AND CIVILISATION

The houses of a people are usually made of materials of the region. The production of pottery is dependent upon the supply of the proper type of earth. The clay in the Euphrates Valley was favourable for making small clay blocks on which the writing known as cuneiform was developed. Papyrus was native to Egypt, where it was used for paper. The Samoans use the thin lining of the bark of native trees for making clothing. The reindeer was domesticated by the Lapps in the north, where it was native, while the horse found on the plains was

¹ " . . . Since the beginning of human history, there have been no striking changes in the major land and water features of the earth." While climate has been less stable, "daily weather changes are more pronounced than changes over a long period of time". C. C. Huntington and F. A. Carlson, *The Geographic Basis of Society* (New York, 1933), p. 68.

domesticated far to the south by the people living there and not by the Lapps. Nature presents materials for culture to use.

But whether culture uses the materials presented to it is another question. The presence of the material is no guarantee that it will be used by a people, no matter what the biological inheritance of the race may be. Before the discoveries which made agriculture possible, the people used the fertile plains of the river valleys only for hunting and gathering herbs. There are peoples who live where clay is suitable for pottery, but do not make it. The caribou was not domesticated by the Indians of America, though this was done by the Lapps of Europe and by the Chukchee of Asia. The Red Indians lived over the Mesabi iron range, but never used the iron ore beneath them. In eighteenth-century England iron ore was smelted by the use of charcoal from wood, although coal suitable for making coke was abundant. It is only since the latter half of the nineteenth century that Americans have been using aluminium, although bauxite is common.

Moreover, materials presented by Nature may be utilised, but Nature does not determine *how* they will be used. A large part of the world possesses domesticated cattle but not all people use the meat or milk. In China no animal is milked. The Negroes of Africa do not make cheese, and use butter as a cosmetic but not for eating. In the latter part of the nineteenth century Americans used coal only as a fuel, but the Germans were using it also for dyes and perfumes.

The earth gives us materials, but what causes them to be used is the presence of invention or scientific knowledge about their use, plus a favourable attitude on the part of the folkways towards their use. The presence of the materials does not, *ipso facto*, bring the knowledge of their use. Neither does biological inheritance. The inherited ability of the Germans did not change from the time in which they used coal for fuel, wasting the by-products, to the time when they founded a great chemical industry on these by-products. The knowledge of how to use materials grows out of previous cultural knowledge.

GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE

The fact that different parts of the earth have different materials for culture to use has led to different cultures. For instance, extensive flat grazing lands where there were large herds of cattle led to a nomadic life, often with an effective military organisation and a culture with a strong masculine domination. On the other hand, the hoe culture of the river valleys and mountain sides gave rise to villages and a sedentary life. The position of women who cultivated the soil was generally higher. In this manner has there arisen a differentiation of culture traits in different parts of the world. As transportation developed, these different culture traits spread, so that a group could have the advantage of inventions made in other localities. Domesticated cattle were adopted by the agriculturists and farming methods

were taken up by cattle breeders. Inventions spread from the locality where they originated. The chicken was domesticated in south-eastern Asia, but has spread to all parts of the world. South-eastern Asia has tobacco, which came from America.

Influence of Climatic Changes. An interesting question in regard to climate and the evolution of the superorganic is whether climatic change during the long history of man has been a factor in the growth of culture. It was stated in a previous paragraph that the growth of culture in the Americas since 1492 could not be attributed to changes of climate, since there had been no significant climatic change. But over a much longer time, climate and geographical conditions have changed greatly. It is well known, for instance, that the climate of Europe has changed during man's residence there. Four times during the past half-million years, more or less, the upper half of Europe has been covered by glaciers. At times central Europe has also been sub-tropical.

In these early geologic times, the way in which climatic changes affected the growth of the superorganic is not known. It may be observed that the climatic changes were slow. Glaciers recede only a few feet a year. The rise and fall of the earth's surface is gradual. Occasionally a volcanic mountain island has been thrown up rapidly and lands have disappeared quickly into the sea, but these are exceptions. If the change of climate is very slow, its effect on the superorganic development would appear to be slight. Occasionally, however, slight changes of climate do affect the superorganic. For instance, when the rainfall is very light, as in the semi-arid region of the south-western part of the United States, and springs are few, a slight lessening of precipitation dries the springs and makes food scarce. The inhabitants are forced to move, even to abandon towns and villages. Such is the interpretation of abandoned villages and towns in this region. Yet for inhabited areas where the rainfall is, say, 45 inches, a yearly fluctuation of a few inches makes little difference. In spite of exceptions, the changes of climate during geologic time are not likely to have been of great significance in the growth of culture, any more than marked variation in climate from one region to another explains the differences in the civilisations in those regions to-day. What needs to be particularly noted is that the superorganic has had its greatest development since the recession of the last glacier. Its growth has been especially rapid since the period of written history, when climate has been quite stable.

Cultural Level and Dependence upon Geographical Conditions. The lower the cultural level of a people, the more dependent they are on prevailing geographic conditions. Primitive hunters living in caves, without domesticated animals and with only stone weapons, live close to nature. They do not have the skill to change it. Their manner of life is nearer that of the animals than that of modern human beings.

As they learn to build houses, to heat them, to sow seeds, and to reap harvests, they are freed from limitations of geographic factors. Increasing enrichment of culture means increasing liberation of man from the clutch of climatic circumstance.

INFLUENCE OF CULTURE ON GEOGRAPHY

The furthest extreme to which culture has freed man from the limitations of geographical environment is in the modern city. The houses are heated in winter and cooled in summer. Shelter is provided in transportation vehicles. The streets are cleared of snow. Most of the activity is indoors. Weather means less to the townsman than to the farmer, and less to the farmer than to the hunter. Man lives less like a wild animal in the city than in any other habitation he has yet had.

Artificial heating is an invention that man has used for a long time to push back the limits of climate. Now he is learning to produce cold. Artificial cooling may aid in extending the cultural advance into the tropics. The knowledge exists in our culture to create in a small space any kind of climate desired. Artificial sunlight, moisture, dryness, any degree of temperature, any proportion of daylight or darkness, strong winds or gentle breezes, man can produce. He can, if he wishes, supply the climate of the polar regions or that of the hot dry desert, but at a price. As Bowman suggests: "Man can build a comfortable and well-lighted city and provide education, opera, and games at the South Pole, or build an artificial, rain-compelling mountain range in the Sahara at an expense equivalent to that of cutting a few Panama Canals. But will it pay?"¹ It may be concluded that the limits imposed by natural environment are not insuperable and that they are being changed by science and technology.

Culture not only pushes back the limits of geographical conditions, it actually changes them. The cutting down of forests increases floods. Cultivation of the hillside may destroy the soil through erosion. The dust storms which are turning sections of the grazing lands of the United States into deserts are caused by man, who has ploughed up the grass roots that formerly bound the soil.

The soils of the earth, however, can be reconstructed as well as depleted, as farmers do yearly. The Grand Coulee Dam in eastern Washington creates a lake that makes a desert bloom. Lakes may be formed and deserts made fertile. It is now possible to clear away fog from an aeroplane landing-field, and also to extend vision through a fog to a much greater distance. It has proved difficult to create rain, though the planting of forests will in time increase precipitation. We may conclude that the further development of culture will furnish man in part with an artificial substitute for his natural environment.

¹ Isaiah Bowman, *Geography in Relation to the Social Sciences* (New York, 1934), p. 164.

SUMMARY

This chapter has assessed the significance of natural environment for man and his culture.¹ A review of the relationship between geography and race revealed that the former may play a part in the modification and selection of bodily structure, but as to what significance for culture this may have, we are not entirely clear. It would seem, too, that a plausible relationship might be established between energetic behaviour and certain kinds of climate, but convincing evidence is lacking that such climatic stimulations of energy are responsible for the growth of culture.

The fact is that in the growth of culture, "We have no evidence of a creative force of environment."² It was pointed out that the culture of a region may change profoundly while the geographical conditions remain constant. New Zealand to-day has a social heritage quite unlike that of the inhabitants whom the white man displaced. Also, two or more groups may live in the same general region, yet show greatly divergent patterns of behaviour, as was shown for the Hopi and the Navaho.

Geography does play an important rôle in furnishing materials for culture. It does not dictate what materials shall be used. The reindeer was domesticated by the Lapps, but not by the Eskimos, among whom it was first introduced by the American government. Nor does geography dictate how materials shall be utilised. Cows are used for meat by some peoples, for milk by others, and exclusively for religious purposes by still others. The use of the material furnished by nature depends on the existing state of knowledge and the point of view of the prevailing folkways. As the culture expands, new materials of nature are utilised. Waterways served as transportation routes when the boat was invented, and now the air is the route for the dirigible, balloon, and the aeroplane.

Man is, of course, an organism adapted to nature. As such, he is ultimately dependent on his geographic environment. Wide fluctuations in geographical conditions set limits. However, given relative stability of natural conditions, such as man now enjoys, he can become master of his natural environment rather than remain its slave. Man's growth in knowledge has allowed him to escape in part from the controls of nature to which other animals are subject, and even to substitute increasingly an environment of his own devising. In the life of man the major emphasis deserves to be placed on the cultural rather than the natural environment.

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. Does climate affect races and, through races, influence societies?
2. Are there variations in social life because of variations in energy in different climates?
3. Are the temperate zones more favourable to the development of civilisation than other regions?
4. What is the rôle of geography as a supplier of materials for culture?
5. Why do we say geography is a limiting rather than a creative factor as regards the superorganic?
6. Is the geographical location of a community to-day less important or more important than it was a century ago? Why?

¹ The rôle of geography in affecting the location, size, and functions of communities is considered in Chapter XIV, "Human Ecology".

² Franz Boas, "The Aims of Anthropological Research", *Science*, vol. 76, pp. 605-13, 1932.

7. In what ways has culture changed the natural environment?
8. A comparative study of the cultural similarities of two peoples living under dissimilar geographic conditions.
9. A comparative study of the cultural dissimilarities of two peoples living under similar geographical conditions.

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PART III : GROUP BEHAVIOUR

Sociology as the study of social relations is primarily concerned with groups. A man cannot be social by himself unless he has previously lived with others.

In Part III we undertake to examine systematically certain aspects of group behaviour. We are interested in knowing how groups arise and become cohesive. These topics are treated in Chapter VI under the heading "Group Integration". One of the principal factors in the cohesiveness and stability of groups is organisation, which consists in part of a system of inter-related social rôles governed by social norms. But situations arise, especially in a changing society, where the norms underlying social organisation are not applicable or effective. In such situations, the controls that usually restrain extreme behaviour are inoperative, leading to crowd behaviour. Or if there is confusion because of a new issue confronting the group, a period of group unrest may ensue, accompanied by group discussion, until public opinion crystallises in new cultural directives. Sociology must reckon not only with culturally organised group behaviour but with group behaviour when tradition breaks down or is challenged or is reformulated ; hence Chapter VII on "Crowds and Publics". A certain amount of social unrest, and challenge to the social order, is permitted ; but the group tries to limit deviation from the established norms. How it undertakes to do so is considered in the concluding Chapter VIII on "Social Control".

CHAPTER VI

GROUP INTEGRATION

THE NATURE OF INTEGRATION

We want to know what group integration is, how it is achieved, and the factors increasing or decreasing it. But because integration is a group phenomenon, we need first to know why and how groups are formed. When we have this knowledge, we can then undertake to learn what accounts for different degrees of cohesion.

Why and how Groups are formed. A simple statement is that groups are formed in order to satisfy human needs. A basic need is survival, and the family is an illustration of a group which serves to meet this need, for without the help of others the human infant would perish. Groups also provide many activities which would not be possible to a lone individual. It takes twenty-two men to play football, and it takes many thousands to support grand opera. We derive so many satisfactions from groups that group affiliation itself becomes precious to us. We want to feel that we belong to certain groups and that these groups accept us. In this way groups provide us with security and fellowship.

The Nature of the Social Group. The term, group, is used by sociologists in several different senses. One is the *statistical category*, which refers to persons who have some attribute in common, logically permitting them to be grouped together, such as devotees of baseball or persons 65 years of age and over. Another is the *social category*, which refers to persons who have the same status and perform the same rôle, as for instance, women, stenographers, or divorcees. A *social group*, in contrast to the foregoing, is characterized by patterned interaction, shared beliefs and values, and "consciousness of kind". It is with social groups that this chapter is concerned.

There are various types of social groups, ranging in size from the dyad (for example, a marriage) to the all-inclusive society, and differing in organisation, as informal friendships and formal associations.

Attractiveness and Approachability as Factors in Integration. How attractive a person is to the rest of a group is more important for group integration than how attracted he is to the group, although both are essential. When a member of a group seeks to become or remain attractive to the others, he engages in what Goffman has called "impression management", a complicated process.¹ He must, taking and responding to cues from the group, demonstrate attractiveness by

¹ Erving Goffmann, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (University of Edinburgh Social Science Research Centre, 1956, Monograph No. 2).

showing that he has superior qualities desired by the group. But he must not over-impress, lest he be regarded as unapproachable. That attractiveness and approachability are factors in group integration has been tested in a study of 12 work groups, each of 5-6 caseworkers, in a public assistance agency.¹ The test of integration was calling a co-worker by his first name, which was not the standard practice in the group. Popularity was judged by the number of friendship choices, and approachability by low-seniority. The data support the theory that individuals who are approachable and attractive have the best chance of winning acceptance in a peer group. Unpopular oldtimers were least likely to be integrated into the group. Further analysis showed that if the service a member has to offer is great enough, members may be willing to pay the cost of unapproachability. Such a person receives respect without liking. The deference shown him is the basis of social differentiation in the group.

The foregoing discussion is an example of the general theory propounded by Homans that all social interaction is a kind of exchange. Above, respect is exchanged for service. Homans argues that no exchange continues for long unless both parties are making a profit.² Each person in an exchange expects that rewards will be proportional to cost. The more to a man's disadvantage the rule of distributive justice fails of realisation, the more likely, according to Homans, is he to show anger.

What Integration is. Group integration, then, refers to the ties which the members have one with another. These ties vary in intensity from one group to another, so that we speak of highly integrated and loosely integrated groups. Actually there are not just two polar types but various degrees of integration. And since integration refers to one or more ties, it may be high in some respects, loose in others; for example, a family may be highly integrated with regard to economic production and loosely integrated with regard to affection, or vice versa. The Negroes in the United States are more closely integrated into the economic life of the white community than the social life. These considerations raise the question whether we can correctly use the phrase "group integration" as a unitary concept. A unitary concept of cohesiveness is acceptable only when the different aspects of cohesiveness are highly correlated, which is sometimes not the case.³

¹ P. M. Blan, "A Theory of Social Integration", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 65, pp. 545-56, May, 1960.

² George Caspar Homans, *Social Behaviour: Its Elementary Forms* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc. 1961), Chap III.

³ Neal Gross and William E. Martin, "On Group Cohesiveness", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 57, p. 546, May, 1952.

COMPONENTS OF INTEGRATION*

MECHANICAL AND ORGANIC INTEGRATION

Interdependence resulting from Division of Labour is an Integrating Factor.

What we have to consider now are the factors that cause individuals to remain in the group instead of withdrawing from it.

Sharing the same characteristics makes for group solidarity, as does interdependence resulting from division of labour. Durkheim (and others such as Tönnies) used the concept, *mechanical* solidarity, to describe the small community or society in which all members share the same basic characteristics and consequently feel sympathy for one another. They used the concept, *organic* solidarity, to refer to group integration resulting from division of labour. They also tended to use the same concepts in a historical context: mechanically solidary societies precede organically solidary societies in point of time.

These concepts are admirably illustrated in an account of four communities in Yucatan,¹ ranging from folk society at the one extreme to urbanised society at the other. The most homogeneous of the four communities is Tusik where with one exception the entire population consists of agriculturalists. The exception is the priestly leader who is supported by the people because of his office. With few exceptions there are no specialists or half-specialists such as carpenters, masons, or storekeepers. • Racially, the population is homogeneous, with Maya blood predominating. The great majority of the names are Indian rather than Spanish. The language is primarily Indian. The ability to speak Spanish carries no prestige. The leaders in Tusik are those who express the old way of life. Tusik would be considered a community characterised by mechanical integration.

By degrees, one moves from Tusik to Chan Kom, then to Dzitas, and finally, to the least isolated and most highly urbanised Merida. Here the heterogeneity shows in the nearly 100 different occupations; the many residents who are not native to the city; the groups from every Mexican state and 56 foreign countries; the mixed racial groups; the use of both Spanish and Mayan as important languages; and the significant differences in social classes.

Tusik, mechanically integrated, shows the basic characteristics of the ideal "folk" society: isolation, cultural homogeneity, organisation of the conventional understandings into a "single web of interrelated meanings", the predominantly personal character of social relationship, the relative importance of familial institutions and the relative importance of sacred as compared with secular sanctions. Merida, organically integrated, tends to show the opposite characteristics.

¹ Robert Redfield, *The Folk Culture of Yucatan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941).

NORMATIVE INTEGRATION

Consensus on "Rules of the Game" is a Unifying Force. Animals other than man participate in a division of labour which serves to integrate their group life. Thus ants have a highly organised social life built around the division of labour. But man is the only animal with a substantial culture, and the culture may be an integrating factor in group life. Especially important in this regard are the group norms, which regulate conduct by setting up expectations of how individuals are supposed to behave. The division of labour of the Eskimo men and women is, of course, prescribed by the culture. There are established notions about women's rôles and men's rôles. But there are other norms than those of division of labour which affect the relationships of Eskimo men and women and which tend to bind them together more firmly than would be the case if there were no such norms. Such, for instance, are the norms governing sexual activities, which prohibit promiscuity.

What we are saying is that if there are rules of the game, and the rules are adhered to, the activity of the players will be more closely integrated than if they try to play without rules or do not conform to them. When there is agreement on opinions or values, we say there is *consensus*. Consensus is then a measure of integration; since consensus is a matter of degree, scales can be devised to measure the extent to which a given opinion is held by the members of a group.¹

Ethnocentrism as a Cohesive Factor. There is a general tendency to regard one's own associates as the chosen people, one's culture as the best of all cultures, and one's community as "God's own country". The best fraternity is usually one's own. Many colleges have "the finest campus in the country". As Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, "The axis of the earth protrudes through the centre of each and every town." This preferential feeling which members of a group have for their own culture, referred to as ethnocentrism, is a cohesive factor in group life.

Observation of the behaviour of individuals in different societies suggests that ethnocentrism is stronger in relatively stationary, isolated societies than in groups characterised by high rates of mobility and change. Contact with cultures other than one's own may produce a xenocentric view in which a culture other than one's own is preferred; or such contact may lead to cultural relativism, wherein each society is evaluated in terms of its own circumstances and values.²

Ethnocentrism may be Dysfunctional in Intergroup Relations. Although ethnocentrism is functional in promoting social control within a

¹ M. W. Riley, J. W. Riley, Jr., and M. L. Toby, "The Measurement of Consensus", *Social Forces*, vol. 31, pp. 97-106, December, 1952.

² Donald P. Kent and Robert G. Burnight, "Group Centrism in Complex Societies", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 57, pp. 256-9, November, 1951.

group, it may be dysfunctional in intergroup relations. Research suggests that for a group to appear ethnocentric entails measurable costs in intergroup relations. Apparent ethnocentrism incurs hostility on the part of other groups.¹

Are some Value Systems more Highly Integrating than others? High consensus with respect to any set of norms tends to integrate a group more than low consensus, but are some norms more integrating than others? This question arises in connection with the problem of whether democratic leadership is more highly integrating than dictatorial leadership. In a well-known experiment² using boys' clubs, groups with democratic leadership showed less friction than groups with autocratic leadership. Friction or lack of solidarity was measured by the relative number of remarks in which "I" was used rather than "we", the number of friendly and unfriendly comments, and the number of remarks indicating contentment or discontent. Does this experiment show that dictatorial leadership *per se* causes more dissatisfaction or that it causes more discontent in certain American groups under certain conditions? The United States is a country with democratic traditions, and dictatorial leadership is, generally speaking, anathema. Was dictatorial leadership so disturbing in Nazi Germany?

The efficacy of values as integrative forces depends on the nature of the behaviour to be integrated. If the objective, as in a parliamentary body, is to arrive at determinations of policy which will work and will be acceptable to those to whom it applies, then relatively free and unrestricted discussion under democratic leadership is usually more effective than dictatorial edicts. But if the problem is to train an army that will make an effective fighting force, some limitation has to be placed on the participation of the soldiers in the decision-making process.

If we take a particular goal, like family integration, we can compare various value systems in terms of their relative efficacy in achieving the goal. Thus we know that the value system of the Roman Catholic Church forbids divorce and that the divorce rate of Catholics is lower than that of Protestants. We cannot conclude that the effect is greater family integration, because the Catholic Church permits annulments and separations; and there is some evidence³ that the rate of dissolution of Catholic marriages in the United States is not significantly lower than that of Protestants. The Mormons have perhaps the lowest rate of marital breakdown of any major religious group. So we conclude that the Mormon normative system is more highly integrative

¹ William R. Catton, Jr., and Sung Chick Hong, "The Relations of Apparent Minority Ethnocentrism to Majority Antipathy", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 27, pp. 178-91, April, 1962.

² Ralph White and Ronald Lippitt, "Leader Behavior and Member Reaction in Three Social Climates", in D. Cartwright and A. Zander, *Group Dynamics* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Company, 1953).

³ William J. Goode, *After Divorce* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955).

than that of most other groups, so far as family life is concerned. The stability of Mormon marriages may, of course, be due to factors other than the teachings of the church, such as income and occupational factors. And we are not saying that integration is good or bad, that integration in family life may not be bought at a high price, or that there are not other values than integration which groups esteem, like freedom and independence.

Preceding paragraphs have shown that group cohesion is fostered when members satisfy one another's important needs and when they agree on social values. Study¹ of group cohesion in informal groups of air force personnel shows that when integration is achieved through reciprocal need satisfaction, the group tends to be symbiotic, that is, made up of unlike individuals, whereas if integration is consensual, the group is more likely to be composed of like individuals.

Normative Consistency fosters Integration. A group tends to be more highly integrated if its norms are consistent, for if they are not, the members may work at cross-purposes. Karen Horney has observed that the culture of the United States embraces a number of contradictory teachings such as those of Christianity extolling altruism and self-sacrifice, whereas the economic system encourages self-seeking and personal success. These and other conflicts are developed more fully in another chapter,² where it is shown that, although the group as a whole tolerates these inconsistencies reasonably well by a process of compartmentalisation, which avoids the conflict inherent in the incompatible values, not all individuals are successful in achieving such compartmentalisation.

Discipline Unites the Group. Among the values that tend to integrate a group and make it resistant to disruption, high priority must be assigned to discipline. The presence of discipline, especially courage and persistence in critical situations, is often notable in groups showing unusual integration.³ Thus one is impressed by the marked integration of the British nation in the middle of the twentieth century. This solidarity was shown especially in time of deep crisis in World War II, when the island was under heavy air bombardment by the Germans, when the disastrous retreat at Dunkirk had occurred, and invasion appeared to be imminent. Their great war leader promised only blood, sweat, tears ; but there was no collapse, only greater effort and greater unity. The reasons are many, but prominent is the fact that the British are a disciplined people. You see the discipline in the queues that form at the bus stops. Each person takes his proper place, and there is no crowding and pushing. You see the discipline in the austerity programme with reduced imports and increased

¹ Edward Gross, "Symbiosis and Consensus as Integrative Factors in Small Groups", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 21, pp. 174-9, April, 1956.

² Chapter X, "Culture and Personality".

³ R. B. Cattell, Chap. 2 in Cartwright and Zander, *op. cit.*

exports, and with rationing and the going without, in order to bring the economy into balance, while other nations in similar difficulty do not make comparable sacrifices. You see the discipline of the English in their characteristic practice of understatement, a form of self-control. You see it in the efficiency and honesty with which their welfare programmes, especially the health insurance schemes, are administered. The authors of this book on the occasion of a visit to a European country where only a partial system of health insurance is in effect asked governmental officials why all the expenses of medical care were not provided in that country as in England. Because, said one official, we cannot trust our people the way the British can. Our people will feign illness and bribe the doctors to get benefits to which they are not entitled. An English child is taught from infancy to be honest; but our children early learn to be deceitful and evasive, because our emphasis is on punishment for wrong-doing rather than on reward for good behaviour. Whether his analysis was sound or not, he was commenting on an important difference in the normative systems of two cultures.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL INTEGRATION

Our discussion has shown that integration may involve agreement or consensus on group norms. Consensus is, of course, a social psychological phenomenon. But more than consensus may be involved in integration. As the example of the British showed, there is also present a feeling of satisfaction because of the consensus. This feeling of satisfaction is sometimes referred to as morale. It is this experience of morale that we wish to consider next.

Husband and wife are, we have seen, held together in part by their economic dependence upon each other and in part by the teachings of the culture regarding appropriate marital behaviour. Especially important are ideologies of the nature of marriage. If the group believes, as do Catholics, that marriages are indissoluble, then divorce will be relatively rare, although separations may not be. The possibility of emotional divorce (that is, psychological alienation of the marital pair one from the other), even when the marital bond remains formally intact, introduces the idea that there are social psychological factors in integration. Group cohesion depends in part on morale, a sentiment built up around satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Interdependent activity, consensus, and morale are, in sum, the principal factors affecting the integration of groups.

Group Integration is strengthened by Mutual Satisfaction, not by Social Interaction alone. This proposition is supported by a study¹ which found that a sample of Danish killers chose their victims within their circle of relatives or acquaintances in nine cases out of ten. This

¹ Kaare Svalastoga, "Homicide and Social Contact in Denmark", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 62, pp. 37-41, July, 1956.

ratio showed no significant change from the prewar to the postwar years despite an increase in the homicide rate. The preponderant choice of familiars as victims suggests that the survival of the human group depends on its ability to provide consensual and or symbiotic satisfaction to its members, not on social interaction *per se*.

There have been a number of studies to show that if the members of a group like each other, the morale is better than if they do not like each other ; and the stability of the group is enhanced. In one experiment in a juvenile correctional institution, the girls were asked to name those with whom they wished to room ; and when their choices were granted, the amount of disturbance in the institution decreased. The introduction of an undesired girl into the group produced tensions in the group, and the introduction of a second undesired member produced disproportionately greater disturbance.¹ The theory is that, in the realm of one's social life, one should be free to choose one's associates, and the group so freely chosen will be more congenial and more highly integrated than one where choice does not exist. This argument should not, however, be used to justify a membership ban on members of other races and religions, for such bans by associations actually curtail one's freedom to choose associates on the basis of personal qualities, since broad groupings are categorically excluded.

Sociometry : the Measurement of Group Attraction and Repulsion Patterns. The measurement of the attraction and repulsion patterns of groups (that is, who likes whom), which has come to be known as *sociometry*, has been carried quite far ; and a considerable body of literature has accumulated on the subject. It is mainly concerned with the investigation of small groups and constitutes a sort of microsociology. One limitation is its relative neglect of the mass society in which we live in the middle of the twentieth century. The small groups are treated as closed small systems without due regard for the larger system, so that in the concentration on social psychological problems, the cultural factor is often neglected.

There is a circular or cumulative effect of group liking on group solidarity. The more members like each other, the more they will tend to do things together ; and the doing things together, agreeably, further intensifies the liking.² In a study of data gathered by questionnaire from 5,871 production workers of a machinery factory, it was found that group integration was facilitated by the liking of group members for each other and by the opportunities for interaction. Such opportunities were affected by the size of the group the workers formed and the duration of the groups.³ The implications of this

¹ J. L. Moreno, *Who Shall Survive?* (Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Company, 1934).

² George Homans, *The Human Group* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950).

³ Stanley E. Seashore, *Group Cohesiveness in the Industrial Work Group* (Ann Arbor, Mich. : University of Michigan Survey Research Center, 1954).

study are that if you wish to increase the solidarity of a factory group, it will help if the individuals who work together like each other and have opportunity for continued interaction.

In April, 1927, six female operators assembling telephone relays were moved out of the room where they had worked with others and moved into a test room. Records of their output had been kept before they were transferred. Previously they had worked under the direction of a group chief; but in the test room they worked in the presence of a "friendly observer". The six girls were given a physical examination every six weeks. Rest pauses were introduced, and their output rose. The supervisors of the test were inclined to ascribe the increased production to the introduction of the rest periods. Then the rest pauses were abolished. The output continued to rise. It then became clear to the investigators that what was increasing the productivity of the workers was not so much the changes in their working conditions as the sense of importance which the girls felt in being singled out for special consideration. They did not know why they were being studied, but they knew that they were in some way a select group, and the knowledge gave them a zest in their work which they had previously lacked. They demonstrated that high morale promotes efficiency as well as group integration.¹

In another experiment,² a prestige hierarchy was established, with some men given the authority to tell others what to do and how to do it. Of the high-status persons, some were told, "You are secure in your jobs," while others were told, "You may be changed to a lower status later." Some low-status persons were told, "You will not be allowed to rise," whereas others were told, "You may be promoted." Measurements indicated that those most attracted to the group were the high-status persons who were told they would be secure in their jobs and the low-status persons who were given the assurance that they might be promoted. This study indicates that, in our culture, security in an already satisfactory status, or the prospect of advancement for those in low positions, makes for high morale and group integration.

Reference Groups, Relative Deprivation, and Morale. If we revert to the experiment of the girls who assembled telephone relays, we note that their satisfaction was in large part the result of comparisons they made between their status in the factory and that of the other girls they had left behind in the assembly room. They had been selected for a special purpose which they felt was good and added to their prestige, and the others had not. Groups which serve as points of comparison are known as *reference groups*, although the concept also

¹ C. E. Turner, "Test Room Studies in Employee Effectiveness", *American Journal of Public Health*, vol. 23, pp. 577-84, 1933.

² Harold H. Kelley, "Communication in Experimentally Created Hierarchies", *Human Relations*, vol. 4, pp. 39-56, 1951.

has other meanings.¹ The significant point here is that we compare ourselves with others, and if the comparison is favourable, our morale rises; if not, our morale drops. The members of the faculty of the X State University may get an increase in salary which would be expected to raise morale; yet if the members of a comparable sister institution in the same state, namely the University of X, get an appreciably larger increase, the morale of the faculty of the X State University may be adversely affected. This is the phenomenon of *relative deprivation*.

FACTORS AFFECTING INTEGRATION

In the preceding paragraphs, we have analysed integration in terms of its component parts: interdependent or common activity, consensus, and morale. We wish now to consider the factors that affect integration, that is, the factors that are associated with increasing or decreasing integration.

Let us consider some observations on a reform group which is reported to be highly cohesive.² This group was the Columbia (Missouri) Committee on Racial Equality, organised for the purpose of trying to eliminate segregation in facilities serving the public in the local community. The group met regularly, once a week, on the same night. They had clearly defined methods and goals. So there was consensus. They agreed on direct but nonviolent action. Test teams would pay a visit to a restaurant to see if it would serve Negroes. If not, the group would try to negotiate with the owner. If negotiation failed, they would resort to picketing, or a boycott, or a sit-down. Their possession of such potential power gave them confidence and led to many victories.

SIZE OF GROUP

We can use this illustration as a springboard for certain observations regarding factors in group integration. One of these is size of group. The reform group described in the preceding paragraph, we are told, was relatively small—twenty to thirty persons. It is easier to integrate a small group for many kinds of activity than a large group. The reader will probably have noticed that at social affairs like teas or receptions the group tends to break up into small conversational units. When discussion groups were formed consisting of twelve members, it was found that they were more likely to break up into smaller, separate groups than when the discussion groups consisted of six persons.³ Also there was less consensus in the larger

¹ Tamotsu Shibutani, "Reference Groups as Perspectives", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 60, p. 562, May, 1955.

² Verda and Irwin Deutscher, "Cohesion in a Small Group", *Social Forces*, vol. 33, pp. 336-41, May, 1955.

³ A. Paul Hare, "Interaction and Consensus in Different Sized Groups", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 17, pp. 261-7, 1952.

groups. In another study¹ the function of size in small-group interaction was investigated from published data and observation of governmental and economic organisations in the United States Congress and in the state of Oregon. The mean group size of representative Senate subcommittees and of selected political and economic committees in Oregon ranged from 4.7 to 7.8.

The reasons why integration is more difficult to achieve in a large than a small group are numerous and complex, but an important factor is the number of relationships.² Two persons, A and B, can have only one relationship. A, B, and C can have three relationships, A-B, A-C, and B-C. In the same way it can be shown that four persons may have six sets of relationship; five persons, ten sets, and so on. The addition of an individual to a group increases the size of the group in a simple arithmetic progression, whereas the number of personal interrelationships within the group increases in the order of triangular numbers.³ If we consider not just (a) as shown above, the possible relationships between any two members of a group, but (b) potential relationships between an individual or group combination, and (c) potential relationships between any group combination of two or more and any other individual or group combination of two or more,⁴ the following line shows how the potential relationships increase as the number of individuals involved increases:

$$\begin{array}{ccccccc} N = & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 \\ \text{P.R.} = & 1 & 6 & 25 & 90 & 301 & 966 \end{array}$$

If we use the family as an illustration, an example of (a) above would be the relationship between two brothers; (b) the relationship between parent (group) and children (group); (c) the relationship between individual and group—e.g., grandfather and grandchildren. When all of these combinations are considered, we see how groups must be kept small if the total number of potential relationships is to be kept down. The addition of an in-law to a household of mother, father, and three children means the addition of 211 new potential relationships.⁵

¹ John James, "A Preliminary Study of the Size Determinant in Small Group Interaction", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 16, pp. 474-7, August, 1951.

² James H. S. Bossard, *The Sociology of Child Development* (2nd ed.; New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), p. 145.

³ If P = the number of personal relationships between any two persons and n the number of persons, the formula is:

$$P = \frac{n(n-1)}{2}$$

⁴ The total number of intragroup personal relationships is expressed by the formula:

$$\text{P.R.} = \frac{(3^n - 2^{n+1}) + 1}{2}$$

where n is the number of individuals.

⁵ William M. Kephart, "A Quantitative Analysis of Intragroup Relationships", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 55, pp. 544-9, May, 1950.

It is not surprising, therefore, that families with four or more children had the lowest mean score on a family solidarity scale, whereas families with one child had the highest score.¹

Table 3 shows the approximate number of members in a sample of 895 gangs. Nearly two-thirds consist of 20 or fewer members. Gangs emphasise intimacy of contact and therefore tend to be small.

TABLE 3
APPROXIMATE NUMBERS OF MEMBERS IN 895 GANGS *

Number of Members.	Number of Gangs.	Percentage of Total.
From 3 to 5 (inclusive)	37	4.1
From 6 to 10	198	22.1
From 11 to 15	191	21.5
From 16 to 20	149	16.7
From 21 to 25	79	8.8
From 26 to 30	46	5.1
From 31 to 40	55	6.1
From 41 to 50	51	5.7
From 51 to 75	26	2.9
From 76 to 100	25	2.8
From 101 to 200	25	2.8
From 201 to 500	11	1.2
From 501 to 2,000	2	0.2
Total Gangs	895	100.0

* Frederic M. Thrasher, *The Gang* (Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, 1927). Copyright, 1927, by the University of Chicago.

The Primary Group has great Integrating Potentialities. One of the first sociologists to note the special function of small groups in society was Charles Horton Cooley. He directed attention especially to what he called *primary groups*, groups characterised by intimate relationships between members. Such relationships are usually, but not always, face to face. A close relationship can be carried on by correspondence ; it was through a liking for each other's published verse that Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barrett developed their romantic interest in each other. Since our concern here is with relationships rather than with group membership *per se*, it is more accurate to speak of primary relations rather than primary groups. Primary relations can be provided by a variety of groups and not just by those which Cooley identified as the principal primary groups : the family, the neighbourhood, and the play group. And, on the contrary, in

¹ Luther T. Jansen, "Measuring Family Solidarity", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 17, pp. 732, December, 1952.

some neighbourhoods—and even in some families and play groups—relationships between the participants may not be personal and intimate. Cooley called the above-mentioned groups primary, because they are first both in time and importance. They are the groups of infancy and early childhood which usually play a commanding rôle in the development of personality.¹

Social relations which are not primary but which are casual or formal are called *secondary relations*. Actually there are not just two polar types, namely, primary and secondary group relations, but various degrees of intimacy ranging from, say, that of very close friends to casual acquaintances. The point is that close friends are highly identified sympathetically with each other and are therefore greatly influenced by the relationship. A further qualification is that in a particular relationship, A may be more closely identified (more intimate) with B than B is with A.

Secondary-group relations are less time-consuming and less demanding than primary relations, and we can therefore support or sustain more of them. Another way to express this is to say that the number of friends anyone can have is much smaller than the number of his possible acquaintances. Sociologists explain this by saying that a primary relationship is a relationship involving the whole personality, whereas a secondary relationship is segmental, involving only a small fraction of the self. It is probably more accurate to speak of the primary-group relationship as involving *more* of the self than does the secondary relationship.

Parsons had delineated specific aspects of primary and secondary social structures which he calls *pattern variables*. They are fundamental choices which must be made by a person before he can act in a given situation. These choices, which are conceptualised in polar terms, are those between affectivity and affective neutrality, diffuseness and specificity, particularism and universalism, quality orientation and performance orientation, and self-orientation and collective orientation. That is, one must choose either to get immediate gratification or to exercise self-restraint because of long-term considerations; to respond to many aspects of the person or object or to respond to some selection of those aspects; to treat the person or object in the light of his or its special relationship to oneself or to treat the object or person in terms of a general principle without reference to oneself; to treat a person or object in terms of his or its supposed qualities or to treat it or him in terms of what it or he may be expected to do; and to serve self-interest or group interest.² Although these variables are stated in polar terms, it is recognised that in reality they are

¹ C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909, 1929), p. 27.

² This presentation follows that in *The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons*, edited by Max Black, Engelwood Cliffs, N.J. (Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), pp. 285-6.

distributed on a continuum. A number of studies have undertaken to operationalise certain of these concepts, as for instance, in the empirical study by Stouffer and Toby,¹ in which the subjects were asked to respond to a number of situations like the following : " You are riding in a car driven by a close friend, and he hits a pedestrian. You know he was going at least 35 miles an hour in a 20-mile-an-hour speed zone. There are no other witnesses. His lawyer says that if you testify under oath that the speed was only 20 miles an hour, it may save him from serious consequences. What do you think you'd probably do ? " Although this study found that it is possible to classify people according to degrees of predisposition to behave in a particularistic, affectively-toned and diffuse manner in a situation involving rôle conflict between the obligations of friendship and the obligations of the larger society, there is a question as to whether the several variables are mutually exclusive or independent. Thus it has been noted that if affectivity is chosen, then the choice between particularism and universalism does not exist.² Moreover, the pattern variables are on such a high level of generality that they have limited utility for research.

Secondary Relations are relatively more common in Complex Modern Society. Secondary relations are not of much importance in tribal society or in other small groups of families but are highly important in modern civil society with its very large numbers, like the United States to-day. Of the three component parts of group integration (division of labour, consensus, and morale), the first is the one on which complex mass societies must mainly depend for integration. Or more precisely division of labour is relatively more important as an integrating force in modern society than in simple societies like those of most non-literate people. As the group gets bigger, consensus is less perfect and more difficult to achieve ; and as for morale, it is also more difficult to feel sentimental towards strangers. On the contrary, elaborate economic enterprises may require large numbers of workers and a complicated division of labour.

Primary Relations underlie Formal Social Systems and help to achieve their Goals. Modern society is built in large part on impersonal social relations ; but if all of the group interaction were impersonal, the society would be weakly integrated indeed. As it is, workers often complain about the monotony of modern factory production. Minute division of labour makes rare the experience of creative workmanship which comes when one makes the whole product. Management is far away, and ownership still further away. Yet there is considerable evidence that human beings need to feel that they belong. They

¹ Samuel A. Stouffer and Jackson Toby, " Role Conflict and Personality ", in Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., *Toward A General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952).

² Robert Dubin, " Parsons' Actor : Continuities in Social Theory ", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 25, pp. 466, August, 1960.

want to be assured that someone cares and that they are not alone. This is the kind of assurance or security that primary relations provide. In all large-scale formal organisation we therefore find a tendency for informal, personal relations to be established. In factories it will be small groups of employees who work together on a particular operation, or who fraternise during lunch-time. The Army, a vast, impersonal organisation with strict discipline, monotonous routine, and distasteful chores, recognises the need to balance somewhat the complex secondary organisation with primary relations, in the interests of morale, and encourages, as a matter of policy, the "buddy" relationship. Buddies train, play, fight together. They look after each other. A buddy is someone who cares, who will not desert you in combat or when the going gets rough.

From the standpoint of the larger, formal organisation, the principal function of the informal organisation is to help achieve the objectives of the system.¹ In the case of the Army, it is to make an effective fighting force. During World War II, the question was asked of a representative sample of soldiers: "What are the factors that keep you going?" The next to the most important reason given was "I don't want to let the other fellow down." This answer was surpassed only by prayer when the going got rough and by "the desire to get the job over with".² The primary relationship is thus a source of strength and, in time of trouble, it can be a partial substitute for religion.

The significance of primary group affiliation for morale in complex social organisations is not uniform for all social situations but varies with the social structure. Thus the significance of such affiliation is apparently greater in the army than on the college campus.³ It may be hypothesised that the more threatening the situation, the greater the utility of the primary relation.

While primary relations are satisfying, they are also demanding, and limiting. You cannot ignore your friends with impunity. If near by, they expect to see you frequently and to share certain activities with you. If they get into difficulty, they expect you to be helpful. If they disapprove of your conduct, you may curb it somewhat, since you do not want to offend them. When you associate with strangers or mere acquaintances, you are in large measure freed of such demands and expectations. You are let alone and left to do as you please, because nobody knows or cares. If you do not wish to be alone, you will be lonely, even utterly lonely, as so many people are in

¹ Edward A. Shils, "Primary Groups in the American Army", in R. K. Merton and P. F. Lazarsfeld (eds.), *Continuities in Social Research* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1950).

² S. A. Stouffer *et al.*, *The American Soldier*, vol. II (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1949), pp. 108-9, 174.

³ Henry Zentner, "Primary Group Affiliation and Morale", *Sociology and Social Research*, vol. 40, pp. 31-4, September-October, 1955.

the big, impersonal cities.¹ Here, then, is the paradox. Primary relations are integrating but restrictive. Secondary relations are liberating but non-integrating. It is interesting to consider different types of communities from the standpoint of the different degrees of integration and freedom they provide.

HOMOGENEITY

Size of group, we have seen, is related to group solidarity directly in terms of the volume of interaction and indirectly *via* the chances of consensus. It is easier to get agreement in a small group than in a big one. These observations introduce the phenomenon of homogeneity as a factor in group integration. A small group is more likely to be homogeneous than a large group; thus small tribal societies are in general more homogeneous than large modern states. But a small group can be more heterogeneous than a large group. Cyprus is culturally more heterogeneous than Sweden.

The Columbia Committee on Racial Equality, mentioned earlier, was a homogeneous group, ideologically. All the members belonged to the Fellowship of Reconciliation, an organisation devoted to social reform by non-violent means. The homogeneity of the group is said to have been one of the important reasons for the group's cohesiveness. They were in agreement on objectives and methods, and their consensus helped to integrate them.

The concept of homogeneity ties in with the concept of mechanical solidarity used earlier in this chapter. The more alike or homogeneous the members of a society, the more likely the society is to be organised on the basis of mechanical solidarity.

How homogeneity is related to integration can be seen in connection with divorce rates. A low divorce rate, if it is coupled with low rates of marital separations, is an index of a high degree of family integration; and a high divorce rate—since divorce implies marital dissolution—is evidence of poor family integration. Sweden has a very much lower divorce rate than the United States, 14.8 divorces per 100 marriages in 1950 compared with 23.1.² The reasons for the difference are many; but prominent among them is the greater cultural homogeneity of the Swedes, and of the Scandinavians generally. Among 1,000 Scandinavians there are on the average 2 Lapps, 1 Jew, 1 German, and 3 Catholics; in the United States the corresponding figures would be 33 Jews and 190 Catholics. Sweden has one set of divorce laws for all Swedes, whereas the United States has a separate and different set for each state and the District of Columbia. The divorce rate is lower in Sweden despite the fact that divorces are

¹ David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950).

² Kaare Svalastoga, "The Family in Scandinavia", *Marriage and Family Living*, vol. 16, p. 379, November, 1954; and W. F. Ogburn and M. F. Nimkoff, *Technology and the Changing Family* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1955), p. 217.

easier to get than in the United States. The standard of living is high in Sweden, although not quite so high as in the United States, a factor which should favour the United States so far as divorce rate is concerned, since income level is positively correlated with family stability. On the other hand, there is more levelling of income in Sweden, with fewer rich and fewer poor. Divorces are associated with cities, and the United States is more highly urbanised; but the difference is not great and is insufficient to account for the great differences in the divorce rate. So the differences in cultural homogeneity appear to be mainly responsible for the differences in family integration. When persons with highly similar traditions marry, they are more likely to stay married than are persons whose traditions are dissimilar.

Clash of interests is a Basic Obstacle to Group Integration. Even more important, the unity of a group is enhanced by common or supplementary interests and weakened by divergent and conflicting interests. The United States experienced a Civil War which nearly destroyed the Union because of the clash of interests of the urban industrial North and the rural agricultural South, focusing on the use of slave labour. If a society is culturally homogeneous, such divergencies of interest are less likely to occur than if the group is heterogeneous.

Also throughout history the stability of states, as in the case of France, has depended upon integration. Civil wars occur in states, as shown in recent Spain, only when integration is weak. However, wars between states may increase integration within a warring country, as was true in Germany under Bismarck, provided the war has not been too crippling.

An interesting question for the Trust Territories, set up by the Security Council of the United Nations, looking towards self-government in a democratic ethos, and for newly formed democratic states, is whether by attaining self-government they may not lose some efficiency in government based upon integration. Somewhat the same problem concerns power and democracy. Much of the world wants democracy, that is, government by the people; this is especially true in those countries where a degree of integration has been attained through power exercised by a social class or by an alien government. In such cases, democracy does not encourage integration, at least for a time, as in the case of Indonesia, but rather allows the centrifugal force of localism to operate in the different parts. In any attempt to form a world government, the obstacles to the essential integration will be great indeed.

The United States is a nation of many different ethnic and religious groups with different value systems. These differences are reflected in our cities as well as in other types of community. Robert Angell, interested in the factors influencing integration, undertook a study of cities in the United States with a population over 100,000.¹ He

¹ Robert Cooley Angell, *The Moral Integration of American Cities* (Supplement to the July 1951 issue of the *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 57).

constructed a welfare-effort index based on per capita expenditures raised from local sources. He used this measure as an index of community integration, on the assumption that the per capita expenditure for social services, with money derived from the local community, is a good measure of group morale and integration. Adjustments were made for the income of the community. On the negative side, a crime index was developed, on the theory that criminal acts lessen the integration of a community. Limitations of the method include the difficulty of obtaining comparable economic data and crime statistics for the cities studied ; differences in community needs reflected in social services ; and the use of so few measures for so complex a phenomenon as integration. Angell proceeded to correlate his index of community integration with a series of background factors, all but two of which produced nonsignificant correlations. The first of the two exceptions was cultural and economic heterogeneity, which correlated $-.59$ with integration, accounting thereby for 35 per cent of the variation in integration of the cities studied. The second significant factor, residential mobility, correlated $-.49$ with integration, accounting for 25 per cent of the variation. Heterogeneity and mobility combined gave a multiple correlation of $-.79$ with integration, accounting for 63 per cent of the variation. Angell therefore concludes that homogeneity and stability are the key factors in community integration.

PHYSICAL MOBILITY

We wish to consider certain aspects of cultural homogeneity as it relates to group integration, but first it is necessary to discuss briefly the factor of physical or residential mobility which Angell isolated. It is not difficult to see how mobility works against integration, for integration implies remaining in the group and wishing to remain, whereas mobility is an act which separates the individual or individuals from a group with which they have been affiliated. If the move is from one cultural area to another, there is present the problem of adjusting to new values. If the move is to the same kind of cultural area, there is still the problem of making new acquaintances and friends. So migration leads in any case to "de-grouping", at least temporarily, the individuals involved ; and the experience is often a difficult one, especially for the children.

In analysing the effects of migration, it is helpful to distinguish two types : mobility of a whole group and mobility of a single member of a group. When, as with some non-literate groups, the whole band moves from one site to another, following the game, there is probably little if any loss in group integration. When the members of a family move as a unit from one community to another, or one neighbourhood to another, the problem is one of integration into the new residential area. There are data which show that juvenile delin-

quency, an index of low community integration, is strongly associated with physical mobility. Or, stated the other way, a low delinquency rate may be expected for a stable community "even though it were characterised by poverty, bad housing, and overcrowding".¹ An evidence of social stability is home ownership. Another relevant point is that Negroes contribute a disproportionate share of juvenile delinquency, mainly in those urban environments to which they are recent migrants or which are in transition.

The situation is often different when the migrant is a single member of a family, usually the breadwinner engaged in a mobile occupation. There is considerable evidence that the stability of the family life of such persons is in general affected adversely. Thus higher than average divorce rates are shown by travelling salesmen and by members of the armed forces.² The explanation is that, on the one hand, the familial ties are broken or strained by absence, and on the other hand, there is greater temptation to unconventional behaviour in a new setting where controls are not so binding on the stranger.

It becomes obvious from the foregoing paragraphs, then, that physical mobility—of whatever type—is likely to pose problems for the integration of the group.

Orderly Careers are Integrating. Research has shown that an orderly career enhances social participation.³ Compared with men who have chaotic work histories, those who have even "a taste of an orderly career" (those who spend at least a fifth of their work-lives in ordered jobs) have stronger ties to formal associations. Their contacts with kin, friends and neighbours are more integrated, extensive and stable. Wilensky observes that although men with careers are only a small fraction of the labour force in modern society, they may be very important for social order.

Physical mobility may be linked to careers, in that the mobile are more likely not to have an orderly career.

Growing Old : the Process of Disengagement. A final factor in group interaction to be considered here is age. Data gathered in a study of "adult life" in Kansas City suggest the theory that ageing is accompanied by social disengagement.⁴ Many social ties are severed and those remaining are altered in quality. Retirement is a key event initiating or accelerating disengagement for men ; for women, widowhood. Old people do not relinquish all ties. Relationships with intimate kin (children and siblings) are intensified. If the theory

¹ Bernard Lander, *Towards an Understanding of Juvenile Delinquency* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1954).

² M. F. Nimkoff, "Occupational Factors and Marriage", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 49, pp. 248-54, November, 1943.

³ Harold L. Wilensky, "Orderly Careers and Social Participation: The Impact of Work History on Social Integration in the Middle Mass", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 26, pp. 521, August, 1961.

⁴ Elaine Cumming and William E. Henry, *Growing Old : the Process of Disengagement* (New York : Basic Books, 1961).

just stated is valid, social programmes which exert pressure on the aged to maintain activities they prefer to abandon may be ill-advised, although there is the further consideration of whether the activities, even if undesired, would be beneficial.

PROCESSES OF INTEGRATION

INTEGRATION *via* ASSIMILATION

The relationship between physical mobility and group integration may be viewed as an aspect of the problem of the relationship between homogeneity and integration. Mobility introduces a stranger into the group, and the problem is how to assimilate him without jeopardy to the group. In the new state of Israel, for example, representatives from about sixty different ethnic groups have been brought into the country since 1948. They speak different languages and have widely divergent customs. They are all Jews, but even in their religion they have considerable differences. For instance, the definition of what is kosher food is different for different groups, and Jews with one conception feel uncomfortable about eating at the homes of those with a different belief. Israel, a small state with a population (1960) of two million, needs migrants to utilise her resources and to provide more adequate defence. How absorb these aliens without disrupting the group? The problem is complex, but the aim is to create a culturally homogeneous state. To this end, for instance, Hebrew has been made the official language and is taught to all the school children, as well as to many adults.

The process whereby individuals or groups once dissimilar become similar, that is, become identified in their interests and outlook, is termed *assimilation*. It is "a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a cultural life".¹ Assimilation is a two-way process. Close contact of persons of dissimilar cultures always results in mutual interpenetration and fusion of culture traits, although the borrowing may not be so pronounced in one direction as the other.² The assimilation of African Negroes into the culture of America has proceeded to the point where Negroes generally evince no interest in Africa as a homeland, and possess culture traits which are almost altogether American in nature. While the Negro was being assimilated, however, America was adding such Negro contributions as jazz music and spirituals to its cultural store. Likewise, as Linton³ points out, the assimilation of Italians has given

¹ R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (2nd ed. ; Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, 1924), p. 735.

² Alain Locke and Bernhard J. Stern, *When Peoples Meet* (New York : Progressive Education Association, 1942).

³ Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York : Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1936), p. 335.

us, among other things, a wider interest in grand opera and spaghetti dinners.

Partial Assimilation and Integration. Assimilation, like integration, is a matter of degree. Ethnic groups not only contribute to the host culture, but they retain many of their own ways, so that the result, as in the United States, is cultural pluralism, a mosaic of separate groups. Cultural pluralism may thus often represent voluntary, incomplete assimilation. Where a minority group is rejected by the majority group, as the Irish were in Boston prior to 1865,¹ they have even more incentive to retain and develop their own institutions, such as schools and newspapers. The conflict of cultures in a community results, then, in some integration but also in the emergence of patterns which are not necessarily transitional to a common culture but may form a stable part of the culture.²

A comprehensive index,³ designed to measure the degree to which persons of foreign background have internalised certain aspects of American culture and the degree to which they have retained aspects of their own culture, has been devised by Campisi. The instrument appears to be valid and reliable, and, although based on Italian, French Canadian, and Portuguese groups in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, may perhaps with some adaptation be applied to other ethnic groups.

Another model for the measurement of assimilation, developed by Roy,⁴ comprises three social processes: acculturation, social integration and amalgamation. A random sample of Spokane Indians is compared with a sample of whites living in the same community. The measures of acculturation, using education, level of living and occupation, showed the Indians to have a much lower status than the whites. The measure of social integration showed participation in the formal institutional systems established primarily for Indians and cleavage in the voluntary organisations. Amalgamation, the percentage of white ancestry among the Indians, was inversely related to age and directly related to education, level of living, and income.

Phases of Assimilation. Observation of immigrants shows that the process of assimilation has two parts or stages, although the two may overlap in point of time. One is the suppression of the parent culture. We see this, for example, in the efforts of immigrants not to use the native tongue. The other is the acquisition of new ways, including

¹ Oscar Handlin, *Boston's Immigrants 1790-1865: A Study in Acculturation* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941).

² Ralph H. Danhof, "The Accommodation and Integration of Conflicting Cultures", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 49, pp. 14-23, July, 1943.

³ Paul J. Campisi, *A Scale for the Measurement of Acculturation* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago Libraries, August, 1947).

⁴ Prodipto Roy, "The Measurement of Assimilation: the Spokane Indian", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 67, pp. 541-551, March, 1962.

the new language. One is a process of unlearning the old ; the other a process of learning the new. Dornbusch has given us an excellent analysis of " the military academy as an assimilating institution ".¹ The function of the academy is to make officers out of civilians or enlisted men. This is accomplished by imparting technical knowledge and instilling appropriate attitudes. The new cadet must suppress pre-existing statuses. Discussions of wealth and family are taboo, and no money may be received from home. The objective is equality of status. Concurrently the cadet learns the new rules and how to adjust to conflicts between rules. He learns the formal regulations and the informal rules, the bases of normative integration. Solidarity is also furthered by successful responses to common experiences of a critical sort, involving deprivation, pain, or suffering. Finally, integration is strengthened by division of labour and the development of a bureaucratic organisation which puts its chief emphasis on the office, not the man.

Assimilation, Social Acceptance, and Integration. There is a common assumption that the more two persons interact, the more they are apt to like each other. All other things being equal, this is true.² The more they interact, the more alike they tend to become. And the more alike they become, we say, the better they will like each other. There is a companion idea that the more we know about others, the better we like them. The international exchange of students and university professors in the interests of world peace are based on such assumptions. But these are only half-truths, as will be shown by the following discussion.

Assimilation means that a person or group has acquired the values of another group. This represents normative integration. There is similarity of standards, tastes, interests. But to be fully integrated into the society, the individual or group which was formerly alien must be liked and accepted by the members of the society. And it is a matter of common observation that such acceptance is not always forthcoming. Indeed, sometimes the resistance to acceptance increases as a group becomes more completely assimilated. This has been true in the United States for a number of racial groups. The Negroes to-day are more fully assimilated than they were in slave times, and they are more fully integrated into American society for this reason and also because they have achieved a certain measure of organic integration in occupation, education, recreation, religion, etc. But there has been a lag in social psychological integration, or social acceptance. Can we say that Negroes in the United States are generally better liked by white people in the middle of the twentieth century than they were, say, a century ago, before emancipation ? The Negroes to-day are more fully assimilated, yet as a group they

¹ Sanford M. Dornbusch, *Social Forces*, vol. 33, pp. 316-21, May, 1955.

² George Homans, *op. cit.*

are now less well adjusted to the white man's world than they were in the earlier period of slavery. It has been shown by means of objective tests that the better educated Negroes are more militant in their objection to caste discrimination than are those with less training.¹ The more thoroughly assimilated Negroes become, the more they realise the limitations and discriminations under which they must live and the more resentful they become. The more assimilated the Negro, the more nearly he approaches the white man in competitive skill ; hence the greater becomes the white man's resentment against him.

Where the alien individuals differ from the majority group in culture only, assimilation may easily lead to rather complete acceptance and social integration. Members of the second and third generations of immigrants from northern Europe are readily absorbed. Even members of the first generation with unusual talent of some sort and an ability to take on the American patterns of life may win complete acceptance. But when a racial barrier, or what is thought to be a racial barrier, also exists between the two groups, the situation is radically different. An alien culture can be set aside, but not an alien skin.

Effects of large numbers on the Integration of a Minority Group. Earlier we considered the relationship between size of group and group integration. Now we examine another aspect of the problem of group size, this time the size of the alien group seeking admission and the relationship of size to acceptance. The principle may be stated thus : the larger the proportion of newcomers, the greater the resistance of the established group to their integration.² This hypothesis was tested experimentally by Moreno.³ At the Hudson School for Girls, a correctional institution in New York State, six or eight girls lived together in a cottage. It was found that the introduction of one Negro girl into a cottage caused little or no resentment, but the hostility increased if others of the same race were added, with the increase in resentment disproportionate to the increase in numbers. Similarly, opposition among whites to the integration of Negroes in the school system of the South varies with the size of the Negro population and is greatest where the percentage of Negroes is greatest.⁴

Measurements of integration. We have referred in previous paragraphs to various methods of measurement for different types of integration. We mentioned the standard sociometric test for recording preferences for associates for various purposes. We considered Angell's tests of the "moral integration" of cities. In the field of

¹ Charles S. Johnson, "Racial Attitudes of College Students", *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, May, 1934, pp. 24 ff.

² Lazarsfeld and Merton, *op. cit.*

³ J. L. Moreno, *op. cit.*

⁴ W. F. Ogburn and Charles Grigg, "Factors Related to the Virginia Vote on Segregation", *Social Forces*, vol. 34, pp. 301-8, May, 1956.

the family, there are tests for measuring the degree of consensus between husband and wife, and between parents and children. There are also devices for determining the state of morale between spouses, which we call marital happiness.

In addition there are scales for measuring *social distance*. Bogardus, following the suggestion of Robert Park, pioneered in developing a scale for the measurement of social distance between ethnic groups.¹ The Westies,² using scales which purport to measure social distance in four areas of interaction (residential, position of power and prestige, interpersonal relations, and physical aversion), found the greatest social distance between Negroes and Whites of low status and the progressive diminution of distance between those of higher status.

CO-OPERATION, CONFLICT, AND INTEGRATION

These measures of liking and disliking, and acceptance and rejection, call to mind Samuel Butler's observation that our experiences with others partake of the nature of either a string or a knife; they bind us closer together or they cut us apart. People marry and are divorced, work and strike, form religious brotherhoods and engage in sectarian strife. Indeed, the social organisation of a community at any given time represents the balance struck between these centripetal and centrifugal forces.

It is these on-going tendencies in group life, these fundamental ways in which men interact, to which the name *social processes* is applied. When men work together for common goals, their behaviour is called *co-operation*. When they strive against one another, their conduct is labelled *conflict*. Co-operation and conflict are the two basic processes of group life. We wish in this chapter to consider their relationship to group integration.

We have stated that these processes are operative in all group life, irrespective of the content of group behaviour. Therefore co-operation and conflict, and the derivative processes we shall consider shortly, are tool concepts to be used throughout our analysis of social behaviour. It should be noted, however, that these processes operate on three different levels: between groups, between individuals, and between the individual and a group. The principles which govern these processes are not the same for all three aspects. For example, the integration of the group is generally threatened more by conflicts within the group than by conflict between groups. And conflict may exist between groups, as in wars between modern states, without an expression of hostility on the part of all the members of one group towards the other.

¹ Emory S. Bogardus, *Immigration and Race Attitudes* (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1928). Also, *Social Distance*, Los Angeles, 1959.

² Frank R. Westie and Margaret L. Westie, "The Social Distance Pyramid: Relationships between Caste and Class", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 63, pp. 190-6, September, 1957.

Competition. Competition is the fundamental form of social struggle and occurs when demand outruns supply. The basic terms of competition are "a population of insatiable wants and a world of stubborn and inadequate resources".¹ In our society, for example, there are generally more people who want jobs than there are jobs available; hence there is competition for available places. Among those who already have employment there is competition for better posts. There is competition for luxuries, power, social position, fame, and all the other things not available for the asking.

Theoretically, if the attention of competitors is confined to the goals for which they are striving and if they are not aware of one another, the competition remains impersonal. However, human beings are social and cultural, which makes it difficult if not impossible for human competition to be impersonal. In his classic study of land use in central Boston, Firey has demonstrated that even ecological competition involves social factors, such as sentiment and symbolism.² When there is a shift in interest from the objects of competition to the competitors themselves, *rivalry* results. Rivalry is personalised competition. *A* wishes not only to win the prize but to beat *B*. Each knows that he can win the prize only by defeating the other. When personalised in this way the competition tends to become keener, and hostility between the competitors is easily engendered. As a consequence, antagonistic competition, or conflict, may develop.

In the interests of clarity, it has been necessary to define each process separately. But it is unrealistic to think that the several social processes are unrelated. In fact, the interrelationship is complex. Conflict itself may involve co-operation. There can be no conflict unless the competitors recognise one another as adversaries. In countries where duelling is the custom, an encounter occurs only when a challenge is made and accepted. The one who is challenged may ignore the invitation to fight if he feels the challenger is beneath him socially. The phenomenon of co-operation as a condition of conflict is recognised in the popular saying that it takes two to make a quarrel. Christianity takes cognizance of this fact when it recommends non-retaliation as a solution to the problem of hostility.

One of the more important generalisations in sociology has to do with the relation of out-group hostility to in-group solidarity. The generalisation may be stated thus: intergroup conflict is a potent factor in promoting intragroup co-operation. Indeed, it is difficult to exaggerate the part that external struggle plays in consolidating a group internally. If it does not eliminate intragroup conflict, it often subdues it and makes it covert. Co-operation and patriotism among the citizens of a nation are seldom more perfect than when

¹ Walton H. Hamilton, "Competition," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, IV (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937), p. 143.

² Walter Firey, *Land Use in Central Boston*.

the enemy is at the gate. In wartime there are coalition cabinets of different parties; and a common trick of politicians who want to dodge a domestic defeat is to get up a war scare.

Intergroup conflict will increase intragroup morale and integration if there is anticipation of victory and confidence in the struggle. Without these factors, the conflict may be disorganising.

Integration Decreases in the absence of a likely solution during a Crisis. In an experiment¹ a crisis situation was created for 12 groups of three people of the same sex and age, with 12 other groups acting as control. Participants were either personal acquaintances of the staff or residents of a housing development for married students. Tests of integration were helping behaviour, the absence of self-oriented behaviour, praise given to fellow students and lack of antagonism toward the experimenter or others in the group. Results indicated that integration decreases in the absence of a likely solution during a crisis. This can be explained by the fact that there is no good reason for co-operating if a solution is unavailable. Moreover, mounting frustration causes members to over-react to things not normally irritating, thus leading to aggression and withdrawal of help. Results of previous studies indicate that integration increases during a crisis if a likely co-operative solution is present and decreases if a likely competitive solution is present.

Co-operation is integrating; intragroup conflict is disorganising. Within a group, co-operation is an integrating factor and conflict is a disorganising influence. This is a general statement which needs qualification in particular situations because of the complex interrelationships of the two processes and the varying conditions under which they operate. In one experiment² two classroom groups were created. One was told that all the members would get the same grade depending upon the quality of the collective product. The other was told that they would be rewarded differentially, each in terms of his achievement. Tests showed that the co-operative groups were more highly integrated, more friendly, liked one another better. It may be noted that this was an experiment in the United States, a society that greatly emphasises competition. In another study³ sixteen male students met in groups of four to work on various tasks. Each student worked with each other student only once. Observers noted individual behaviour and group behaviour. In general it was found that effective group functioning was increased by co-operativeness, whereas group cohesiveness and friendliness were reduced by striving for individual prominence.

¹ Robert L. Hamblin, "Group Integration During a Crisis", *Human Relations*, vol. 11, pp. 67-76, 1958.

² Morton Deutsch, "The Effects of Co-operation and Competition Upon Group Processes", *Human Relations*, 2: 129-152, 199-231, 1949.

³ William Haythorn, "The Influence of Individual Members on the Characteristics of Small Groups", *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 48, pp. 276-84, 1953.

Both intragroup competition and conflict are disorganising, but the latter is more so. Hence there is interest in knowing why competition often turns into conflict. Competition is maintained by the agreement of the competitors on the norms governing the competition and by agreement on the application or interpretation of the norms. Changes in either may bring conflict. Thus in industry, new demands by the workers or by management, leading to a change in the status quo, if unacceptable to the other party, may result in a strike or a lockout. Many conflicts are caused by disputes about the proper application of the existing rules, as in disputes over umpires' decisions in a baseball game. Finally, competition may give rise to conflict when competition is initiated between groups which formerly did not compete, especially if there is long-standing prejudice against the new competitors. Thus conflict between white and Negro residents has developed when Negroes compete with whites for the same housing. When Negroes live in segregated areas, there is no competition for living space with whites, of course, and no conflict with them. Competition in this instance gives rise to conflict when the group which had had the advantage begins to lose it.

ACCOMMODATION

Since conflict disturbs the integration of the group, and social stability is favourable to social order, human societies make efforts to prevent conflict, to keep it within bounds when it occurs, and to terminate it.

Accommodation is the term used by the sociologist to describe the adjustment of hostile individuals or groups. In accommodation there is latent hostility, so that the adjustment may be only temporary, with conflict breaking out at a later time. Yet accommodation is not merely quiescent conflict. Accommodation refers rather to the actual working together of individuals or groups in spite of differences or latent hostility. This led Sumner to refer to accommodation as "antagonistic co-operation". Accommodation, like the other group processes, is a matter of degree.

The integration of conflicting individuals or groups depends on the outcome of the conflict, or on the forms of accommodation.

Overt conflict comes to a close when one of the antagonists achieves a clear-cut victory over the other. The loser has to choose between submitting to the terms of peace imposed by the victor or continuing the conflict with the risk of extermination. If the one who is defeated is also annihilated, the social relationship obviously comes to a close. Conflict may lead to the elimination of one or both rivals, but as a rule some sort of adjustment is worked out short of carrying conflict to its "logical extreme". In cases where one party to a conflict is victorious over the other, the latter usually accepts defeat and a position of inferiority.

Compromise as Co-ordinate Accommodation. The superordination-subordination type of adjustment usually results when the contestants are unevenly matched, or when the issue is brought to a definite head through the victory of one of the parties. When the combatants are of about equal strength, on the other hand, neither may be able to prevail over the other. In order to avoid fruitless struggle, the contestants may agree to a compromise wherein each party to the dispute makes some concessions. The "all-or-nothing" attitude gives way to a willingness to yield certain points in order to gain others. "A compromise is by its nature a crazy quilt in which everyone can identify his patch; he can find consolation for his disappointment by reflecting that everyone else is disappointed too."¹

Politicians are generally realists who believe that half a loaf is better than none. Compromise has therefore been called the politician's art. Idealists find compromise less palatable, and martyrs and die-hards scorn it. Rebellious people are particularly loath to compromise since they have a compulsion to keep on fighting. Some matters, like religious ideologies, are not subject to compromise.

Toleration may occur where Compromise is not feasible. Where, as in religion, compromise is not feasible and the conflicting groups do not resort to open hostility, only one adjustment is possible, namely, toleration. In toleration no concession is made by any of the groups, and there is no change in basic policy. Each group, however, must bear with the others. Though each religious group believes its faith is the only correct faith and proselytises for new members, it must suffer the other groups and accord them the same rights. In the United States religious toleration came only after years of religious strife. The difficulty of maintaining this fine balance is shown by the recent church history of Russia, Spain, and Argentina.

The Cultural Control of Conflict. Cultures differ in the kinds of accommodation they prefer. Some insist on a clear-cut victory and frown on compromise and conciliation, while other cultures extol conciliation. Among the Kwakiutl, for instance, compromise is regarded as a sign of weakness. If one man murders another, he may avoid retribution on the part of the murdered man's family by paying them an indemnity; but this settlement is regarded as a disgrace which hounds the murderer's family for generations.

On the contrary, the Zuni, favouring peace and moderation as they do, are inclined to compromise; and the same seems to be true of the Chinese. In China, it often happened that should two persons start a quarrel on the street, they might soon be surrounded by interested spectators. The whole group would then repair to a teahouse, where over teacups each principal would present his side of the case, while the audience would act as jury. If the verdict went against one

¹ H. D. Lasswell, "Social Conflict", *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. IV, p. 195.

of the contestants, he paid for the tea party and the affair became a closed matter.¹

In the United States compromise, conciliation, and arbitration are favoured, although the usual resort is to more formal means of settlement, such as courts, tribunals, and commissions. So many different interests and points of view are represented in our heterogeneous, complex society that compromise and concessions are required if social life is not to be too greatly disturbed.

How effective are the various methods of accommodation? Our knowledge in this important field is limited, but researches² indicate that information and education, legislation and law enforcement, and adequate social organisation may be effective in reducing intergroup conflict. Propaganda which emphasises common values is generally more effective in reducing conflict than that which stresses intergroup differences. Except in acute crisis situations, problems of group conflict are usually more readily resolved indirectly than by frontal assault. The best results are also obtained if the individuals are not attacked, are allowed to express their hostility, are permitted to discover the facts for themselves, are approached as groups, and are encouraged to identify themselves favourably with someone in the out-group, so that the issue is personalised.

The Achievement of Superordinate Goals reduces Intergroup Conflict. An experiment in inter-group relations³ throws light on the relative effectiveness of two methods of trying to resolve intergroup conflict. The subjects were boys who came from the same city, from stable families with siblings, from the same religious, socio-economic group, the same age and educational level, with good adjustments at school and in the neighbourhood. The observed intergroup trends cannot therefore be ascribed to variations in individual traits. The boys were formed into groups with goals requiring inter-dependent activity for their attainment. After formation of definite in-groups, intergroup rivalry was promoted by competitions, so that victory for one group meant defeat for the other. This was accompanied by a series of encounters, leading to unmistakable friction, manifested in hostile acts and derogatory stereotypes. At this point, an experimental attempt was made to reduce the intergroup hostility. One approach was to provide contacts involving close physical proximity in activities satisfying in themselves, such as eating meals and seeing movies. The alternative chosen was the introduction of a series of *superordinate* goals, with high appeal to both groups, whose attainment

¹ Lin Yutang, *The Importance of Living* (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1937), p. 44.

² Robin M. Williams, *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions* (New York: Social Science Research Council, Bulletin 57, 1947).

³ Muzafer Sherif, C. J. Harvey, B. Jack White, William R. Hood, and Carolyn W. Sherif, *Intergroup Conflict and Co-operation: The Robbers Cave Experiment* (Norman, Oklahoma: The University of Oklahoma, 1961).

is beyond the resources and efforts of one group alone. Such activities included renting a greatly desired movie, *Treasure Island*, costing more than one group would want to pay; and stoppage of the water supply, requiring both groups to correct it. It was found that the use of superordinate goals was the more effective means of reducing intergroup conflict.

SUMMARY

In this chapter we have wanted to know why groups arise and why some of them endure. In general we say groups are formed because they serve certain basic needs; and they endure because these needs are continuing needs. In addition there are several processes that tie the members of a group together more or less securely. These processes are division of labour or co-operative labour, agreement or consensus on norms, and satisfaction with one's associates or group morale. A high degree of consensus integrates a group more than does a low degree of consensus. Norms that stress co-operation result in more group solidarity than norms that emphasise competition, although the latter may be superior in other ways, as in promoting higher productivity. Among the values that maximise group solidarity, noteworthy is efficient social organisation centring in discipline. Morale is heightened by success and by the feeling on the part of the group that it is the object of special recognition or status.

Integration is facilitated by cultural homogeneity and hampered by heterogeneity. Since homogeneity is easier to achieve in small groups than in large ones, size of group is indirectly related to group integration via the composition of the population. Smallness of the group also favours integration directly because of the more limited number of social relationships in small groups. Especially important as agencies of integration are the small, intimate groups called primary groups. Primary groups give us security and affection, whereas the more impersonal secondary groups of our modern mass society give us more freedom.

Physical or residential mobility, a common characteristic of our time, is a significant obstacle to group integration, since moving "de-groups" the movers, at least temporarily. Mobility introduces a stranger into the group and creates the problem of assimilation. The solution is to discard the old behaviour patterns, insofar as they clash with those of the new hosts, and take on the new. A person or group may acquire the values of another group and be assimilated culturally and yet not be accepted by the majority group. The larger the number of aliens, the more difficult the problem of integration of the minority group.

Intragroup conflict weakens group solidarity, hence many groups try to minimise such conflict. Various techniques of accommodation such as conciliation, compromise, and arbitration have been developed to promote the co-existence of individuals or groups with conflicting interests.

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. Is group integration a unitary concept?
2. Are some value systems more highly integrating than others?
3. What is the sociometric approach? Its contribution and limitations?
4. What is the relationship between doing things together and liking people?
5. How does group morale affect efficiency?
6. How does size of group affect group solidarity?

7. What are the functions of primary-group relations in complex modern society?
8. How are rates of juvenile delinquency related to physical mobility and group integration?
9. What is the effect of (a) prejudice and (b) large numbers on the integration of a minority group?
10. How are (a) out-group hostility and (b) intragroup co-operation and conflict related to in-group solidarity?
11. What is the relation between group integration and suicide?

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CHAPTER VII

CROWDS AND PUBLICS

On October 30, 1938, thousands of Americans in the New York area were terrorstricken by a radio broadcast describing an invasion from Mars. The presentation was merely a dramatisation of H. G. Wells' fantastic novel *The War of the Worlds*, but it was presented with such stark realism—including reports from fictitious astronomers, governmental officials, and "eye-witnesses"—that many listeners fled their homes and their communities.¹ In London on January 15, 1955, a thick belt of darkness, caused by an accumulation of smoke under an extremely thick layer of cloud, suddenly wrapped itself around the city in the early afternoon. It lasted only ten minutes; but during this time, women screamed in the streets, others fell to their knees on the sidewalks and prayed. Some cried out hysterically that they had gone blind. A man at Croydon groped through the inky blackness shouting, "The end of the world has come."² These episodes are at once identified as cases of panic,³ an extreme type of crowd behaviour, which is in turn a variety of collective behaviour. In the interests of coherence of treatment and because of limitation of space, this chapter will treat only two related aspects of collective behaviour: crowds and publics.

CROWDS

Ordinarily when we think of the crowd, we picture a group of individuals massed in one place; but as the opening illustration of the chapter indicates, physical proximity is not essential to crowd behaviour, especially in a society like ours with instruments of mass communication like the newspaper and the radio. What is crucial to the understanding of the crowd is the highly emotional responses of individuals when they are released from the restraints that usually inhibit extreme behaviour. What releases the customary restraints and leads to crowd behaviour?

THE BASES OF CROWD BEHAVIOUR

The early students of the subject dealt with crowd phenomena in a mystical manner. Le Bon,⁴ for example, advanced the idea that when men find themselves in crowds, a collective consciousness

¹ Hadley Cantril, Hazel Gaudet, and Herta Herzog, *The Invasion from Mars* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1940).

² AP dispatch, *Jacksonville Times-Union*, January 17, 1955.

³ Pan, in Greek mythology a god of flocks and wild life, was regarded as causing sudden and groundless fear. On the Acropolis is a grotto for his worship, since Athenians believed he caused panic among the Persians at Marathon.

⁴ G. Le Bon, *The Crowd*, p. 26.

emerges and supplants their individual consciousness ; this he calls the "law of the mental unity of crowds". Later writers offered more concrete theories but blundered into thinking that crowds are socially abnormal entities. Thus, Martin¹ offers the Freudian view that crowds are the means of release for repressed wishes. According to this theory, powerful tensions are developed in individuals because modern society imposes artificial restraints on the expression of natural human impulses, such as, for example, the sexual impulse. Crowds in turn afford opportunity for the release, in indirect, disguised form, of this pent-up energy. While this theory is no doubt helpful in accounting for certain phases of crowd behaviour, it would be a mistake for the reader to think that all crowds are unnatural and pathological. By this theory, for example, it would be difficult to explain why crowd behaviour occurs among the lower animals, as in the case of a stampeding herd. These remarks suggest that the reader should be critical of any theory which seeks to account in a simple manner for a complex phenomenon like the crowd.² In accounting for crowd behaviour, it is necessary to consider the rôles of the group, and culture.

CROWD BEHAVIOUR IS LEARNED

Crowd emotionality is perhaps best interpreted in terms of heightened suggestibility, that is, the tendency of an individual in a crowd to respond uncritically to the stimuli provided by the other members. The individual learns to make almost automatic responses to the wishes of others, particularly those in authority and those he greatly respects. From infancy on, he is so dependent upon the judgment of others for direction in his own affairs that he comes to lean heavily on the opinions of others. Moreover, he learns to value highly the esteem in which other persons hold him, and consequently he courts their favour by conforming to their ways and wishes. For these reasons, among others, when he finds himself in a congenial crowd of persons, all of whom are excited, it is natural that he, too, should be affected.

The effect of suggestion is to produce a partial dissociation of consciousness. When we are critical about a matter, we give it close attention, and our whole interest is centred upon it. But when a suggestion is made by someone whom we esteem, our attention is divided, partly on the issue at hand, partly on the person who made the suggestion. The more awesome the source of the suggestion, the greater the degree of dissociation and the greater the amount of automatic behaviour.

¹ E. D. Martin, *The Behaviour of Crowds* (New York, 1920).

² Cf. W. I. Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins* (Chicago, 1909). The same caution is urged in a number of places in this book. It is important to note the limitations of "particularistic" or single-factor explanations, where complex human behaviour is involved.

The Admired Leader. If the crowd has a leader who is admired, the effect of the suggestion is still further heightened. The situation is illustrated by hypnotism, where the effectiveness of the suggestion depends in part on the attitude of the subject towards the hypnotist. The best results are obtained where close co-operation exists between subject and experimenter. The effect of suggestion should help us to understand the frenzy of a camp meeting led by an evangelist like the late Billy Sunday, or the hysteria of a Nazi mass meeting led by Hitler.

The Effect of Numbers. It is to be observed, furthermore, that the crowd heightens the suggestibility of the individual because of the volume of stimulation involved. The individual in the crowd is bombarded by suggestions from every side, and the cumulative effect is very great. Also, the emotion works round in a circle and so is still further enhanced. For instance, A is affected by the excitement of B, C, and D. A, excited, in turn stimulates B, C, and D and increases their excitement, which reacts on A and further heightens his emotions, and so on. Such mounting contagion is seen frequently in religious revivals, where individuals are progressively stimulated until they give way to most extraordinary behaviour, such as barking, or bouncing, or jerking in every joint.

Milling and Crowd Rhythm. It is known that suggestions are more effective if they are even and regular and continuous. Crowds may furnish such rhythmic, repetitive stimuli. The very milling about of the crowd is itself somewhat hypnotic in effect. In addition, crowd activities such as singing, cheering, dancing, and so forth, follow rhythm patterns. They serve to break down the barriers between individuals and accentuate the feeling of group solidarity. Demagogues, evangelists, and other skilled leaders use these techniques in winning crowds to their purposes. The orator is an expert in rhythmic speech; he literally as well as figuratively sways his audience.

Security in the Anonymous Group. The group factor also influences crowd behaviour through the security which the individual feels when he is part of the mass. Individuals are less reluctant to join a lynching party than to commit murder on their own. The explanation would seem to lie partly in the fact that the action seems more defensible when carried out by the group and partly in the fact that individual responsibility is blotted out. The participants remain anonymous and there is no one upon whom the authorities can pin the offence. This condition, in which the group does not identify its members as individuals and which therefore has been called "de-individuation", leads to reduction of inner restraint and to more expressive behaviour.¹ As the Langs put it, crowd behaviour permits "a collective defence against anxiety".²

¹ L. Festinger, A. Pepitone, and T. M. Newcomb, "Some Consequences of De-Individuation in a Group", *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 47, pp. 382-9, 1952.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 122.

However, if an individual has attitudes and habits which are fundamentally opposed to those of the crowd, he will not follow the crowd. A critical student of religion who has a real aversion for emotional appeals is not likely to be carried away by the frenzy of a revival meeting. White men have been aroused to extremes of emotion when in a mob attacking Negroes and on certain occasions, as in the Chicago race riots, mobs of Negroes have shown the same intensity of feeling toward white victims; but there is no record of a Negro enthusiastically joining a mob of white men about to lynch one of his own race.¹ The crowd cannot elicit behaviour for which there does not already exist a favourable basis in established attitudes and habits.

A recent study of collective behaviour² presents a theory according to which types of collective outbursts (panics, crazes, hostile outbursts, norm-oriented movements and value-oriented movements) can be differentiated. The social determinants of collective action are given as structural conduciveness, structural strain, growth and spread of a generalised belief, precipitating factors, mobilisation of participants for action, and the operation of social control. As an example, it is hypothesised that panic will occur only under certain conditions: if the appropriate social conditions are present, *and* the appropriate conditions of strain, *and* the appropriate belief, *and* mobilisation, *and* if social controls fail to operate. Among other things, the condition of maximum structural conduciveness to panic is one of limited and closing exits. Completely open or completely closed exits are not conducive to panic. The appropriate belief is hysterical belief, leading to collective flight. Other beliefs, such as those characterised by hostility or wish-fulfillment, lead to other types of collective behaviour but not to panics. Each set of constructs adds to the others and a particular type of collective behaviour, it is held, results only from a given configuration and sequence of constructs.

HOW CULTURE AFFECTS CROWD BEHAVIOUR

Societies usually curb or limit crowd behaviour because it disrupts the social order. In some social situations, however, there may be no cultural directives or the directives may be inadequate or conflicting, with the result that release from the usual restraints and doubts occurs when there is provocation. An example is the damage to property sometimes done by crowds of celebrating students after an important football victory. Our culture teaches respect for property, but it also harbours the idea that college life is not quite complete without its pranks and hilarity.

¹ Ellsworth Faris, *The Nature of Human Nature* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1937), p. 76.

² Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behaviour* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963).

Observers have been impressed with the contrasting conduct of crowds in America and in England. In the United States, large celebrating crowds are likely to be boisterous, careless of public property, and disrespectful of law and order. After a celebration in a public park in an American city, the ground is likely to be covered with old newspapers, empty bottles, and other litter. Public property may be mutilated. Not thousands but actually millions of people camped for days in the public park facing Buckingham Palace during the celebration of the Silver Jubilee of King George V, and it is reported that when the affair was over not a trace of any kind of refuse was to be seen in the park and not a single flower had been plucked from the large flower beds.

Interesting contrasts are also presented by rioting mobs in different societies. Assault and battery are much more common in English-speaking countries than in France, where rioters wreak their vengeance on property rather than on persons. In the widespread Paris riots of 1934, so extensive as to lead some observers to believe a general political upheaval was imminent, there was much damage to property but little loss of life. This has been attributed to a number of factors, such as the effect of the Catholic religion, with its emphasis on the sanctity of human life, and the stringent French laws against assault, which date back to the days after the Revolution.¹

CHECKS ON SUGGESTIBILITY

As man has become more civilised, he has taken measures to protect himself against his own credulity. His problem is to keep from reacting instantly and automatically to suggestion. To meet this need, man has in the course of time developed various devices such as the debate, the public forum, and the scientific method. In a debate the suggestions released by one side are challenged by the counter-suggestions of the other side. The open forum provides even more protection against the dangers of suggestibility, because the participants are encouraged to ask questions and to cross-examine the spokesmen for particular points of view. Science and scientific method furnish the greatest protection against emotional and irrational conduct. Suggestions are not enough; science demands evidence. The evidence, besides, must conform to certain conditions required by logic and scientific method. The seal of science is withheld from any finding until it is verified and found to be reliable.

Cultural devices such as those just indicated are useful as checks on suggestibility, even though they do not constitute anything like a complete defence against irrational or emotional conduct. Cultural aids such as schooling or scientific training do lessen the chances that a person will behave irrationally or irresponsibly in certain situations.

¹ R. La Piere, *Collective Behaviour*, p. 548.

This is shown by an experiment¹ at the University of Iowa in which a simulated kidnapping episode was worked out in detail as to locale, persons, and timing. This was then reduced to a series of news bulletins. By pre-arrangement, a dramatic reader appeared before some classes in psychology and read the bulletins. The kidnapper had been caught, had confessed, and a mob was forming to lynch him. What part would the students wish to play? Only one subject in ten would resort to drastic action. "With respect to age, college education, and the best evidence available on general intelligence, the averages for subjects electing the different courses of action increased similarly and consistently along the scale as the subjects respectively elected to participate in, observe, deter and avoid action." In other words, the students tended to avoid mob behaviour as they approached the higher end of the scale in age, college education, and general intelligence. These facts support the findings of another study² that most participants in lynching mobs in the United States are shiftless or uneducated youths. Education may lessen the probability of crowd contagion, even if it does not eliminate it.

Man may not only take advantage of the various cultural defences against crowd suggestion, but he may also seek to protect himself by avoiding crowds. It is not uncommon for those who have creative work to do to isolate themselves. Many writers and scientists lock themselves in study or laboratory. Browning shut himself up in his workroom for days at a time. When working on a new invention, Thomas Edison worked, ate, and slept in his laboratory, protected from all disturbance.

Isolation from others is easier to achieve in modern urban society than it was in times past, when individuals living side by side in a community were neighbours intimately acquainted with one another. One could scarcely withdraw from the group without attracting attention. In the city, on the other hand, where even neighbours may be strangers, the anonymity of life affords considerable freedom from group or crowd pressure. Urban experience is organised more in terms of impersonal interests, and is influenced less by proximate contacts. Hence the position one takes on social issues may be influenced more by conviction and less by consideration for the feelings of one's associates. This means that in the city, public opinion can be more objective and rational than it is in a folk society.

PUBLICS

Publics are inclusive interest groups, usually with divergent opinions concerning social issues. When the interest of a group of individuals

¹ G. H. Mennenga, *A Technique for the Study of Crowd Behavior*; H. J. Stoltz, *A Study of Individual Response in a Crowd Situation* (unpublished M.A. theses), Department of Psychology, University of Iowa, 1933, 1934. Studies made under the direction of Dr. Norman C. Meier.

² A. F. Raper, *The Tragedy of Lynching* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1933), p. 11.

in a social issue or set of social values is more abiding and more rational than it is in a crowd, we call the group a public. There are many publics in our society to-day, as indicated by the content of a daily newspaper which caters to publics and which reflects the social life of the community. Sections of the daily paper which are devoted to stocks and shares and business affairs are read by the financial public ; there are sections of interest to the athletic, motion picture, radio publics, and so on. The concept, public, derives its vitality mainly from the fact that while large groups of individuals have sustained common interests, they do not necessarily have common viewpoints. Thus the motion-picture public is divided over such issues as the best picture of the year, the relative merits of the various stars, and the necessity for censorship of the industry. We see from this that the public is characterised by discussion and controversy, hence by the formation of public opinion. It is the dependence of the public on processes of discussion that chiefly sets it off from the emotional crowd.

When members of a public take positions on issues confronting them, the result is public opinion. Issues arise when there is conflict, anxiety, or frustration as a result of social change ; and public opinion, therefore, as the process of collective decision-making, represents an attempt to establish a new equilibrium.¹

Publics are Characteristic of Complex Societies. In a small, simple, stationary society, like that of a primitive people where culture is not highly developed, the number of interest groups will be small and the number of social issues that arise will be few, because conditions remain relatively unchanged over long periods of time and because such problems as arise can often be dealt with in terms of the prevailing folkways. In a complex, rapidly changing society like ours, however, there is a great proliferation of interests and therefore of publics ; and the issues that beset publics under conditions of rapid change may be numerous and acute. To illustrate the contrast, when illness arises among primitive people, the medicine man is called in. There is not much alternative to using him and little question about how he shall be paid. But in our complex culture, various publics prefer various kinds of " medicine men " : physicians, osteopaths, faith-healers, herbists, occultists. There is considerable difference of opinion about how physicians shall be paid. A large section of the public would like to see the doctors employed by the state just as school teachers are ; others advocate systems of voluntary insurance against doctors' bills ; while the medical profession on the whole prefers to retain the private-fee basis.

The Modern Poll is a Social Invention for Sampling Opinion. Those who determine policy with regard to social issues are generally inter-

¹ Leonard W. Doob, *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (New York : Henry Holt and Co., Inc., 1948).

ested in knowing the state of public opinion on the issue, since it is easier to implement a policy if it has public support, especially in a democracy like ours where the public has an important rôle in the resolution of issues. Members of Parliament would like to know how the voters, whom they are supposed to represent, feel about the issues before them. If it were necessary to canvass all the voters on their attitudes towards universal military training, expanded social security, aid to education, public low-cost housing etc., the cost would be prohibitive. The solution is the modern poll with its device of selective sampling, where the aim is to question a sample that is representative of the whole. In an election, the outcome depends on all who vote, hence an effective poll is one that samples the same proportion of sub-groups as occur in the electorate. The aim is to poll at random Negroes and whites, rich and poor, men and women, farmers and urbanites, etc., giving weights to replies according to the proportion they constitute of the electorate. Techniques have been devised whereby small samples may be used, and the possible margin of error calculated. In view of the value of scientific methods of sampling public opinion, it is not surprising that polling should have developed into a substantial and flourishing enterprise.

Steps have been taken from time to time to improve the accuracy of election polls.¹ Earlier, in 1950, the samples were drawn from among all persons old enough to vote who were living in private households, without excluding any respondent on the ground of likelihood of not voting. Later, an effort was made to restrict the universe sampled to one approximating the voting population; that is, those who were registered or said they planned to register and to vote. Then a more restrictive sample was used, based on a turnout scale derived from a series of questions related to voting participation and a cutting point corresponding to the percentage of the adult population expected to vote. The sample of voters comprises those persons whose scale scores are above the cutting point. In the elections since 1956, a further innovation was the use of a secret ballot. With these several refinements, election polling has moved closer to the true universe of voters and increased the validity of responses. Even so, every election is a unique event and the possible sources of error in election surveys are many. Thus an international crisis on election eve might cause enough votes to be shifted to invalidate the results of a prior survey.

Do the polls influence public opinion? An interesting question is whether the results of the polls, when announced, affect public opinion. Do they create a band-wagon effect, converting others to the side of the majority? Some critics allege this to be so, but the evidence is inconclusive. The prestige of majority opinion is well-known, and

¹ Paul Perry, "Gallup Poll Election Survey Experience, 1950 to 1960", *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 26, pp. 272-9, Spring, 1962.

there is some experimental evidence¹ to indicate that people's attitudes may be changed by learning the results of public opinion surveys. On the other hand, the pollsters point to the *Literary Digest* poll of 1936 which predicted an overwhelming victory for Alfred Landon who lost the election, and to the election of Harry Truman in 1948 despite almost unanimous agreement of the polling services that he would be defeated.² It is even possible that the polls may in some instances produce an anti-band-wagon effect by building up sympathy for the underdog ; or the polls may give the favoured group such a false sense of security that they relax their efforts, while the opposition works harder. Some believe such a false sense of security to have been a factor in the outcome of the 1948 presidential election. In addition, then, to gauging public opinion, the polls may be a factor in the formation of public opinion, although the nature of the influence is obscure.

Limitations of polls. The polls have not been immune to criticism. It is charged³ that the polls claim to measure public opinion without ever having defined public opinion. Public opinion is not just voting, not a mere "yes" or "no" or "don't know" or "don't care". Public opinion is often a complex, shifting phenomenon. The brief answers that people are willing to give to strangers may not be an adequate measure or indicator of complicated opinions. Nor, even in a democracy, do the opinions of all citizens carry equal weight, except in voting. Some who hold intense opinions may be more successful in influencing others than those who hold their opinions lightly. Some citizens, like journalists and commentators, are strategically placed to influence opinion. Policy on many questions is influenced by organised groups having power in the community rather than by mere numbers of majorities of citizens. Moreover, many decisions with regard to social issues are made by those in authority, without resort to the democratic process.

PUBLIC OPINION MANAGEMENT

Publics are often scattered, loosely organised, and confused. On the other hand, there are in modern society various organised groups of individuals who know what they want and are out to get it. They have products, or services, or ideas they wish to sell and are in search of as large a market as possible. Some are already in a position of power and are seeking to sustain or strengthen it ; they have a "corner" on some particular market and are called "vested interests". Others are seeking to wrest power from the vested interests, and if successful to become in turn vested interests themselves. Both realise

¹ Winston Allard, "A Test of Propaganda Values in Public Opinion Surveys", *Social Forces*, vol. 20, pp. 206-13, December, 1941.

² Frederick Mosteller *et al.*, *The Pre-Election Polls of 1948* (New York : Social Science Research Council, 1949).

³ Lindsay Rogers, *The Pollsters* (New York : Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1949).

that to enjoy power they must have the support of public opinion ; or, at least, public opinion must not be unfavourable towards them. When he was told there would be a public reaction against some of the practices he was using to build up his great railroad empire, Commodore Vanderbilt was quoted as saying, " The public be damned ! " Whether or not he actually did say this, he was shrewd enough to deny it instantly.

Since Commodore Vanderbilt's time, great industrialists have learned not only to respect public opinion but to control it. An outstanding example of a long-term public relations programme is that of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company.¹ In 1935 the parent company and subsidiaries had 398 public relations experts on their payrolls, and spent for advertising in magazines and newspapers alone the sum of \$5,138,000.² The purposes of this campaign are primarily to increase the volume of business done by the company and to maintain the monopolistic benefits already possessed. To attain these ends, a central idea is held constantly before the public : that the company is a public service operated in the best interests of the public. To create a sympathetic and uncritical attitude towards the company, the service is identified with values or symbols that have favourable sentimental significance for the masses of the population, such as courage and the home. The inner workings of the system are revealed ; the hazardous operations of the linesmen, and the impression is given that the company is a vital protector of life and property. The telephone is shown as a device linking those away on business and their loved ones at home. Played up, too, is the fact that the company stock is owned by hundreds of thousands of investors, creating the illusion that the company is, after all, a publicly owned enterprise. The Federal Communications Commission, after investigating these practices, concluded they were designed to " lull the public into a satisfied and sympathetic frame of mind ".³ The American Telephone and Telegraph Company is not alone, however, in its quest for public support. Almost every large corporation now has on its payroll individuals whose business it is to create public goodwill towards the management, its policies, or its products.

PRESSURE GROUPS

Most publics are organised on an opinion basis ; that is, they are concerned with the discussion and determination of issues. When,

¹ Professor Norton E. Long of Harvard University refers to this programme as " a classical example of methods arrived at over a long period of years not untypical of those utilised or about to be utilised by large-scale business in general ". (" Public Relation Policies of the Bell System ", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 1 (4), pp. 5-23, October, 1937.)

² Bronson Batchelor, *Profitable Public Relations* (New York, 1938), p. 216.

³ Special Investigation Docket No. 1, vol. iv, June 15, 1937.

however, a public moves from opinion to action, in an effort to make its will effective, and particularly to secure legislation favourable to its own interests, it may be designated a pressure group. Our own society is characterised by a great number of such pressure groups each seeking to gain some sort of advantage by securing the support of those who have power, as for instance the voters or their elected representatives. Hundreds of organisations maintain permanent offices in London for the purpose of pressing their special ends. These agencies are often engaged in a political tug-of-war, with the outcome greatly affected by the relative power and strength of organisation of the competing groups. Publics that are unorganised or poorly organised, and therefore lacking in influence, like the public of unskilled workers and the consuming public, are at a great disadvantage in protecting their interests.

An interesting illustration of an outstanding pressure group in American experience is the Anti-Saloon League,¹ begun in 1895 by forty-nine different temperance and religious groups as a national organisation with paid professional workers agitating for the abolition of the liquor traffic. At first the League appealed to the individual to abstain from alcoholic drink and called for the signing of a pledge to this effect. Later, the drive against the saloon was started, and finally came the movement for national prohibition. The national organisation linked up with state and local committees operating through churches and other established agencies such as the Women's Christian Temperance Union and the Civic League. It is estimated that the League at its height had the support of about 60,000 agencies. Committees of voters were formed; states were marked off into districts, districts organised by counties, and counties by wards, precincts, or townships. A paid superintendent was provided for each district and a paid manager for each county, the other units being served by volunteer captains and lieutenants. Odegard characterises the organisation as a "politico-ecclesiastical machine".

That the League was effective can scarcely be denied. An account of the temperance legislation passed by Congress in which the League had a hand would fill a large volume. But besides the two outstanding victories of the prohibition of interstate shipment of liquor into "dry" states in 1913, and the general introduction of Prohibition (1920) the League was instrumental in securing the following national legislation: 1902, saloon substitutes at army posts; 1903, prohibition of sale of intoxicating liquor at immigration stations; 1906, Soldiers' Home Canteen Law; 1906, Prohibition enforcement in Indian Territory; 1908, Anti-liquor code for Alaska; 1909, prohibition of the use of the mails for transportation of liquor.

¹ Peter Odegard, *Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-Saloon League*.

PROPAGANDA

As suggested above, the League had also an extensive promotional programme, largely propagandistic in nature. For instance, the saloon was pictured as the enemy of the child and the home ; as the source of all crime, degeneracy and poverty ; indeed, as the epitome of all that was vicious in society. The League exploited the recruiting of youth by saloons, publishing widely such advertisements as the following : ¹

WANTED : BOYS FOR CUSTOMERS

Most of our old customers are rapidly dropping out.
 Ten committed suicide last week.
 Twenty are in jail—eight in the chain gang.
 Fifteen were sent to the poorhouse. One was hanged.
 Three were sent to the insane asylum.
 Most of the rest are not worth fooling with ; they have no money.

WE NEED FRESH YOUNG BLOOD

Propaganda is an Effort at Mass Persuasion. Because in our day one is bombarded on all sides by propaganda, it is desirable to understand what propaganda is and how it operates. Propaganda is one of four basic instruments which modern groups employ in efforts to achieve goals, the other three being physical conflict, economic methods, and diplomacy.² In physical conflict, exemplified by war, the attempt is to coerce through violence. Economic methods include gifts and loans, using goods or services. Diplomacy uses negotiation and contracts. In contradistinction, propaganda aims at persuasion by means of symbols, that, is words, pictures, or gestures.

Does Propaganda differ from Education ? A question often asked is : how does propaganda differ from education ? Like propaganda, education uses symbols ; but unlike propaganda, education aims at clarification, not persuasion. Propaganda seeks to influence decisions in ways favourable to the propagandist, whereas education provides information on the basis of which decisions may be made, if called for or desired. In terms of this distinction, it is apparent that, in some instances, what passes for education is actually propaganda, or special pleading. Propaganda may get into education *via* the ethics and religion of the instructor who communicates his preferences and convictions to his students.

Propaganda and Advertising. Nearly all advertising is labelled as advertising, and there is no difficulty in knowing that it is advertising. In this sense it differs from propaganda, which is not so clearly

¹ *American Issue* (Ohio edition), January 11, 1908.

² Daniel Lerner, *Propaganda in War and Crisis* (New York : George W. Stewart, Publisher, Inc., 1951), p. 346.

signalised. Thus when an English scientist comes over to America to comment on social problems, it is not always clear that he is supported by British propaganda funds. Both advertising and propaganda, of course, try to persuade the individual and neither presents both sides adequately. But the payment aspect of advertising is obvious, whereas it is more frequently under cover in propaganda, and readers are less able to discriminate between what is fact and what is fancy.

Propaganda and the News. *The New York Times* in its masthead announces it publishes "all the news that's fit to print". Can it publish all the news or must it make a selection? Is the selection unbiased or do newspapers slant the news? A researcher interested in this general question examined the reporting of a significant single day in the world by major or "quality" world dailies in fourteen countries.¹ The day chosen was November 2, 1956, when the Hungarians appeared to have won their revolution and the British and French were ready to invade Suez. (Within a few days the Soviet Union had re-established itself in Hungary and the British and French had withdrawn from Egypt.) The study found that the reporting of these events varied so greatly that readers in different countries could not be expected to hold similar views of the events. Political rather than journalistic principles seem to account for the variations.

Why Propaganda has a Bad Reputation. To many, the term "propaganda" carries an evil or sinister connotation. This may be partly because of a bias in favour of impartial evidence, which the prestige of scientific method has helped to establish. It may also be due to the fact that propaganda is often devious. The propagandist, like the puppeteer, often works out of sight; we are influenced without knowing it. A number of years ago, for instance, an investigation² brought to light the pervasive propaganda which the public utility interests in the United States had been carrying on for many years. It was found that these interests had succeeded in incorporating into the textbooks of the public school certain material which gave a very favourable view of private ownership and a very unfavourable view of government ownership. A similar point of view was emphasised in college textbooks in economics. Few students reading this material would ever suspect that they were being victimised. Propaganda of

¹ *One Day in the World's Press*, edited, with an Introduction and Commentary by Wilbur Schramm (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1959).

² The story of the propaganda campaign of the electric utilities is told in a report by the Federal Trade Commission (Senate Document 92, 70th Congress, 1st Session), which runs to about 100 volumes. A summary of the testimony given in the first four years of the hearings appears in Carl D. Thompson, *Confessions of the Power Trust* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1932). See especially Chap. 39, "Revising the Textbooks," and Chap. 40, "Our New School Books". "Besides the pamphlets above referred to, which were prepared especially for use in high schools, grade schools, and to a greater or less extent for general distribution, the utilities were also diligent in the preparation of textbooks of a more advanced and technical nature for use in colleges, universities, and technical schools." Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 384.

this type is the promotion of emotional attitudes on one side of controversial subjects, usually by indirect means.¹

Propaganda Techniques. Since propaganda is a symbolic process involving conversion by suggestion rather than by such methods as violence, bribery, or boycott, the techniques of propaganda revolve round the manipulation of symbols. The subject is exceedingly complex and to list all the techniques would require a manual, but it is possible here to cite briefly a few of the fundamental methods by which the propagandist manipulates attitudes. First, repetition is essential. "If you have an idea to put over, keep presenting it incessantly. Keep talking (or printing) systematically and persistently."²

Second, do not admit, do not even suggest, that there is any side to the question but the one you represent. This means that you must distort the evidence. The Anti-Saloon League claimed that between 60 per cent and 100 per cent of all divorce was due to liquor, when as a matter of fact drinking is a relatively minor cause of marital infelicity, in many cases being merely the result of more deep-seated troubles. The public utilities compared the costs of electric power furnished by some of the most favourable privately-owned plants with some of the poorest municipally-owned ones. Not mentioned was the fact that one large community in Florida regularly earned a large enough surplus from the sale of power to its citizens to be able to exempt them from property taxes.

Third, cast your cause in the rôle of the hero, and your opposition in the rôle of the villain. Resort to generalities, emotionalised symbols, and stereotypes to build up affection for your hero and hatred towards the enemy. The Anti-Saloon League linked God to their cause and Satan to the saloon.

Fourth, produce testimonials on behalf of your cause, supplied by persons whose names carry a great deal of weight. This brings prestige suggestion into play.

Fifth, "For the most permanent eventual results, aim your propaganda at the children; mix it in your pedagogy."³ The totalitarian states furnish excellent examples of the application of this principle.

The newer Methods of Content Analysis. In the early stages of propaganda analysis, represented by the work of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, the content of the propaganda document was analysed in terms of symbols. This method, while an improvement over earlier, less standardised procedures, was deficient in that no attempt was

¹ H. D. Lasswell, R. D. Casey, and B. L. Smith, *Propaganda and Promotional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1935). A continuation, up to about March 1943 is: B. L. Smith, H. D. Lasswell, and R. D. Casey, *Propaganda, Communication and Public Opinion* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1946).

² Knight Dunlap, *Civilised Life* (Baltimore, 1934), pp. 360-1.

³ Knight Dunlap, *ibid.*

made to ascertain the reliability and validity of the analyses, nor the effectiveness of the propaganda itself. Later research has shown that content analysis is highly complex, involving the problem of sampling, the selection of units of measurement, and the selection of categories. It is important, moreover, by means of "focused interviews" to determine the effect of the propaganda campaign, for the propagandist does not always achieve the results he seeks. Propaganda efforts may, in fact, boomerang for a variety of reasons, such as the erroneous appraisal of the predispositions of the audience being propagandised. For example, in sophisticated circles there is widespread distrust of exhortation and appeals to sentiment, and the propagandist who uses these methods in dealing with such groups may find that his efforts backfire. Another reason for the failure of propaganda is that different themes may be working at cross-purposes. When, during World War II, propaganda was released showing the cruelty and inhumanity of the Nazis, the effect was the one intended, namely, hatred towards the enemy, but this effect was offset because the accounts also unwittingly emphasised the power and efficiency of the Nazi war machine, and consequently led to fear and withdrawal.¹

If the newer methods of content analysis are valid, they should be useful in spotting propaganda. Congress has passed legislation requiring that foreign agents register with the State Department, on the assumption that the public will be in a better position to detect and evaluate anti-democratic propaganda if the source is known. This is especially important in a democracy where anti-democratic statements are permitted. But how can you prove that any materials are propaganda? Among the tests used are (1) the explicit identification of the documents in question with one side of a controversy; (2) the similarity of the content, vocabulary, and style to the content, vocabulary, and style of known propaganda channels; and (3) the use of one party to a controversy as a source, without disclosure.

Propaganda has in modern times been lifted from its long-established place as a minor factor in social life to a new position as a major social force. This growth has been made possible by the growth of the sciences of human relations, providing new knowledge of how to manipulate human beings; by the amazing development of communication facilities in modern times, including the telegraph, the oceanic cable, the telephone, the radio, the film, facsimile transmission, teletype, the multigraph machine, rotary printing presses; by the highly efficient control and organisation of the propaganda machinery now possible; and by the proliferation of interest groups in our time. Particularly in the totalitarian states do we see pro-

¹ Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton, "Studies in Radio and Film Propaganda", *The New York Academy of Science*, Series II, vol. 6, No. 2, December, 1943.

paganda agencies established as vital adjuncts of the government, on equal terms with the other major departments of the state.

There are those who argue that in an anomic society (one in which there is confusion as to norms and values, with resulting suspicion and distrust), certain types of propaganda lose some of their effectiveness. Merton has given us an analysis ¹ of a World War II bond drive conducted by a famous radio star, Kate Smith, who spoke over the air for a minute or two at repeated intervals from eight o'clock one morning until two the next morning and succeeded in getting 39 million dollars in pledges. Merton thinks it was because of the self-sacrifice of the broadcast marathon. Nearly all of those who heard Kate Smith were impressed by her sincerity and her appeals made a powerful impression. Merton concludes that under conditions of anomie, "propaganda-of-the-deed" is much more effective than "propaganda-of-the-word".

Propaganda in Wartime. Propaganda is perhaps seen at its fullest in wartime, when even democratic states make it a major function. This can be shown in connection with the promotion of America's entrance into the First World War, and her subsequent participation in the conflict. Previous to American participation in the war, a strong sentiment had developed in the United States against becoming involved in it. For example, in the late autumn of 1914, 367 newspaper proprietors were asked: "Which side of the European struggle has your sympathies?" The replies of 242, or almost exactly two-thirds of the group, expressed no particular preference.² Woodrow Wilson was re-elected in 1916 on the slogan: "He kept us out of war."

A number of factors, however, were instrumental in drawing the United States into the conflict. Among the underlying causes may be mentioned the Anglo-Saxon basis of American civilisation, which led quite naturally in time to increasing sympathy for the British rather than the German cause; the widespread indignation at the invasion of Belgium; the enormous stake of the financial interests in an Allied victory; shocking episodes, such as the sinking of the *Lusitania* and the threat of unrestricted submarine warfare; and the fear that if Germany won the war the United States would be invaded. But not to be discounted is the rôle of British propaganda from 1914 to 1917, when the United States finally entered. There is abundant evidence to show that during these three years the British were extremely active in creating a favourable public opinion by very varied means.³

The Germans undertook a propaganda campaign, too, but their direct, open, obvious methods caused them to blunder badly and

¹ Robert K. Merton, *Mass Persuasion* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946).

² *Literary Digest*, vol. 49, p. 939, November 14, 1914.

³ J. D. Squires, *British Propaganda at Home and in the United States from 1914 to 1917* (Cambridge, Mass., 1935).

perhaps led them to do more harm than good to their cause. The British were far more subtle. They would not even admit that such a thing as British propaganda existed in the United States. Sir Gilbert Parker, upon being put in charge of the work, had a careful analysis made of American press opinion, and an equally thorough investigation of opinion in the colleges and universities. On the basis of these studies and a careful selection from *Who's Who*, a mailing list was prepared of thousands of persons to whom the propaganda was sent. The literature was always sent out with a personal card, with never any indication of official sponsorship, giving the impression that here was a prosperous, kindly, social-minded Englishman who wanted to fulfil his obligations to his American friends. Whenever literature written by Americans was available, it was utilised. The British resorted not to violent wooing as the Germans had done, but to gentle, personal appeals.

With war finally declared against Germany, it was necessary to build up a solid favourable public opinion towards the war. An organisation for this purpose was established in the United States Government, and was called the Committee on Public Information. The Committee set out to build up love and hate attitudes; love towards the Allies and hate for the Germans. These goals were achieved by the constant use of emotionalised words and symbols. The Germans were called "Huns", and the Kaiser was the "mad dog". Atrocity stories were circulated. We were told that the Germans were entirely responsible for the war. On our side there was nothing but great virtue; we were fighting "to make the world safe for democracy".

Changes in Propaganda Techniques in World War II. There were a number of differences between the propaganda of World War I and World War II. During the Second World War, propaganda tended to be less emotional and less moralistic. Atrocities were not played up, as they had been in the propaganda of World War I. There were fewer divergences from fact. This was mainly because the cult of credibility had spread, and there was more distrust of the propagandist who after the first war publicised his devious methods. It should be pointed out that these remarks apply to the propaganda of the Western democracies more than to that of Germany and Russia.

A Cold War emphasises Propaganda. If there are no shooting or limited wars, the contest between rival military powers depends more on means other than the use of weapons. Thus a further expansion of propaganda as an established instrument of policy in foreign affairs resulted from the expansion of the U.S.S.R. after World War II. The Marshall Plan, the Point Four programme, the exchange of educational personnel, and similar programmes became indirect propaganda weapons which were coupled with a direct propaganda offensive.

Conversion of Publics into Crowds. Publics are capable of rationality, but under the influence of propaganda, publics may readily become as emotional as crowds. Indeed, when an interest group abandons processes of deliberation and discussion and gives way to emotion, it ceases to be a public and becomes a crowd. In the graphic words of Mark Twain, this is the way war hysteria develops :

The loud little handful—as usual—will shout for the war. The pulpit will, warily and cautiously, object—at first ; the great, big, dull bulk of the nation will rub its sleepy eyes and try to make out why there should be a war, and will say, earnestly and indignantly, “ It is unjust and dishonourable, and there is no necessity for it.”

Then the handful will shout louder. A few fair men on the other side will argue and reason against the war with speech and pen, and at first will have a hearing and be applauded ; but it will not last long ; those others will outshout them, and presently the anti-war audiences will thin out and lose popularity.

Before long you will see this curious thing : the speakers stoned from the platform and free speech strangled by the hordes of furious men who in their secret hearts are still at one with those stoned speakers—as earlier—but do not dare to say so.

And now the whole nation—pulpit and all—will take up the war cry, and shout itself hoarse, and mob any honest man who ventures to open his mouth ; and presently such mouths will cease to open.

Next the statesmen will invent cheap lies, putting the blame upon the nation that is attacked, and every man will be glad of those conscience-soothing falsities, and will diligently study them ; and refuse to examine any refutations of them ; and thus he will by and by convince himself that the war is just, and will thank God for the better sleep he enjoys after this process of grotesque self-deception.¹

Does a Cold War also turn us into a Crowd ? In the years following World War II in the United States, several hundred persons in government service were charged with being either a loyalty or security risk, and suspended without pay.² Written charges were preferred against them and hearings held, but the government file—on the basis of which the charges were founded—was not released to the employee or his attorney. The accused was thus not able to identify the sources of the charges or to interrogate the accusers. The government's position was that to divulge the sources would be to violate the confidence of the informants and to discourage potential informants. This, however, represented a reversal of traditional American principles, namely, that a man is deemed innocent until proved guilty, and has the right to confront his accusers.

The effect of these developments was widespread paralysing fear among government workers and others lest some comment or act or affiliation be construed as disloyal. There was a reluctance to discuss

¹ Mark Twain, *The Mysterious Stranger*. Cited in *The New Republic*, vol. 84, pp. 259, October 16, 1935. Reprinted by permission of Harper and Brothers.

² *Case Studies in Personnel Security*, collected under the direction of Adam Yarmolinsky (Washington, D.C. : The Bureau of National Affairs, August 1955).

public issues publicly or to join new organisations. Individuals with liberal sentiments who had joined organisations in the 1930's and 1940's which they believed served humanitarian ideals, only to find that they were later placed on the Attorney General's list of subversive organisations, were accused of guilt by association.

The causes of the mass fear and the curtailment of freedom and civil liberties were in part related to the cold war which, in the demands it makes on the citizenry, closely resembles a hot war, except for the lack of bloodshed. They were also influenced by conditions peculiar to the United States, for in England civil liberties were given more protection, despite the greater vulnerability of the British Isles to the dangers of war.

Limits to Propaganda. Propagandists boast that they can get people to believe that white is black and black white. Are there no limits to what they can accomplish? The evidence would rather tend to show that such claims of propagandists are excessive and that there are limits to what can be done. The effectiveness of propaganda is, for instance, definitely limited by a knowledge of the facts in the case and enhanced by ignorance of them. Propaganda flourishes where there is ignorance.

At the University of Iowa, in an experiment,¹ 203 students were exposed to propaganda concerning Mr. W. Morris Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia from 1915 to 1923. An Information Check Test given at the outset showed that the students knew nothing about him. Planted editorials were then substituted without the students' knowledge for editorials of the same length appearing in current issues of the student daily newspaper. Thirty editorials were constructed, one half favourable to Mr. Hughes, and the other half unfavourable. Of the subjects reading favourable editorials, 98 per cent became favourably biased towards Mr. Hughes, while 86 per cent of the subjects reading unfavourable editorials became adversely biased. It is safe to say that no such extensive conversions would have taken place if the students had known about Mr. Hughes and his administration. Hence, it follows that knowledge of the facts about society learned by the student of sociology may serve as a breakwater against the waves of propaganda on social questions that beat against him.

This discussion leads directly to a second point, that the effectiveness of propaganda is limited by prevailing interests, prejudices, and social trends. Propaganda is a good deal more likely to succeed when it flows with the current than against it; and doubtless propaganda is often given credit for results that would have come about in any case from the operation of larger social forces. Thus, many American

¹ A. D. Annis and N. C. Meier, "The Induction of Opinion through Suggestion by Means of Planted Content", *Journal of Social Psychology*, vol. 5, pp. 65-81, February, 1934.

historians believe that slavery was on its way out because it was ill-adapted to the newly evolving industrial society, and would have disappeared without benefit of William Lloyd Garrison and *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, although these no doubt hastened the process.¹

Strong propaganda may prevail for a time against current social trends, but it is doubtful if it can maintain this advantage for long. An illuminating example is the experience of the Anti-Saloon League in its campaign against liquor. The dries prevailed at first partly because of their strenuous, persistent crusade and partly because they were supported by favourable social situations, such as the generally recognised menace of the saloon.

Prohibition was abolished because it brought in organised racketeering and bootlegging; its administration proved to be exceedingly expensive and ineffective; and it helped to generate widespread disrespect for law. There were many other reasons why prohibition failed, but the heart of the matter is that it ran counter to modern trends; it is impossible to regulate private behaviour successfully by law in a complex, rapidly changing, urban civilisation.

Finally, it may be pointed out that propaganda is definitely limited by counter-propaganda. Or, to put it positively, the effectiveness of propaganda depends upon how clear a field it enjoys. Propaganda in the dictatorships is so largely successful because the state brooks no opposition. There is only one real propaganda agency, and that is managed by the government.

As Arendt puts it, "Wherever totalitarianism possesses absolute control, it replaces propaganda with indoctrination."² Probably the most extreme expression of indoctrination is *brain-washing*, a phrase coined by the Chinese to describe a method of conquest of men's minds. This method begins by maximizing conflicting forces in order to produce psychological exhaustion. After the mind has been sufficiently disturbed by fear, anger or excitement, so as to heighten suggestibility and impair judgment, the desired beliefs are more readily accepted. "Coercive persuasion" is prolonged persuasion in an inescapable situation.³

¹ Another illustration is Allied propaganda, which is credited with breaking German morale in 1918. British shells carried leaflets ten miles behind the enemy lines. During each week of 1918, more than 2,000 propaganda balloons were released, each carrying 1,000 leaflets. In October, 1918, 5,360,000 leaflets were dropped in Germany. (G. S. Viereck, *Spreading Germs of Hate*, New York, 1930, p. 205). But Bruntz has shown that there were other, more important factors operating on German morale at the time. Civilian morale corresponded a good deal more closely to German military successes and failures and the stress of the food shortage. (G. G. Bruntz, *Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of Germany* (Stanford University Press, 1938).)

² Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1958), p. 341.

³ Edgar H. Schein with Inge Schneier and Curtis H. Barker, *Coercive Persuasion* (A Socio-Psychological Analysis of the Brain-washing of American Civilian Prisoners by the Chinese Communists), (New York: W. W. Norton, 1961).

In democratic countries like Great Britain and the United States, however, the political public may be exposed to divergent suggestions and so have a chance of checking them against one another. During the American presidential contest of 1936, the press of the country was largely lined up against President Roosevelt in his attempt to win a second term. The newspapers for the most part were in the hands of interests hostile to him and his policies. They loosed a great torrent of propaganda against him. If his supporters had had access to no other means of reaching the public, the majority public opinion might have been different from what it later proved to be.¹ But as President of the United States, Mr. Roosevelt had special access to the radio, an advantage which he strongly capitalised. In addition, he could bring his arguments directly to the people by means of a personal tour round the country. In this case, therefore, the public had the opportunity of comparing two rival sets of propaganda, and the effectiveness of the one was limited by the appeal of the other. But while there are limits to propaganda there are also dangers. The new communication inventions, such as printing, radio, television, and facsimile transmitting devices, make excellent opportunities for the propagandists. These inventions can, of course, be used for counter-propaganda, though they may not be so used.

Experimentation² has shown that the effectiveness of communication depends on (1) who said it (the speaker or writer); (2) what is said and how it is said (the message); and (3) to whom it is said (the audience). If the same message is ascribed to a high credibility source and a low credibility source, the former will have more effect than the latter, at least initially. The appeals which serve as incentives to acceptance of a message are substantiating arguments, rewards to be gained from compliance, and penalties resulting from non-compliance. If fear is used, to be successful the appeal must be explicit, based on prior experience of the audience; and it must arouse and then reduce emotional tension. In an experiment in which three different forms of illustrated lecture on dental hygiene were used, embodying three different intensities of fear appeal, the strongest appeal produced the greatest emotional tension, but the weakest appeal produced the greatest change in dental hygiene practice. The strong appeal did not provide the necessary reassurance.

As for the audience, different people react differently to the same message. Those who value their membership in the group most highly are the most subject to group pressure and the most resistant to counter-propaganda. Some persons show a regular tendency,

¹ In the fifteen largest cities of the United States, newspapers controlling approximately 70 per cent of the total circulation were hostile to Franklin D. Roosevelt, whereas he received 69 per cent of the total vote. "The Press and the Public", *The New Republic*, vol. 90, pp. 178-91, March 17, 1937.

² Carl I. Hovland, Irving L. Janis, and Harold H. Kelley, *Communication and Persuasion* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953).

termed persuasibility, to change their opinions, in the direction advocated by an appeal regardless of the content, style of presentation, or identity of the communicator.¹ These observations help us somewhat to understand why certain American soldiers taken prisoner by the Communists in the Korean War and subjected to brain-washing became turncoats and why others did not. Actual participation in Communist propaganda programmes probably intensified the conversion, for studies show that spoken agreement, when accompanied by rôle-playing, increases the effectiveness of persuasive communication.

SUMMARY

Two polar types of collective behaviour, that is, group behaviour lacking formal organisation and not following established tradition, are the crowd and the public. The crowd is unconventional because behaviour is released from its usual inhibitions and is therefore emotional. The public is unconventional because it is confronted by an issue, a challenge to the established tradition, which is met by discussion. The polar types of crowd and public are therefore characterised by emotional and deliberative behaviour, respectively.

The emotional behaviour of individuals in a crowd, although constitutional in origin, is heightened by the power of suggestion which is particularly effective in congenial crowds because of the prestige of numbers, the influence of leaders who are greatly admired, and the repetitive and rhythmic nature of circular responses in the group. When emotion is extreme and the crowd gets out of hand and becomes aggressive, the group is identified as a mob. At the other pole are the more stable groups called publics, characterised by discussion of issues confronting the group. At the extreme of the continuum marked by rational discussion would be, for example, groups or publics of scientists with a common interest in scientific issues. In between the extremes are groups characterised by degrees of emotion and rationality.

Public opinion is rational when both sides of controversial issues are considered in the process of arriving at decisions. There are, however, numerous organised groups with axes to grind, or causes to promote, or vested interests to maintain which resort to propaganda to win uncritical acceptance of their cause. By means of propaganda large sections of the public may be induced to behave in ways which are actually contrary to their own interests. Protection against propaganda is afforded by knowledge, by counter-propaganda, and by an awareness of the propaganda process itself.

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. What is suggestibility? Are individuals in a crowd more suggestible than when apart from one? Why?
2. How is crowd behaviour influenced by the cultural situation? Are crowds found in all cultures?
3. In what respects does a crowd differ from a public?

¹ Carl I. Hovland and Irving L. Janis, *Personality and Persuasibility* ("Yale Studies in Attitude and Communication", vol. II), (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1959).

4. How may publics, under the influence of propaganda, become irrational crowds? Illustrate.
5. What are some common techniques of influencing public opinion? How can we build up "sales resistance"?
6. Under what conditions is propaganda most effective? When is it least effective?
7. Describe and distinguish scientific and unscientific methods of sampling public opinion.
8. What are pressure groups? Why are they so numerous in our time?
9. How would you distinguish propaganda from education? From advertising?
10. Is the boast of propagandists that they can make us believe black is white, and white black, a valid one? Are there limits to the power of propaganda?

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CHAPTER VIII

SOCIAL CONTROL AND CONFORMITY

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL CONTROL

Some students of sociology use the term *social control* in a very general or inclusive sense to describe whatever means are employed by the group to achieve social order. In this usage, the folkways and division of labour, for example, would be regarded as means of social control, since they help to integrate and stabilise the group. In the present chapter, a different and more limited concept of social control is employed, namely, the processes and means whereby deviations from social norms are limited by the group. Accordingly the folkways in general are not means of social control; but a particular folkway like ridicule is a means of social control if in a given society, as among the Eskimo, it is used in the effort to bring wayward members of the group back into line.

According to the usage followed here, social control is to be distinguished from socialisation, which is the process whereby the norms of the group are internalised by the individual. Conformity is achieved by two different routes: immediate conformity, termed acquiescence, the result of social pressure or control, and long term results of conformity to cultural norms, termed conventionality, the product of socialisation.

When we conform to the will of the majority, even though we know the majority is wrong, social control is manifested in its purest form. Such control is shown in an experiment in which a series of groups of eight individuals was asked to match the length of a given line with one of three unequal lines, the judgments to be announced publicly. In the midst of this test, one individual was contradicted by the rest of the group. The contradiction was repeated many times in the course of the experiment. The lone individual did not know that the group had been instructed to give wrong answers at certain times. A substantial minority modified their judgments to conform to those of the majority; a substantial number retained independence throughout. Independence or yielding depends on (i) the clarity of the stimulus, with the majority effect increasing as the clarity of the stimulus decreases; (ii) social structure, with the majority effect proportional to the size of the majority; and (iii) the character of the individual, whether he is self-confident or dislikes to appear different.¹

Social Factors constrain the individual to follow the Group Patterns. The appropriation by one human being of possessions that belong to

¹ S. E. Asch, *Social Psychology* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952), Chap. xvi.

another human being who is a member of the same group is almost universally condemned, as in the commandment, "Thou shalt not steal." The appropriation of property from strangers or from the enemy may be permitted, even lauded, in which case it is not ordinarily defined as stealing. But the appropriation of property from a group associate is usually condemned. The reason is that we greatly value group life because of the many advantages and satisfactions it provides. Stealing from a member of the group disturbs the unity and tranquillity of the group, hence cannot be countenanced.¹ The human group is therefore a kind of defence against the more assertive and pugnacious and irregular members.

The taboo against stealing is only one of innumerable group norms which are integrating factors if there is conformity. Nonconformity threatens the integration of the group, hence the group acts to bring nonconformists into line.

The idea of the group as shaping the conduct of its members carries with it the implication of group pressure. The group not only moulds behaviour, but it also restrains and disciplines. To Durkheim the essence of group life is that it exercises constraint or coercive power upon the individual,² and thereby acts as a conservative force limiting variations.

Durkheim's observation that social facts constrain the individual to follow the group patterns implies that they do act as a "force" limiting individual variations from the group norms. But they are not conservative in the sense of maintaining the patterns of the past. Social facts themselves may be dynamic, sweeping the members of the group along in their wake in new patterns.

There is considerable evidence that social pressure operates to reduce variations from the average. Allport³ had seventeen subjects rate five series of ten different odours with respect to the degree of their pleasantness or unpleasantness. The judgments were rendered both in and apart from the group. In the group, the unpleasant odours were judged to be less unpleasant and the pleasant odours less pleasant. The effect of the group was thus to cut off extreme judgments, suggesting that the group exerts a restraining or conservative influence on human behaviour. It will be observed in this case that the judgment of the other members of the group was not a factor, inasmuch as these judgments were not announced. The pressure would therefore seem to be purely that of the group as such.

¹ Occasionally stealing is institutionalised, as it was in Sparta, where boys were deprived of food so that they would have to steal it. Stealing without getting caught was the goal and was part of the discipline and training of a warrior.

² Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1938).

³ F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924), pp. 274-278. Allport found also that in estimating weights, extreme judgments were avoided in groups.

If, however, the members of the group hold decided views on a question and these views are known, then the effect is to encourage conformity to the group opinion. Thus Moore¹ asked 95 subjects to make judgments in the fields of morals by indicating which of two ethical choices they regarded as less offensive ; for example, disloyalty to friends or cheating on examinations. When all the replies were in, the subjects were informed of the majority opinion, then retested. There was a swing away from the original answers. The effect of announcing the majority opinion was to bring about a greater degree of conformity to it, although whether this change was due to imitation rather than to social pressure is not clear. In any case it is concluded that the influence of the group makes for conventional or conservative behaviour on the part of the individual.

The pressure towards conformity is in terms of the prevailing norms. Some norms, like the taboos against stealing and killing within the group, are almost essential to organised group life and therefore are highly durable. Other norms change from time to time, like the ideas about the proper costume for women to wear at the seashore.

Overt Conformity is the goal of Social Pressure. During Perón's regime, there were many citizens of Argentina who did not subscribe to his policies but who lacked the power to resist them successfully. Most of these individuals conformed outwardly. There are thus in conformity two factors which may or may not be consistent : compliance and conviction. Most compliance is associated with conviction, since members of a group are generally persuaded of the rightness of their way of doing things. But there is a great deal of overt conformity without conviction, especially on the part of newcomers to a group. When in Rome it is prudent to do as the Romans do. Northern students attending Southern schools may conform to the etiquette of race relations existing in the South, although they do not approve of the customs of segregation. Conformity without conviction occurs when the individual cannot withdraw from the group or values his membership in the group and does not wish to offend or is afraid of the consequences of nonconformity. Another example is the worker in an industrial plant who slows down his production because of correctives applied by fellow workers but who doubles his rate when the correctives are removed.²

The Group cuts off extreme Variations. Group norms are group standards which the members are encouraged to emulate. But there is in every group, even in so-called utopias, some deviation from

¹ H. T. Moore, "The Comparative Influence of Majority and Expert Opinion", *American Journal of Psychology*, vol. 32, pp. 16-20, January, 1921 ; see also D. Wheeler and H. Jordan, "Change of Individual Opinion to Accord with Group Opinion", *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 24, pp. 203-6, July-September, 1929.

² Leon Festinger, "An Analysis of Compliant Behaviour," in Muzafer Sherif and M. O. Wilson (eds.), *Group Relations at the Crossroads* (New York : Harper & Brothers, 1953).

the norms. If the deviation is slight, the group—or the agencies empowered by the group to maintain social control—may ignore it or invoke only light sanctions. For example, in the United States despite the injunction “Thou shalt not steal,” it is generally acknowledged that there is widespread cheating in the matter of paying income taxes. Most of the delinquency consists of the under-reporting of incomes by small amounts. When an audit of a taxpayer’s account shows such a delinquency, he is required to pay the amount due plus a fine of 6 per cent for the period the tax was unpaid. The penalty is relatively light. But if the amounts unreported are large, and there is proof of intention to defraud, the penalty is likely to be more severe, including a jail sentence. As the deviation from the norm becomes greater, the more serious becomes the offence in the eyes of the group and the more severe becomes the penalty. Since the seriousness is culturally defined, there is a fairly consistent and stable hierarchy of offences in terms of seriousness in the minds of most members of a society.¹

THE LIMITS OF TOLERANCE

It has been noted that there is in every group some deviation from the established norms. It is recognised that the norms are standards which may be difficult to realise in practice with complete infallibility.

It may also be observed that deviant behaviour has certain latent functions with positive societal value. It arouses the community to the consequences of the breach of the norms, sharpens the concept of what is intolerable, reaffirms common values, and mobilises group energies for combat. Deviant behaviour, like bodily pain, may be a danger signal. It may lead to strengthening the group or to weakening it, as by chronic fragmentation.²

The limits of group tolerance of nonconformity are flexible and depend on three sets of factors : (a) the nature of the social situation ; (b) the status and reputation of the individual ; and (c) the type of behaviour involved.

The Social Tradition. Since conformity is in terms of the norms of the society, the prevailing tradition is a crucial factor in the attitude of the group towards nonconformity. For example, it may be observed that in the British Isles and in the United States the security of the state is greatly valued and subversion is a serious offence. But the degree of freedom of speech and action permitted in England is greater than in the United States in the middle of the twentieth century. The reasons for this difference are probably complex ; but an

¹ Arnold M. Rose and Arthur E. Prell, “Does the Punishment Fit the Crime ?” *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 61, pp. 247–59, November, 1955.

² Lewis A. Coser, “Some Functions of Deviant Behavior and Normative Flexibility”, *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 68, pp. 172–81, September, 1962.

important factor is doubtless the longer British tradition of freedom. Both the United States and England have had reason to fear the Soviet Union and its international Communism ; but the threat to England has been greater, since England is geographically closer and more vulnerable to atomic bombing. Yet the English have not shown the anti-Communist hysteria which has gripped American society. In England the Communist Party has not been limited as much as in the United States ; and there is more freedom of dissent. The tradition of freedom means there is more tolerance of political radicals and less social pressure exerted against those who do not look with favour on the status quo in economic organisation. On the other hand, there is probably less tolerance shown the intolerant.

Deviation from the Norms is tolerated more in a large, Heterogeneous community than in a small, Homogeneous one. Two correlated factors are relevant here, the size and the complexity of the group. The bigger the group, the less the individual is identified and noticed, and the freer he therefore is to do as he pleases. The more complex the group, the more likely the group is to have various sets of norms, some of which may be conflicting and contradictory. Under the circumstances, individuals find support for their behaviour and the opposition is limited. For example, unconventional conduct is tolerated in Greenwich Village, a neighbourhood of New York City. These individuals are not molested, because New York City is a very big community and the unconventional behaviour of a relatively small group does not constitute a threat to the city, especially since the residences of the unconventional individuals are segregated.

Since communities have been getting bigger, and a larger percentage of the population lives in big places, the import of the remarks of the preceding paragraph is that social control is less effective in modern society than it used to be in the smaller and simpler societies of the past. In the groups of primitive hunters which average perhaps less than 50 persons, it is not so difficult to keep an individual in line. He is subject to constant scrutiny, there is no escape into anonymity as there is in the modern city, and the pressure of the folkways and mores is more certain. For those who deviate, gossip and ridicule are effective controls, for one of the most devastating punishments is humiliation before a familiar group whose opinion one values. Experimentation¹ has shown that the more cohesive the group, the more likely the rejection of the deviate. And small, homogeneous communities are more cohesive than large, heterogeneous ones.

In the big complex communities, the informal social controls of

¹ Richard M. Emerson, "Deviation and Rejection : An Experimental Replication", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 19, pp. 688-93, December, 1954. The study which was replicated and confirmed in general is : S. Schachter, "Deviation, Rejection, and Communication", *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 46, pp. 190-207, 1951.

Main Street and primary groups are present but are less effective than in the smaller places. They are supplemented by formal agencies of control like police and courts. As Table 4 shows, the

TABLE 4
AVERAGE NUMBER OF POLICE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES,
BY SIZE OF CITY, APRIL 30, 1955 *

Size of City.	Police Department Employees Per 1,000 Inhabitants.
Under 10,000 . . .	1.4
10,000-25,000 . . .	1.5
25,000-50,000 . . .	1.6
50,000-100,000 . . .	1.7
100,000-250,000 . . .	1.8
Over 250,000 . . .	2.4

* From F.B.I., *Uniform Crime Reports*, XXVI, No. 1, 1955, p. 24.

bigger the city, the greater the number of police department employees per 1,000 inhabitants. Presumably the larger places have more crime. Even with the augmented police force and other formal agencies, the control of socially deviant behaviour is not as effective in the very large communities as it is in the small places without benefit of so much formal control. The weakening of group controls in the modern society means that there is more freedom, that the limits of tolerance of unconventional conduct are greater.

The Family, the Neighbourhood, and the Church are less powerful than formerly as Agencies of Social Control; Business and the State are more powerful. In earlier times social control was exercised mainly by the family, the local community, and the church. There was little industry apart from the family, and the state was not highly developed. The authority of the family over its members is evidenced by the term *patriarchal*, which means the power of the father. This power could be very great as it was in the Roman period, when the father had the power of life or death over his children. Very widespread as a means of social control was corporal punishment, which is common when the relationship between individuals is that of superior and subordinate. In colonial America husbands had the right of chastisement of their wives. The power of the family is great where production is in or about the home, as it is in a farming economy, since production calls for a head who has power. In a household economy, the members of the family are subservient because they must depend upon the family enterprise for employment.

The local community reinforces the individual family as an agency of social control, because the small community is an organisa-

tion of a cluster of families that are well known to one another. The church provides a moral underpinning for the customs of the group, as well as developing its ideology regarding the spiritual life. The church uses such sanctions as shunning and excommunication to keep its members in line, as well as the positive means of confession, repentance, and forgiveness.

With the transfer of economic production from the family to industry, the growth of size of communities, and the trend towards secularisation, there has been a notable shift in the distribution of social control among the major institutions, away from the family, the local neighbourhood, and the church to industry and the state. Husbands may no longer chastise or confine their wives, and the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children will intercede if parents are too harsh with their offspring. The fear of religious sanctions is not so great as it once was. The institutions which have risen to the forefront of social control are economic organisation and government, especially the latter. If an industry is organised under a closed shop, an individual cannot get a job unless he joins the union. If he displeases his employer or his union, he may lose his job, an important economic sanction. It is reported¹ that big corporations strongly influence the kind of wives that executives marry, even as in earlier times the choice of a mate was dictated by family considerations. Sovereignty, or ultimate power within society, rests in the state, which controls through legislation, the police, the armed forces, the courts, and the prisons.

The highly valued Member of the Group has more Freedom. The status and reputation of the individual are also factors affecting the amount of conformity expected of him. First, it should be noted that popularity is associated with conformity in the usual situations. A person becomes popular in part by living up to the standards of the group, or better still, by surpassing them. Generosity and consideration of the wishes of others are virtues which the group esteems and rewards and which help to make an individual popular. Because of his superior status in the group, the popular individual is accorded certain privileges, including greater freedom of speech and action. Thus a well-liked teacher is freer to express dissenting opinions and take issue with the administration of the school than is a teacher who is disliked by his associates. If the teacher is also prominent in his profession, his status is even more secure and he is freer still to speak his mind.

Another way of putting the same idea is that the highly valued member who is dissatisfied with the norms of the group because he thinks they are bad for the group will be likely to deviate more than

¹ William H. Whyte, Jr., "The Wives of Management", *Fortune*, vol. 44, pp. 86-8 ff., October, 1951; "The Corporation and the Wife", *Fortune*, vol. 44, pp. 109-11 ff., November, 1951.

the less secure members and take a stand against the norms.¹ The less valued members are more restrained by fear and by concern over their status in the group.

Some Groups are expected to conform more than others. We have been considering variations in conformity on the part of different members of a group. We need also to note that society holds up different expectations for conformity for different groups. Thus ministers and school teachers are in our society supposed to be models of ethical and moral conduct. In the case of the minister, especially, the social control extends to the members of his family, to his wife and children, and in connection with the latter is said sometimes to lead to resentment and rebellion. Formerly it was not an uncommon practice in the U.S.A. to commit teachers to written contracts which state in some detail where and how they should live and how they should deport themselves, especially in small communities where the new teacher was a stranger. Studies show teachers and clergymen with low rates of crime, divorce, and other socially disapproved conduct. These low rates may involve some selection of personality types, but they doubtless reflect the influence of close social control.

The Organisation Man. There is one large group on whom the pressure to conform is said to be particularly great, namely the management personnel of big business and political organisation.² The conformity in this case is thought to be in terms of the interests of the big organisation or bureaucracy. According to this view, developed by William H. Whyte, the traditional individualistic ethic of Americans has been superseded by an organisational ethic which legitimises social claims against the individual. This new ethic, it is argued, rests on three basic propositions, namely, the belief that the group is a source of creativity, the belief that a basic need of the individual is the need to belong, and a faith in the application of scientific method to achieve the institutional objectives. The claims of the organisation are said to be so great that even the wives of executives are rated by organisational criteria, that is, how well they support the occupational rôles prescribed for their husbands. The wives of executives are judged by their appearance, by their skill in entertaining business associates, and by their willingness to put organisational claims above those of the family.

The above view of the organisation man has been challenged as unrealistic.³ Warner believes that it is false to regard autonomy as behaviour contrary to the basic rules and demands of social organisation. Based on his studies, Warner pictures business leaders not

¹ Harold H. Kelley and Martin M. Shapiro, "An Experiment on Conformity to Group Norms Where Conformity Is Detrimental to Group Achievement", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 19, pp. 667-77, December, 1954.

² William H. Whyte, *Organization Man* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956).

³ W. Lloyd Warner, *The Corporation in the Emergent American Society* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962), p. 47 ff.

- I promise to take a vital interest in all phases of Sunday-school work, donating of my time, service and money without stint for the uplift and benefit of the community.
- I promise to abstain from all dancing, immodest dressing, and any other conduct unbecoming a teacher and a lady.
- I promise not to go out with any young man except in so far as it may be necessary to stimulate Sunday-school work.
- I promise not to fall in love, to become engaged or secretly married.
- I promise not to encourage or tolerate the least familiarity on the part of any of my boy pupils.
- I promise to sleep at least eight hours a night, to eat carefully, and to take every precaution to keep in the best of health and spirits, in order that I may be better able to render efficient service to my pupils.
- I promise to remember that I owe a duty to the townspeople who are paying me my wages, that I owe respect to the school board and the superintendent that hired me, and that I shall consider myself at all times the willing servant of the school board and the townspeople, and that I shall co-operate with them to the limit of my ability in any movement aimed at the betterment of the town, the pupils, or the schools.

FIG. 4.—Code of Conduct for Public School Teachers.

The perceptive student of sociology will be able to infer that the community in which these regulations were operative is probably a small, homogeneous community, where deviations from established norms are tolerated less than in a large, heterogeneous city. Actually the code is from a contract for a teaching job in a North Carolina town in 1927. Since then there has been a radical change in the demand for teachers and the available supply, not without consequences for their bargaining power. (Quoted in T. Minehan, "The Teacher Goes Job-Hunting", *The Nation*, vol. 124, pp. 606, 1927.)

as supine men yielding to corporate pressures but as men who usually make their own decisions. Whyte and Warner may not, however, be talking about the same men. Warner's studies are of top business leaders, whereas Whyte seems to be referring mainly to the lower levels of management.

Tolerance of Nonconformity is affected by the urgency of the Issue. We have considered the effect of (a) the situation and (b) the actor on the approval or disapproval of social acts. We have finally to consider the rôle of the acts themselves. Bernard Shaw, being a highly valued member of a society with a tradition of freedom of the press, was permitted to advocate many unpopular causes like Fabian socialism, and many unconventional ones like vegetarianism; but not even the great Bernard Shaw could advocate incest, perhaps the most widely tabooed of all human acts. So successfully is this dread act condemned that the detected incidence of this "universal crime" in the populations of English-speaking Western societies is estimated to be less than one in a million.¹

There is less censure directed against those who in speech or deed question the folkways, the ordinary customs of the group. If you

¹ S. Kirson Weinberg, *Incest Behaviour* (New York: Citadel Press, 1955).

appear for dinner without a coat, some eating places will bar you ; but most will not. Appearing in public without clothes will bar anyone from all places except jails or mental hospitals.

Conformity to the Mores. Behaviour contrary to the mores is not permitted by society. One would hardly dare advocate slavery to-day, much less attempt to hold anyone in slavery. The mores are not, however, always negative proscriptions inhibiting action. They may require positive action also. In an age not very far behind us, it was the duty of the male to protect the female. If a daughter or a sister had her virtue violated through force or under persuasion by a male of a class with whom marriage was not permitted, death for the man was decreed, not by law, not by the courts, but by the mores. A man must avenge the honour of his daughter or his sister. If a man did not avenge the honour of his family he was considered to be a weakling unworthy to mingle as a man among men.

The Mores can make anything seem right. The power of the mores is so strong that Sumner gives one of his chapters in *Folkways* the title : "The Mores Can Make Anything Right and Prevent the Condemnation of Anything." Is there anything that the mores cannot make seem right ? ¹ The mores in the South made slavery right a hundred years ago. The mores in Hitlerian Germany condemned democracy so that a young German would have been ashamed to admire anything democratic. The mores can even make the abhorred incest right. In ancient Hawaii it was considered proper and right that the highly selected noble blood of royalty should be intensified and perpetuated by brothers marrying sisters, very much as race horses are interbred to-day. Incest was something to be proud of. The mores can make the eating of human flesh seem right. The Chams of Cochin China eat the livers of slain enemies, believing that the liver is the seat of courage, which will be transmitted to them. When the chief of the Miranhas was asked why his people practised so abominable a custom as cannibalism he replied that he was surprised that some people thought it an abominable custom. He said, "You whites will not eat crocodiles or apes, although they taste well. If you did not have so many pigs and crabs, you would eat crocodiles and apes, for hunger hurts. . . . When I have killed an enemy it is better to eat him than to let him go to waste. Big game is rare because it does not lay eggs like a turtle. The bad thing is not being eaten." ² The mores made it right for the Eskimos to kill their old people. In ancient Sparta infanticide was an established custom.

¹ The discussion here is concerned with "right" as defined in practical terms by prevailing custom, not with "eternal verities" such as those which religious and ethical systems attempt to set up. According to the latter, customs can compel any kind of conduct, but the compulsion does not necessarily make the conduct "right".

² William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston : Ginn and Company, 1906), p. 331.

With us it is right to kill murderers and to take the lives of soldiers in war.

TECHNIQUES OF SOCIAL CONTROL

We turn next to an examination of the types of social control, specifically the methods used by the group in the effort to bring deviates closer to the norm. But first we need to note that social order is largely maintained by the internalisation of social norms. An ordered society is achieved by means of social organisation and is transmitted from the older generation to the newer by the learning process. The young learn the values of the society and the ways of doing and thinking that are deemed to be right and proper. This learning process is called *socialisation*. In a later chapter¹ we shall see how, in the process of socialisation, the values of the group are incorporated into the personality of the growing child. They become part of what the psychoanalysts call his superego, or ethical system, and affect his ego, or conception of self. In this way the individual appropriates the values of the group and is prepared to defend them and transmit them in turn to others. The internalisation of social norms means that the group and its ethical system are always with the individual, even when he is alone. The socialised individual has acquired the habits that make him a dependable member of the group. Social control is necessary to take care of the failures in socialisation and to provide reinforcement for those who have learned their lessons well.

Other-direction. In this chapter we are mainly interested not in the internalisation of social norms as a source of conformity but in a second major source emphasised by sociologists, namely, the desire to win the approval of those around us and to avoid their disapproval. This crucial question of the relative dependence of human beings on internal or external sources of motivation for decision-making has been explored at length by Riesman.² He argues that in backward, underdeveloped societies people follow the norms because of external pressures. So-called *inner-direction* developed next in connection with the Industrial Revolution, when men—once they had acquired norms in the process of socialisation—ceased to look to others but were wont to make autonomous decisions. This habit, says Riesman, characterised the Renaissance. And now in modern society has come the tendency towards *other-direction*, a disposition to look towards what one's associates, especially peers, think is proper. Riesman called his book *The Lonely Crowd* because loneliness is a consequence of other-direction. One can no more assuage one's loneliness in a crowd of peers, says Riesman, than one can slake one's thirst by

¹ Chapter XII.

² David Riesman, Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).

drinking sea water. Riesman is not happy with this state of affairs and advocates instead the cultivation of the autonomous man, one able to conform if he wants to but able also to choose not to conform.

A number of attempts have been made to test the foregoing ideas by empirical analysis. The results of a study¹ of 2,500 middle class high school students in New Jersey indicate the existence of an "inner and other directed type". The other-directed tendency of the peer group is seen as only one rôle of the adolescent; in other rôles, e.g., the family, he places a high value on internalised norms, and little conflict is felt between the two. In a second study, Riesman's hypothesis that more industrialised societies produce other-directed personalities and that inner-directed personalities still exist in parts of Europe, especially the North, was tested by comparing a sample of white and Negro students at two southern state universities and a sample of students in Finland.² It was assumed that inner-directed personalities would regard character traits as important whereas other-directed personalities would stress group behaviour and adjustment to environment. The subjects were asked to list three of their most important personality assets and liabilities. The data showed significant differences between United States males, both white and Negro, and Finnish males, and between corresponding groups of females, both for assets and liabilities. In a third study³ an attempt was made to ascertain whether there has been a trend towards other-directedness in the United States. It was assumed that a shift in the verbal themes of consumer-goods advertising would reflect a corresponding change in the values of the readers. A five per cent random sample of the 816 issues of the *Ladies Home Journal*, 1890-1956, was examined for evidences of other-directedness such as use of testimonials and interpersonal appeals. It was found that the proportion of other-directed advertisements published in the period 1921-56 was significantly greater than the proportion for the period 1890-1921. However, there was a decline after 1940, reflecting perhaps either a breakdown of fixed standards in the 1920's and 1930's or greater subtlety on the part of the advertisers.

A particularly illuminating study of the conflict of inner-directed and other-directed factors in human behaviour was undertaken in connection with 105 school superintendents in Massachusetts in 1952-

¹ Matilda White Riley, John W. Riley Jr. and Mary E. Moore, "Adolescent Values and the Riesman Typology: An Empirical Analysis", Chap. 16 in Lipset, Seymour Martin and Leo Lowenthal (eds.), *Culture and Social Character* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961).

² Eugene L. Gaier and Yrjö Littunen, "Modes of Conformity in Two Sub-Cultures: A Finnish-American Comparison", *Acta Sociol.*, vol. 5, pp. 65-75, 1961.

³ Sanford M. Dornbusch and C. Hickman Lauren, "Other-Directedness in Consumer-Goods Advertising: A Test of Riesman's Historical Theory", *Social Forces*, vol. 38, pp. 99-102, December, 1959.

1953.¹ In eight-hour interviews, the positions taken by the superintendents with reference to teachers' salaries were explored, among other matters. There were three possible expectations which a superintendent might have : to recommend the highest possible increases in pay or the lowest possible increases or to have no expectation either way. The first of these expectations usually received the support of the Parent-Teacher Association and the school board, the second the support of the taxpayers' association. Sixty-four per cent of the superintendents recommended the highest possible salary, 9 per cent the lowest, and 27 per cent did not make an unequivocal choice. The researchers developed a theory of the factors governing choice based on (a) perception of the legitimacy of the expectation and (b) perception of the sanctions involved. Three types of superintendents were differentiated, according to orientation in terms of these two variables : (1) Persons with a moral orientation, who resort to compromise if they regard both sets of conflicting demands as legitimate and who resort to avoidance if they regard neither as legitimate. (2) Persons with an orientation of expediency who give priority to sanctions. (3) Those who take legitimacy and sanctions equally into account. Using a separate test to measure each orientation, the researchers report findings which support the theory.

The three types of Sanctions : Physical, Economic, and Social Psychological. The basic processes involved in socialisation and social control are the same, namely, praise and blame, or rewards and punishments, for behaviour which is approved and disapproved, respectively. As they work out in practice, however, the processes differ in emphasis and degree in the two situations. Thus social control may employ capital punishment, but obviously socialisation cannot.

With lower animals, the principal form of control used against those who disturb the order of the group is physical punishment. Thus among baboons the overlord of a harem of females will attack the male who tries to appropriate one of the females.

Man, on the contrary, uses physical sanctions least and social psychological sanctions most, precisely because he is a cultural animal and communicates largely through symbols. If possible, human beings are likely to use symbolic sanctions first, resorting to the other types of sanction only if the symbolic approach fails. Thus a mother may warn her child : "Behave, or I shall spank you. Or if you continue to misbehave, you will lose your allowance."

In practice, the three types of sanction are combined in various ways. Thus a judge may sentence the defendant to pay a fine and serve a certain number of days in jail. And physical punishment entails more or less humiliation, a form of psychological punishment,

¹ Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason and Alexander McEachern, *Explorations in Role Analysis : Studies of the School Superintendency Role* (New York : John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957).

as when among the Hopi Indians a boy who misbehaves is carried by his uncle about the community while the villagers splash water into his face. To correct wrong-doing, pain is inflicted, but this may be coupled with reward for good behaviour, or reward in anticipation of good behaviour.

Social control utilises rewards as well as sanctions. The group holds out positive inducements for conformity. There are, strictly speaking, few if any physical rewards comparable to physical punishments. The handshake, the kiss, or the embrace are symbols of approval and do not involve much physical pleasure which would be the counterpart of the physical pain of corporal punishment. As symbols, they are more accurately social psychological techniques. Economic rewards probably most often take the form of promotions which entail more social prestige as well as more income. Studies¹ in the Army of the United States showed that those who conform to established norms are more likely to be promoted than those who do not. Privates were asked in September, 1943: "Do you think the Army's control is too strict?" Of those who said No, 19 per cent had become P.F.C.'s by January, 1944, compared with 12 per cent of the others.

EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

How effective is a given method of social control in a particular situation? The answer depends on the outcome sought. If the aim of control is to punish the deviate, then any method is effective if it is regarded by the deviant individual as punishment. If the objective is to deter the deviate so that he cannot continue to transgress and harm the group, then obviously any method that isolates him from others is effective. This is, of course, one reason for imprisonment. The limitation of the method is that it is infallible only so long as the deviate is isolated from the group; and transgressions may be resumed, or even intensified, when the imprisonment terminates. This has led in Western society to still a different test of the effectiveness of social control, and that is success in persuading the deviate to conform to the group norms. This is the goal of rehabilitation and is approached *via* the methods of counselling and psychotherapy, whether it be with the criminal in the prison or the problem child in a child-guidance clinic. The interesting point is that these methods of rehabilitation, by which we now lay such store, do not utilise the conventional methods of social control. They make no use whatever of sanctions or punishment. They can be said to utilise rewards only indirectly, as in the expectation that a reformed criminal will be helped to find a job. The principal appeal is the social psychological one of satisfaction in achieving a better adjustment

¹ Samuel A. Stouffer *et al.*, *The American Soldier*, vol. I (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949), pp. 261-2.

to society. In the rehabilitation process involving counselling and psychotherapy, praise and blame are not used so much as is scientific inquiry into the causes of the deviant behaviour.

*In general, the more attractive a Group is to the Individual the greater will be the effectiveness of pressure to conform to the Group.*¹ We are all familiar with the child who offends his parents and then is contrite because he loves his parents and does not wish to hurt them. On the other hand, there is the juvenile delinquent who appears to be incorrigible and who does not respond to pleas as pressures for reform. In more cases than can be accounted for by chance, it has been shown that juvenile delinquents reject² or are rejected by³ their parents. This means that delinquents, more often than non-delinquents, do not identify with their parents and do not value their membership in the family group. The father is a symbol of authority. When the child rejects his father, he often rejects other symbols of authority, like policemen, judges, and prison officials. The rejection by the father may be generalised into a feeling by the child that society as a whole is against him. He develops an attitude of rebellion or resentment and becomes motivated by the desire for revenge.

The attractiveness of the group for the individual, on which the effectiveness of social control depends, may be seen in terms of the opinions of others. The child is born into groups of individuals who become observers and judges of his conduct. Because they also cater to his needs, he comes to value their judgments. If they accept him and continue to satisfy his needs, he becomes positively identified with them emotionally and seeks to please them. If they reject him and do not gratify his needs, he becomes negatively identified with them and seeks to displease them.

For punishment of wrong-doing, society depends mainly on the sensitivity of the individual to the opinions of others. Nearly all punishments, whether symbolic like ridicule or non-symbolic like a monetary fine, involve loss of reputation in the eyes of other members of the group, leading usually to a sense of shame. Punishments such as exile, ostracism, excommunication, and imprisonment involve also a reduction in association and communication with others.

The effectiveness of Social Control depends on the Autonomy of the Group. The nature of the individual being controlled is a factor in the effectiveness of social control; but so, too, is the nature of the group that applies the pressures. The more autonomous a group is, all other things equal, the more effective will be its social control and the less will be the deviation from group norms. This hypothesis was tested

¹ Leon Festinger, "A Theory of Social Comparison Processes", *Human Relations*, vol. 7, pp. 117-40, 1954.

² Ivan Nye, "The Rejected Parent and Delinquency", *Marriage and Family Living*, vol. 18, pp. 291-7, November, 1956.

³ William Healy and Augusta F. Bronner, *New Light on Delinquency* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 1936).

and affirmed in a study of 15 communities representing different cultures, ranked according to degree of autonomy, from limited awareness of outside groups to recognition of integration of the community into a larger group. The communities were also ranked according to the amount of internal social control and deviant behaviour.¹ This finding may help to explain why social control tends to be more effective in independent groups with a unified command, as in simple folk societies, than in interdependent groups with divided authority, like modern complex societies. The individual in contemporary urban society is a member of many different groups, often with conflicting interests, which serve to restrict his loyalty to any one group. Divided loyalty means limited amenability to control by any single unit.

Social Control is maximised by the co-ordination of Bureaucratic and Primary Groups. The primary group because of its small size exhibits flexibility and speed in dealing with non-uniform events. On the other hand, the mass media because of expertness resulting from specialisation and rich resources can better reach a mass audience with a standard message. However, research has shown that when maximal social control in a large segment of society is desired, the best results may be obtained by utilising both the bureaucratic and the primary groups.²

Conflicting commands lead to Disobedience or Frustration. In a study³ using an experimental playground, the point just made, that divided group loyalty leads to less effective group control, was substantiated. It was found that if two adults give children commands in opposite directions, that is, to do and not to do something, the result is an increase in unconstructive activity and oscillating behaviour. If the two commands are opposed, but positively phrased, as "go to point A" and "go to point B", the result was the greatest increase in disobedience. Negative commands produced the most inhibited and nervous activity in the children.

In another study,⁴ based on the ten-year pioneer "Cambridge-Somerville Delinquency Prevention Project", it was not found that punitive, harsh discipline (in whatever form administered) prevents criminality. Under certain conditions consistently punitive discipline deters criminality, whereas erratically punitive discipline promotes it.

¹ James G. Marsh, "Group Autonomy and Internal Group Control", *Social Forces*, vol. 33, pp. 322-6, May, 1955.

² Eugene Litwak, "Voluntary Associations and Neighborhood Cohesion", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 26, pp. 258-71, April, 1961.

³ C. E. Meyers, "The Effect of Conflicting Authority on the Child", *University of Iowa Studies in Child Welfare*, vol. 20, pp. 31-98, 1944.

⁴ William McCord and Joan McCord, with Irving Kenneth Zola, *Origins of Crime: A New Evaluation of the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

SOME SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL CONTROL

Those who deviate get more attention from the Group than those who conform. We conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of some of the social consequences and practical implications of social control. An initial observation is that the deviates are often the ones who get the most attention. College teachers and administrators in the United States know that it is the troublesome student who takes up more of their time than the student who behaves himself. In studies¹ of small groups, it has been reported that more communication is directed towards those who take extreme positions on issues than towards those who take more moderate positions. The communication is an effort to win the extremists over to the prevailing viewpoint. If the effort fails, communication directed towards the deviates is greatly reduced.

Deviates are the objects of special group attention not only because of their unconventional behaviour but often also because of the intensity of the positions they take. Studies² show that those who hold extreme positions, either positive or negative, tend to hold them more intensely than those who hold intermediate positions. An exception occurs in the area of religious belief, where only the extremely orthodox are fanatics and the atheists are not.³

The knowledge that deviation is attention-getting leads some individuals to do things that are not customary in order to draw attention to themselves or their causes. Gandhi used hunger strikes to publicise his causes and win concessions from his opponents. An emotionally unstable individual may commit a crime in order to get his picture in the newspapers. The flagpole-sitter publicises himself. The exhibitionist is especially likely to use deviate behaviour, although not necessarily socially disapproved forms, as an attention-getting device.

The Individual seldom rises above the level of his Group. A number of important consequences flow from the tendency of the group to set limits to the variation in the behaviour of its members. One is that the members of a group, as W. I. Thomas observed, seldom rise very much above the level of their group or fall much below it. The group sets the level of performance for its members. This means that the choice of a group by an individual is of the utmost importance in influencing the kind of learning he will do and the type of habits he will develop. If it is the practice for the group to stay out late nights, then the new member runs the risk of being called a sissy if he does not also stay out late, although this is not his practice and

¹ L. Festinger *et al.*, *Theory and Experiment in Social Communication* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Research Centre for Group Dynamics, 1950), p. 49.

² Samuel A. Stouffer *et al.*, *Measurement and Prediction* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950), pp. 213 ff.

³ Snell Putney and Russell Middleton, "Dimensions and Correlates of Religious Ideologies", *Social Forces*, vol. 39, pp. 285-90, May, 1961.

is not in keeping with his family's wishes. Mothers know what group pressure can accomplish in the way of influencing behaviour, and that is one reason why they are so often concerned about the proper choice of playmates for their children.

Group pressure causes individuals to change their behaviour as they move from group to group, and to take on, chameleon-like, the protective colouring of the group. This can be observed in everyday life, as in the case of the youth who follows one set of standards when at home and another set when with his gang. The degree of change in behaviour is influenced not only by the differences in group norms but also by the degree to which the individual identifies himself with the group and by the amount of pressure to conform exerted by the group. Adolescent gangs are conspicuous for the conformity they exact from their members, who have a strong positive desire to be identified with the group. Sometimes the identification has a negative feeling tone, and conforming behaviour results mainly from the desire to escape punishment for nonconformity rather than from a positive desire to be identified with the group. Such apparently was the case in concentration camps. One observer¹ who spent a year at Dachau and at Buchenwald—the two largest German concentration camps for political prisoners in World War II—reports that many became pliable to the demands of the Gestapo, some because they came to accept the Nazi goals and values as their own, others because, under the stress of severe punishment for any deviation from group regulations, they regressed to childhood attitudes of dependence upon their masters.

The Group is an effective device for changing Individual Behaviour. Since individuals are highly sensitive to group pressure, one of the most effective means of changing individuals is *via* the group. Group pressure may work better than a direct approach to the individual himself. In a deteriorated section of a large city where juvenile delinquency was a serious problem, a group of social workers who had long been dealing with individual offenders tried a new attack upon the problem. In the local settlement house, they organised athletic teams, naming as captains the leaders of the local gangs, who in turn appointed their lieutenants as managers. Seeing their leaders interested in the sports programme, the rank and file drifted into the settlement house. Off the city streets and engaged in wholesome sports, these boys had less provocation to delinquency, and the rate fell off sharply.

The Group is often a better Disciplinarian than a Leader is. The point deserves to be stressed that the group as a whole is often the best of disciplinarians. That is to say, the group itself is frequently able to exert more effective control over the conduct of its members than

¹ Bruno Bettelheim, "Individual and Mass Behaviour in Extreme Situations", *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 38, pp. 417-52, October, 1943.

can an outside individual charged with special authority. As a rule the most efficient regulator of all is a group of persons of the same age and interests. A large measure of the success of modern nursery schools is due to this fact. Many a little child who is a serious disciplinary problem to his parents conducts himself properly when placed in a nursery school. Not wishing to court the disfavour of the other children, he gives up his antagonistic ways and conforms. The power of the group in regulating behaviour is well illustrated also by an experience in a certain boys' reformatory.¹ The old director had tried to keep order by a system of physical punishment administered by the guards. The result was not satisfactory. It is said that in talking to the boys the men always stood as a matter of precaution with their backs to the wall for fear of an attack by another boy. The new director undertook to use the power of group opinion as a disciplinary force. The problem of disorder in the dining-room was handled by giving a banner to the table with the best conduct, and with the banner went a double portion of dessert for each member at the table. If a boy threw a potato across the room he was at once under disapproval from the other members at his table because of the danger to their chances of winning the banner and of getting the extra desserts. Besides, if there was any general disorder, the privilege of attending the movies was taken away from the entire group. The responsibility for the maintenance of order was shifted from the guards to the boys themselves. Marked improvement in discipline resulted, confirming the belief that the organised group is itself the best disciplinarian of its members.

The converse of the foregoing is also true. Individuals are not only cordial to changes introduced by the group to which they belong, but they tend to be hostile to innovations suggested by outsiders or even by newcomers to the group. Another illustration is the resentment which Southerners show towards suggestions for social reform in the South made by Northerners—not an uncommon practice; whereas comparable proposals made by highly regarded native sons are often given respectful attention. One of the surest ways of jeopardising a reform programme, no matter how appropriate, is for members of the out-group to propose it.

SUMMARY

Since human groups are cultural groups and are organised around norms or standards of conduct, groups bring pressure to bear upon those who deviate. The more extreme the deviation, in general the greater is the social pressure to conform. Some deviation may be permitted, the amount depending on the urgency of the norm or issue, the tradition of the society, the existence or non-existence of crisis, and the status of the individual.

Techniques of social control are positive and negative for rewards and

¹ As told to the authors by the leader of the Oregon State Reformatory.

punishments, in three interrelated areas, the physical, the economic, and the social psychological. Since man lives mainly on the symbolic level, he mainly utilises social psychological means of social control.

The effectiveness of social control in a given instance depends on the value the individual being controlled attaches to the group, the autonomy of the group, and the consistency of the cultural directives.

One of the consequences of social control is that a relatively few deviates get a disproportionately big share of the attention and resources of the group. Deviation may also be used as an attention-getting device. Because of group pressure, individuals seldom rise much above or fall much below the level of their groups, highlighting the practical importance of the company one keeps. The group is ordinarily a conservative influence, maintaining the *status quo*; but if change is desired, group pressure can be utilised to promote change, by working through the group as a whole rather than by working with the members individually.

Social control is closely related to social adjustment, which is the central theme of this book. Those who deviate from the norms are not well adjusted to those norms. Social control is concerned with improving the adjustment by changing the individual or his situation or both. On the contrary, social reform—which will be considered in a later chapter—is concerned with changing the norms.

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. Examine critically Durkheim's rules for distinguishing between the normal and pathological.
2. Analyse the relations between law and morals, and law and custom.
3. Distinguish between customs, conventions and fashions.
4. What is the rôle of education as an agent of social control in contemporary Britain?
5. Compare the rôle of kinship as an agent of social control in any two societies.
6. Give a brief summary of Hobhouse's account of the evolution of public justice.
7. What changes have occurred in the relative rôles of the major institutions as agencies of social control?

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PART IV : PERSONALITY

Whereas the preceding section of this book dealt with the collective aspects of group life, the present Part IV focuses on the individual—specifically on the rôle of social experience in the development of personality. By personality we mean the integration of the social psychological behaviour of the human being, represented by habits of action and feeling, attitudes, and opinions. This behaviour contrasts with physiological behaviour, although the two are inter-related. Personality, as used here, is an inclusive term which covers values as well as other aspects of behaviour. Since personality is developed in social situations and is expressed in interaction with other people, it has an important social aspect. Viewed from this social aspect, one's personality is the totality of impressions one makes on others.

We are interested in knowing how personality is formed, maintained, and changed. The sociologist is concerned not with all the determinants of personality but primarily with the social influences. The social influences begin at birth and are brought to play upon an organism that has been nine months in the making. The organism at birth is, in turn, the product of hereditary or genetic factors and the physical environment of the mother's womb. Because both these factors vary, infants are born with individual differences. The social environments into which babies are born also vary, as do the natural environments.

The social environments into which babies are born consist of (a) groups of persons, supplemented by unrelated individuals, and (b) the social heritage or culture. The groups are the bearers of the culture and are in many ways the products of the culture. But some variations in group phenomena are not of cultural origin, as, for instance, variations in size of family within a given socio-economic segment of a given sub-culture. Differences in size of family are not without significance for the personality of the child. So we consider the group apart from culture and devote a chapter to "Group and Personality", after which we consider in "Culture and Personality" the influence of the social heritage. Since culture is defined and discussed at length in Chapter II, it is sufficient here to say very briefly that culture is the learned and shared behaviour of a social group, and the products thereof. It is a common way of life, as expressed mainly in tools, conventional meanings and institutions.

The process by which the individual, in growing up, acquires the values of the group is known as socialisation. Socialisation occurs through communication with others who have already been exposed to the socialisation process. Socialisation consists of learning how

to perform certain social rôles satisfactorily. These rôles embody the behaviour which the culture has defined as appropriate to the holders of given social positions or statuses. In this way, in part, culture is transmitted from generation to generation.

The child starts life as a biological organism with certain potentialities for learning, in the presence of certain agents of socialisation who serve as cultural models. The most prominent of these are parents, siblings, friends, and teachers. Those with whom the individual becomes identified become his reference groups, the sources of his perceptions and values. In the process of rôle-taking, the person undertakes to learn to anticipate the responses of others who are implicated with him in a social situation. He aims to acquire insight into the behaviour of others. In the process of rôle-taking, the person also develops a self, a concept of personal identity, an answer to the question : who am I? The process of socialisation orders behaviour, inculcates basic disciplines, establishes aspirations, and furnishes skills. Socialisation occurs on both the conscious and the unconscious level.

Rôle is a social concept implying a relationship between ego and alter, between self and at least one other person. The delineation of any one rôle implies the existence of at least one other rôle, in a relation of complementary responses. Thus a man can perform the rôle of officer in the army only if there are others who are ordinary soldiers. The officer has a right to expect certain behaviour, such as deference and obedience to his commands in certain situations, and the men in turn have a right to expect certain behaviour, such as leadership, from their officer.

Thus we see that the basic conceptual units of rôle theory are (i) the rôle, which is the unit of culture ; (ii) the position (status), the unit of society ; and (iii) the self, the unit of personality. Reciprocal action occurs between persons in terms of rôles, and there is an interaction of rôle and self. Contemporary rôle theory regards human conduct as the product of the interaction of rôle and self.

Socialisation stresses conformity to certain norms of the group but with some flexibility and selectivity, so that the result is not uniformity of behaviour. But there are failures in socialisation, persons whose behaviour deviates from social norms. Hence the final chapter of Part IV is devoted to " Socialisation and Social Deviation "

CHAPTER IX

GROUP AND PERSONALITY

In 1938, a girl about six years of age called Anna was found by social workers in an attic-like room in her grandfather's house where she had been kept since she was five and one-half months old.¹ Her clothing and bedding were filthy. She was unable to walk, talk, or use gestures. She could not feed herself when food was placed before her. She was emaciated and undernourished, with skeleton-like legs and bloated abdomen. She had been fed virtually nothing but cow's milk by her mother, who was a moron. Anna was an illegitimate child and was presumably isolated because her grandfather, a widowed farmer in whose house the mother lived, was hostile and opposed to having the child in the house. The mother, we were told, engaged in heavy work on the farm and had little time for Anna. After she was found by the social worker, Anna was removed to a county home where she stayed about a year and a half, and where she learned to walk, feed herself, and understand simple commands but not to talk. Finally she was moved to a private home for retarded children, where she lived for three years until her death from haemorrhagic jaundice in 1942. Before her death, Anna could string beads, identify a few colours, build with blocks. She was clean about her clothing, habitually washed her hands and brushed her teeth, and walked well. She had a pleasant disposition and tried to help other children. She talked mainly in phrases.

For purposes of comparison, the case of Isabel is instructive. Isabel was found in Ohio at about the same age as Anna, and under similar circumstances. Isabel had more human companionship in spite of lack of vocal communication. Isabel's mother, a deaf mute, shared much of her isolation, although she could not and apparently did not attempt much training. Isabel was so rachitic when discovered that the bowing of her legs caused her soles nearly to meet when she walked.

When Isabel was first examined, her score on the Stanford-Binet scale was equivalent to 19 months, near the zero point on the scale, while her score on the Vineland social maturity scale was two and a half years. However, Isabel received intensive and skilled training in speech and other human skills, beginning soon after her discovery. Her I.Q. score trebled within a year and a half. When the investigator last saw her, she was 14 and in the sixth grade of a public school, participating normally in school activities.

¹ Kingsley Davis, "Extreme Social Isolation of a Child", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 45, pp. 554-65, January, 1940; "Final Note on a Case of Extreme Isolation", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 52, pp. 432-7, March, 1947.

To sum up, Anna and Isabel were about the same age. Both girls spent approximately the first six years of life in almost complete seclusion and without socialising training. At discovery, both girls seemed to be congenitally feeble-minded. In both cases, there were marked advances to higher levels of physical and intellectual abilities after their discovery. But there were differences. Anna was more isolated than Isabel during the first six years. Isabel achieved normal mentality within two years whereas Anna was still noticeably inadequate after four and one-half years. Anna seems to have been innately deficient mentally whereas Isabel was apparently normal. Isabel received more intensive and skilled training. Both cases indicate that early seclusion does not preclude later development and socialisation.¹ Both cases are instructive in showing how important for personality are the kinds and amount of association we have with others.

Experiments with chimpanzees, who can be manipulated as human beings may not be, throw additional light on the consequences of restricted socialisation. As the following studies show, animals so restricted do not learn certain types of appropriate social behaviour. The spontaneous social interactions of two groups of monkeys were compared, one group which had lived under free-ranging conditions until captured and the other being laboratory-born monkeys separated from their mothers in early infancy and raised under conditions which limited their social experience.² The restricted monkeys showed more frequent and prolonged fighting and fewer grooming episodes. This group also showed less frequency and integration of sexual behaviour, particularly on the part of males. When both groups (the restricted and unrestricted males) were subsequently tested with the same socially experienced females, thus eliminating inadequacies in the sexual partner as a factor in sexual performance, gross differences in the behaviour of the males remained. When given an opportunity to choose between restricted and unrestricted males, socially experienced females uniformly preferred the unrestricted males.³

THE BASES OF GROUP INFLUENCE ON PERSONALITY

When we ask why the human group is a powerful influence on personality, we may begin our answer by noting that if the newborn baby is to survive, he must have one or more associates who look

¹ There is evidence from other studies that, with reference to certain kinds of behaviour, there is a critical point in development beyond which learning either does not occur or does not occur so efficiently. See *ITEMS* (Social Science Research Council), vol. 15, No. 2, June, 1961.

² William A. Mason, "The Effects of Social Restriction on the Behavior of Rhesus Monkeys", *Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology*, vol. 53, pp. 582-9, 1960.

³ William A. Mason, "The Effects of Social Restriction on the Behavior of Rhesus Monkeys: II. Tests of Gregariousness", *Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology*, vol. 54, pp. 287-90, 1961.

after him. He cannot, for instance, get his own food or keep warm. So the human infant is dependent, and a dependent organism is subject to more influence by others than an independent organism like the tadpole which can literally swim for itself shortly after birth. The human infant is usually born into a group, the family, that looks after him. Or if he has only his mother, then mother and child make the group. Or if the infant is abandoned by his mother or separated from her, and reared in an orphanage, then the infant is part of the larger group of the attendants and other orphans.

A further significant reason why the group is a determinant of the human personality is the highly flexible nature of the human organism at birth which makes it especially susceptible to group influence or learning. Learning is to be understood as the processes by which the organism is modified by the responses it makes to stimuli.

INSTINCTS IN ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR

Before modern science discovered the rôle of the learning process, it was customary for psychologists to account for a great deal of human conduct in terms of instincts, defined as inborn tendencies to action.¹ Long lists of such presumed instincts were drawn up. Such common personality traits as parental love, imitation, pugnacity, and acquisitiveness were held to be the result of inborn dispositions. At the present time this type of explanation of human behaviour is largely discredited, and the practice is to explain such traits in terms of learning.

Among the lower animals, instinct plays a large part in determining behaviour; in certain species, the domination of behaviour by inherited patterns is almost complete.² Ants, for example, have a highly socialised life determined by instinct. In founding a colony, the queen excavates a cell in the earth and remains entombed until the eggs develop. After the first batch of eggs is laid, the queen feeds the larvae until they pupate. The first individuals are workers who take charge of the colony, feed the queen and themselves, and tend the brood, thus freeing the parent to devote herself to oviposition. Certain ants, usually those that are physically larger, act as defenders of the tribe and in some cases use powerful mandibles for crushing seeds or prey. Smaller workers tend the brood, forage for food, make nests, and cultivate fungus beds. When the original colony becomes overcrowded, some queens and workers leave the nest to start colonies of their own. Ants do all these remarkable things not as a result of learning, but as a result of inborn responses to stimuli. Because they represent so completely the automatic working out of inherited patterns, these behaviour patterns of ants show a minimum of variation.

¹ Cf. L. L. Bernard, *Instinct: A Study in Social Psychology* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., Inc., 1924).

² Cf. W. M. Wheeler, *Colony-Founding Among Ants* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933); A. D. Imms, *Social Behaviour in Insects* (New York: The Dial Press, 1931), Chap. 5.

The uniformity of the ant colonies stands in striking contrast to the greatly varied behaviour in human communities. One ant colony of the same species is much like another, but there is a great difference indeed between a primitive community of a few families loosely organised as a hunting group, and a highly organised community of millions of families like New York City. The biology of the ant prescribes in detail what an ant colony will be like, but the biology of man exercises no such determinism.

Instinct is a term that applies more correctly to the lower animals than to human beings. The behaviour of the animals is much more largely governed by inherited patterns. A newly hatched chicken will stand, walk, and peck at an object on the ground. A newborn baby is more helpless. The best performance the baby can give in the way of motor activity is a sort of random thrashing about of its legs and arms, and the mouthing and sucking movements already alluded to. In physiological terms we say that the organisation of the nervous system is much less complete in the human baby at birth than it is in the chick, and the period of maturation is accordingly much longer in the human being.

Advantages and disadvantages of instinctive behaviour. At first this lack of neural organisation is a handicap to the human being, but later it becomes his greatest asset. Unlike the chick, the baby cannot shift for himself at birth, but because his actions are less rigid and pre-determined, his learning is much more extensive. Instead of very simple and inflexible acts like pecking at a grain of corn, the child may acquire an extensive set of food habits. Eating, for human beings, may become an elaborate ritual. So with other behaviour also. Man is not born with a building instinct such as birds have for nest-making. From one point of view the birds have an advantage because they do not have to depend on experience or on other birds to learn. Each generation of birds can function independently without suffering any loss of nest-building skill. Man would be helpless in building a shelter if he could not rely on the accumulated experience of the group. An Eskimo caught in an arctic blizzard can put up an igloo in forty-five minutes if necessary, but he can do this only because he has learned how from others. If he had not been taught this knowledge, he would perish. He has no igloo-building instinct to help him.

Birds improve the quality of their nests with practice, and skill is increased by learning from other birds, but the margin of improvement is relatively small. This is not to deny that the nests of birds are remarkable; they are often superior to the means of protection of many primitive peoples who have only such a crude structure as a lean-to with which to protect themselves from the weather. But give man time and he will learn to build a shelter that far surpasses any that instinct can provide. Man has learned how to build a more

lasting and spacious shelter, and he also knows how to heat it, cool it, and ventilate it to his liking. Human beings learn to do an amazing variety of things precisely because they are not dominated by instinct, but instead are endowed by nature with drives that are more flexible.

In some quarters there is objection to the use of the term instinct even when applied to lower animals, on the ground that it conceals the fact that lower animals are also capable of learning and need not be entirely dominated by inherited responses that are mechanically repetitive. It is said that even the lowly amoeba can learn, that is, change its behaviour somewhat in response to new stimuli. The point is well taken. The differences between man and the lower animals can be exaggerated. But even if the difference in learning capacity between man and the lower animals were only one of degree and not one of kind, the difference would still be a considerable one and of the utmost significance, forming as it does the basis of culture which the lower animals lack, or possess only in negligible degree. There is, however, a type of human learning of which other animals appear to be incapable, namely, learning which involves the use of abstract symbols, and without which culture must remain very rudimentary indeed. Differences in kind of learning, as well as in degree, distinguish man from the lower orders.

To sum up the foregoing discussion, then, we may say that in the extreme dependence and flexibility of the human organism at birth we have the chief keys to the teachability of the human being and the reasons why other persons exert such a powerful influence in the formation of personality.

SOCIALISATION, RÔLE-LEARNING, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SELF

We turn next to a consideration of how the group influences personality. We are concerned here with the processes of group influence and not with those of culture, which will be dealt with in the next chapter on "Culture and Personality".

The Social Environment consists of Social Interaction and Culture. The social environment which is so important for personality is really made up of two parts, group interaction and culture. The two factors are difficult to separate because human groups are cultural, in contrast to the group life of lower animals, yet group and culture are not identical. Although culture is learned through the group, not all learning through others is cultural. Only learning which is transmitted from generation to generation as part of the social heritage is cultural. A great deal of learning, in which the cultural factor is subordinate or absent, takes place in relation to other persons. Group interaction is common to life in all cultures, in all ages. Everywhere there is leading, following, teaching, imitating, intimidating,

fighting, ostracising, praising, blaming. These are general patterns of conduct, or forms of social behaviour. But what is praised or what is blamed varies tremendously from culture to culture. The Plains Indians in America praised stealing under certain circumstances, but in modern cities it is nearly always condemned.

It should not be inferred from the foregoing that the group processes are general and the cultural processes specific, for each has both general and specific aspects. The difference is that cultural processes are conventional and may be codified; not so, group processes. To cite a specific illustration, sibling rivalry is very widespread in different cultures and in different families of the same culture, and is therefore a general group phenomenon. It may be regarded as a manifestation of the group process of competition arising between two siblings who become rivals for the affection of a parent or for social status. Yet each case of sibling rivalry is different. "Joseph's brethren hated him and could not speak civilly to him because they saw that their father loved him more than all the rest." The situation would probably have been different if Joseph had had sisters rather than brothers, or if all the brothers had been equally attractive or competent, at least in the sight of their father. There are, then, a considerable number of factors in the group situation which influence the degree to which sibling rivalry occurs and the way it is developed. Insofar as it affects these factors, culture influences sibling rivalry indirectly. In addition there may be a direct cultural influence *via* specific teachings on sibling rivalry which vary from place to place. In the United States, sibling rivalry is frowned upon; hence an older child who shows hostility towards a younger sibling because the latter has displaced him in the affection of his parents may later develop a sense of guilt or remorse;¹ whereas no such feeling is observed among the Pilagá Indian children, who show their hostility openly and directly and have fear only of retaliation.² The culture, then, patterns sibling rivalry and probably influences also the degree to which it occurs, but sibling rivalry itself is a phenomenon of group life and is affected by the many variables of family composition and structure. Sibling rivalry is, of course, an important influence in the development of personality, but it is only one of many similar influences derived from group interaction.

There is an interval before conscious moral codes are applied to the child,³ during which the influence of interpersonal relations is relatively very powerful. This is partly because a certain degree of maturation is needed before the child can understand the adult norms.

¹ David M. Levy, *Sibling Rivalry* (American Orthopsychiatric Association, Research Monographs, No. 2, 1937).

² Jules and Zunia Henry, *Doll Play of Pilagá Indian Children* (American Orthopsychiatric Association, Research Monographs, No. 4, 1944).

³ Margaret Mead and Martha Wolfenstein, *Childhood in Contemporary Cultures* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 350.

The field of race relations furnishes illustrations.¹ An intensive study of 103 children in a racially mixed area of a seaboard city in north-eastern United States showed that at the age of six, a white child might refuse to play with a Negro child and give colour as the reason. The four-year-olds, on the other hand, were conscious of physical differences but played together on the street with few racial incidents. If it were possible to press back still earlier, the awareness of community racial attitudes would probably be weaker still. The interpersonal reactions come much earlier, that is, the reactions, for example, to whether the other children, regardless of colour, are aggressive or not, considerate or not, and so on.

The early Interpersonal Relationships of the Child influence his Basic Personality Structure. The relationships that a very young child has with his mother, father, siblings, and peers profoundly affect the organisation of his drives and emotions—the deeper, more unconscious aspects of his personality which are often referred to as “character structure”. Research² involving boys and girls ten to eighteen years of age, members of different social classes, discloses a distinction between two aspects of personality: the deeper character structure and the relatively more superficial structure built around specific value systems. In each class there are various character types: aggressive, impulsive children, intimidated ones, and socialised ones; yet each class has a distinctive set of opinions, attitudes, values and habits respecting, for example, food, work, sex and play. The evidence suggests that homogeneity in attitudes, values, and habits, to which the name “modal personality” may be assigned, is more characteristic of socio-economic classes than is basic personality structure. The basic personality structure is more stable and more difficult to change.

How do such processes as praise and blame, co-operation and conflict, ascendance and submission affect personality? For affect it they do. Whether a person becomes a leader, a bully, a coward, an imitator; whether he feels inferior or superior; whether he is altruistic or narcissistic depends upon the kind of interaction he has with others. Group interaction moulds his personality.³

How the Child learns the need for others. The infant is born with a set of organic needs which other persons help to satisfy, and it is for this reason that the child learns to make differential responses to

¹ Mary Ellen Goodman, *Race Awareness in Young Children* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc., 1952).

² Robert J. Havighurst, “Social Class and Personality Structure”, *Sociology and Social Research*, vol. 36, pp. 355-63, July-August, 1952.

³ A somewhat different distinction between group and cultural influences has been made by other writers, using a different terminology. Thus Kimball Young distinguishes between culture and “personal-social or inter-individual influences”. “Personal-social here means the effect of another individual or group of individuals upon one, outside of codified forms of behaviour. It is the person-to-person relationship, uninfluenced by standardised habits and ideas common to one’s group” (*Social Psychology*, New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1936, p. 5). See also the distinction made between “common-human” and “collective” processes.

human beings. Because of these and other satisfactions, the child as he grows older becomes increasingly identified with other persons and comes to crave social relations. To the organic needs are added another, different set of needs which, because they are derived from the group, may be called sociogenic needs. Prominent among these acquired needs, largely built up around the ego, are the desire to belong to the group, to be accepted and loved by the group, and to enjoy good standing in the group. These have been described by W. I. Thomas as the wish for response and the wish for recognition.¹ The abhorrence with which human beings regard isolation from the group may be judged by the fact that solitary confinement is regarded as an extreme form of punishment. When an individual withdraws from association with other human beings, he is likely to be or to become queer. If his withdrawal from others is extreme, it may mean insanity. Obviously, then, the sociogenic drives are highly important motivating forces in personality.

How the concept of self develops. Clearly the idea is acquired, not inherited, since little babies do not have it. The notion of self begins to arise as the child learns something of the world of sensations about him. He learns to distinguish this colour and that form; similarly he comes to learn that parts of his body belong to him. The fascination of the little child when he discovers his toes is familiar. In discovering his universe the child discovers himself. The idea of self develops in conjunction with the idea of other things. He learns that they are distinct beings and that he too has individuality. Acquaintance with his name and the use of pronouns aid the process of self-discovery. Little children get a great deal of practice answering such questions as "What is your name?" and "Whose little boy are you?" which emphasise the idea of self in relation to others.²

THE SELF AND "THE OPINIONS OF OTHERS"

The self is thought of particularly in relation to others as listeners or observers. As listeners or observers, these outsiders are passing judgment. They praise the child for certain things he does, and blame him for other things. An eminent psychologist, G. Stanley Hall,³ in writing about his early boyhood on the farm, tells how his

¹ Thomas also postulates two additional wishes, the wish for new experience and the wish for security, which seem more closely related to the organic drives of hunger and activity. W. I. Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1923).

² In an attempt to throw light on the development of the idea of self, Cooley studied the self-words used by his own children between the 20th and 33rd months of life. He found that the use of the word "I" represented "the assertion of self-will in a social medium of which the speaker is conscious". (C. H. Cooley, "A Study of the Early Use of Self-words by a Child", *Psychological Review*, November, 1908, pp. 339-57.) This conclusion is confirmed by Read Bain, "The Self and Other Words of a Child", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 41, pp. 767-76, May, 1936.

³ G. S. Hall, *Life and Confessions of a Psychologist* (New York, 1923).

father forced him to do many things which were distasteful to him. He had to drive the pigs to the market. His schoolmates teased him about this so much that the boy took to driving the pigs by a circuitous route, far out of the way, to avoid going past the homes of his acquaintances. As a result he was late for school one day. When he entered the room, his teacher made some insinuating comments, to the great amusement of the whole class and to young Hall's mortification. Years later this same teacher was one of Hall's associates at Harvard. It happened that this man sickened one night and died. Even under these circumstances, Hall reports, he found it difficult to feel any real sympathy for him. This incident reveals how sensitive the child is to the opinions of others.

Hall¹ suggests in another place that a clue to the child's idea of self may be found in the names or name by which he is called by his intimates which reflect approval or disapproval. A child to whom the epithet "Pet", "Sweetheart", or "Angel" is applied would be likely to have a different idea of self from one called "Imp", "Cry-baby", or "Monkey". Indeed, as we shall see below, it is possible to account in large measure for a given individual's conduct in terms of the praise and blame he has received from others.

We learn the Opinions of others in part by taking the rôles of others. The self has the distinguishing characteristic that it may be an object to itself; we speak of this as *self-consciousness*. A person directs behaviour towards himself, converses with himself, passes judgment on himself. The development of the self leads to the growth of conscience and ego. The self does not exist at birth but arises in social experience as the result of taking the rôle of others.

In the development of the self, Mead² notes three stages: the stage of meaningless imitative acts, the play stage, and the game stage. During the first, occurring about the second year, the child imitates others without understanding the meaning of his or the other's actions, as when he "reads" a magazine. The child is beginning to place himself in the position of others. Later, around the third year, the child takes the place of mother, father, etc., in a whole variety of rôles in ordinary play activities. In taking the rôle of others, he is in a position to act towards himself as others do. As storekeeper, for example, he offers merchandise to himself and bargains with himself as the storekeeper might. In this way the child gets outside himself and gains perspective on himself; that is, he makes an object of himself and forms a concept of himself. Since the child takes many rôles, he has a series of selves; and since the power

¹ G. S. Hall, "The Early Sense of Self", *American Journal of Psychology*, vol. 60, pp. 351-95, 1897-8.

² G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934), pp. 135-226.

	MENNONITE	NON-MENNONITE
GENERALIZED HELP —	6·8	3·3
CARE OF OTHER CHILDREN —	4·4	5·2
WORK FOR PARENTS —	9·0	10·7
		5·5
INTENSIVE WORK —	13·8	16·4
CHORE —	10·5	
WORK —	7·6	8·4
CLEANLINESS —	4·6	12·3
INDIVIDUAL ACHIEVEMENT —	5·3	
CHARACTER —	6·2	13·7
OBEDIENCE —	9·2	5·2
RELIGION AND VIRTUES	9·2	4·7
		4·9
SOCIAL MORALITY —	13·4	9·7

FIG. 5.—The Distribution of Praise in Two Groups.

The values in Mennonite and non-Mennonite children in rural areas. There is not much difference in amount of praise for work ; but the Mennonites emphasise social morality, religion, virtues, and obedience, while the non-Mennonites stress individual achievement and cleanliness. These influences of praise and blame, which vary according to culture, are highly influential in moulding the social nature of the person. The numbers are percentages. (From J. Kalhorn, "Studies in Topological and Vector Psychology : III. Values and Sources of Authority Among Rural Children", *University of Iowa Studies in Child Welfare*, vol. 20, 1945.)

of integration and generalisation are at a minimum, there is little consistency in his behaviour.

The unified self, according to Mead, emerges in the game stage when the child begins to act towards himself from the viewpoint of the whole group, not from the standpoint of just one particular individual. As a member of a team, he must anticipate the behaviour of all the other members; he accordingly plays a number of rôles simultaneously, a generalised rôle of a number of people. The rôles, moreover, are built around the rules of the game. As he appropriates the rules, the child generalises his behaviour: that is, he plays the rôle of what Mead calls "the generalised other". The team with its rules is thus a prototype of the organised community. The whole community is a "generalised other" with which the child becomes identified. Its values become incorporated into his neural structure. The self, viewed in this way, consists of an organisation of rôles taken over from the community as a generalised other.

In the interests of clarity, a distinction may be made here between rôle-taking and rôle-playing.¹ Rôles are taken when they are not one's own, as with the actor on the stage or the child when he undertakes to imitate his elders. But both the actor and the child have rôles of their own, which they fill when they are not "acting" and which consist of an organised set of socially expected patterns of behaviour. Rôle-taking may be purely for amusement or for better understanding of another's rôle, or in anticipation of playing that rôle at a later time. Rôle-taking may be incorporated in rôle-playing. This may be done either quite explicitly as in the case of the actor whom we expect to act out the rôles of others, or more deviously by those who take other rôles like the young college instructor who in the classroom imitates a favoured teacher of his own.

We go through Life adjusting our Conduct, in part, to others. The imaginary play of children is a well-known phenomenon. Not so obvious is the fact that everyone goes through life playing rôles which are responses to the attitudes of others, revolving especially around praise and blame. Little behaviour, indeed, is undertaken without consideration for others. Human beings may be regarded as "acting" with reference to the opinions of others. In the view of Charles H. Cooley this tendency to adjust our conduct to the conduct of others towards us is the central fact in personality.

Rôle Differentiation. Among the types of rôle found in human society, two of the more basic are the *instrumental* and the *expressive*. The former refers to the performance of tasks and the latter to the manifestation of sentiment. Generally speaking, the rôles of men are organised more largely than are those of women around instrumental

¹ Some sociologists employ still a third concept, "playing at a rôle". According to this usage, rôle-playing refers to the performance of one's own rôles; rôle-taking is putting oneself in the position of another; the actor is playing at a rôle.

rôles, and the rôles of women more largely around expressive rôles. This is what we mean when we say men are mainly the breadwinners and women chiefly the source of affection. Bales has studied the distribution of rôle-types in problem-solving groups.¹ He notes that some individuals in such groups emphasise their own prominence and achievement ; others emphasise group achievement ; and still others emphasise sociability. These three rôle-types tend to be uncorrelated with each other in a large population. Rare is the well-rounded leader who may be described as one who ranks high on all three rôle-patterns. The task specialist is not so rare, and the same is true of the social specialist or the morale-builder.

In this chapter we are interested in the relationship of rôles and personality. One aspect of this relationship has to do with the "fit" between rôle and personality attributes. A common phenomenon is the square peg in the round hole, the person who is not competent to perform the duties of a given rôle, or is not happy in that rôle.

Rôle Conflicts and their Resolutions. The problem of adjustment is complicated for most of us by virtue of the fact that we have not just one rôle to perform but several, which introduces the possibility of rôle conflict. For example, every male is first a son, and at some later time usually also a lover. In the ancient Greek legend dramatised as high tragedy by Sophocles, Oedipus unwittingly slew his father (parricide) and wed his mother (incest), violating two major taboos. When he discovered his crimes, his anguish was great. It is in part because rôle conflict can lead to great mental turmoil that social psychologists concern themselves so much with this phenomenon.

However, rôle conflict does not ordinarily lead to lasting maladjustment. Were it not so, society would be in a state of chronic disorder, for there are many rôle conflicts, especially in a complex, highly dynamic society. There are several devices for coping with such conflicts. One is to relinquish one of the two conflicting rôles. Thus a judge who finds he has been assigned to a case in which he has some stake is expected to disqualify himself. A doctor is not supposed to treat a member of his family who is seriously ill. John F. Kennedy on becoming President sold all his stock in private enterprises. A second method for resolving rôle conflicts is to retain both rôles but to compartmentalise and rationalise them. This is usually accomplished by a system of priorities, either of time or of values. Thus one may, from 9 to 5, be highly competitive and self-seeking in his rôle as a business man, and highly co-operative and altruistic the rest of the time in his rôle as the head of a household. Finally, one may try to moderate the demands of each rôle while meeting both.

We have been discussing possible conflicts between two or more

¹ Robert F. Bales, "Task Roles and Social Roles in Problem-Solving Groups", in *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1958), pp. 437-47.

rôles. There is another type of conflict which involves two or more aspects of the same rôle. This is portrayed in Shakespeare's play, *Hamlet*, a Prince of Denmark who is called upon by his father's ghost to avenge his murder. Hamlet's uncle, Claudius, and his mother, Gertrude, had murdered his father and his uncle had become King. Hamlet was torn between his duty to avenge his father and his love for his mother, two aspects of his rôle as a son. The play is especially interesting as a literary source for studying rôle behaviour. Hamlet entertains the King and his guests with a pageant in which he hopes "to prick the conscience of the King" by a re-enactment of the circumstances of the murder. Here is an early application of what is now called socio-drama. Observe also that to protect himself, Hamlet pretends madness, an example of playing at a rôle, not actual rôle-taking.

Personality is a Function of Social Situations. The point made above, that personality is a function of the expectations of others, is a special case of a more general principle, namely, that personality is a function of social situations.

When may we say of someone that he has the personality trait of perseverance? A person may show persistence in one situation and not in another. The trait of persistence is thus best defined in connection with particular situations. The same thing is true for other traits. It has been shown that children who have a reputation for being trustworthy may cheat if the temptation is great enough¹ or a child may be scrupulously honest in some situations and dishonest in others. Figure 6 shows the rating of a particular girl on twenty-one




FIG. 6.—Honesty Profile, showing the Variability of the Subject.

This girl was given 21 tests for honesty and the chart shows quite clearly that she was very honest in some situations, while quite dishonest in others. Honesty as a trait seems to depend somewhat on the situation. (Adopted from H. Hartshorne, M. A. May, and F. K. Shuttlesworth, *Studies in the Organisation of Character*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1930, p. 291.)

¹ H. Hartshorne and M. A. May, *Studies in Deceit* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928), Book I, p. 286; Book II, p. 220.

different tests of honesty. According to popular notion it is thought that if she were honest, she would react honestly in all situations. This, however, was not true. The girl deviated from considerably above average in the honesty of her reactions to some situations to very much below average in others. In a similar manner it has been shown that conformity and nonconformity tend to be specific responses to particular situations rather than general behaviour patterns.¹

The Opinions of others influence our Conception of Self. We implied in the foregoing discussion that the conception of self is built up out of the conceptions that others have of us. This led Charles Horton Cooley to describe the social self as "the looking-glass self".²

"Each to each a looking-glass
Reflects the other that doth pass."

The conception of self, Cooley pointed out, seems to have three principal elements: the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgment of that appearance; and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification. The whole process, it will be noted, takes place in the imagination. In this regard it is somewhat different from the looking-glass, which does not so often throw back to us an image which is distorted by errors of perception. The opinions of others can only be inferred from what they say and do, and some individuals are more skilful at making correct inferences than others. Some individuals watch more carefully or accurately the effect of their words or deeds upon others. What we are saying is that we have only images, or as Walter Lippman called them, "pictures in our heads", which may or may not correspond to reality. That is why the poet, Robert Burns, pleaded for the skill to see ourselves as others see us.

What evidence is there to support these interactionist hypotheses of self-conception? In one test,³ individuals rated themselves on a five-point scale as to intelligence, self-confidence, physical attractiveness, and likeableness. These responses were compared with the actual judgment of others, the "perceived responses of others" (that is, the subject's predictions of how others would rate him), and the notion of the generalised other (how the subject perceives most persons view him). Those accorded high esteem by others reflect a higher self-esteem than do those who are poorly regarded. Those who perceive that they are highly regarded show greater self-esteem than do those who perceive that they are not highly regarded, and the perceived

¹ Robert A. Harper, "Is Conformity a General or a Specific Behaviour Trait?", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 12, pp. 81-6, February, 1947.

² *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922), pp. 183-5.

³ S. Frank Miyamoto and Sanford M. Dornbusch, "A Test of Interactionist Hypotheses of Self-Conception", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 61, pp. 399-403, March, 1956.

behaviour of others is more influential than the actual behaviour. Those with high self-ratings perceive *most* others as viewing them highly. Thus the findings are that the attitude of others is related to self-conception, but the perceived responses of others are even more closely related to self-conception.

Some of Mead's key ideas were tested with a group of institutionalised child psychiatric patients,¹ whose chief reason for hospitalisation was inadequate reciprocity with others. Both before and after long-term residential treatment, measurements were taken of how the subjects defined themselves, how they defined others, and how they thought others defined them. The responses on the second set of tests were more nearly in accord with Mead's theory than were those on the first set. The subjects whose self-concept underwent the greater change were those whose overt behaviour changed most significantly in the normal direction.

Mead's theory of rôle-taking involves the proposition that the ability to take a rôle is predicated upon a common universe of discourse. Circumstances encouraging the development of shared meanings, it is assumed, make for more accurate rôle-taking than situations which do not encourage consensus. Blood relatives presumably have more opportunity as a rule for developing consensus than persons not related by blood. Accordingly it was hypothesised by Stryker that rôle-taking is more accurate for persons related by blood than it is for in-laws. A set of statements of attitudes was used, adapted from a scale measuring family ideology on an autocratic-democratic continuum. The subjects were married adults and their parents. Each subject answered for himself and predicted how his parents or in-laws would respond. The hypothesis was supported by the data. Rôle-taking was found to be more accurate for persons of blood relationship than for persons of in-laws relationship. Likewise rôle-taking was found to be more accurate for persons of similar occupations than for persons of different occupations.²

Reference Groups: why we regard some Judges as more significant than others. It is common observation that we do not value all judges of our conduct equally but attach more significance to some than to others. On what bases are these "significant others" ³ chosen? Clearly one basis is the degree of intimacy and affection existing between us and them. We value more highly the judgments about us which are held by friends whom we esteem than we do the opinions of others who are just acquaintances, and we generally value the opinions

¹ William R. Rosengren, "The Self in the Emotionally Disturbed", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 66, pp. 454-62, March, 1961.

² Sheldon Stryker, "Conditions of Accurate Role-Taking: A Test of Mead's Theory", in Arnold Rose (ed.), *Human Behavior and Social Processes* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962).

³ H. S. Sullivan, *Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry* (Washington, D.C.: W. A. White Psychiatric Foundation, 1947), pp. 18-22.

of acquaintances more than we do those of strangers. Another basis on which we discriminate between judges of our behaviour is the degree of power or authority which those others have over us. All things equal, our valuations are proportional to the degree of control which these others have over us. A student is likely to care more about the opinions of him which his instructors have than he is about the opinions of members of the faculty in whose classes he has not enrolled.

Our Parents are usually our "most significant others". In the light of the above, it is not difficult to see why we generally look upon the members of our immediate family, and especially our parents, as our most significant judges, since they are the ones whose relationship to us is usually characterised by the greatest intimacy and power, especially during the early years of life. These observations are confirmed by a study¹ of Jewish adolescents in Philadelphia and Elmira who were asked: "Who are the persons whose opinion of you matters a great deal to you?" The modal number listed was four; about nine out of ten named one or both of their parents; in almost every case a parent was the first person listed. Some adolescents listed more persons than others; but by simple ranking, parents were mentioned most frequently, after which the order was the following: the peer group, teachers, siblings (tied for fourth place with aunts and uncles), grandparents, and finally assorted adults—rabbis, friends of the families, youth leaders.² There was a significant relationship between parental expectations and adolescents' attitudes, as well as a positive correlation between parent-child religious attitudes and behaviour. Parents may be somewhat more "significant others" for Jewish adolescents than for some other ethnic groups because of the special importance attached to family life by Jewish culture.

Our Early Experiences are very important for Emotional Development. Freud and his co-workers taught that the emotional phases of personality are shaped largely during infancy and childhood, the first five or six years of life, and to some extent during youth. According to this view, adult situations such as one meets in occupational environment may affect the personality also, although not so profoundly as the early childhood influences. Childhood is the period of greatest mental growth. The child's brain grows fastest the first year, then slackens its pace. Children six years old have brains often well within the range of those of adults. The rapid development of the nervous system is ordinarily matched by a prodigious amount of learning during the early years. But even without this special growth factor, it is assumed that the early years would be the most important simply

¹ Bernard C. Rosen, "The Reference Group Approach to the Parental Factor in Attitude and Behavior Formation", *Social Forces*, vol. 34, pp. 137-44, December, 1955.

² Information supplied by Professor Rosen.

because they come first. This idea is expressed in the popular saying that first impressions are the most important. They leave their mark on the nervous system and affect all subsequent experience. As the twig is bent, so is the tree inclined.

Until recently the importance of the early years of life was not recognised and the fact is still not appreciated very widely. The influences of childhood are by general assumption bracketed as heredity. Another popular idea seems to be that nothing of much importance happens during the early period, except such things as concern health. From the fact that most persons find it difficult to recall childhood experiences, particularly those they had before they were two or three years old, it is assumed that these experiences count for little. Good evidence of the widespread existence of this point of view is afforded by the usual run of biographies and autobiographies¹ which give only slight attention to the person's early experiences. An author may mention who his ancestors were, what his parents did, where they came from and where they lived, but usually there is very little about his earliest experiences with his family and playmates, and the meaning of these experiences for his disposition and character.

It is not always clear what makes a person domineering or submissive, expansive or reclusive, altruistic or selfish, but most of the researchers seek explanations in the group of habits of infancy or very early childhood. For instance, the following behaviour was observed in a group of children at play in a child-guidance clinic. A slightly older child was placed with a younger child, and their behaviour watched by observers unseen by the children. When a toy was introduced, the older child took the toy away from the little child, pushed the child down and kept the toy. Similar behaviour was repeated throughout the day. One child tended to develop selfish, bullying habits, while the other child learned avoidance devices and yielding habits. Such a situation might well continue in actual life outside the experimental laboratory for weeks, months, years. If an invisible statistician were keeping a record over such a long period, the grand total of such reaction patterns would be very large. Such repetition tends to fix habits, and to develop at a tender age personalities either with grasping and domineering tendencies or with side-stepping and avoiding traits.

Since the foundations of personality are laid in early life, our interest is directed particularly to the experiences the child has with his mother and father, his brothers and sisters, his playmates, and his schoolmates. Most important of all, of course, are the relationships of babyhood. In some cultures the responsibility of caring for the

¹ A. M. Tozzer, "Biography and Biology", in C. Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray (eds.), *Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1948), pp. 145-57. Professor Tozzer shows the compulsive bent among biographers to see a biological explanation for human personality.

baby falls on other children. In New Guinea each child is charged with the care of the next youngest. Elsewhere it may be usual to turn the baby over to a nurse or governess. Generally, however, the chief rôle in the child's early life is played by his mother. Under the circumstances, nothing is more important for personality than the kind of relationship a child has with his mother.

Is the Affectional Relationship between Infant and Mother a necessary antecedent for Normal Development of the relationship between Infants? The relationship of mother and infant obviously precedes in time the relationship between infants. What difference, if any, does the presence or absence of a real mother make in child development? Some clues are provided by studies of infant monkeys reared with mother surrogates and with real mothers.¹ These infants were observed in interaction in a play pen from the sixteenth day of life on. The surrogate-reared monkeys showed a greater amount and persistence of biting and licking. The mother-reared infants showed earlier and more frequent social responses to other infants. With maturity, they also showed a greater readiness and frequency of rough and tumble play. The evidence suggests that the first affectional system between infant and mother is a prerequisite to normal development of the second affectional system, that between infants.

The evidence of additional studies with monkeys² indicates that normal mothering alone is not enough to insure normal development. Young monkeys must also have an opportunity to play with other monkeys if they are to develop normally. The experience with the peer group seems to be even more important than that with the mother, since young monkeys raised without mothers developed into socially effective animals when they played together every day. Monkeys raised in isolation for six months remained shy, frightened and inactive even after months of daily playroom sessions. Six months for a monkey is about equivalent to two years for a human child. The researcher says that by the age of two years, isolated children have reached the point of no return but the case of Isabel cited at the beginning of this chapter casts doubt on this interpretation and suggests the greater recuperative power of the normal human being, possibly in part because of symbolic interaction.

SPECIAL IMPORTANCE OF EARLY FAMILY EXPERIENCE

In many fields of research, findings converge on the family as the principal social influence in the life of the individual. A few representative studies may be cited. In one investigation, a large number of children were tested as to their ideas of right and wrong,

¹ Studies by Harry F. Harlow as reported by Francis H. Palmer, "Critical Periods of Development: Report on a Conference", *ITEMS* (Social Science Research Council), vol. 15, No. 2, June, 1961.

² Harry F. and Margaret K. Harlow, "Social Deprivation in Monkeys", *Scientific American*, vol. 207, pp. 136-46, November, 1962.




FIG. 7.—Rates of Physical and Mental Growth, from Birth to Maturity.

The above figure shows the importance of the early years of life for growth, when the rate of growth is much more rapid than during later years. The upper chart indicates the physical growth of man from birth to maturity, with vertical lines added to mark the duration of the periods required for each 10 per cent addition to the weight. (Adapted from Minot, *Age, Growth and Death* (New York).) The lines are close together at the start, one 10 per cent gain following after another in short intervals of time. As the child gets older, it takes longer to add the same proportional amount. The lower chart illustrates the arrangement of intervals of mental growth according to norms of development established by Gesell. The vertical lines represent the same time interval as in the upper chart. (Arnold Gesell, *The Mental Growth of the Pre-School Child* (New York, 1925), p. 18.) There is an analogous concentration of mental growth in infancy. There are nine developmental intervals in the first sexennium of life and only three in the succeeding sexennia. According to this, there is, broadly speaking, relatively three times as much mental development in the first six years as in the following twelve, showing the special importance of the early years for personality.

and the result correlated with the answers of the children's associates, as shown in Table 5.¹

¹ H. Hartshorne and M. A. May, "Testing the Knowledge of Right and Wrong", *Religious Education*, vol. 21, pp. 539-54, October, 1926.

TABLE 5
CORRELATION BETWEEN MORAL JUDGMENTS OF CHILDREN
AND THEIR ASSOCIATES

Child and his parents	0.55
Child and his friends	0.35
Child and club leaders	0.14
Child and school teachers	0.03
Child and Sunday-school teachers	0.002

These figures show that the moral judgments of children are more largely derived from their parents than from their friends or teachers. There is evidence also that parental influence does more than form judgments; it influences conduct profoundly as well. Terman found that happiness in the parental family is the factor most highly correlated with marital happiness of offspring.¹ That is to say, the most important single asset for a happy marriage is to have come from a happy home. Still other studies show that character, as well as happiness, is generally a function of satisfactory family adjustment. Healy and Bronner report that juvenile delinquents are almost always children who at some stage of their development have been blocked in their needs for satisfying relationships in their family circle.² Rejection of children by their parents and the exposure of children to deviant parental rôle models are important factors in criminality.³

There has been considerable research on how family patterns are related to achievement motivation, a highly important question in our exceedingly competitive society. Strong achievement motivation results when parents set high goals for their children, instil confidence in them as to their competence, provide appropriate training by imposing standards of excellence in problem-solving tasks, and stress independence and autonomy, especially on the part of sons with reference to their fathers.⁴ Family size, ordinal position, mother's age, and social class are all relevant factors in achievement motivation but the effects of these variables are complex and interconnected. For instance, it is hypothesised that younger parents will generally be more energetic than older parents in socialising their children, but the results of research show that sons of younger mothers have higher motivation than sons of older mothers only when the family is small

¹ Lewis Terman, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness* (New York, 1938).

² William Healy and Augusta F. Bronner, *New Light on Delinquency and its Treatment* (New Haven, 1936). This research sought an answer to the question: Why do we find a delinquent child in a family where the other children are not delinquent? A group of 105 delinquent children were compared with a control group of 105 non-delinquents from the same families. In nearly every case the delinquents were found to have suffered serious frustration in their family experience, while their non-delinquent brothers and sisters fared better.

³ William McCord and Joan McCord, with Irving Kenneth Zola, *Origins of Crime: A New Evaluation of the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

⁴ B. C. Rosen and R. D'Andrade, "The Psychosocial Origins of Achievement Motivation", *Sociometry*, vol. 22, pp. 185-218, September, 1959.

and mainly when the parents are middle class.¹ Socio-economic class is significantly and directly related to vocational aspirations but it is not as significant as ethnicity, for the samples studied. Achievement motivation is more characteristic of Greeks and Jews than of Italians and French-Canadians.² Brazilian mothers are less likely to train their sons in self-reliance, autonomy and achievement than are American mothers. The Brazilian value system is associated with the prevailing type of family structure: authoritarian and father-dominated. In this type of family, the sons are more often indulged and over-protected than are sons in the smaller, more equalitarian family system of the United States.³

The Influence of Peer Groups on Values and Attitudes increases as the Child grows older. The table above shows that the correspondence of ideas of right and wrong between children and their friends is second only to that between children and their parents. The family group and the peer group are pan-cultural, that is, found in all societies, whereas some societies lack schools and churches. For this reason we are interested in this chapter on group influences on personality in considering further the influence of the peer group on the behaviour of the growing child. We observe that the influence of playmates generally increases with age throughout the pre-adolescent and adolescent years. This hypothesis has been tested on a sample of 322 children of lower socio-economic status in three age-grade levels, 11-13, 15-18, and 20-24, who were asked to give their attitudes and those of their parents and peers with regard to permissive behaviour in the feminine rôle. The influence of the peer groups appears to be proportional to the length of adolescence.⁴

If we inquire into the reasons for this phenomenon, one explanation appears to be that the growing child comes to depend more on the peer group for the achievement of status and less on his parents, hence values more highly the opinions of his contemporaries. His status in his home is generally more or less secure. Status in the peer group has to be won and validated by being one of the group, which means subscribing to the group values. Only in a changing society, of course, are an appreciable number of the values of youth significantly different from those of their elders.

Where there is Conflict in Norms during Adolescence, those of Peer Groups may outweigh those of the Family. In a changing society the young people are likely to be more liberal, favouring the new, whereas their

¹ Bernard C. Rosen, "Family Structure and Achievement Motivation", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 26, pp. 574-85, August, 1961.

² Bernard C. Rosen, "Race, Ethnicity, and the Achievement Syndrome", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 24, pp. 47-60, February, 1959.

³ Bernard C. Rosen, "Socialization and Achievement Motivation in Brazil", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 27, pp. 612-24, October, 1962.

⁴ Lionel J. Neiman, "Changing Attitudes and the Conceptions of Peer Groups" (Paper given at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society, Berkeley, 1953).

parents may be more conservative, favouring the values with which they have grown up and with which they are more familiar. This conflict between the generations is often particularly conspicuous in immigrant or minority groups, where the elders are identified with the culture of their own minority group, whereas the children seek to become identified with the majority group. In such a situation, the young may adhere more closely to the values of their peers than to those of their parents, as shown in a study¹ of conflicting group pressures from family and peer group in fifty adolescent Jewish high school boys and girls in a small city in upper New York. Unstructured interviews with the adolescents and a sample of parents were supplemented by observation in school activities and a structured interview schedule after a year. The use of kosher meat was chosen as an area of conflict between the children and their parents. Consideration must be given to the small size of the sample and the issue studied, but the data show that where there is conflict in norms, the adolescents tend less often to agree with their parents than with their peer groups, suggesting the great importance of peers' norms during adolescence.

The values of teenagers are highlighted in a study of the populations of ten high schools in greater Chicago,² a study based on the premise that in American society, teenagers form their own set of societies with interests and norms different from those of adults. This view supports that of Riesman, namely, that teenagers are increasingly oriented towards peers. The data show that scholarship is less valued than athletics for boys, and club activities for girls. The athlete outranks the scholar, although the scholar outranks the average student. Coleman makes the interesting suggestion that, to enhance scholarship, the schools increase inter-group rather than inter-personal competition.

In the United States, the conflict between the generations is affected by the discontinuity in cultural norms.³ We send our children to school, keep them out of the labour force, and generally encourage dependence on parents. But as tests of adulthood, we expect our children in due course to find a mate and a job, and in the pursuit of both they enjoy self-determination. The transition then is from norms of dependence to norms of independence, and conflict may arise when parents are loath to relinquish the control they have so long exercised. This problem does not arise in societies characterised by cultural continuity in child-rearing practices, as in traditional China, where grown sons even after marriage continue to show filial piety and obedience to their fathers.

¹ Bernard C. Rosen, "Conflicting Group Membership: A study of Parent-Peer Group Cross-Pressures", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 20, pp. 155-61, April, 1955.

² James S. Coleman, *The Adolescent Society: The Social Life of the Teenager and its Impact on Education* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961).

³ Ruth Benedict, "Continuities and Discontinuities in Cultural Conditioning", *Psychiatry*, vol. 1, pp. 161-7, 1938.

The play group of peers is a group of equals or near-equals whereas the parent-child relationship is one of superior and inferior. Accordingly, in the family situation the prospect is greater than in the peer situation that the relationship between members will be one of dominance and submission. Because the parent is bigger or superior or more powerful, he may dictate the behaviour of the child ; or because the parent is loving and indulgent, he may adopt a more permissive attitude towards his child's behaviour, in which case the child may dominate the parent. Clinical studies¹ suggest that the child who is dominated and overprotected by his parents tends to become a submissive child, whereas the child who is overprotected but indulged often becomes rebellious. The play group of peers, on the other hand, emphasises give-and-take. It values the child who can rough-house and hold his own, who is full of physical energy, who can participate in competitive sports. Because in the peer group the child generally associates with a larger number of individuals than just two parents, and because the members of the peer group tend not to idealise their members as do parents their offspring, the child usually gets from the others in his play group a more realistic judgment of himself than he does from his parents. The play group of peers may accordingly serve as a corrective for the errors of parents in dealing with their children.

The Theory of Differential Association as an explanation of Normal and Deviant Behaviour. The substance of preceding paragraphs is that our conception of self is largely derived from the opinions of others. Others, therefore, have an important influence on our personality and behaviour. Can we infer from this that our behaviour is conditioned by the company we keep? In Chapter 9, where the rôle of the group was explored, it was indicated that individuals seldom rise much above or fall much below the level of the group. One criminologist² has taken this idea and based on it the theory of differential association as an explanation of deviant behaviour. One important reason we have criminals, according to this theory, is that association with criminals begets criminals. There is a good deal of evidence to support the theory. The presence of companions has been shown to be a major component in male delinquency.³ Association of young delinquents with hardened criminals in prison has been shown to be a potent reinforcement of criminal behaviour in the young. The theory is deficient, however, in that it does not account for the fact that not all those who associate with criminals become criminals. Preferential association is also important, that is, the

¹ D. M. Levy, *Maternal Overprotection* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1943).

² Edwin Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology* (Philadelphia : J. B. Lippincott Company, 1934).

³ Thomas G. Eynon and Walter C. Reckless, "Companionship at Delinquency Onset", *The British Journal of Criminology*, 162-70, October, 1961.

nature of the persons with whom we wish to associate ; or—in terms of the earlier discussion—the persons who are “ the significant others ” in our lives. If an individual who associates with criminals does not regard his associates as significant, he will be less influenced towards crime.

Groups whose Opinions we value become our “ Reference Groups ”. A useful concept which has been introduced into social science to identify certain ones among “ the influential others ” is that of reference group, by which is meant the group from which we get our values, or whose approval we seek. The reference groups contrast with the membership groups, which are the groups to which we belong. A person may belong to a group without sentimentally identifying himself with it and accepting its values. So a person may associate with criminals without respecting them and sharing their values. The concept, reference groups, as distinct from membership groups, has particular relevance for modern, complex, heterogeneous society with its high rates of physical and occupational mobility, where a person may be a member of one group but prefer membership or aspire to membership in another. In a small folk society, the distinction between membership and reference groups is less common and may be nonexistent.

To whose Judgment do we refer ? As we have seen, others influence us, and “ the significant others ” influence us most. They influence us in two ways : they help to give us our conception of self and they help to give us our early values. Of the two, the former is more stable. Our values are more subject to change, especially if they are not “ ego-involved ”—that is, not tied in so closely with the self that an attack on the values is regarded as an attack on the self. Thus studies of college students show that they are generally more liberal in their attitudes at the close of their college course than they are at the beginning. Each student at Bennington College filled out several attitude scales each year for four years, and seniors were interviewed just before graduation. Most of the students were conservative on entering and the great majority, in the liberal atmosphere of this college, became appreciably more liberal. Factors which affected the outcome included the strength of the ties with home, the degree of identification with the college and the community, the success at college, and the time spent at college, as well as the nature of one's friendships. Those who stayed in college the shortest time changed the least.¹

Our reference groups offer an important key to our personality and especially to our values. There are persons who say, “ I don't care what anyone thinks. ” In so far as this statement does not reflect merely a momentary feeling of pique or a temporary need to assert

¹ T. M. Newcomb, *Personality and Social Change* (New York : The Dryden Press, 1943).

one's independence, but represents a chronic attitude, it is a serious one from the standpoint of society. This attitude characterised a group of juvenile delinquents who have been described in a book with a revealing title: *Children Who Hate*.¹ The book is dedicated to the group described, "to the children nobody wants". Without exception, these children came from homes where they experienced open brutality, cruelty, or neglect. Their frustration led to hostility so great that it was directed against all authority and against all those who tried to help them in the conventional ways that exist for trying to help such delinquents. The authors contrast the "complete" aggression of these delinquents with the episodic hatred of the middle-class child, which is auxiliary to his anxiety over his status, and the ambivalent feelings of love and hate which normal children have. We are told that these delinquents had not known even one adult with whom they had had a warm and satisfying relationship.

Whereas some children place no confidence in anyone, there are those at the other extreme who are sensitive to the opinions of so many others that we say they are highly sensitive to public opinion, to a kind of "generalised other". Such individuals are likely to be extremely conforming and conventional. It is interesting to speculate on how such attitudes are produced.

A crucial Self-judgment is whether we think we are wanted by others. People vary in the nature and intensity of their reactions to frustration. Thus a child refused an ice cream cone may feel only the loss of the treat. But if he interprets the refusal as evidence that his mother does not love him, the consequences are more serious. Deprivation is more frustrating when it means rejection, inferiority, or lack of respect, when it becomes a threat to the personality. It leads to a sense of personal insecurity and lack of self-confidence.


Another important Self-judgment is the result of disappointing or offending others whose Judgment we value. When we love or admire someone, our desire is to please that person; consequently, it is disturbing to feel that we have, instead, offended or disappointed him. Such a feeling leads to a sense of shame or sin or guilt. Guilt feeling is, so to speak, the voice of conscience which in turn represents the incorporation into one's personality of the admonitions of those we respect most. Strong guilt feelings tend to lead to aggression against the self; that is, self-blame. A study of guilt in young boys indicates that boys with strong guilt feelings tend to express less overt aggression than boys with weak guilt feelings.²

Sociometry: Measuring the Acceptance or Rejection of the Individual by

¹ Fritz Redl and David Wineman (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951).

² C. M. Heinicke, *Some Antecedents and Correlates of Guilt and Fear in Young Boys* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Social Relations, Harvard University, 1953).

the Group. The group does more than shape personality ; it also evaluates personality, and the evaluation becomes in turn a factor influencing the personality. The group looks at its handiwork (or at that of other groups) and calls it good or bad, generally disclaiming



CLASS STRUCTURE, 7TH GRADE

14 boys and 18 girls. *Unchosen*, 5 : WN, CH, LB, JH, BR ; *Pairs*, 15 : LN-SR, SR-LR, SR-RI, FR-BA, RI-TP, MR-EB, KR-HE, KR-JR, KR-KE, BB-MY, WL-MN, MN-BC, BY-LA, LA-BC, BY-SP ; *Stars*, 5 : LR, RI, BY, LA, FR ; *Chains*, 2 : SP-BY-LA-BC-MN-BY, LN-SR-RI-TP-BA ; *Triangles*, 0 : *Inter-sexual Attractions*, 2.

FIG. 8.—Sociogram of the Seventh Grade, Public School 181, Brooklyn.

The diagram represents the preferences expressed by a group of school children for one another and shows how popularity is distributed in the group. Popularity is a function of group values and has important consequences to personality. (From J. L. Moreno, *Who Shall Survive?* Washington, D.C., Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Company, 1934, p. 41. With permission.)

any responsibility for the product if the verdict is negative. This rôle of the group as a selective factor in personality development has been dramatised by Moreno and his associates who have devised tests for measuring the acceptance or rejection of the individual by the group. In one test, each student in a class is asked to choose from among his classmates those whom he would want to have remain in

the same classroom and sit near him. A number of students remain unchosen ; they are the isolates on the fringe of the group. A number choose each other : there are mutual pairs, triangles, and chains. Other choices are not reciprocal. Those who are "over-chosen" are the leaders. The measurement of such group relations has been called *sociometry*, and a diagram representing the configuration of attraction-repulsion patterns in a group, like the one shown in Fig. 8, a *sociogram*. Such a diagram is more meaningful than, say, an alphabetical seating chart of the class. Many of the activities of the school, especially the extracurricular activities, are tied in with these ratings. In general, the most popular children show, in addition to good health and vigour, superiority in such traits as the tendency to conform, poise, initiative, adaptability, dependability, consideration for others, and originality.¹ In so far as the children show these qualities when they enter school, the classroom serves mainly as a selective agent, but the selection is itself an important influence on personality if it reinforces existing traits. In other cases, of course, the evaluation of a child by his associates may be a factor in giving a new direction to his personality.

Sociometry : Measuring Rôles in the Group. Feelings of preference by members of a group for one another are not limited to general acceptance or rejection, for an individual may take a number of different rôles in the group, each of which is evaluated. The test referred to earlier was one of liking or popularity, which seems to depend upon the ability to release tension in the group and to build morale. A well-liked person tends to be an expert in "expressiveness"; his skill is in the emotional aspects of interpersonal relations, since he establishes good feeling in the group. Investigations² of small groups involved in problem-solving show that there is in addition to the "best-liked man" the "idea man", an "instrumental" specialist chosen for skill in furnishing fertile ideas. There is also the leader who supplies the group with direction. In these studies, leadership was correlated more highly with guidance than with "being liked".

Self-chosen Groups are more co-operative than Groups not self-chosen. In an experiment³ twenty groups of five children each were observed for five weeks. Ten groups (the experimental groups) comprised children who had expressed mutual choices for each other. The ten control groups consisted of children who had not. The children ranged in age from five years and three months to six years and three

¹ Merl E. Bonney, *Popular and Unpopular Children* (New York : Beacon House, 1947). A five-year study of 150 schoolchildren. A large number of interpersonal choices were recorded each year and the children ranked according to a general index of popularity. The five most popular and five least popular were studied intensively.

² Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales, *Family, Socialization and Interaction Process* (Glencoe, Ill. : The Free Press, 1955), Chapter 5.

³ Aileen D. Harding, *The Effect of Grouping by Sociometric Techniques on the Social Behavior of Children* (Master's thesis, The Florida State University Library, 1952).

months, and engaged in activities such as clay modelling and finger-painting. The children in the experimental groups made significantly more responses than the control groups indicating co-operation, initiative, and friendly conversation, whereas the control groups excelled in seeking assistance, demanding behaviour, show-off behaviour, and aggression. This experiment and others reporting similar findings raise interesting questions about social policy. Should democratic or aristocratic grouping be encouraged? For example, in accordance with democratic tenets, should the seating of children in a classroom be alphabetically arranged, or should it be determined by the preferences of the pupils? Should classes be self-chosen groups of congenial persons? There is a gain in morale and in achievement among the chosen, but what of the rejected? The problem, of course, involves values besides those of in-group morale and achievement; but the advantages of the self-chosen group for certain purposes make understandable the widespread appeal of such voluntary congenial groups as fraternal organisations and cliques.

SUMMARY

Since man is social and lives in groups, the group is an important factor in the development of personality. The personality of the individual is shaped fairly definitely during infancy and childhood, and to some extent during youth, mainly in the intimate associations of the family, play groups, and local neighbourhood. These experiences have a cultural component; hence culture is an additional factor in shaping personality, and the group acts as a carrier of the culture. The group and culture are inseparable in human affairs; but they are two factors, not just one, and we therefore have here a problem in the distribution of emphasis.

The infant, needing affection and protection for survival, seeks first to identify himself with his guardians, and then as he matures, with a succession of other groups. Because he wishes to be accepted and esteemed, the response he receives from others influences greatly the traits of personality he develops. Acceptance by the group is an organising force in personality; rejection by the group, a disorganising influence. The idea of self develops in relation to others who are viewed as critics and is therefore a reflection of the ideas of others. Skills and traits are acquired through imitation of others, by taking the rôles of others. As the principal motivating and socialising forces, the group employs praise and blame in their multifarious forms.

Some critics and judges are more highly valued than others. The "significant others", with whom the individual has a relationship of affection or respect, exert the greatest influence over behaviour. The persons whose judgments are valued constitute "reference groups" for the individual who values their judgments. In modern heterogeneous society, a person may belong to one group but use another of which he is not a member as a reference group. This possible disparity between membership and reference groups helps to explain why some individuals who are reared in anti-social groups do not become delinquents, and vice versa.

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. What are the interrelationships of group and culture? In what ways are these two phenomena different?
2. Why is an understanding of a person's life situations necessary to an understanding of his personality?
3. How is the development of the idea of *self* in a child dependent upon the opinions of others?
4. What is "basic character structure"?
5. How is "rôle-taking" different from "rôle-playing"?
6. How are social rôles related to personality?
7. What part does the desire for social status play in the formation of personality?
8. What are similarities and differences between peer-group and parent-child relationships?
9. What do you understand by "reference group theory"?

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CHAPTER X

CULTURE AND PERSONALITY

A traveller ¹ crossing the narrow English Channel is impressed by the contrast between the stolid, casual British tars who load the boat at Dover and the animated, excitable Frenchmen who unload it at Calais. Another observer ² notes German children playing war and developing militaristic traits, even after the defeat of the First World War and before Hitler, while Mussolini fails to build up soldierly qualities in the Italian people. The Japanese, ³ with their sense of obedience to the law, after their surrender in World War II co-operated fully with their conquerors, but the near-by liberty-loving Koreans for years defied their Japanese conquerors.

It will be noted that the previous paragraph is concerned with personality traits that distinguish the members of one society from another. The contrasts are stated in extreme terms, as between the stolid British and the animated French. In reality there are degrees of stolidity and animation, and some Frenchmen are more stolid than some Englishmen. If the traits were measured and plotted on a graph, the two curves would overlap. The situation may be like the widely held stereotype of the Swedes as tall, fair, blonde, and blue-eyed, whereas actual measurements show that only about 30 per cent of the Swedes have all four characteristics and the rest are mixed types. Ideas about national personality traits are generally based on limited studies in local communities which may not be typical of the whole society ⁴ or are impressionistic and not based on measurements.

The central problems of culture and personality are two : how to account for the characteristic differences in personality as between societies ; and how to account for the variations in personality within a given society.

DIFFERENCES IN PERSONALITY BETWEEN SOCIETIES

The variations in Personality Traits as between Societies are of Cultural Origin. How account for the differences indicated in the first paragraph ? It is unlikely that racial factors are involved, for we have

¹ Gardner Murphy, *Personality* (New York : Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 763.

² Kurt Lewin, " Cultural Reconstruction ", *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 38, pp. 166-73, April, 1943.

³ Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (Boston : Houghton Mifflin Company, 1946).

⁴ John Gillin, " National and Regional Cultural Values in the United States ", *Social Forces*, vol. 34, p. 107, December, 1955.

instances above of national groups, belonging to the same race, showing different traits. We know also that children transferred from one group to another, even a radically different group, readily adopt the characteristics of the new group. The personality traits of different national groups are manifestly of cultural origin and are learned. Conversely, groups representing different racial stock may show the same traits: the Japanese were regimented, soldierly, and fond of authority, much like the Germans.

The scientific study of national character is relatively recent. For many years anthropologists concerned themselves much with the formal organisation of different cultures, little with the way culture influences personality. Psychologists, meantime, largely confined themselves to the study of behaviour in the standardised laboratory, shutting out the highly significant environmental influences. Lately the anthropologists have discovered personality, and the psychologists culture; and the two disciplines have begun to collaborate profitably on the problem of the interrelationship of these two factors. The sociologists have also made a contribution, especially in their analysis of the bearing of social status, social rôle, and social change on personality.

TECHNOLOGY AND PERSONALITY

Students of culture and personality have concerned themselves mainly with the relationship of non-material culture (especially values) and personality but little with the relationship of material culture and personality, even when material culture is an important factor in producing the values. Yet it can be shown that the material products of culture call forth reactions that affect personality.

CLOCKS AND PUNCTUALITY

The products of culture themselves call forth reactions that affect personality. Inventions such as the watch and the clock encourage the habit of punctuality. The American Indians who have no clocks or watches in their culture have little notion of keeping appointments with any exactness, whereas men who have to travel to work in any large town have a very acute sense of time. Appointments are regulated with precision and daily schedules are laid off in units of time. Variations in hours or days may take place in keeping appointments among peoples without clocks. We say they have no sense of time. Why primitive peoples have little use for punctuality and why it is so important in modern civilisation depend on many other factors than the watch, of course, but promptness is in general reaction to objective products of cultural life. Modern culture is loaded with things like the radio, the railway and the timekeeper, all demanding punctuality of those who use them. The personality of an American

Indian differs from that of a white man in the matter of punctuality, and this difference is a consequence of differences in their cultures.¹

PLUMBING AND CLEANLINESS

Another illustration is the relation of plumbing to cleanliness. Cleanliness is a personality trait which is greatly valued by our culture, as witnessed by the saying: "Cleanliness is next to godliness." It is, however, a trait which is greatly encouraged by the technology of plumbing and other inventions that are found with it. No doubt some peoples are cleanly without the benefit of modern plumbing, in which case other conditions are favourable. The Eskimos are dirty; but when one considers that they have to hang a bag of snow down their backs to melt it in order to get water, it is seen that it is not so easy to be clean as when one has only to turn on a tap of hot or cold water and reach for the soap. In comparing peoples, therefore, cleanliness is seen to be a matter not of heredity but of the type of culture. Within a culture there may be some hereditary basis for variation in the tendency to be clean, but generally it is a function of occupation, or wealth, or some other culture trait.²

The Romans carried further the Greek cult of the body by building enormous public baths; but the early Christians, reacting against the pagan religion of the Romans, repudiated also many other traits of the culture, including baths which they believed indulged the flesh instead of saving the soul.³ This attitude continued throughout the Dark Ages and the early Middle Ages, moderated somewhat from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, and then was renewed in the sixteenth century. The Crusaders must have seemed an unwashed barbarian horde to the oriental Saracens. This phase of our culture history was terminated by the growth of enlightenment, the increase in wealth, and the rise of the middle class which brought the scrubbing of Dutch doorsteps and the portable bath of the Englishman. The ascetic idea that too close attention to the flesh jeopardises the soul is not conducive to great cleanliness. Suitable technology is conducive

¹ Cf. A. Irving Hallowell, "Temporal Orientation in Western Civilisation and in a Preliterate Society", *American Anthropologist*, vol. 39, pp. 647-70, October-December, 1937.

² We ordinarily think of the English as a cleanly people, but before the advent of modern plumbing and sanitation conditions in England were such as scarcely to justify the use of this adjective. "Every writer during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries who makes his comment on the customs and practices of English life, adverts to . . . the extraordinary uncleanness of their habits and persons. The floor of an ordinary Englishman's house, as Erasmus describes it, was inconceivably filthy, in London filthier than elsewhere . . . The streets and open ditches of the town were polluted and noisome beyond measure. The Englishman disdained all conditions of health." J. E. Thorold Rogers, *Six Centuries of Work and Wages* (New York, 1884), p. 118.

³ S. Giedion, *Mechanization Takes Command* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948). In Part VII, pp. 628-721, there is a very interesting account, profusely illustrated, of the habits and conditions of bathing and cleanliness.

to cleanliness, but to be effective the technology must have favourable ideological support.

NON-MATERIAL CULTURE AND PERSONALITY

The values of a society that affect personality are not always derived from technology. Religion, art, philosophy, law, and custom also furnish values which influence personality. Since these values differ from society to society, members of different societies, in general, show differences in personality.

Kwakiutl competitiveness and Zuni co-operation. An illustration of differing emphases in values, with important consequences for personality, is provided by the Kwakiutl Indians of the Pacific North-west and the Zunis of the South-west. The Kwakiutl emphasise rank and prestige. Rank is validated and enhanced by the distribution of property, by giving great feasts during which large amounts of valuable candlefish oil and other materials are destroyed, and by vanquishing a rival of equal rank. The latter feat is attempted at the famous potlatch ceremony, which has two forms. In the first, a man offers his rival property in the form of blankets and copper plates worth thousands of blankets. The property thus offered must be accepted by the rival and returned with 100 per cent interest within a year, or the rival will suffer shame and loss of prestige. In the second type of potlatch, which involves rivalry through destruction of property, the ultimate challenge is to throw a "copper" into the fire to be consumed or to throw it from the headland into the sea. An element in the personality of the Kwakiutl may thus be said to be competitive self-glorification.

The Zunis, on the contrary, play down competitiveness and stress co-operation instead. This is illustrated by an experience reported by an American teacher in a school for Zuni children operated by the federal government on the Zuni reservation. The teacher was new and not familiar with Zuni folkways. She sent her pupils to the blackboard to work some problems in arithmetic and asked that, when they finished, they turn around and face the class. After a time she noticed that they were all making very slow progress and were looking out of the corners of their eyes to see how the others were getting on. No one wanted to be the first to finish. In Zuni culture it is not regarded as proper to set oneself off against the group. One does not work for oneself but for the family, the clan, the association, or the village. There is little emphasis on the private accumulation of property. All the men in a matrilineal household work together in the fields, and the food is pooled in a common storehouse. Should wealth be accumulated by someone as a result of special circumstances, it is redistributed at the winter festival of the Shalako, for the collective good; that is, to win the favour of the gods for the group as a whole.

Among the Zuni, a person may have in his possession hundreds

of ceremonial objects and masks, yet they represent no value to him whatsoever if the whole village does not freely use them. On the contrary, a Kwakiutl has a vested interest in his ceremonial prerogatives; and they may not be exercised by anyone else as long as the owner lives. The Kwakiutl occasionally resort to murder in order to appropriate another man's honours.

CULTURE PATTERNS AND PERSONALITY

The discerning reader has no doubt made certain reservations concerning some of the relations between culture traits and personality indicated above. As for the connection between timepieces and punctuality, for example, it may be observed that the possession of clocks does not guarantee that their owners will be on time for engagements. The Latin peoples have timepieces, but they are not always so prompt as North Americans. When a Mexican makes an appointment with an American to meet at ten o'clock, he may ask if it is to be *hora inglesa* or *hora mejicana*. If it is the latter, he may start out for his appointment at 9.30, meet a friend *en route* and invite him to have a cup of coffee at one of the many cafés; this done, he may proceed, only to meet another friend, of whom he inquires at length as to the health of his family. When the Mexican arrives for his appointment, it is 12 o'clock. Hospitality and friendship mean more to the Latin-American peoples than punctuality in keeping appointments. However, to this statement we should add that the leisurely Mexican time sense is basically related to technological factors. This time sense is typical of an underdeveloped, agrarian society which lacks timepieces or has not much need for them. In Mexico City, with industrialisation and urbanisation, the leisurely pace is less conspicuous than in the hinterland. From this it is seen that although material inventions as such may have significance for personality, the direction and degree of this significance depend upon the cultural situation as a whole. It is helpful to go beyond individual culture traits and consider the relation of personality to the larger aspects of culture which are known as culture patterns.

WOMEN'S OCCUPATIONS AND OBEDIENCE

Another illustration of the influence of culture on personality is the relationship of men and women. In the late 1880's, a young woman's memory book popular in the schools of that day contained, among such questions as "What is your favourite flower?" and "What is your favourite poem?" this query, "What is your favourite trait in a woman?" By far the most usual answer was obedience. To-day, not one educated woman in a thousand would give this answer. Among school girls to-day, self-expression and initiative are probably valued more highly than obedience. Why this difference? In the earlier period, farming was the principal business. Women generally

had no occupations, outside the home, nor was there outside employment beckoning them ; they were therefore economically dependent upon their fathers and husbands. Obedience was a natural consequence of such conditions. At the present time, millions of women work for pay, and they are not employed by members of their own family. They can go to school on more nearly even terms with men. They may vote and hold public office. They may remain unmarried and live alone without incurring public censure. These are only a few of the cultural conditions which encourage attitudes of independence in women at present.

It is not to be assumed, of course, that all women living in the latter part of the nineteenth century were equally submissive. There were, no doubt, marked individual differences. How these may be accounted for has already been suggested in part in the preceding two chapters, and will be considered further below. In addition, some discrepancy is always to be found between theory and practice ; for even when the folkways favour the trait of submissiveness in women, real-life situations are often such that, for instance, a good many women have husbands whom they dominate. But the point to be emphasised is that several generations ago, obedience on the part of a young woman was both more widespread and more pronounced than it is to-day.

CAN SOCIETIES BE PSYCHOLOGICALLY TYPED ?

The question may be raised whether it is possible to identify the influence of the total culture on personality, rather than the influence of segments only. Since cultures are unique, Benedict¹ thought it possible to characterise them as wholes in terms of their ethos or distinctive feeling tones. Two such types she identified as *Dionysian* and *Apollonian*, borrowing the terms from Nietzsche. The first, like the Greek god of wine, is impulsive, violent, self-assertive, outgoing, dominated by strong feeling ; the second is poised, restrained, serene. Benedict applied the term Dionysian to the Indians of the Great Plains (such as the Sioux, Crow, Dakota, and Blackfoot), while the Pueblo Indians of the South-west were designated Apollonian. Each Dakotan sought his own " vision ", sought to make individual contact with his guardian spirit, going without food or water to achieve this end ; men danced until exhausted or passed wooden skewers through the muscles of the chest and hung suspended in the sun. In ceremonial dances, drugs and intoxicants were used to induce extreme ecstasy and frenzy. The Zuni, on the other hand, were gracious and calm, maintaining control even in the exciting ceremonial dances. Personal ritual was subordinated and priests interceded for the individual, in religious matters. The emphasis was on the group, not the individual, and the group frowned on anyone's trying to exalt himself above

¹ Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (Boston : Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934).

his fellows. Here, then, are said to be two types of culture with distinct psychological emphasis, producing contrasting psychological types. The Plains Indians were more restless, daring and selfish than the Zuni.

The designation of cultures, even primitive cultures, as distinct psychological types has been criticized as oversimplification. Is a single label sufficient? Is it enough to tag the Dobuans as *paranoid* when they are also said to be acquisitive? A single label is perhaps justified when a culture is so dominated by a given trait that it overshadows all other traits; we use the term *paranoid* under these conditions to describe the individual, despite the fact that he has other traits. But then how designate the cultures that are better balanced and that lack special or extreme emphases? It is more accurate to consider cultures as differing in degree in respect to common personality traits than to view cultures as producing mutually exclusive personality types. Personality differences are those of "more or less", not those of "all or none". Culture traits may be discrete variables but personality traits are continuous. While one culture may have plumbing and another not, cleanliness is a matter of degree. Suicide and the use of intoxicating liquors, present in so-called Dionysian cultures, may be absent from Apollonian cultures, but strong emotions in the latter find other outlets. The relatively mild Pueblos have dances like the Scalp dance which are only somewhat more subdued than the cannibal dance of the Kwakiutls. These observations apply even to the simple cultures of primitive peoples. When we turn to modern cultures, the problem of psychological characterisation is much more complicated. It is more difficult to speak of the ethos of the United States with its heterogeneous and dynamic social organisation than it is of the homogeneous, slowly changing culture of the Zuni Indians.

Personality and the Social System. A more fruitful type of analysis of the relation of personality to society is one based on a more comprehensive view of these variables. Such an analysis is provided by study of the modal personality and its adjustment to the sociopolitical order of a group of disaffected Soviet citizens who chose exile and a criterion group of Americans matched with the Russian sample on age, sex, occupation and education.¹ A long questionnaire was completed by 3,000 such refugees, 329 of whom also provided a detailed general life history, obtained by interview. A smaller sample of 51 submitted additionally to a clinical study, including a battery of tests involving Rorschach, TAT, sentence-completion, "projective questions", and a problems-situations test. The researchers think that the sample, while special in some respects, is probably represen-

¹ Alex Inkeles, Eugenia Hanfmann and Helen Beier, "Modal Personality and Adjustment to the Soviet Socio-Political System", *Human Relations*, vol. 11, pp. 3-22, 1958.

tative of the general Russian population because the personality modes which they uncovered are consistent with those reported in the traditional literature.

Among the paramount central needs reported is a greater need for affiliation on the part of the Russians than the Americans. The Russians appear to have a strong need for intensive interaction with others in immediate, direct, personal relationships. They have greater capacity for warm personal contact and enjoy such relationships more. They are not too anxiously concerned about others' opinion of them. Americans, on the contrary, emphasise achievement more and the need for approval and autonomy. They fear too close or intimate association because it limits freedom. They desire recognition more and are more eager to be liked.

As to modes of impulse control, the Russians are said to be more expressive, more highly aware of their impulses such as oral gratification, sex, aggression or dependence, and more freely accepting of them as normal. Accordingly the Russians more readily yield to these impulses and depend more on external controls applied by authority to keep in line. On the contrary, Americans rely more on self-control. Whereas the Russians tend to lack well-developed defensive structures, the Americans more often show mechanisms such as isolation and reaction formation that serve to counteract and modify threatening feelings.

The typical dilemmas of the Russians were more often related to trust versus mistrust, faith versus despair and activity versus passivity. The Russian personality was more often contradictory and ambivalent. In one projective test, tools and materials needed for doing a job failed to arrive. The Russians responded more often in terms of the consequences for the actor, concerned with whether they were good or bad, whereas the Americans more often moved to resolve the problem, proposing in optimistic fashion a plan of action.

With reference to achieving and maintaining self-esteem, important differences reported are that the Russians more often tend to feel ashamed when they feel they have violated moral or interpersonal norms as in matters of honesty, sincerity or trust, whereas Americans are more often upset by hints that they are incompetent or unable to meet standards in production or sports. The Russians showed relatively little self-awareness and little painful self-consciousness, the Americans much.

As to relations to authority, the Russians more often wanted their leaders to be warm, nurturant, and concerned with the individuals' welfare. They expected their leaders to be the principal source of initiative in the establishment of plans and programmes but did not think such authority should be arbitrary. The Americans expected less in the way of leadership from government, which was thought to be good when it operated within precisely defined rules and limitations.

Other facets of personality were explored, but the foregoing encompass the more salient traits. The picture of modal personality in the traditional Russia here presented is regarded as ill-suited to communist society, especially in the era of Stalin. The Soviet system with its surveillance of private behaviour, its emphasis on collective responsibility, its encouragement of social distance on the part of the élite, and its manifest hostility towards small groups hampers greatly the strong need for affiliation. The rigorous discipline of the regime is hostile to the marked expressiveness of the people. The regime's focus on shame over poor performance in production is said to be ineffective since the personality system is oriented differently, around shame in inter-personal relationships. The strength of oral needs has been hampered by a condition of scarcity. Unanswered is the question as to why the ideological forces and the programme of indoctrination which have now been brought to bear on two generations have not been more successful in changing the modal personality. In view of the fact that a comparable study within the Soviet Union is not feasible, the representativeness of the sample studied must remain in doubt.

An interesting additional direct approach to the delineation of national character has been through the use of the experimental method, as in the following study of conformity among Norwegians and Frenchmen.¹ By the use of tape recordings, 20 Norwegian and 20 French students were individually given the impression that five other subjects were present. The subjects listened to two tones and were asked to say which was the longer. The five supposedly present subjects answered first, via tape, and their decisions were heard by the subject. In 16 of the 30 trials that constituted one experiment, the five taped voices responded with wrong answers. It was found that the Norwegian subjects conformed to the group on 62 per cent of the critical trials (that is, trials in which the group deliberately voted wrong); the French, on 50 per cent. In other experiments with additional groups of students, and with industrial workers, similar results were obtained. Where the requirement of a public response was eliminated, the amount of conformity dropped to 34 per cent for the French and 50 per cent for the Norwegians. When criticism of the subject for non-conformity was added, the French subjects concurred with the majority on 59 per cent of the critical trials, the Norwegians on 75 per cent. In a word, the Norwegians were consistently more conforming than the French in these tests. The researcher concludes that the Norwegians are more highly cohesive and have a deeper feeling of group identification than the French, whose smaller concern with group consensus is illustrated, he thinks, by their more frequent failure to achieve political stability.

¹ Stanley Milgram, "Nationality and Conformity", *Scientific American*, vol. 205, pp. 45-51, December, 1961.

BASIC PERSONALITY TYPE

A further interesting line of inquiry has to do with the rôle of the culture in producing the basic personality traits which dispose towards adjustment or maladjustment. Since the emotional attitudes that make an individual happy or unhappy, well adjusted or ill adjusted, are generally developed early in life, attention turns to an investigation of the family patterns prevailing in the given culture. Special note is taken of the code of infant care, particularly as to whether (1) there is care or neglect; and if the former, then (2) whether the discipline governing sex, elimination, weaning, and kindred matters is rigid or permissive. According to whether it is the one or the other, there results, say the psychiatrists, a weak or strong ego. As an illustration the Marquesas Islanders are cited.¹ In this society there is, for reasons not specified, a great shortage of females, which leads to intense competition for them on the part of the males. As a result, the females overplay the sex functions and underplay their maternal rôles. There is little or no breast feeding; instead the mother prepares a doughy paste, lays the infant on its back, drops some of the paste on its mouth, and lets the baby gulp or swallow what it can; the further care of the infant is relegated to secondary husbands. The maternal rejection leaves the child anxious and insecure. He does not know why he is nervous; his anxiety develops as a generalised effect which is later transferred in part to food, supernatural beings, and other objects. The basic personality structure—the product of family patterns—in turn influences the pattern of folklore, religion, and other institutions.

Since this pioneer analysis by Kardiner and Linton, a growing number of comparable field studies have been undertaken to test the hypothesis of the differential effects of varying patterns of infant care on personality. This trend in research in cultural anthropology is significant, for previously the broad generalisations were insecurely based on the uncorroborated reports of a single investigator. In the main the new studies support the Kardiner-Linton formulations. Thus DuBois' study² of the people of Alor in the Dutch East Indies traces the disorganised personality of the typical adult mainly to the negative, inconsistent discipline, and to the lack of any sure source of love and security in childhood. An interesting feature of this study is a set of thirty-eight Rorschach tests of the natives which when analysed by an independent specialist gave results supporting DuBois' analysis.

The usual situation among preliterate and literate alike, very different from that of the Marquesans or the Alorese, is for mothers to show affectionate interest in their offspring. In a sample of 75

¹ A. Kardiner, *The Individual and His Society*, with a foreword and two ethnological reports by R. Linton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939).

² Cora DuBois, *The People of Alor* (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1944).

primitive societies, the most characteristic mode of treatment of young infants was found to be indulgence.¹ The Navaho² mother nurses her baby whenever he cries, not according to a fixed schedule. The child terminates the nursing. Later on the child will eat and sleep when and where he chooses. Toilet training is not undertaken until the child can talk and then is gradual and gentle. Weaning is delayed until the child is at least eighteen months old, and usually two years old or more. All Navahos make a considerable fuss over babies, fondling them and playing with them a great deal. The investigators report that Navaho children develop "a secure and confident personality".

Still another variation in the pattern of child care and in the resulting personality pattern is reported for Bali.³ Photographs have familiarised us with the remarkable grace of the Balinese as expressed in their trance-like dances. With blank expressions on their faces, they hold a posture for a long time; and when changing it, they do so with a "waxy flexibility". Why do the Balinese behave like this? We are told that they receive affection and attention as young infants, but before the year has passed, a sudden change in parental attitude occurs. Now when the child bids for attention, his mother turns away from him and teases him by fondling some other child; if she doesn't have one of her own, she will borrow a child for the purpose. This rebuff usually produces a temper tantrum in her own child, which she smilingly ignores. Also as the child wanders from his mother's side, she calls out a word signifying danger and he scurries back. He learns that it is unprofitable to give himself either to others or to the outside world. Instead he withdraws into himself, develops a narcissistic interest in his own body, and becomes adept at posturing.

The conclusions presented above regarding the bearing of early childhood training practices on personality are either those of psychiatrists, based on case studies of abnormal subjects, or those of anthropologists based on observations and inferences. In neither case are representative samples or careful measurements used. Sewell⁴ has sought to satisfy both of these criteria in a study of 162 farm children of old American stock, five to six years old. Carefully trained inter-

¹ J. W. M. Whiting and I. L. Child, *Child-Training and Personality* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953).

² Dorothea Leighton and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Children of the People* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1947). This is part of a programme to investigate the development of personality in a sample of about a thousand children, six to eighteen years old, in each of five tribes: Hopi, Navaho, Papago, Sioux, and Zuni. Published studies are: Laura Thompson and Alice Joseph, *The Hopi Way, 1944*; and Gordon Macgregor, *Warriors Without Weapons, 1946*, both published by The University of Chicago Press.

³ G. Bateson and M. Mead, *Balinese Character: A Photographic Analysis* (New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1942).

⁴ William H. Sewell, "Infant Training and the Personality of the Child", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 58, pp. 150-9, September, 1952.

viewers questioned the mothers regarding the infant training practices they had used, and the personality of the children was measured by several objective tests. None of the disciplines used by the mothers was significantly related to personality adjustment as determined by personality tests and personal interviews, and some of the relations were in the opposite direction from that suggested by psychoanalytic theory. A replication of Sewell's study, this time in Ceylon,¹ found no evidence of support for the psychoanalytic position either. These studies cast considerable doubt on the claims of those who hold infant training practices to be determinants of later personality. Further, there is evidence which casts doubt on the idea that mothers are generally either consistently "permissive" or "restrictive" in their child training practices.² Despite the care used, Sewell points out the limitations of his study in the crude controls and imperfect measuring devices employed. The significant factors in personality development may not be the child rearing practices but the total personal-social situation in which they occur, including the attitudes of the mother, which are extremely difficult to isolate and measure.

A significant point emerging from the preceding paragraphs is that cultures differ in the degree of strain they produce in man. Some cultures make for greater happiness than others; some lead to a better adjustment, others to a worse adjustment, from the standpoint of biological man. If the human infant needs affection and care for his complete maturation, then a culture like the Marquesan which frustrates these needs will cause more strain than one which fulfils them, like the Hopi. Of course the human being has many needs other than the one just cited, some biological, others social, so that the problem of the adjustment of man and culture is an exceedingly complex one. How the culture satisfies or fails to satisfy human needs is an enormously important question which is considered further in the next chapter.

Are Secondary Institutions predictable from a knowledge of Basic Personality?

The Kardiner-Linton conceptualisation is a dialectic which begins with the family and other so-called primary institutions shaping the human personality during the formative years of life. The basic personality, according to this view, is an intervening variable between the primary institutions and the so-called secondary institutions, such as religion and art. Thus it is stated that illness which is laid to sorcery in most primitive societies is, in the Trobriand Islands, most often ascribed to a maternal relative because as a child the Trobriander has a friendly relationship with his father while his mother and his maternal uncle are the disciplinarians.

¹ M. A. Straus, "Anal and Oral Frustration in Relation to Sinhalese Personality", *Sociometry*, vol. 20, pp. 21-31, 1957.

² W. H. Sewell, P. H. Mussen, and C. W. Harris, "Relationships Among Child Training Practices", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 20, pp. 137-48, April, 1955.

The theory of modal personality as an intervening variable between primary and secondary institutions has not been fully supported by the evidence. In a study¹ using a world-wide sample of 75 primitive societies, the relationship of beliefs and practices regarding illness to the personality traits of childhood was tested. The data support the hypothesis of negative fixation : if anxiety is conspicuous in a behaviour system in child training, there is a tendency in adulthood to attribute illness to that same system of behaviour. However, there is no consistent evidence to support the equivalent hypothesis of positive fixation. A second study² undertook to discover whether secondary institutions are predictable from a knowledge of basic personality. Specifically, the investigators asked whether, in a situation of culture change, it is possible to predict which cultural alternatives will be adopted by various individuals, in the light of knowledge of the culture and personality theory. Two groups of Algerians were compared, both having common origins in a particular oasis but one group having subsequently moved to Algiers. An independent analyst predicted which Algerian culture traits would be adopted by given personality types ; the predictions were not correct. The authors conclude "that factors external to the basic personality structure contribute so much to the determination of specific cultural forms that prediction of the latter becomes impossible on the basis of a knowledge of general behavioral predispositions".³

DIFFERENCES IN PERSONALITY WITHIN A SOCIETY

The general terms in which the foregoing discussion is couched may give the impression that all members of a society have identical personalities, which is obviously not the case. All Pueblo Indians are not equally calm nor all Plains Indians equally violent. Indeed some Plains Indians may be more restrained in particular situations than some Pueblos. How do these individual differences arise ? The cultural factor alone accounts for differences in personality when the comparison is between different societies, but how shall we account for variations in personality traits within a given society ? The answer lies in differences in (1) constitutional characteristics, (2) emotional relationships with members of the family and other groups, and (3) socialisation in distinctive sub-cultures.

The Group and Culture select Constitutional Traits for Special Valuation. Although the analysis of constitutional variations as determinants of personality variations is not a proper function of sociology, we may note, in passing, the direct influence of the constitutional factors as

¹ John W. M. Whiting and Irvin L. Child, *Child-Training and Personality : A Cross-Cultural Study* (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1953).

² Horace M. Miner and George DeVos, *Oasis and Casbah : Algerian Culture and Personality in Change* (Anthropological Papers, Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, 1960).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

shown in differences in intelligence and temperament. But there are indirect ways in which the physical structure may contribute to personality which are the concern of the sociologist, namely *via* the valuation of physiological traits by the group and culture.

While little direct connection has been established between specific constitutional and personality factors, the situation is different for the indirect influence of physique. Ziegfeld, originator of the famous "Follies", used to say that the most beautiful girls in his chorus were the poorest dancers. They had no great urge to practise long hours at dancing, since their beauty alone brought them a great deal of attention. Beauty may, of course, depend somewhat on factors other than the genes, such as proper diet, good health, and the skill of one's hairdresser and cosmetologist; but it is essentially built out of hereditary traits. The hereditary traits, however, are only indirectly responsible for such personality traits as self-assurance and poise that flow from beauty. It is the group or culture that admires the physical traits and gives them prestige value. Societies vary greatly in the constitutional traits that are deemed attractive. In our society, at present, a slim figure is thought to be attractive; but this was not always so, as the paintings in art galleries indicate. The influence of physique on personality is, then, largely indirect, operating through the valuation placed by the group on constitutional traits.

Cultural Variations within a Society are also Determinants of Personality Differences. Culture varies within a society and not just between societies. It is a point of the first importance to recognise that culture is not a single massive die that cuts all the members of the group to precisely the same specifications. Culture exerts uniform influences only through the so-called "universals", the aspects of culture to which all the members of the group are subject. In a homogeneous culture, the universals might include language, certain elements of technology, the incest taboo, and ridicule for wrong-doing—to mention but a few items. Even these items are not universal in the sense of affecting identically all the members of the group; some individuals, perhaps because of royal rank, may be exempted from the traditional taboos against incest; and special groups in a culture, like the medicine men, may have their own vocabulary and forms of speech. A certain body of language, religion, etc., may be common to all the members of a society. This common culture may produce consensus or common understandings, thus integrating the group. But the point to be noted here is that even in simple cultures the social heritage, far from being uniform for all members, consists of a series of sub-cultures applicable to special groups. In addition to the universals, there are what Linton calls "specialties" and "alternatives".¹ The latter are the choices open to a member of society

¹ Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1936), pp. 272-4, 278-9.

from among a variety of approved ways of behaving ; in recreation, for example, there are a number of activities which one may choose.

Differences in learning bring differences in personality. In the United States to-day, men are more athletic, more interested in mechanical manipulation, more aggressive than women. A test has been devised to measure the masculinity and femininity components.¹ This is not a test of innate biological differences but of learned differences between the sexes in a particular cultural setting. The discussion of an earlier paragraph showed that women's personalities have changed as woman's culture has changed. Mead has shown that the personality of women varies greatly in different cultures, from extreme submissiveness to extensive dominance.²

Social Differentiation on the bases of Age and Sex. Since the business of society is continuous and important and cannot safely be left to chance, societies assign certain rôles to their members. These are commonly referred to as *ascribed* rôles in contrast to *achieved* rôles, which the individual acquires by his own effort. In all societies, rôles are ascribed on the basis of age and sex, and the classification serves as a prerequisite to all other positions in the society. The age-sex classification is perhaps the most important single basis for determining the participation of the individual in the culture.³ The number of sex-age groups varies from culture to culture. The Inca of Peru had ten age groupings for males alone, but a minimum of seven categories appears to be basic to all systems of age-sex classification : infant, boy, girl, adult man, adult woman, old man, old woman.⁴ The adolescent period is not clearly demarcated from other stages in some societies, ours among them ; whereas in Polynesia adolescents are sharply differentiated from both adults and young children and are relieved of most domestic and community responsibilities in order to be free for courting and other activities of personal adjustment. Polynesian youth are said to make good adjustments and to be free from the storm and stress that characterise adolescents in our society.⁵ In the United States we do not recognise any special shift in status at adolescence ; marriage and/or the assumption of full-time paid employment brings adult status, at which time there is a rather abrupt change from dependent to independent rôles.⁶ With us, age-grading, except for the educational system, does not entail formal age categorisation but is

¹ L. M. Terman and C. C. Miles, *Sex and Personality* (New York : McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1937).

² Margaret Mead, *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies* (New York : William Morrow & Company, 1935) ; *Male and Female* (1949).

³ Ralph Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality* (New York : Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1945), p. 64.

⁴ Ralph Linton, "Age and Sex Categories", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 7, pp. 589-603, October, 1942.

⁵ Margaret Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa* (New York : William Morrow & Co., Inc., 1928).

⁶ Ruth Benedict, "Continuities and Discontinuities in Cultural Conditioning", *Psychiatry*, vol. 1, pp. 161-7, 1938.

interwoven with other institutional elements.¹ For instance, we have in many jurisdictions a separate body of law and set of institutions for adult criminals and juvenile delinquents. Many societies consider the transition from one age category to another an occasion for a public ceremony ; and since the occasion signals the transition from one set of rôles to another, these ceremonies have been named by the anthropologist "rites of passage".

Age as a basis of rôle allocation is important in all societies. But an analysis² of the relation of age groups and type of social structure makes out a case for the view that in societies organised on a family or kinship basis, the principal emphasis is on the relationships between persons of different ages. On the other hand, there is evidence that homogeneous age groups tend to develop especially in two situations : (1) in societies organised on a civil rather than a familistic basis, as in modern urban, industrialised Western nations ; and (2) in familistic societies where the family structure is authoritarian, as in the Murngin tribe of Australia. In both situations, the youth is hindered from attaining full social status through identification with the age-heterogeneous members of the family, which leads to the establishment of youth groups, clubs, cliques, Scouts, gangs, fraternities, organisations, and movements. Homogeneous age groups of children or adolescents exist in all societies, as in play groups ; but under the two special conditions indicated above, these groups become more highly articulated.

Hand in hand with age-grading goes sex-typing. All cultures mark off males from females and have separate bodies of habits and attitudes which are deemed appropriate for either sex. Such cues as differences in clothing, hair-do, and body paint are useful in helping the sexes to make appropriate overt responses to each other and to themselves. In all cultures there is sex division of labour, usually sharp, and generally the rôles of men and women in the religious life differ.

Class Differences in Personality. The alert reader has doubtless observed, as he has followed the discussion, that sex and age do not exhaust the bases for differences in learning. Occupation, education, and income are also selective factors. Contradicting earlier reports of research, more recent studies³ point to the absence of any general or profound differences in socialisation practices as a function of social class. Working-class mothers are more severe in toilet training and less responsive to baby's crying than middle-class mothers.

¹ Talcott Parsons, "Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the United States", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 7, pp. 604-16, October, 1942.

² S. N. Eisenstadt, *From Generation to Generation : Age Groups and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Ill. : The Free Press, 1956).

³ Richard A. Littman, Robert C. A. Moore and John Pierce-Jones, "Social Class Differences in Child Rearing : A Third Community for Comparison with Chicago and Newton", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 22, pp. 694-704, December, 1957. Also, Martha Sturm White, "Social Class, Child-Rearing Practices, and Child Behavior", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 22, pp. 704-12, December, 1957.

Emotional expression is relatively more direct. Sex finds an earlier and more frequent outlet in heterosexual activity, whereas with the middle classes the taboo against direct sex expression more often leads to autoerotic practices and petting.¹ Deprivation among the poor having to do more often with food and creature comforts, day-dreams tend to focus on these objects, whereas for the same reason the day-dreams of the middle-class youth have a larger sex component. Aggression in the lower classes is more likely to take the form of fighting, whereas middle-class boys are more often taught that the open expression of anger is not proper. The poor are reported to be more conventional in religious beliefs,² and more radical in their politico-economic thinking.³ As might be expected, the lower-class children have less social poise.⁴ It is claimed that the neurosis of middle-class children is mainly the result of the strong accent on status;⁵ yet one investigation⁶ suggests that children from families of semi-skilled workers have more worries and less emotional stability than children from professional families. This finding squares with the known inverse relation between rates of psychoses and amount of family income,⁷ although poverty may be a result as well as a cause of mental illness. The figures on mental disorders suggest that in the rearing of children among the poor, economic and affectional insecurity may be important factors.

Occupation may affect personality directly. An individual's occupation affects his income and family reputation, and is a factor in the determination of his social status which in turn affects his personality. The rôle of occupation in personality development in this case is indirect. The influence of occupation may, however, be direct and apart from social-class position. Consider two individuals of the same social class but of different occupations, say a clergyman and an artist. We expect a clergyman in the United States to-day to be emotionally stable, altruistic, conservative in his family life, and conventional in dress and manners, but we are less critical of a temperamental, self-centred, immoral, unconventional artist, especially if he is eminent.

¹ Alfred C. Kinsey *et al.*, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1948), Chap. 10.

² Harrison G. Gough, "A New Dimension of Status: I. Development of a Personality Scale", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 13, pp. 401-9, August, 1948.

³ Richard Centers, "The American Class Structure: A Psychological Analysis", in T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley (eds.), *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1947).

⁴ A. Gesell and E. E. Lord, "Psychological Comparison of Nursery School Children from Homes of Low and High Economic Status", *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, vol. 34, pp. 339-56, September, 1927.

⁵ Arnold Green, "The Middle Class Male Child and Neurosis", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 11, pp. 31-41, 1946.

⁶ Nancy R. Maddy, "Comparison of Children's Personality Traits, Attitudes, and Intelligence with Parental Occupation", *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, vol. 27, pp. 3-65, 1943.

⁷ R. E. L. Faris and H. W. Dunham, *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939).

The rôles of the minister and the artist are differently defined by society. Likewise firemen, policemen, and soldiers are expected to show more physical courage than those not in the protective services. Among most primitive peoples, since specialisation is generally not carried very far, occupations play a minor part in determining cultural rôles ; but with the growth of technology and division of labour, occupations become increasingly important for this purpose. Sociologists have shown some interest in analysing occupations as social rôles but so far have not been much concerned with tracing out the consequences for personality.

A further basis for the differential ascription of culture to individuals in a society is membership in associations. Even in primitive communities we find individuals organised into exclusive clubs or associations, often secret in nature, so that the culture they transmit is reserved for members only. In our own society, such special-purpose associations are exceedingly numerous, each with its own body of culture. What an individual learns if he is a member of the Young Men's Christian Association, is different from what he would learn as a member of the Bach Chorale Group, or the West Side Bridge Club, or the Browning Society, or the Salvation Army, or the Chamber of Commerce, or the Single Taxers, or the Communist Party, or the Oxford Movement. The influence of such associations on personality may be to reinforce existing habits rather than to establish new ones, because individuals with particular traits may be attracted to one type of association rather than another. Much depends on how old the individual is when he affiliates.

The existence of numerous special purpose associations in our society to-day suggests that ours is not a single homogeneous culture like that of primitive peoples but rather a congeries of special sub-cultures superimposed upon a common cultural base. While the existence of the functional unit, the United States of America, implies a body of common understandings, or a consensus, still we cannot ignore the vast regional and ethnic differences in culture which also exist. It is one thing for a child to be reared among the " Pennsylvania Dutch ", another for him to grow up in a Mormon community. A close student ¹ of regional cultures in the United States suggests that, among other values, thrift is given special emphasis in the rural North-east, Protestant morality in the South-east, democratic symbols in the Middle States, " taking a chance " in the South-west, and optimism in the Far West.

CULTURAL CHANGE AND PERSONALITY

It is often stated with an air of finality, that human nature cannot be changed ; that, for instance, we can never hope to abolish war because man is by nature pugnacious. The argument of this chapter,

¹ John Gillin, *op. cit.*

on the contrary, has been that human nature is highly changeable, that human personality is mainly the product of culture rather than culture the product of human personality. We do not have war because man is bellicose by nature ; we might have war even if man were pacifistic by nature. At least many persons fight in modern wars who have little enthusiasm for combat ; they have to be drafted. Also war does not occur in some cultures, although there may be fighting and occasionally even murder. If by human nature is meant man's biological nature, then it may be true that human nature cannot be changed ; at least, it probably has not changed in any significant respects in the last 10,000 years or longer. Man's biological nature includes the capacity to generate and express fear and hate, and it is doubtful that culture can completely stifle these emotions. But the discussion of preceding paragraphs has shown that culture can and does determine the direction and degree of emotional expression. There is an enormous difference between the Borneo headhunter and the Quaker who fights for peace ; yet a Borneo child reared by Quakers would be peace-loving, while the offspring of Quaker parents brought up in Borneo would hunt heads. The range of human traits is wide, from the utter filthiness of some primitive and peasant groups to the aseptic cleanliness of modern surgeons ; from the self-torture of Plains Indians to the flight-from-pain *via* analgesics of modern man. So variable indeed is the influence of culture that in some instances it almost succeeds in turning human nature inside out, as Faris suggests in the following:

Ethnological studies have no more important lesson to teach the sociologist than the lesson of the almost limitless adaptability of the human animal. Given an uncontradicted cultural medium and we can see that the powerful drives of hunger, sex and even the will to live are as nothing if they run counter to the mores. Confirmation of this is familiar to us all. Voluntary fasting, voluntary celibacy, voluntary mutilation and torture, voluntary suicide—examples abound to show the irresistibility of the cultural model. One can no more organise his personality independently than he can be born without a mother.¹

Our discussion has shown that if we are to change widely established personality traits, we must first change the culture. Although changing the culture is not easy, it is possible within limits, and is easier than trying to change man's genes. One thing we cannot do is wipe clean the cultural slate. We cannot start all over again to build man anew, but must face up to the existing culture. The effort to make the Germans and the Japanese quickly democratic according to the American model is doomed to failure, for it does not reckon with a long-standing tradition of these people, which is favourable to authoritarian rule. The adoption of the Weimar Constitution in Germany after the First World War was an attempt to make Germans

¹ Ellsworth Faris, *The Nature of Human Nature* (New York : McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1937), p. 279.

as democratic as New Englanders, but it failed because of a thousand years of hostile tradition. In Japan after World War II the same mistake was not repeated ; at least the Emperor, the principal symbol of authority, was retained. Reforms calculated to produce new personality traits have more chance of success if they are adapted to existing conditions.

Indeed, if the change is drastic, and sudden besides, the result may be not the adoption of new traits or even the retention of the old but the disorganisation of personality itself. History furnishes numerous examples of the disastrous effects of such acculturation. How cultural change influences personality adversely is discussed at greater length in the next chapter.

SUMMARY

Confronting the child at birth is a ready-made culture to which he must largely submit. Since each child is dynamic and unique, his relationship to culture is not entirely one-sided like that of the potter and the clay. Nevertheless the culture is dominant. John Dewey has symbolised the situation by observing that the scope of culture's contribution to the individual bears the same relation to the individual's influence on culture as his total vocabulary bears to the words which he himself originates.

How culture influences personality has only recently been investigated and our knowledge is sketchy. There is first the influence of individual culture traits. It has been shown, for example, that differences in punctuality between two groups of people are related to differences in the diffusion of timepieces. Other culture traits, non-material as well as material, contribute to personality differences. But cultures are complex wholes, and we are therefore mainly interested in inquiring how the major emphases of a culture affect personality. Different cultures often produce different personality norms. We see in one culture an accent on competition, in another an accent on co-operation. The range of variation in personality traits may be much the same in different societies, but the frequencies differ. Personality traits, moreover, differ in their adaptive value, hence the number of well adjusted and poorly adjusted persons varies from society to society. Most Zunis are said to feel emotionally secure, and most Alorese insecure.

How account for the variation in personality within a culture ? Individual differences in biological constitution and interpersonal relations are factors, but individuals differ also in cultural experiences. There is in every culture what may be called a division of learning according to social classification. Both sexes and all age groups learn certain things in common but in addition each sex and age group learns different things. Age-grading and sex-typing are perhaps the most important classifications for determining social rôles. Occupation, education, income, and family background are additional selective factors which are highly important in determining what aspects of the culture an individual will be exposed to. All cultures accordingly produce variety as well as uniformity of personality, and this is particularly true for a culture like that of the United States, which is not whole cloth but a patchwork of many different pieces.

It is well to note that the same personality trait can often be produced by varying any one of the four components. The trait of dominance or leadership may be influenced by inherited and constitutional causes affecting the glands. Some children observed in the nursery school are aggressive at

a very tender age before the environment has had a chance to influence them much in this way. But a child who is not dominant naturally may be made more aggressive by increasing the domination at home or the ridicule by the gang; that is, by varying interpersonal, or group, factors. Again, a child who is normally not very assertive may perhaps be rendered more energetic by environmental pressures, such as the frequent prospect of famine or constant danger from attack by wild animals, as may be the case in primitive society.¹ Finally, training or cultural experience may convert a submissive child into an assertive one.²

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. How have the personality traits of women in Britain changed with changes in culture?
2. "John Dewey has said in all seriousness that the part played by custom in shaping the behaviour of the individual as over against any way in which he can affect the traditional custom, is as the proportion of the total vocabulary of his mother tongue over against those words of his own baby talk that are taken up into the vernacular of his family." (Ruth Benedict, "The Science of Custom", in V. F. Calverton (ed.), *The Making of Man*, New York, The Modern Library, 1931, p. 807.) Discuss.
3. "The ethical philosophy of Confucius written two centuries before Plato has been the constantly accessible textbook, and its concepts have been absorbed even by the illiterate. One cannot find Chinese who are not polite according to the Confucian code." (H. A. Miller, "Social Process in Asia", in *Social Problems and Social Processes*, p. 16.) Discuss.
4. What is meant by "basic personality structure"? How is it related to (a) culture? (b) social adjustment?
5. How account for variations of personality within a single culture?
6. Why does there tend to be greater differentiation of personality in modern culture than in primitive?
7. How do the factors of heredity, group, and culture interact in the formation of personality? Are certain traits always brought about by the same types of causes?
8. Personality differences of lawyers and doctors in our culture.

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¹ In the main, however, the geographic factor can be shown to be of negligible significance for personality, and not of equal importance with the other three factors.

² Lois M. Jack, "An Experimental Study of Ascendant Behaviour in Pre-School Children", *University of Iowa Studies in Child Welfare*, vol. 9, pp. 7-65, 1934.

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CHAPTER XI

SOCIALISATION AND SOCIAL DEVIATION

In New York State, the probability that a young man of twenty will be in a hospital for mental disorders sometime during his life is 83 out of 1,000 ; and of a young woman, 84.¹ A life-table giving the probabilities of commitment to a prison for crime, comparable to the life-table for commitments for psychoses, has not been prepared. We know, however, that the incidence of commitments for crime is very great.

The preceding paragraph refers only to institutionalised cases. Additionally, there may be persons in a community with mental disorders not severe enough to warrant hospitalisation, and others who should be in a hospital and are not. In 1954, a pioneer study of the prevalence of emotional disorders was undertaken on a representative sample of the approximately 110,000 persons, aged 20-59, in a mid-Manhattan residential area. Signs and symptoms of mental illness were obtained in a home interview survey and were evaluated by a team of two psychiatrists. On the basis of these data, the population was distributed as follows, by percentage : no symptoms, 18.5 ; mild, 36.3 ; moderate, 36.3 ; marked, 13.2 ; severe, 7.5 ; incapacitating, 2.7. Combining the last three groups, we have 23.4 per cent of the non-institutional population who are emotionally impaired. This figure is probably an understatement since it is likely that some of the impaired would be missed by the investigators. While the findings are only applicable to this one area of Manhattan, the researchers offer evidence that Midtown's mental morbidity rate is not out of line with the results of previous research.²

The psychotic and the criminal are at once identified as the two principal types of social deviants. There are other types, such as the mentally defective. Three out of every 100 children born in the United States are mentally retarded to the extent that they benefit little or not at all from regular schooling.³ This is not the place, however, for an inventory or description of socially abnormal types, since this chapter is concerned rather with an analysis of social deviation in general and especially the social factors that underlie deviation. In the interests of coherence of presentation, the discussion will be largely limited to the field of mental disorders ; crime and other deviant behaviour will be treated only incidentally.

¹ *Trends of Mental Disease* (New York : Kings Crown Press, 1945), p. 52.

² Leo Srole et al., *Mental Health in the Metropolis—the Midtown Manhattan Study*, vol. I (New York : McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952).

³ *The Child Who Is Mentally Retarded* (Children's Bureau Folder No. 43, 1956).

Social Deviation is Nonconformity to the Norms of the Group. The psychotic and the criminal are social deviants because they do not conform to the norms of the group. The group expects its members to engage in interaction which is responsible and predictable, and this the psychotic cannot do. The group also expects its members to conform to certain ethical and legal practices, and the criminals are those who violate these practices. Normal individuals also transgress from time to time and may behave in irrational ways on particular occasions. Society distinguishes between those whose deviation is temporary and those whose deviation is of longer duration. The temporal point is therefore important in the conception of social deviants, who represent various social types, that is, more or less persistent constellations of personality traits. A criminal under the law is one who is found guilty of one or more crimes, and a person who commits only one crime in his lifetime and is adjudged guilty is a criminal under the law. But when we speak of a criminal type, we usually have in mind someone for whom criminal behaviour is characteristic.

Different Groups within a Society may have different Norms. Different groups have different ideas of permissible behaviour. The range of acts that would be approved by college students differs from that which would be approved by college authorities. In somewhat comparable manner, certain groups of delinquents share values that help to explain their delinquency. Middle-class and working-class children tend to grow up in different social worlds ; but in the schools and elsewhere, the working-class children are judged by middle-class standards, which many are ill equipped to meet. These frustrated children flock together in little gangs, where a sub-culture emphasising malice and negativism is developed and in which delinquent behaviour is rewarded because it represents an attack on the values of the respectable middle-class. These delinquents behave in accordance with the norms of a delinquent sub-culture.¹ When speaking of norms, therefore, it is helpful to indicate whose norms are being referred to, especially in a modern society which is complex and rapidly changing. In this discussion the reference will be to the norms of the inclusive society, unless otherwise indicated.

Different Groups within a Society may have differential access to the Dominant Goals. One theory of the causes of social deviation, just presented, is that of culture conflict, namely, the clash of two sets of incompatible values. Another theory is in terms of a conflict of ends and means.² According to this view, although certain social goals are general in society, some social groups are disadvantaged because they do not

¹ Albert K. Cohen, *Delinquent Boys : The Culture of the Gang* (Glencoe, Illinois : The Free Press, 1955).

² Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie : Revisions and Extensions", in Ruth Nanda Anshen (ed.), *The Family : Its Function and Destiny* (New York : Harper & Brothers, 1959).

possess the requisite means for reaching the preferred goals. As perhaps the principal example, financial success is widely sought in our society. However, some groups do not have the opportunity to acquire legitimate means, such as schooling, for achieving financial success. Such groups may as a consequence resort to illegitimate means. Exponents of this theory argue that urban slum boys gravitate to delinquency sub-culture when they discover they do not have access to legitimate avenues of success.¹

Each of the theories is a partial explanation of delinquency, accounting for some delinquents and certain types of delinquency. Each has limited applicability because it does not specify the differing characteristics of the boys who behave and do not behave in the indicated manner.

The Cultural Norm is the "standard desired". A further clarification of terms is needed. The term cultural norm, as used in this book, refers to the "standard desired" and not to the cultural norm in the statistical sense, which is the way most people in the society behave. The latter is more properly referred to as the mode. The cultural norm and the mode are often the same, though, as in manners and etiquette.

Social Deviants represent failure in Socialisation. Socialisation is the process by which the individual learns to conform to the norms of the group. When he does not more or less systematically conform, he is a social deviant. Socialisation may be viewed as the training of a performer, one who can play the rôles required by the cultural plot.² Such training calls for mastery of a conventional code of rules for interaction, by which to keep one's own face and to protect the face of others. Details of this code have been set forth with insight by Erving Goffman, around the two central concepts of *deference* and *demeanour*.³ Society protects the integrity of the individual and yet includes him in social interaction by means of deferential rules of avoidance and deferential rules of presentation. The former relate to the principle that the self is in part personal and is entitled to privacy and protection; the latter concern the principle that the self is partly social and that everyone has the right to engage in interaction with others if the rules are followed. Effective interaction requires acceptable egos. Hence the need for demeanour, which is self-regard reflected in proper dress, bearing and deportment. The mentally ill, according to Goffman's view, are those individuals who are not able to project a sustainable self.

¹ R. A. Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin, *Delinquency and Opportunity* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960).

² Ernest Becker, "Socialization, Command of Performance, and Mental Illness", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 67, pp. 494-501, March, 1962.

³ Erving Goffman, "The Nature of Deference and Demeanor", *American Anthropologist*, vol. 58, pp. 473-502, 1956; and *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (Garden City New York: Doubleday and Company, 1959).

In Chapter VIII there was discussion of methods used by the group to bring deviants back into line and to punish them for their deviation. These efforts by the group were labelled *social control*, which is concerned, as it were, with the failures in socialisation. The present chapter approaches the same problem from the standpoint of the individual, as a function of the development of personality. Our interest here is in the process of socialisation and the reasons why it sometimes goes awry.

The Process of Socialisation is one of Alternating Differentiation and Integration. The social order is maintained largely by socialisation, not social control. That is to say, most members of a society can be counted on to behave in ways which are in consonance with the values of the group. This result is achieved by a process of assimilation of newcomers. Some of the newcomers are immigrants from other societies or sub-cultures of the same society, but generally most of the newcomers are new-born babies. We have seen that the new-born infant has needs like those for food and warmth that press for satisfaction. Normally it is his mother who mainly satisfies these needs, and the child comes to depend upon her and "identifies himself" with her emotionally. It is thought by some that the child is aware of his mother before he is aware of himself or that the mother and child are at first a common identity. The mother is "internalised" by the infant, with the satisfaction of food and other bodily needs the goal. In due course, the child differentiates himself from his mother and then is faced with the problem of integrating self and mother into a new social system, a two-person, two-rôle system, with the child taking a subordinate rôle to the bigger, more powerful mother.¹ Later, it is thought, the child repeats the process for his father. He differentiates his father as a person from his mother and then integrates his father into his social system in new and enlarged ways, which take into account not only his father's relationship to him but to his mother. In this way, the number of "significant others" increases for the child; and the child internalises, in his mind and imagination, the rôles of these others, including the sentiments and tasks that accompany the rôles. The mother usually takes the "expressive" rôle, centring in affection, whereas the father takes the "instrumental" rôle, organised around discipline and the provision of a livelihood, although there is in reality considerable variation in the degree to which these rôles are sex-linked. The child internalises these rôles in his rôle-taking. The little boy pretends that he is head of the house and has a job and goes off to work in the morning the way his father does. This is what is meant when it is said that the child learns to adjust or conform to the group. He learns that it is expected that the male will be a breadwinner and the female a comforter. If he

¹ Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales, *Family, Socialization and Interaction Process* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955).

is properly socialised, he will one day become a breadwinner ; and he will expect to find a wife who will be a loving mother to his children. The number and type of rôles with which the growing child becomes familiar increases further when he goes to school, for here he is judged by " universalistic " standards, that is, in terms of competence, rather than by the " particularistic " or personal standards of the home. Still later he will probably learn to identify with an occupation. Investigation ¹ has shown that such identification is facilitated by participation in the activities of the chosen occupation and by the acquisition of skills and appropriate occupational ideologies that lead to pride in occupation.

FACTORS IN SOCIAL DEVIATION

In his study of the causes of social deviation, the sociologist is interested mainly in the situational and cultural ones ; but he cannot assess fully the influence of these factors without also taking into account the rôle of non-social factors, since all the factors involved in personality are interrelated. It will be recalled that the four factors affecting the social life of man and therefore human personality are biological heredity, natural environment, group, and culture. The problem is to determine, if possible, how much of the change in a given personality from normal to abnormal may be attributed to variation in each of the four factors.

Types of Mental Disturbance. Mental health, like physical health, is a matter of degree, ranging from vigour to serious illness. Least serious are relatively minor personality defects, such as conceit in a highly competent person. More serious are neuroses (popularly identified as nervousness) which lessen efficiency in limited areas of behaviour. Most serious are psychoses which often incapacitate the individual and may require institutionalisation. Neuroses and psychoses may differ in their etiology and incidence. Thus it has been found that social class is positively correlated with neuroses but negatively correlated with psychoses.² The discussion in this chapter mainly concerns psychoses.

ORGANIC AND FUNCTIONAL DISORDERS

In some cases of mental illness, the roots of trouble are definitely organic. Some of these organic conditions are of an hereditary nature, as in Huntington's chorea and certain types of epilepsy. Others are due to factors of the natural environment, such as the disease germ of syphilis, capable of causing dementia paralytica. Drugs, other diseases, and physical impairment of certain sorts may affect the constitution in such a way as to disorder the mind. Such factors as

¹ Howard S. Becker and James W. Carper, " The Development of Identification with an Occupation," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 61, pp. 289-98, January, 1956.

² A. B. Hollingshead and F. C. Redlich, *Social Class and Mental Illness*.

excessive use of alcohol, encephalitis, brain tumour, arteriosclerosis, and glandular difficulties, may be responsible for impairing the nervous system. Behind many of these physical factors, it should be noted, are larger social factors. Thus alcoholic psychoses would not exist without alcohol, although alcohol is not the only factor in chronic alcoholism. Alcohol is, of course, a cultural factor.

However, for a great many cases (roughly about half of the total number) no physical basis can be found with the instruments of diagnosis now available. These cases are therefore called functional disorders, and the assumption is that the causes must be sought in areas other than organic impairment.

On the other hand, those who emphasise the physical basis of mental disorders say that constitutional factors in the so-called functional disorders will be uncovered when instruments of diagnosis are improved. There have been reports that schizophrenics show brain changes visible under the microscope, and nerve cells containing a low content of an important chemical, polynucleotides.

A substance, called taraxein, has been discovered in the blood of schizophrenic patients; when injected into normal persons, it temporarily produces the psychotic symptoms.¹ Students of the behavioural sciences have tended to underestimate the rôle of biological factors in mental illness because their orientation does not dispose them to keep abreast of developments in human biology.² In recent years, one of the more significant developments in the treatment of schizophrenia and other functional psychoses has been along biological lines, namely, the use of tranquillising drugs. These have been a major factor in shortening the average hospital stay of mental patients. The drugs do not cure patients, but make them more amenable to psychiatric treatment. The sociologist needs to be mindful of biological factors as they relate to social behaviour, even though his principal focus is appropriately on the societal correlates of social deviation. The traditional practice of regarding schizophrenia as a "disease" has disposed researchers to regard it as having a physiological basis, whereas the most reasonable assumption at present is that schizophrenia represents a group of disorders and that, theoretically, many possible etiological agents exist: genetic, biochemical, physiological, psychological and cultural.³

In the development of functional mental disorders, there are three sets of influences, relating to (a) heredity, (b) learning in infancy and early childhood, and (c) critical social situations, usually in adulthood or near-adulthood. It is not suggested that (b) and (c)

¹ Robert Heath *et al.*, "Effect on Behaviour in Humans with the Administration of Taraxein", *American Journal of Psychiatry*, vol. 114, pp. 14-24, July, 1957.

² M. F. Nimkoff, "Biological Discoveries and the Future of the Family: A Reappraisal", *Social Forces*, vol. 40, pp. 121-8, December, 1962.

³ Don D. Jackson, *The Etiology of Schizophrenia* (New York: Basic Books, 1960).

are distinct and separate phases. Socialisation as a process goes on throughout the life of the individual. Childhood socialisation is probably most important because of its primacy but it is not necessarily determinative of later behaviour.

Hereditary Factors in functional Mental Disorders. Even if constitutional conditions are not found in mental disorders, heredity must still be considered a factor. The argument is that since some individuals survive stresses that crush others, the difference must be due in part to inherited differences in ability to resist strain. Studies of the incidence of psychoses among identical twins throw light on this problem. In cases in which the hereditary factor is constant, differences in mental traits must be due to variations in experience. Kallman¹ studied 794 schizophrenic twins (called index cases) whose co-twins were available for examination at the age of fifteen years. Here were 794 schizophrenics who had twin brothers and sisters. The question was : how many of these siblings also developed schizophrenia? In answer, schizophrenia was found in 85.8 per cent of the monozygotic co-twins (identical twins), but in only 14.7 per cent of the dizygotic (fraternal) twins. This is a highly significant difference. Identical twins have the same heredity, whereas fraternal twins are as unlike in heredity as brothers and sisters born at different times. It is interesting that the rate of schizophrenia for non-twin siblings of schizophrenic patients was 14.3 per cent, nearly the same as for fraternal twins. Among the parents of schizophrenic index cases the rate dropped to 9.2 per cent, and then declined progressively to 7 per cent for half-siblings, 2.1 for marriage partners, and 1.8 per cent for step-siblings. Clearly, the chances of developing schizophrenia increase in proportion to the degree of blood relationship to a schizophrenic patient.

In interpreting the high incidence of psychosis in both members of pairs of identical twins, the question arises : are not such twins more apt to have similar experiences than dissimilar twins, and may not the high rate of disorders be due to the similar experiences? Kallman found the highest rate for monozygotics who were reared together, 91.5 per cent ; but even for those who were separated and reared apart the rate was 77.6 per cent. The evidence is not conclusive because age at separation and degree of separation may be important factors. Yet the data may be interpreted as indicating a specific hereditary factor in schizophrenia, probably recessive and autosomal (not sex-linked).

Favourable Environment may neutralise the effect of the unfavourable Genetic Factor in Schizophrenia. In about one-fifth of cases of identical

¹ Franz J. Kallman, "The Genetic Theory of Schizophrenia," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, vol. 103, pp. 309-22, 1946. For a fuller statement of the genetic factor in mental disorder, see Kallman's *Heredity in Health and Mental Disorder* (New York W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1953).

twins reared apart, one twin was not affected. If heredity were the sole determining factor, both twins should have been ill without exception. Schizophrenia is the result not of genetic factors alone but of the subtle interaction of hereditary and environmental influences. The disease is not inherited, only the structure which predisposes to the disease. This is an encouraging conclusion for it means that schizophrenia may be prevented by favourable environmental conditions.

Personality Traits predisposing to Mental Health or Illness are established in Infancy and Early Childhood. The environmental conditions which are of the greatest importance for mental health or illness are those relating to the early years of life, for as an earlier chapter showed, these are the years in which the foundations of personality are laid, largely under the aegis of the family. If one relationship is to be singled out as most meaningful, it is the early relation between the child and his mother. This is borne out by a study¹ of the rate of dementia praecox (the term by which schizophrenia was formerly designated) among parents of dementia praecox patients, in which it was found that the disease was somewhat more common among mothers than fathers, the rates being 9.1 and 3.7 per cent respectively. If heredity alone were responsible the rate of psychosis would be the same for both parents since each contributes 50 per cent to the child's heredity. The greater incidence among mothers indicates that social factors are present, and confirms the point made earlier that children are influenced by their mothers more than by their fathers. The father's influence is ordinarily not inconsiderable, however, as compared with the influence of persons outside the family.

If as an illustration of functional mental disorder, we take the most common psychosis, schizophrenia, with its salient characteristic of seclusiveness (except for the catatonic type), we may ask: what sort of early childhood experience centring in the family helps to develop seclusive tendencies in a child? Too little affection of parent for child, or actual hostility, may be a factor. The child who feels rejected by his parents may withdraw from them and others into a world of fantasy and live in his daydreams. Or the failure of a child's parents to teach him the skills needed for effective group participation, especially the skills in sports and games of other children, may be an isolating influence. Too much affection is also bad, especially if it is unintelligent, for the over-protected child may have difficulty in adjusting to others outside the family who do not show him special consideration.

Isolation from others has long been recognised as a symptom of

¹ H. M. Pollack, B. Malzberg, and R. G. Fuller, "Hereditary and Environmental Factors in the Causation of Dementia Praecox and Manic-Depressive Psychoses", *Psychiatric Quarterly*, vol. 7, pp. 450-79; vol. 8, pp. 77-97, 337-71, 553-99; vol. 9, pp. 129-42, 287-96.

schizophrenia, but it is not clear whether the isolation is cause or effect. Prisoners in solitary confinement may show schizoid traits.¹ When census tracts in Austin, Texas, were compared, it was found that in areas with the highest rates of schizophrenia, the residents knew significantly fewer names of their neighbours and the number of reported friends and acquaintances was smaller than in areas with low rates of schizophrenia.² But when, in another study,³ a group of schizophrenics was compared with a normal group, with age, sex, occupation, family composition, and residential area controlled, the data did not support the hypothesis that social isolation in adolescence is a predisposing cause of schizophrenia. Only one-third of the schizophrenics were isolated in adolescence. Nor was there evidence that the isolates were prevented from interacting with peers because of lack of available playmates, excessive residential mobility, severe illness, or parental restrictions. It is suggested that the abnormal personality of the schizophrenic probably leads not to isolation but to alienation. Inadequacies in social relationships, both within and outside the family, cause certain individuals to feel that they do not really belong to their peer groups. Alienation may lead to compulsive interaction as well as to social isolation.

Seeman has differentiated five meanings of alienation: powerlessness (the perception that one cannot control what is happening to him), meaninglessness (the perception that one is unclear as to what one ought to believe), normlessness (a high expectancy that socially unapproved behaviour is required to achieve given goals), isolation (the assignment of low reward value to goals or beliefs that are usually highly valued in a society), and self-estrangement (the failure to find self-rewarding activities).⁴ Using the three major components of powerlessness, normlessness, and social isolation, Dean has created a scale for measuring alienation. His research indicates that there is a low but significant negative correlation between the three components of alienation and occupational prestige, education, income and rural background; and a small positive correlation between alienation and advancing age.⁵ In another study⁶ the hypothesis was tested that differences in alienation (i.e. powerlessness) are associated with differential learning of behaviour-relevant information. Controlling for socio-economic backgrounds and for health and

¹ R. E. L. Faris, "Cultural Isolation and the Schizophrenic Personality", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 40, pp. 155-65, September, 1934.

² E. Gartly Jaco, "The Social Isolation Hypothesis and Schizophrenia", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 19, pp. 567-77, October, 1954.

³ Melvin L. Kohn and John A. Clausen, "Social Isolation and Schizophrenia", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 20, pp. 265-73, June, 1955.

⁴ M. Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 24, pp. 783-91, December, 1959.

⁵ D. Dean, "Alienation: Its Meaning and Measurement", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 26, pp. 753-8, October, 1961.

⁶ M. Seeman and J. Evans, "Alienation and Learning in a Hospital Setting", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 27, pp. 772-82, December, 1962.


The child who . . .




lacks DEXTERITY and APTITUDE in sports,



HAS NO HOBBIES, unless only reading,




no FRIENDS,



and is AFRAID of the opposite sex, may get TOO frustrated at adolescence.

It is particularly unfortunate . . .

Then he may begin the process of SCHIZOID WITHDRAWAL, shutting out the overpowering frustrating outside world and retreating into wish-fulfilling FANTASY



if he has a DOMINATING MOTHER PERSON who is PERFECTIONISTIC and who runs his life through LOVE or PRESSURE of a kind which is difficult to resist without guilt . . .



so that the only way that he can get away from her and assert his own wishes is in DAYDREAMS.



This may progress into a FULL BLOWN SCHIZOPHRENIA.

FIG. 9.—Some Causal Factors in Schizophrenia.

(Taken from Veterans Administration Pamphlet 10-36, *A Hypothesis of Schizophrenic Behavior*, Veterans Administration, Washington 25, D.C. Initially prepared in 1950 as a scientific medical exhibit by Dr. Richard L. Jenkins and Dr. Lucy D. Ozarin, Psychiatry and Neurology Service, Department of Medicine and Surgery, Veterans Administration, Central Office.)

hospital histories, it is shown that the more alienated patients score lower on an objective test of knowledge about tuberculosis than the less alienated patients.

The Social strains of later life may be Precipitating Factors. Ordinarily schizophrenia makes its first appearance between twenty and forty years of age. In fact, mental disorders in childhood are unusual, and it is not until adolescence or later that they usually become severe enough to require institutionalisation, although there are many exceptions. Much learning takes place in infancy and early childhood that ill equips the individual for life with others. Why, then, do the disorders not develop until later? The causes are complex, but one reason is that children—those with unfortunate preparation included—are shielded by our culture from the consequences of their handicaps. The child's rôle is a protected, dependent one. If he is a seclusive child, this trait may be described as shyness and accepted with little censure. As he grows older, his shyness becomes more and more noticeable and an increasing handicap if it prevents him first from entering into the activities of the gang, and later from having normal relations with the opposite sex. As an adult or near adult, new rôles await him requiring independence, responsibility, decision. Now he must begin to think of supporting himself and choosing a mate. There is the strain of the competitive economic struggle, which may be rendered acute by loss of money or job. There is the conflict of moral codes, of wishes and standards, intensified in adulthood. There are the burdens of war, the emotional shocks of unrequited love, of divorce, of loss of relatives and friends. The social demands upon him are heavier than when he was a child or a youth and his weaknesses are magnified.

How mental disorders are related to social stress has been shown in detail in studies of men who falter on the field of battle. During World War II a great many soldiers experienced "battle fatigue". They developed disabling symptoms, such as stomach ulcers or heart disorders, so they could no longer serve actively at the front. Medical examination would often show these symptoms to be psychosomatic, that is, involving both psychological and physical factors. Others developed abnormal psychological reactions without physical disabilities. These were men afraid of war, overwhelmed by the horror of mutilation and death. The natural impulse would have been to run away. But they were soldiers with a duty to perform. If they deserted they would be branded cowards and the thought of such disgrace was unbearable. In some cases the powerful clash of wishes was solved unconsciously by taking on physical symptoms which are acceptable excuses for inaction in our culture. After V-E Day, there were many sudden cures.

The experiences of wartime effectively emphasise a point of the first importance, namely, that mental illness is a function of (a) the

severity of emotional stress as well as (b) the abnormality of childhood conditioning and (c) hereditary weakness. Examination of war neuroses disclosed cases of minimal stress resulting in severe symptoms.¹ For instance, the mere anticipation of being sent to the front might cause a breakdown. These cases reflect a previous disorder usually extending back to early childhood.² In the great majority of cases, however—and there were some three million inductees in World War II who experienced some kind of mental breakdown—the disorders developed only after long exposure to severe stress.³ Indeed, as the investigators emphasise, if the stress is severe enough, even the emotionally healthy may develop neurotic-like behaviour. This means that most “battle fatigue” is due less to pre-existing emotional weakness than to the pressure of external events leading to a breakdown in the ability to deal with anxiety. For this reason, some authorities limit the term “war neurosis” to those cases where prior to the war disturbance the personality was stable.

The discussion of the preceding section can be recast briefly in terms of socialisation process. Since we train our youth mainly in the arts of peace, despite selective service, they are ill-prepared for the harsh realities of war. Other adult crises may be likewise unanticipated. Certain adult neuroses may be looked upon as due not only to inadequate early socialisation but also to socialisation which fails to anticipate certain adult rôles.

CULTURE AND PERSONALITY DEVIATION

The student of sociology notes that behind all deviant individuals are great social and cultural stresses; unless we know the culture we cannot understand why the number of individuals who develop mental disorders is greater in some societies than in others, or is greater in some communities or classes than in others within the same society. Nor can we understand why certain types of disorder appear more often in one place than in another.

CULTURAL VARIATION IN MENTAL DISORDERS

An illuminating approach to the problem of factors in personality deviation is through the study of comparative cultures and sub-cultures. For most groups, the existing evidence is not good, for few peoples keep accurate records of mental disorders or, for that matter, any records

¹ Roy R. Grinker and John P. Spiegel, *Men Under Stress* (Philadelphia: Blakiston Company, 1945).

² Edward A. Strecker, *Their Mothers' Sons* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1946).

³ Anxiety symptoms when measured showed little change with increasing time in the Army, except for an initial rise early in the soldier's career. Overseas service brought a real though slight increase, but combat induced a high level of anxiety. The closer to combat, the more likely and the more intense the fear reactions. S. A. Stouffer *et al.*, *The American Soldier*, vol. 2 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949), Chap. 9.

at all. There is available, however, a census which was taken in 1951 of every person who was then or ever had been mentally ill, among the Hutterites.¹ The Hutterites are a fairly closed Anabaptist religious sect of 8,542 people of German stock living at the time of the census in ninety-eight communities in the Dakotas, Montana, and the prairie provinces of Canada. They are set apart from other groups by their religious beliefs, which emphasise co-operative activity and the simple life. They own all property jointly, eat as a body in a common dining hall, and pay all expenses, such as doctor's bills, out of a common treasury. They disdain jewellery, art, overstuffed chairs, radios, motion pictures. They think a grammar school education is enough. They engage in highly mechanised farming and trade with their neighbours, the business of each colony usually exceeding \$100,000 a year.

In the summer of 1951, it was reported that there were 199 persons who had shown symptoms at some time in their lives which the research staff diagnosed as mental illness. This included mental deficiency as well as psychoses, neuroses, epilepsy, and personality disorders. The ratio was thus 1 in 43, much less than for the United States in general. So far as psychotic manifestations were concerned, the Hutterites had a relative frequency only slightly lower than hospitalisation for mental illness in New York state.

Is the lower rate of mental disorders among the Hutterites to be ascribed to more favourable cultural factors, like the close identification of the members one with another and the affection and security which the group provides? A cultural explanation is inviting, but the genetic factor cannot be ruled out. The Hutterites are closely inbred. All are descendants of 101 married couples and children who migrated to the United States between 1874 and 1877. Marriage with outsiders is considered a sin. Nearly half of all the families in 1950 had one of three surnames: Hofer, Waldner, and Wipf.

The distribution of mental disorders among the Hutterites is different from that in other societies. In populations generally, schizophrenia is the most common type of psychosis. The ratio of schizophrenic patients to manic-depressive patients among the Hutterites was 0.23, whereas in other populations it exceeds 1.00. Again, a genetic interpretation is possible, since manic-depressive psychoses occur more often in certain family lines than in others. Over against this is the more confident interpretation in terms of what is known about the values of the culture. Schizophrenia is characterised by withdrawal from others, and this is difficult in Hutterite society. On the other hand, the culture emphasises service to the community; and the depressive states can be seen as an intensification of the sense of unworthiness experienced by those who feel that

¹ Joseph W. Eaton and Robert J. Weil, *Culture and Mental Disorders* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955).

they do not measure up to the expectations of the group. This interpretation fits in with other findings that social isolates like farmers and unattached city dwellers show relatively high rates of schizophrenia, whereas manic-depressive reactions are more prominent among professional, socially prominent, and religious persons.

The cultural factor is conspicuous in the absence among the Hutterites of psychoses due to drugs, alcoholism, or syphilis, whereas 12.8 per cent of first admissions to state hospitals in the United States are for these reasons. It appears that Hutterite mental deviation is more anti-self, less anti-social. Investigators did not find a single case of murder, arson, severe physical assault, or sex crime. There had been only two suicides since 1874, both within the five years preceding the survey.

A companion study¹ of a sample of normal Hutterites reports that the general picture of conformity and harmony presented in the overt behaviour of adults is not matched by an equal harmony at the covert level of personality. Hundreds of years of Hutterite teachings which subordinate the individual to the group welfare have not eliminated disturbing and disruptive impulses.

The experience of the Hutterites suggests that there are ethnic differences in types of social stress and that these may be related to types of personality deviation. There is supporting evidence of differences among Irish, Jewish, Italian, and Yankee-American groups in the Boston area in the emotional stress in families with psychotic children.² The son in the Irish family who develops stress feels it particularly in relation to his mother, who shows solicitude for him but a lack of overt affection, coupled with strict discipline and little reward for parentally approved behaviour. The father too frequently belittles his son but engenders little conflict because the number of situations in which the mother dominates is so much greater. In the Jewish home, stress between mother and son, when it occurs, is said to be occasioned by her highly emotional, overtly affectionate relationship to her son, a relationship controlled by the withdrawal of love. The reaction of the son is said to be a highly ambivalent one, compounded of exaggerated dependency and deep-rooted repressed hostility. The relationship of the Italian mother to her son, when it fosters stress, is apt to be different still. The mother is likely to be oversolicitous and acts as a buffer between son and the punishing father, who is the dominant figure in the family, and to whom the son's reaction is one of fear-ridden respect. The son in the Yankee-American family, different still, experiences stress because he competes with siblings for parental affection and because the moral implications of conduct

¹ Bert Kaplan and Thomas F. A. Plant, *Personality in a Communal Society* (Lawrence : University of Kansas Publications, Social Science Studies, 1956).

² Paul Barrabee and Otto von Mering, "Ethnic Variations in Mental Stress in Families with Psychotic Children", in Arnold M. Rose (ed.), *Mental Health and Mental Disorder* (New York : W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1955), pp. 161 ff.

are stressed rather than the effect of behaviour on interpersonal relationships. These are some of the sources of stress which differentiate family life of psychotics in one ethnic group from another. They leave unanswered the question of why one son in a family succumbs to the stress, whereas another son is able to tolerate it.

There are Social Class differences in Psychiatric Disorders. Social classes are large inclusive groups with distinctive cultural traits that set them apart from one another. Their importance is such as to warrant treatment at length in a later chapter,¹ but here it is appropriate to report their relationship to mental health. Parental socio-economic status, based on education and occupation, is related inversely to the frequency of impaired mental health of their offspring and directly to the frequency of the well state. When the evidence for the younger respondents (ages 20-29) is considered separately, the same general findings hold, suggesting that some share of responsibility for adult mental health may be attributed to differences in family socio-economic status during childhood. These findings are based on the Manhattan study of some 110,000 adult residents, which had the advantage of sampling the general population in a home survey.²

Turning to a different category of persons, namely, those with mental disorders under treatment, an earlier inventory in New Haven³ reported higher rates for the lower classes, whereas the Manhattan survey reports higher rates for the upper classes. The difference is said to be explained mainly by the fact that in New Haven the hospital patients of the lowest stratum tend to become permanently institutionalised, whereas in Midtown there is a numerical dominance of patients receiving office therapy, representing the upper economic classes. The lower classes have many more mentally ill members but they less often get psychiatric attention. When they do receive attention, the outcome appears to be less favourable.

The rationale for the relatively great concentration of mental distress among the lower classes is complex and involves the following points. These classes show a greater malfunction in inter-personal relations in early childhood. Middle-class children tend to perceive their parents as pairs but the lower-class children see their parents as separate individuals.⁴ Lower-class individuals describe themselves as relatively more isolated from their parents whom they are more inclined to see as cold and rejecting.⁵ A significant proportion

¹ Chapter XVI.

² Leo Srole *et al.*, *op. cit.*, Chap. XII.

³ A. B. Hollingshead and F. C. Redlich, *Social Class and Mental Illness: A Community Study* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958).

⁴ F. Sabghir, *Relation Between Consistency and Ego-Supportiveness of Influence Techniques Used by Parent and Behavior and Self-Acceptance of Children* (Doctoral Dissertation, George Washington University, 1959).

⁵ J. L. Singer, "Projected Familial Attitudes as a Function of Socioeconomic Status and Psychopathology", *Journal of Consult. Psychology*, vol. 18, pp. 99-104, 1954.

of lower-class males are reared in a predominantly female household, with the male an uncertain and episodic figure. The relative lack of income, education, information and verbal facility handicaps the lower-class child in participation in our predominantly middle-class culture. He is often caught in the conflict between the American ideology of equality and his treatment in school and elsewhere as an inferior.

In a follow-up study¹ of the New Haven population receiving psychiatric care, additional support was given to the hypotheses that social and psychodynamic factors in the development of psychiatric disorders are related to an individual's position in the class structure, and that social mobility is associated with the development of psychiatric difficulties. It was found that for middle-class patients, important sources of stress were striving for respectability and striving for status achievement, and that these stresses were more common among schizophrenic than neurotic patients. In the lower working-class patients, the major sources of stress were economic insecurity and isolation from and hostility towards community organisations. Upward mobility, significantly greater among the middle-class than the working-class patients, was associated with psychiatric illness in the middle-class.

Is Normality a Relative Concept? We observe that the incidence of mental disorders varies in different societies, as does also the distribution by types. The question arises: is personality deviance socially defined or are there absolute standards of psychological abnormality? The evidence indicates that standards of normality are in part relative to culture. Behaviour which is approved in one society may be condemned in another. Deviant behaviour may be recognised as such, but valued differently by different societies. In the United States in the middle of the twentieth century, epileptic seizures are regarded as symptoms of illness, whereas in some societies they are thought to be signs of supernatural power.

Cultural norms vary, and in theory they may vary without limit; but in reality there are limits to cultural variations because mankind is one species with common problems, and the preferred solutions are limited in number. Thus all cultures taboo incest because the practice is destructive of family organisation, which is essential to social order. Nearly all societies forbid stealing from a member of the group.

In view of the foregoing, it may be argued that there are universal cultural judgments, that certain behaviour patterns are considered abnormal in all cultures, that pan-human standards of normality may be defined in terms of the rôle of a set of symptoms in the total behaviour of the individual.² Are the Kwakiutl Indians of the Pacific

¹ Jerome K. Myers and Bertram H. Roberts, *Family and Class Dynamics in Mental Illness* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959).

² Henry J. Wegrocki, "A Critique of Cultural and Statistical Concepts of Abnormality", *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 34, pp. 166-78, 1939.

TABLE 6

HOME SURVEY SAMPLE (AGE 20-59), DISTRIBUTIONS OF RESPONDENTS ON MENTAL HEALTH CLASSIFICATION BY PARENTAL-SES STRATA

Mental health categories	Parental-SES strata					
	A (highest)	B	C	D	E	F (lowest)
Well	% 24.4	% 23.3	% 19.9	% 18.8	% 13.6	% 9.7
Mild symptom formation	36.0	38.3	36.6	36.6	36.6	32.7
Moderate symptom formation	22.1	22.0	22.6	20.1	20.4	24.9
Impaired *	17.5	16.4	20.9	24.5	29.4	32.7
Marked symptom formation	11.8	8.6	11.8	13.3	16.2	18.0
Severe symptom formation	3.8	4.5	8.1	8.3	10.2	10.1
Incapacitated	1.9	3.3	1.0	2.9	3.0	4.6
N = 100%	(262)	(245)	(287)	(384)	(265)	(217)

*2 = 28.81, 5 df, $P < .001$

From Leo Srole, Thomas S. Langner, Stanley T. Michael, Marvin K. Opler, Thomas A. C. Rennie, *Mental Health in the Metropolis—the Midtown Manhattan Study*, vol. 1 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.), p. 213.

North-west paranoiac? Does their culture so institutionalise paranoia as to legitimise it and thus rule out the possibility of a paranoiac being a deviant type in the society? When the self-esteem of the chief is injured, he arranges a "potlatch ceremony". The slightest provocation will suffice: the potlatch victory of a rival or the accidental death of a wife. In the potlatch, as we noted in a preceding section, there is lavish distribution of property, accompanied by narration aiming at self-glorification and the ridicule of one's opponent. Is this institutionalised paranoia of a moderate, episodic sort? It is paranoid behaviour, although not recognised as abnormal by the culture. It is not so extreme as the delusions of the paranoiac in the psychopathic hospital; but mental disorders, it will be recalled, vary in degree. The institutionalisation of paranoid behaviour in the potlatch does not rule out the possibility that the group will regard other expressions of paranoia as abnormal and undesirable. If one of the chief's followers were to claim that the chief was a pretender and he was the real chief, the tribe would scarcely think him normal.

Another observation with reference to variations in mental illness in different cultures is that certain syndromes of symptoms may be

the same even though the content differs. On the basis of ethnographic field work in the forest country of Ghana, reported by a researcher who is both an anthropologist and a psychiatrist, it appears that the general syndrome of mental diseases as defined in the West reappear in Africa but with a different cultural content.¹

Differences in the rate of Social Isolation of Deviant Groups in a Society. The problem with which we have been concerned has to do with possible differences in the rate and kind of mental disorders among cultural groups. There is a different problem relating to the rate of commitment of different cultural groups in the same community, differences which may reflect discriminatory attitudes on the part of the agents of social control in the society towards the deviant behaviour of different groups. A recent study² reports that the proportion of socio-cultural aliens in a population influences the relation between the amount of psychopathology and rates of mental hospitalisation. In general, the larger the proportion of socio-cultural aliens, the higher the ratio of the "rate of isolation" to the rate of deviant behaviour. Put in terms of the individual, the social and cultural alien is more likely to be isolated for committing a deviant act.

CULTURAL FACTORS UNFAVOURABLE TO MENTAL HEALTH

The conflict of Biological Impulses and Cultural Directives. How shall we account for the fact that some societies have more mental disorders than others? There seem to be at least two different kinds of social conditions that are productive of mental stress. The first is that a culture may make excessive demands on individuals. Thus the Manus of New Guinea believe that sex is sinful and is properly used only for reproduction. The marital relationship lacks warmth and tenderness, and is instead a source of frustration and antipathy. The Trobrianders, on the contrary, have a naturalistic attitude towards the sexual function, and it is reported that there is little deviant sex behaviour in Trobriand society and that marital adjustments are conspicuously good.

Secondly, a society may be divided against itself culturally. This is true in the United States, for example, where a number of different cultures live side by side, competing with one another. Rapid social change in culture has much the same effect, since it creates new ideas and new standards which may be at variance with the old, which also persist. There are so many different ideas of what is right and of what is true in our society that individuals frequently find it difficult to develop an integrated personality. Even within one's own family

¹ M. J. Field, *Search for Security: An Etho-Psychiatric Study of Rural Ghana* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1960).

² Jack P. Gibbs, "Rates of Mental Hospitalization: A Study of Societal Reaction to Deviant Behavior", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 27, pp. 782-92, December, 1962.

there may be a bewildering array of sentiments and loyalties, as Mead¹ so strikingly indicates :

. . . the girl's father may be a Presbyterian, an imperialist, a vegetarian, a teetotaler—a believer in the open shop and a high tariff, who believes that woman's place is in the home, that young girls should . . . not smoke, nor go riding with young men in the evening. But her mother's father may be a Low Episcopalian, a believer in high living, a strong advocate of States' Rights and the Monroe Doctrine, who reads Rabelais, likes to go to musical shows and horse races. Her aunt is an agnostic, an ardent advocate of woman's rights, an internationalist who rests all her hopes on Esperanto, is devoted to Bernard Shaw, and spends her spare time in campaigns of anti-vivisection. Her elder brother, whom she admires exceedingly, has just spent two years at Oxford. He is an Anglo-Catholic, an enthusiast concerning all things medieval, writes mystical poetry, reads Chesterton, and means to devote his life to seeking for the lost secret of medieval stained glass. Her mother's younger brother is an engineer, a strict materialist, who never recovered from reading Haeckel in his youth; he scorns art, believes that science will save the world, scoffs at everything that was said and thought before the nineteenth century, and ruins his health by experiments in the scientific elimination of sleep. Her mother is of a quietistic frame of mind, very much interested in Indian philosophy, a pacifist, a strict non-participant in life, who in spite of her daughter's devotion to her, will not make any move to enlist her enthusiasms. And this may be within the girl's own household. Add to it the groups represented, defended, advocated by her friends, her teachers, and the books she reads by accident, and the list of possible enthusiasms, of suggested allegiances, incompatible with one another, becomes appalling.

The situation is, indeed, even more complicated than that described. While the members of this family show a great variety of attitudes, the attitudes are doubtless not so consistent and unified as they are made to appear. For instance, the father may be an imperialist, yet in actual wartime vigorously oppose conscription if it includes his own son; the pacifist mother, once her own country is involved, may be convinced this is the war to end all wars and regrets that she has only one son to give to her country. The heterogeneous nature of our culture is reflected not only in the great variety of attitudes that are held by different persons, but also in the contradictory and conflicting attitudes of the same individual. Cultural contradictions in society become mental conflicts in individuals and the source of mental disorders.

Culture Conflicts in Modern Society. This point has been well developed by Horney,² who shows that despite variations due to differences in heredity and life experiences, neurotic persons in our society are essentially alike. They are alike because they are produced by conflicts which are general in our culture. Neurotics are torn

¹ Margaret Mead, *The South Seas*, pp. 202-3. Copyright, 1928, 1930, 1935, 1939, by Margaret Mead. By permission of William Morrow & Company, Inc.

² Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*, Chap. xv, "Culture and Neurosis" (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1937).

between aggressiveness and timidity, between the making of excessive demands and the fear of failure, between striving for status and feelings of inferiority. In much the same manner our culture is divided against itself. On the one hand it teaches the transcendent value of brotherly love, of friendship, and unselfishness. The way to find happiness, we are told, is to live for others, not for self. On the other hand, our culture stresses intense individual competition. Whether it be in school, in business, or in sports, we are engaged in a contest for superiority over others. To get to the top is the goal, and this involves leaving others at the bottom. One man's success is another man's failure. A result of such competition is the growth of hostility between individuals; another is fear lest one fail. The latter may be particularly pronounced, since the chances of failing are much greater than the chances of succeeding. The fear of failure, moreover, is intensified by our false ideology; if an individual fails, we are apt to say it was his own fault, a sign of some inadequacy on his part. The rôles of luck, exploitation, and circumstances are largely ignored. The belief that one has failed leads to lowered self-esteem and a sense of isolation from others that is painful.

A second basic cleavage in our culture is the intense stimulation of desires and the limitations imposed on satisfying the desires. For example, our culture uses numerous methods like high-pressure advertising and instalment buying to whet the human appetite for more goods and satisfactions, that is, for a higher standard of living. But it is much easier to create wants than to supply the means of satisfying them. To widen the gap between what people want and what they actually have or can reasonably expect to have is to make for widespread discontent and nervousness. All of us are, of course, exposed to these contradictions in our culture, but those who, for one reason or another, experience the conflicts of our culture in accentuated form are likely to become neurotic. They may be called, says Horney, "the stepchildren of our culture".

The Ecology of Mental Disorders. This thesis gets factual support from a study of the distribution of mental disorders in Chicago,¹ which shows a dynamic association between the cultural areas of the city and the mental health of the populations occupying them. The investigation covered 7,069 first admissions to Cook County Psychopathic Hospital, 1930-1; 28,763 Chicago cases admitted to four state institutions, 1922-34; and 6,101 private hospital cases from the eight largest private hospitals in Chicago, 1922-34. The addresses of these patients were plotted on a map. Ratios of mental disorders for the various neighbourhoods were then obtained by computing the number of cases in the area per 100,000 population 15 years old and over. The ratios ranged from 48 to 499; that is, the neighbourhood with the

¹ Robert E. L. Faris and H. Warren Dunham, *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas* (Chicago, 1939).




FIG. 10.—The Distribution of Mental Disorders in Chicago.
Faris and Dunham, *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas*, Map V (Univ. of Chicago Press).

greatest proportion of commitments for mental disorders had more than ten times the ratio of the district with the lowest proportion. There was a regular decrease in the relative number of cases as one moved from the centre of the city out towards the periphery. Concentration of high rates were found in the rooming-house districts, in the area of homeless men, in certain Negro areas, and in the slum districts of the foreign-born. The lowest rates occurred in the residential districts of the upper income groups. The high Negro rate does not indicate a racial factor, for considerable variation in the rate appeared within the area, the highest being in the most deteriorated areas. The areas characterised by high rates of mental disorganisation are also the ones which have been shown by other studies to be marked by high rates of social disorganisation, that is, by high rates of poverty, unemployment, infant mortality, disease, and the like.¹

The thesis that conflict in personal life tends to increase the probabilities of developing a mental disorder gets support from research on the relation of marital status and mental disorders. In Manhattan, no significant mental health differences were discovered between men and women of like age and socio-economic status. When the factor of marital status is introduced, the situation changes. A relatively high prevalence of mental pathology is reported for single men and the divorced of both sexes. A possible explanation is that failure to marry represents rejection for men, since they take the initiative in courtship, whereas in the case of women, failure to marry means more often only that they are unchosen. Selective processes likewise probably account for the relatively high rate of mental morbidity among the divorced.²

Mental Health and Community Integration. If the above observations on the relation of social structure and mental health are correct, then it follows that the amount of mental health in a society will be correlated with the degree to which the social structure is (1) integrated and (2) consistent with the biological nature of man. This thesis is receiving increasing support from accumulating evidence, including what is probably the most comprehensive social psychiatric investigation ever attempted.³ Five small communities were investigated (three depressed areas and two well-integrated places) and a larger town having both types of areas. Symptoms of social disintegration included lack of economic resources and political power, little access to sources of information, lack of clear goals, diversity

¹ This study also shows that certain types of mental disorder are not uniformly distributed, but rather are concentrated in particular areas. It is difficult to appraise this finding, however, in view of the fact that present diagnosis and classification of mental disorders is somewhat arbitrary.

² Leo Srole *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

³ The Stirling County Study of Psychiatric Disorder and Sociocultural Environment. Vol. 1: *My Name is Legion*, 1959; Vol. 2: *People of Cove and Woodlot*, 1960. Vol. 3: *The Character of Danger*, 1963 (New York: Basic Books).

of standards, social inaction and non-communication, as evidenced by withdrawal from social participation. These social indices were accompanied by subjective indices of *anomie*, revealing a sense of failure and futility. On the contrary, the integrated communities showed heavy emphasis on co-operation, consensus as to standards, and a sense of purpose or mission. The authors report that their data show a relationship between the degree of integration of the




FIG. 11.—Number of First Admissions to State Mental Hospitals in the United States during 1933, by Marital Status, expressed as rate per 100,000 of the General Population of those of Corresponding Marital Status as of 1930.

The married have a more favourable rate than others. Selection of more favourable types for marriage might explain the difference between the married and the single, but would hardly account for the higher rate among the widowed. From Landis and Page, *Modern Society and Mental Disease* (New York, 1938), p. 70, Fig. 9.

community and symptom patterns indicative of psychoneurosis and psychophysiological disorders.

WHAT IS THE TREND OF MENTAL ILLNESS?

The preceding discussion has developed the thesis that types of communities differing in degree of integration differ also in amount of mental illness. There is a further significant question that may

be asked : does the prevalence of mental disorders increase as societies become more complex ? It is assumed that societies tend to become more complex with increasing industrialisation. Not clear is whether they also become less integrated, and as a consequence, more vulnerable to mental illness.

First of all, it is hazardous to assume that because modern societies are more complex than primitive societies, all simple societies have better mental health than all complex societies. It is risky to compare modern and primitive cultures generally as to rates of mental illness because of the great variation in social adjustment found in particular societies on the two cultural levels. A relatively simple culture is more likely to be integrated and consistent than is a more complex modern culture, but a simple integrated culture may place a heavy strain on man if it runs counter to his biological tendencies. It will be recalled that we have a picture of widespread marital unhappiness among the primitive Manus of New Guinea due in large part to their negative teachings on sex, which resemble those of some modern cultures ; whereas the Trobrianders with their naturalistic attitudes towards the sexual function are reported to have conspicuously good marital adjustments. Competition leading to anxiety and insecurity is inimical to mental health, and our own society is cited as one in which competition is particularly pronounced. Yet there are highly competitive primitive societies, while in a modern civilisation like that of India competition is more moderate, as it is also among the preliterate Hopi Indians. Allowing for variation, we may still note that literate cultures are in general more complex than preliterate ones ; and increasing complexity probably means added strain, although civilisation also brings solutions to many problems.

Because western society has become more complex and has brought added strain, many writers assume that the prevalence of mental disorders has increased. Our urban civilisation represents a relatively recent change from rural patterns that existed for several thousand years. We have had our present urban civilisation for less than two hundred years. Cultural changes are most pronounced in the cities, yet the evidence suggests that urban living is not more productive of mental illness than rural living. If prevalence rates were equal for given urban and rural areas, hospitalisation rates would still tend to be higher in the urban areas because of more ample facilities. However, it is reported that urban hospitalisation rates are not uniformly higher than rural rates in different countries and in different sections of the United States.¹ Urbanism as a way

¹ Eleanor Leacock, "Three Social Variables and the Occurrence of Mental Disorder", Chap. 10 in *Explorations in Social Psychiatry*, edited by Alexander H. Leighton, John A. Clausen and Robert N. Wilson (New York : Basic Books, Inc., 1957).

of life has been diffused to rural areas, reducing the significant differences between urban and rural patterns. In earlier times, the differences were more pronounced.

When the data on mental disorders for the United States were carefully examined, the conclusion was reached that there has been no long-term increase during the last century in the confinement rate of functional psychoses of persons under 50 years of age.¹ This conclusion is based on an examination of a time series of age-specific rates of first admissions to mental hospitals in Massachusetts, where facilities for the care of the mentally ill have long been relatively favourable. For the aged, an increase in mental disorders is reported, possibly due in part to a true increase in arteriosclerosis, and certainly due in major part to increased hospital facilities. The very limited facilities for the care of the mentally ill in the nineteenth century meant that patients had to have a relatively severe illness to be admitted.

The widespread belief that modern civilisation with its individuation, insecurity, competitiveness, lags, and *anomie* is responsible for an increase in the incidence of psychoses thus appears not substantiated by this evidence covering one century in an already advanced culture. This finding does not however preclude the possibility of a real increase in neuroses and psychoneuroses during the last century. Nor does it rule out the possibility of short-term changes in the rate of functional psychoses due to critical social changes like economic depressions and wars. The study, moreover, does not and could not demonstrate the relative ratio of confined cases to cases not confined in 1840 and 1940.

The parity of rates of functional psychoses in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries lends itself to various interpretations regarding causation. The data give some support to the theory of genetic and constitutional predispositions to mental disorders. The theory that functional psychoses arise from thwarting of basic human drives and traumas in early family experience is not invalidated, for the sources of such emotional disturbances may have remained more constant than the total social structure of adult life.

SOCIAL ORIENTATION TO DEVIATION

The rate of mental disorders, whether increasing or not, poses the serious problem of what can be done to ameliorate the situation. The attack on the problem is twofold, remedial and preventive.

THE REMEDIAL APPROACH

One approach is to have the individual who is suffering from a mental disorder treated by a psychiatrist, a physician, a man of religion,

¹ Herbert Goldhamer and Andrew W. Marshall, *Psychosis and Civilization: Two Studies in the Frequency of Mental Disease* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953).

a teacher, or a sympathetic companion, depending upon the nature of the disorder and the availability of aid.¹ The route of cure is to develop in the patient more and more insight into his difficulties. Psychologists generally frown on any attempt to solve the problem simply by changing the individual's environment. They say that unless the person's conflicts are solved, he will carry them into the new situation, and the problem will reappear. It is more helpful, therefore, to explore the patient's inner life until he gets some insight into his difficulty ; such insight is desirable regardless of what is done to change the individual's environment. To do this is much more difficult with psychotics than with neurotics.²

There is a way of solving an individual's conflict which does not involve an inner change at all. In certain cases satisfactory results are achieved simply by effecting a change in the individual's experience. The solution consists in putting the individual into a situation which is socially acceptable and which obviates the conflict. The new situation may be special in that it is unusual ; but it is not abnormal because it is socially approved. Dollard³ reports the case of a man who dreaded competition and who was maladjusted in our highly competitive society, but who found happiness when he entered a monastery.

The Public Attitude towards Mental Disorder often contains Negative Influences that hamper recovery. Unlike the general attitude towards physical disease, which is that those who become ill are unfortunate, the traditional attitude towards insanity in the United States and a number of other societies is one of shame, which causes the patient to feel "secondary guilt" and to blame himself for his illness, retarding his recovery. This sense of shame shows itself in the tendency to deny, if possible, the reality of the abnormal symptoms, in the effort to "normalise" the symptoms of mental disorder by providing reasons why a person might act in a markedly deviant manner without being mentally ill. This tendency towards normalisation and denial has been observed even in families faced with mental illness of a member.⁴

The Environment of Treatment is significant for recovery. The attitude of shame in certain cultures may be reflected also in the type of care the disordered person receives, for if there is shame, efforts are more likely to be made to isolate the patient, as in a mental hospital, than

¹ A study of tenement families in New York City found that these individuals go first to their friends in case of trouble, next to relatives, then to local druggist, then bartender, priest, labour leader, politician, clergyman, and policeman in this order. These are not, however, individuals with mental disorders. Earl L. Koos, *Families in Trouble* (New York : Kings Crown Press, 1946).

² The difference between a psychotic and a neurotic has been humorously stated as follows. A psychotic is one who believes that 2 plus 2 equals 5, whereas a neurotic knows 2 plus 2 equals 4, but worries about it.

³ John Dollard, *Criteria for the Life History* (New Haven, Conn. : Yale University Press, 1935), pp. 282-4.

⁴ John A. Clausen, "Social Science in the Mental Health Field", *Items* (Bulletin of the Social Science Research Council), vol. 9, no. 4, December, 1955.

if there is no feeling of shame. At least the Hutterites, to whom we have referred above as having below-average rates of mental and social deviation, do not feel that mental illness is disgraceful. They do not hospitalise their mentally sick members, except for brief periods for diagnosis and perhaps shock therapy, but care for them at home.

Recognising the importance of the environment of treatment, the sociology of the mental hospital has lately been accorded greater recognition by students of mental health.¹ Attention has been given both to the advantages of the mental hospital with its more protected environment and less taxing routine than is found in the outside community, and the disadvantages, like the isolation from normal family and community life. Greatly aggravating the problem is the acute shortage of professional personnel, estimated by one study to be one-third of the psychologists, one-half of the physicians, and four-fifths of the nurses needed in mental hospitals by minimal standards.²

Because of such factors as the rigid authority structure of the large mental hospital, the status differences between patients and staff and between categories of personnel, the non-therapeutic attitudes of most attendants and the disparity between formal and informal social structures,³ it is often difficult to develop in the mental hospital the sense of community or belonging which may have therapeutic effects. The importance of participation is suggested by a study which reports that the behaviour of a chronic schizophrenic patient became more organised when her participation with others was facilitated and more disorganised when she was excluded.⁴ Awareness of this problem has led to experiments which try to create in a hospital some of the usual identification with a community.⁵ The so-called "open-door" hospitals of England⁶ undertake to substitute for the customary "prison" atmosphere of fear, one of warmth and understanding. Close working relationships between the hospital and community are promoted by guided tours, "adoptions", and social events. Continuity of patient care along the entire length of the chain of psychiatric services is at the heart of the system. A further step towards the Hutterite model occurs when the mental hospital is abandoned and treatment is undertaken in a real, full-sized community organised for therapeutic purposes, as in the Amsterdam Municipal Health Services and other Dutch cities.

¹ Alfred H. Stanton and Morris S. Schwartz, *The Mental Hospital* (New York : Basic Books, Inc., 1954).

² George W. Albee, *Mental Health Manpower* (New York : Basic Books, 1959).

³ Ivan Belknap, *Human Problems of a State Mental Hospital* (New York : McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956).

⁴ Daniel P. Schwartz, "The Integrative Effect of Participation", *Psychiatry*, vol. 22, pp. 81-6, February, 1959.

⁵ Maxwell Jones and Associates, *The Therapeutic Community* (New York : Basic Books, Inc., 1953).

⁶ G. R. Metcalf, "The English Open Mental Hospital : Implications for American Psychiatric Services", *Miebank Quarterly*, vol. 39, pp. 579-93, October, 1961.

In general, social groups that are relatively secure favour cathartic strategies, whereas insecure groups favour control strategies in coping with mental disorders. Some societies provide institutionalised occasions for the mass expression of basic impulses, although the frequency and scope of these occasions may vary considerably. Such ceremonial occasions as the sexual orgies of certain preliterate peoples are regarded as serving a useful cathartic function in the release of accumulated tension. Groups that are relatively insecure are already confronted with threats to social order, hence are reluctant to assume the additional risk involved in cathartic expression. Such societies favour what they need, namely, better control. A secure group may also prefer control but be more tolerant of catharsis. The strategy of control stresses the exercise of will on the part of deviants. Reinforcement techniques include sermons, rallies, confession, indoctrination, and group therapy. To the psychiatrically sophisticated, these methods seem superficial but their advocates can point to successes, as in the control of drunkenness among the Iroquois on the part of those who joined Handsome Lake's Movement¹ and the contemporary success of Alcoholics Anonymous. It is reported that the newer "combat psychiatry", which consists of a day or two of rest, combined with verbal catharsis and reinforcement by suggestion of the individual's sense of responsibility, has proved more successful than the usual psychotherapy and psychoanalysis.²

THE PREVENTIVE APPROACH

While it is necessary to treat individuals who have mental disorders, there is increasing recognition of the fact that behind these disordered individuals are great cultural forces which help to induce the disorders. When there are so many persons with mental disorders in our society, we might achieve better results if we attacked the social situations responsible for mental disorders which, as we have seen, mainly cluster about (a) the methods of child-rearing and (b) the cultural conditions of adult life.

An environment conducive to mental health in early childhood involves two basic social orientations on the part of the young child. The one is the need of the child to feel secure in the group, a need which depends for its satisfaction primarily on the show of affection by members of his family. The other is the need of the group to feel secure about the child, which requires conformity on his part to the norms of the group.

The need for Love, with Understanding. The child's need for affection is sometimes obscured by excessive attention by parents to the

¹ Anthony F. C. Wallace, "The Institutionalization of Cathartic and Control Strategies in Iroquois Religious Psychotherapy", in Marvin Opler (ed.), *Culture and Mental Health* (New York: Macmillan, 1959).

² Anthony F. C. Wallace, *Culture and Personality* (New York: Random House, 1961).

techniques of child care. As recent researches suggest, more important than methods and times of infant feeding, toilet training, and the like is the quality of the interpersonal relationships between mother and child. Attention to techniques is probably more appropriate to the performance of impersonal tasks than to the cultivation of effective human relations. The crucial problem in the administration of affection is the proper dosage, avoiding too much or too little. Too much may lead to overprotection and sheltering, too rigid fixation on parent, and too much emotional stimulation. Too little induces insecurity or even a feeling of rejection, which may result in anti-social regression. The need for balance in love means that love is not enough,¹ but must be tempered with understanding of the child and by judicious discipline.

The child's impulses must be disciplined in the interests of social order, but this is not to be confused with the mere convenience of adults. If, instead, discipline is judged by its consequences to the personality of the child, then control which is moderate and even is generally to be preferred to discipline which swings from the extreme of severity to that of laxity. Discipline without understanding is tyrannical and often leads to rebelliousness, especially if one parent is lenient and the other severe.

Controlling the conditions of Adult Life that lead to Strain. To change the conditions of adult life that help to produce tensions is a big order. How, for instance, reduce war neuroses? The ideal is to eliminate war. But to expect to abolish war in the near future is probably less realistic than to rear our children to become warriors, which appears to be the course we are beginning to pursue. It does not seem possible, for reasons which will be detailed in Chapter XXVI, to reshape completely the social heritage; but it may be both possible and sufficient to deal with those segments of the culture that lead to strain. An example is the successful campaign against venereal disease which has reduced the rate of general paresis. With wartime prohibition, the rate of alcoholic psychoses began to decrease in 1918 and reached a low point in 1921, from which point it has risen to a new high. While our experience with legal prohibition was not such as to encourage further experimentation along this line, it does indicate the need for effective methods of controlling the consumption of alcohol.

Our views of Culture are correlated with our attitudes towards Deviants. It is instructive to observe that our attitude towards social deviants reflects the idea of culture that we hold.² If we view the existing culture as the best possible solution to our problems, or at least as

¹ Bruno Bettelheim, *Love Is Not Enough* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1950).

² Morris E. Opler, "Theories of Culture and the Deviant", in *An Educational Philosophy for Exceptional Children* (Proceedings of the Spring Conference on Education and the Exceptional Child of the Child Research Clinic of the Woods Schools, May, 1947), pp. 8-14.

the most practicable solution, then we may feel that the deviant is to blame for his maladjustment, and that he ought either to adjust himself to the existing order or be removed from the group. The deviant according to this viewpoint is a threat to the existing order which deserves to be preserved because it is the best possible social order. This is essentially the position taken by Sumner who viewed the folkways as the products of a struggle for survival among various possible solutions to life problems. The solutions that win out are held to be best adapted to the existing circumstances. Since circumstances vary from place to place, the folkways also vary. This view of culture naturally emphasises the necessity for conformity on the part of the individual, and perhaps explains Sumner's conservatism in matters economic and political.

But there are those who take a different view of culture. There may be, as Sumner held, a strain towards order and consistency in the folkways, but how are we to determine whether a given cultural trait represents "the best possible adjustment under the circumstances"? As a rule the tools and techniques of a people are developed as fully as the state of knowledge and the available natural resources permit. But can we say that the religion or the sex and family organisation of a people represents an equally satisfactory adjustment? The test is not as definite as in the case of technology. But if we find that the sex code of a culture is associated with strained marital relations between husbands and wives, as is true in many cultures, does this represent the best possible adjustment? Perhaps a repressive sex code, by diverting energy from sexual into economic channels, aids in the struggle for survival, in which case what would represent a favourable adjustment along one line would constitute an unfavourable adjustment along another. For one reason or another the adjustment in non-material culture is often not so conspicuously good as it is in technology.

If we follow not Sumner but Horney in the view that culture may be maladapted to the needs of man, then our attitude towards the deviant changes. We regard him as a victim of unreasonable and inconsistent demands, and our attitude is one of sympathy not censure. We are not so much disposed to cast him out of the group as to help him. Even more, in the interests of prevention, we recognise the need for social reform and social planning. If, as Horney indicates, anxiety is generated in individuals by an economic order that overplays competition, then mental health can be improved by setting brakes on competition, as in minimum wages, unemployment compensation, collective bargaining, and old age pensions. Whatever increases economic security, decreases emotional insecurity and promotes mental health. If, as is often charged, the modern factory gives the worker no sense of participating in a creative process but instead segmentalises and routinises his experience, then the problem is how

to reorganise the industrial process so as to make it satisfying to the worker. If the modern city with its accent on anonymity leaves many persons with a feeling of intense loneliness, then clubs and other organisations are needed which help to bring congenial strangers together and supply the intimacy and sense of belonging normally found in small groups. These examples—only a few out of many that might be cited—illustrate the point that much could be done to reduce the incidence of maladjustment in our society by setting our cultural house in order.¹ Mental hygiene is a cultural as well as a psychological problem. In Chapter XXVI detailed attention will be given to the problems involved in adjusting culture to man, as well as man to culture.

SUMMARY

The first two chapters of this section were devoted to considering separately the rôles of group interaction and culture in the development of normal personality. The present chapter is concerned with deviant types, that is, persons who characteristically and significantly deviate from the norms of the society. Social deviants represent failures in the process of socialisation, since they have not satisfactorily interiorised certain norms of the group.

The sociologist, while principally concerned with the group and cultural factors in personality, cannot ignore the constitutional and natural environmental factors, since all four factors are interrelated.

Where no organic basis is discernible, mental disorders are called functional. In the development of these functional mental stresses, there are two general factors.

The first is the predisposing cause that lies in the genes which are inherited. These genes unfold and develop into our biological traits with some assistance from environment during the period before full maturation. Thus the correlation of schizophrenia in identical twins is much greater than in non-identical ones.

The second general factor is environmental stress, mainly at two levels : (a) infancy and early childhood, and (b) adulthood or near-adulthood.

As to the influence of infancy and early childhood, the psychoanalysts, who have admittedly contributed much to psychiatry, so often trace the origins of neurosis back to early childhood that they are credited with saying the possibility of a neurosis is determined by the time one is five years old. The evidence for this bold assertion is, however, inadequate. These influences of early childhood are largely due to the group, generally the family, and the peer group whose influences have so much to do with affection and its frustration, with feelings of inferiority, the development of the ego, and the conception of self.

Later come the influences that bear upon the adult or near-adult. These are the emotional crises of life, the conflicts between wishes and standards, the frustrations imposed by moral codes, wartime discipline, competitive struggles, emotional shocks, etc. If a child has had a wise upbringing in infancy and childhood, he may withstand most or all crises of adult life without ill effect, although signs of strain are likely to appear in intense crises even among those with the most sturdy childhood.

¹ L. K. Frank, *Society as the Patient* (New Brunswick, N.J. : Rutgers University Press, 1948).

Both group and cultural stresses upon the individual vary in kind and intensity in different cultures, and are related to phenomena of the integration of society, and the adjustment of inherited nature to the group and culture.

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. Where does society draw the line between eccentricities that are tolerated and those that are not?
2. What is the difference between a cultural norm and a statistical norm?
3. How would you account for the relative absence of mental disorders among children under ten years of age?
4. Why is the study of personality disorganisation important to sociology as well as to psychology?
5. What aspects of college life, if any, are not conducive to good mental health? What aspects are favourable?
6. Why are studies of mental disorders among identical twins of special interest to sociologists? What do such studies show about hereditary and environmental factors?
7. Are mental disorders on the increase? What difficulties lie in the way of answering this question?
8. How is the environment of treatment important for recovery?
9. Write notes on :
 - (a) Social class and psychiatric disorders.
 - (b) The group approach in the treatment of mental disorders.
 - (c) The social structure of a mental hospital.
10. What are the social implications of the theory that different groups within a society may have differential access to the dominant goals?
11. What is the relationship of impaired mental health to social class?
12. How are mental illness and marital status related?
13. What is the relationship between mental health and community integration?

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PART V : HUMAN ECOLOGY AND POPULATION

A community may be thought of as the total organisation of social life within a limited area. Human social life is characteristically carried on in such communities. They are the loci of group activity, of institutional organisation, and of the development of human personality.

The present section considers this important factor of community from the standpoints of settlement and population. What determines the location of human communities, their size and their physical pattern? Chapter XII undertakes to answer these questions, tracing the changes in the nature of human communities attendant upon the growth of culture, and raising the interesting question of the adequacy of man's adjustment to his urban environment. Chapter XIII, "The Distribution of Population", considers the distribution of population at the present time by continents and races, together with the recent changes in these respects and the principal reasons therefor. The elements of size and composition of population are so important in their social consequences that Chapter XIV, "The Growth of Population", considers, in detail, the factors of migration, births, and deaths, by which populations change. The social significance of the declining birth rate and the changing composition of the population receive special attention.

CHAPTER XII

COMMUNITIES

There are all sorts of communities, and we may have our choice. There are thinly settled rural communities and densely packed cities. There are villages and satellite towns. They differ not only in size but also in other characteristics. Some are industrial communities, clustering around factories. Others are agricultural trading centres. There are college towns and pleasure resorts. Then there are the great metropolitan areas that seem to have everything—but quiet.

But linking all these many kinds of communities are the automobile and airplane, the telephone and radio, which encourage our interests far beyond the community confines and weaken the neighbourhood feeling.

COMMUNITY AND ECOLOGY

COMMUNITY

A Community is the total organised Social Life of a Locality. We cannot discuss satisfactorily how communities change or the different kinds of modern communities unless we know what a community is. A community is a group or a collection of groups that inhabits a locality. The residential tie to an area is one attribute that distinguishes a community from other groups. Another distinguishing feature of a community is the total organisation of social life in the area. Thus the British Sociological Society is a group, while Brighton, Sussex, is a community.

The origin of the word community goes back to a time when inhabited places were small, consisting of a very few families. Hence the group of families living at a place comprised the only group there. The term continued to be applied to places as they grew larger, as, for instance, towns and cities, which contained many different groups, one of which might be, for example, a school. The school would not be a community, even though it may be identified with a locality, for the schoolchildren do not live on the school grounds. If they do, and their needs are largely met there, as in the case of students at Oxford University, then the school can be called a community. Thus there may be communities within communities.

The term community has been applied to very large areas indeed. The United Nations comprise an international community. We even have the expression world community. Since the area in this case is the whole planet, the distinguishing emphasis is the communal nature of this world organisation. Communal implies common interest sufficient to commune or talk intimately together. For the nations

of the world to have common interests enough to talk about them in a friendly manner is a thought attractive to those who ardently wish the nations of the world to live together without war. Hence in a community of nations the emphasis is on harmony or common interests.

HUMAN ECOLOGY

Communities are of interest to sociologists because of their social life. The young men and women of a community marry and form families. Thus there is the study of family organisation which is a branch of sociology and may be studied without reference to any particular community. The inhabitants of a community also work to produce the goods they need or which they exchange through the medium of money for a variety of other goods. This is economic activity. The people of a community belong to religious organisations. In a local community there are public opinion, moral and immoral behaviour, learning from others, conflict and crime.

These kinds of organisation and these types of social behaviour suggest the usual chapter headings in sociology textbooks. In other words, the social life of a community represents in miniature the social life in general with which sociology deals. So in this chapter on communities we do not deal with family, religion, government, or with social control. These are dealt with in other chapters of the book. The approach here is from the point of view of ecology.

Ecology is the Study of Groups in relation to their Environment. Communities are groups inhabiting a locality, with a specific natural environment, of fertile lands or navigable waterways with varying degrees of precipitation and temperature. Hence communities are readily studied ecologically.

Ecology is a branch of biology and has been largely concerned with the habitats of the lower animals and plants. Some of these studies are very interesting, as, for instance, the building habits of the beaver, the hibernation of the cold-blooded reptiles, the sea-coast shell life that must adjust to the pounding surf, and the social organisation of the bees.

The human animal, the subject of human ecology, is less restricted by his physical environment. Communities of human beings have been found by explorers wherever they have ventured except in a few such places as the top of Mount Everest or among the queer fish at the bottom of the ocean. The reason man can live almost anywhere on the planet is the culture he possesses, which enables him to wear clothing, to construct houses, to build fires, and to spray with D.D.T.

However, natural environment does set limits to human habitations. Communities at the junction of river and sea are larger than those on the sides of mountains. The population of South America is most concentrated around the coastal rim of that continent. The

sizes and spatial distribution of communities are in part a function of natural environment ; and the size of communities and the spacing of the inhabitants therein have much to do with human happiness and welfare.

PRIMITIVE COMMUNITIES

Hunters and Food-gatherers live in small and unstable Communities. There are many different kinds of hunting. Some peoples hunt small game like rabbits with a throwing stick. Others kill birds with a blowgun. Bigger animals like the wild pig require more territory to roam. The caribou are found in large groups, as are the bison in grassland areas on the edges of forests. But they move great distances with the seasons.

Many peoples live less on animal food than on the products of plants such as berries, fruits, nuts, and roots.

The abundance of these sources of wild food varies, permitting larger or small aggregations of people in a region or large area. However, in no case are they sufficiently abundant to permit in any particular locality a large community. These communities vary in size usually from ten persons to three or four hundred. The size of a community depends not only on the supply of animals but also on the stage of technological development of such things as traps and hunting weapons.

A point of interest is how long a group of people will live in one locality. Sometimes the immediate locality of a community will be continued only a few years, if the area is depleted of animals or if the route of migrating herds changes. On the other hand, the route of migrating salmon does not change, and a community at a waterfall may be large and permanent. In cases of unstable localities the word community may not be applicable. Sometimes they are called a "band" of hunters and their families.

Pastoral Peoples often wander with their Flocks. Domesticated animals ensure a more continuous food supply than do wild ones. Hence a region where the inhabitants live largely on their herds is somewhat more populous than a region of hunters ; but their communities are still small, because a large territory is needed to graze the animals possessed by the community. If the land is semi-arid or far north or the food for animals is scarce, herds range far, and the families of the herders move about over considerable distances, as is the case with the Lapps, where a community may consist of one large family with relatives, shifting back and forth from a summer locality to a winter one.

Agriculture brings a more stable Community. The word community may have originated with the coming of agriculture. The cultivation of plants permitted a group to live a long time in one locality. Furthermore, a larger and more stable food supply meant larger communities.

Agriculture was first quite crude. Only a digging stick of wood was used to plant seeds or roots. Hence the area cultivated was small and generally not far removed from place of residence. There was also some hunting. The sizes of the early agricultural communities were measured in the hundreds of inhabitants per village.

The combination of domesticated plants and domesticated animals such as fowl, pigs, sheep, llama, goats, as well as cows, brought increased food and increased size of communities. In time the tools of agriculture were improved; and the plough, at first not much more than a wooden hoe dragged along, was added. The improved plough pulled with oxen meant more land cultivated and hence more food. The sizes of these communities were measured in the thousands.

With Agricultural Villages came division of Labour and more Social Organisation. The early farmer was a Jack-of-all-trades, and he and his family could do almost any task around the farm and household that needed to be done. But in time specialists developed in healing, in delivering babies, in basket-making, in weaving, in tooth-pulling, in barbering, in carpentry. Such services were exchanged for other services or for food, or there was reciprocation without monetary exchange. There also developed some specialisation in cultivated crops which led in turn to some exchange, although in general a farmer raised pretty much all that his family ate, and made much that they used.

And so communities grew into villages a long time ago with some special social organisation. Later they grew into towns and cities.

TOWNS AND CITIES

Larger Communities grew on Cross-roads and Waterways. Services and goods were exchanged not only within villages but between them. The exchange of goods such as baskets or cloth or grain or pottery enables a community to get its supplies from longer distances over a larger area and also to profit from specialisation of skills and crops. Such advantages could not have been realised without the development of technology such as making of pottery and pans, metal-working and weaving, as well as the plough and oxen. This combination of advantages expanded villages into towns and cities, with populations measured in tens of thousands.

Technology and trade account for towns and cities. Many of their inhabitants do not raise enough food to keep them alive. To get the food they must trade for it goods and services they produce with tools. The food is brought in from a distance. In the days of the earliest cities, the easiest method of travel was in boats, the next best method by pack animals. Hence towns and cities were located at crossroads and on waterways, usually in or near fertile lands, such as the valleys of the Nile, the Euphrates, the Yangtze, and the Indus. Favourable as these valleys were to the growth of cities, they were

inhabited for thousands of years before mechanical invention and social organisation reached a point where cities were possible.

How graphical and cultural factors combine to influence location is exemplified in the case of New York, which is the centre of a vast metropolitan region covering 7,000 square miles and extending over



FIG. 12.—Plan of Nippur

This is the oldest known map of a city (Nippur in Sumeria between the Tigris and Euphrates). Inscribed on a clay tablet now in the possession of the University of Pennsylvania, it shows several of the more important temples and buildings, its "Central Park", its rivers and canals, and its walls and gates. The three essentials for a city are manufacturing, trade, and a source of food. Fortresses, religious centres, and seats of government, all resembling cities, existed in early times without manufacturing and sometimes without trade. (Photograph from The University Museum of the University of Pennsylvania.)

22 counties in three states. Why is the region's economic activity located in New York rather than in Philadelphia? The answer¹ is said to be the Erie Canal and a harbour which has a sand bar that is less objectionable than the one at the mouth of the Delaware. New York took an early lead in foreign trade, marine insurance, finance and wholesaling. The concentration of shipping in New

¹ Raymond Vernon, *Metropolis 1985 (An Interpretation of the Findings of the New York Region Study)*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

York harbour brought waves of immigrants to that port, which in turn provided an adequate labour supply. Growth fostered further growth.

Not all cities were the result of trade and manufacture. The earliest cities were burial places, the hallowed ground of the ancestral dead.¹ Later cities were citadels, walled communities subject to the will of feudal kings. The Industrial Revolution brought the modern city, blackened by the smoke of the steam engine; blackened cities which we are even now trying to cleanse. The modern city is considered in some detail below. The pre-industrial cities, characteristically feudal, are said to have resembled one another closely and to have differed markedly from modern industrial cities.² The pre-industrial cities were smaller. They were centres of governmental and religious activity more than of commerce. They showed rigid class structures, with the élite residing in the centre of the city and the lower classes on the periphery. The economy was irrational, based on a primitive technology linked to inefficient marketing procedures, non-standardised prices, weights and measures. Management was in the hands of a bureaucracy based on privilege.

THE URBANISATION OF THE WORLD

MODERN CITIES

Technological advances in Transportation, in Manufacture, and on Farms made more Cities and more big ones. There have long been cities, even large ones, but they were few until relatively recent times. Probably several of the cities in ancient Greece had populations above 100,000 and some estimates put the population of Carthage at 700,000. Rome has been estimated to have had as many as 1,000,000 inhabitants at its height, though other estimates go as low as 250,000. But by the end of the eighth century, Rome's population was only 20,000, and Vienna had disappeared from historical records for several hundred years. There was thus no gradual, linear evolution of city size.

As boats evolved into ships, and paths into roads, and as the tools of hand manufactures proliferated and became more efficient, the bases were laid for larger communities. Cities could not have grown in size and multiplied in number, however, unless food could be supplied them. Such a supply was possible only through greater productivity per farm labourer, which in turn was possible through fertilisers, two or three crops per year, rotation of crops, better ploughs, stronger draught animals, and selected seeds. Before these

¹ Lewis Mumford, *The City in History* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961).

² Gideon Sjoberg, *The Preindustrial City: Past and Present* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960).

agricultural improvements, farmers could hardly produce enough food for their families. Afterwards they produced enough to feed the cities as well as themselves. The size of cities was also limited by the water supply, fire hazards, the disposal of sewage, and the contagion that comes from density.

Mechanical Power brought the Age of Cities. It was the steam engine that played a large part in multiplying cities, giving us for the first time an urban society, one in which eventually most people came to live in an urban environment or to behave like urbanites. The steam engine did this by putting steam locomotives on railroads and by applying steam power instead of muscle to tools, which became very large, requiring factories to house them. These uses called for the replacing of wood with steel and iron. Cities were no longer restricted to the seaboard, for railroads filled the interior with them.

Steam and steel not only multiplied cities, but they magnified them in size, so that their populations are measured in the millions.

An interesting question has to do with the conditions under which urbanisation grows. On the basis of data for 45 countries, it is reported¹ that the degree of urbanisation is significantly related to the division of labour, the level of technological development, and the dispersion of objects of consumption. The latter is measured by the dollar value of materials imported by a country from all other countries and the distance the materials are transported. The authors believe there is no particular set of values that is a sufficient condition for a high degree of urbanisation; whether the population professes socialism or capitalism, liberalism or conservatism, Buddhism or Free Methodism is said to make no great difference.

THE METROPOLITAN COMMUNITY

The internal combustion engine helped to usher in the Metropolitan Community. The size of a city is limited by its area. By placing houses and factories close together, a lot of people can be packed into a small area, especially if buildings can be made tall, which they can be with structural steel supplemented with vertical transportation—called elevators in the United States and lifts in England. But if the citizens get about largely by walking, the area of a city cannot be increased if there is only one trading and work centre; there must be several such centres somewhat separated, as is the case in some Oriental cities.

Larger areas are possible if improved local transport is substituted for walking. The electric street car was such an improvement; but the bus and the private automobile were a much greater improvement, as was the diesel-driven railroad train. With a larger area, the

¹ Jack P. Gibbs and Walter T. Martin, "Urbanization, Technology, and the Division of Labor: International Patterns", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 27, pp. 667-77, October, 1962.




Fig. 13.—Non-Resident Stepney Workers.

Compiled by London Region Research Division, M.O.T.G.P., from a sample of the Ministry of Labour Unemployment Index of Stepney Unemployment Returns, July 1948.

population of the locality increases. The population may become so large and the central city may exert such considerable influence on outlying areas that a new name is given to the locality : a metropolis.¹

The size of a City is determined not only by its Area and Population but also by its Political Organisation. A large community is not just an aggregation of people ; it is also a social organisation. The over-all formal control is centred in its government, which collects taxes from its citizens and gives them the right to elect officials. The city's political boundary line sets off its citizens from outsiders and enables one to determine who pays who taxes and who votes.

Many of the advantages of a large city, such as jobs or recreations or libraries, can be used by non-residents who by living outside are deprived of voting for the mayor and of paying high taxes. So citizens of a city move out to suburbs, where the air is fresher, and are taken to their place of work in a vehicle.

Since the coming of the automobile it is rather difficult to draw a political boundary line which will include the residences of all those who work in the metropolis, because some live very far out along highways and railroads. Many people live in one political community and work in another. The separation between place of work and place of residence is becoming greater, and thus the conception of community has changed. In the United States in 1954, 14 per cent of the labour force worked in a county different from the one in which they lived. In New York City 308,000 non-residents were employed in the city and 146,000 residents were employed outside the city, in 1960. The only one of the 30 cities in which the daily outflow exceeded the inflow was San Antonio.

Political Cities and Suburbs constitute an Economic City. The people who work in a city and live elsewhere are generally said to live in suburbs. Some of these suburbs have been picturesquely called bedroom cities or dormitory towns. If they were bedroom cities, they would be mere aggregations of sleepers like a hotel, rather than a community. Families, especially those with children, need the various social services which characterise the larger communities, particularly schools, churches, a library, a post office, stores, and places of amusement. Unemployed wives and children are dependent on local community life. Hence the families of commuters to big cities do not live in a line of dwellings along a highway but rather in near circular community areas with the social services near the centre. The configuration is like that of beads of various sizes strung at unequal distances along a string. Those communities close to the boundary line of the metropolis are nearly always called suburbs. They are sometimes close together. Those communities of which a substantial portion of the working population have jobs in the metropolis and

¹ The term conurbation may be used to describe the large urban areas formed by the coalescence of separate towns—such as Tyneside, or Greater London.

which are further away are sometimes called satellite towns. Their area is much smaller than that of a big central city. The inhabitants use both the car and the suburban train or bus to go to work in the city.

The central metropolis with its nearby suburbs and satellite towns plus scattered villages and hamlets and a few truck or dairy farms make up what is called a metropolitan area or conurbation, and in an economic sense they constitute a large city. Such an area might be called a city if it had a single government and one great boundary line, although the inhabitants would be scattered over a rather large territory.

In England and Wales, six conurbations are distinguished, which between them contain 17 million persons—nearly 40% of the total population.¹

	1955 (000's)
Greater London	8,290
West Midlands (Birmingham)	2,257
West Yorkshire (Leeds and Bradford)	1,682
South East Lancashire (Manchester)	2,411
Merseyside (Liverpool)	1,388
Tyneside (Newcastle)	840

In 1951, there were 158 towns with over 50,000 population compared with 168 (metropolitan areas) in the U.S.A. By 1955, 80 per cent of the population were living in urban areas in England and Wales.

If the boundary line of a metropolitan area included nearly all the people who worked in the central city, it would probably be somewhat circular and include a great territory. A more appropriate boundary would probably be somewhat like the outline of a starfish, for there are several highways and railroads going into the centre of the central city.

The Metropolitan Area is a Trading Area as well as a Working and Residential Area. Larger communities exist because they are market places, as truly as because they are places for the manufacture of goods. With the growth of population and of wealth, trade has increased. The steam engine and the internal combustion engine have brought many more traders from long distances. The citizen of the small community does not do all his trading in the community in which he lives. He will usually buy his groceries, drugs, soap, and the other articles which must be purchased frequently from local tradesmen; but for more expensive articles, purchased infrequently, such as an overcoat, a pair of skis, or a jewelled wristwatch, he is likely to go to a large city. Thus the place of trade, like the place of work, is moving for some articles further away from the place of

¹Carr-Saunders, *et al.*, *A Survey of Social Conditions in England and Wales* (1958), pp. 52-3.

residence. A person may live in one community, work in another, and do some trading in still another. Thus separation of places of residence, of work, and of trade has changed the concept of community.

COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS

Though there are large metropolitan communities, we also have very little communities, too—some not much larger than those of the hunting and food-gathering cultures. And there are communities of all sizes in between. Communities classified by size make a continuum sometimes loosely called the rural-urban continuum. Various points along this continuum to-day are labelled hamlets, villages, small towns, large towns, cities, big cities, metropolises. There are no common definitions of these communities in terms of number of residents. But life in a small village is quite different from that in a big city. Also life in a small village is different now from what it was in a small village 3,000 years ago.

A study of a small agricultural centre in upstate New York, focusing on how it functions within American society, reports that the central fact of local life has been its growing dependence on forces originating in the larger society, particularly its more urbanised segments.¹ With increasing dominance of urban patterns in the United States, and possibly also in highly industrialised societies generally, the distinction between urban and rural communities diminishes, although it is still important.² An analysis of a small Swedish town of 13,000 and its hinterland suggests the continued usefulness of the rural-urban variable. Among other differences, families in the hinterland showed greater adherence to traditional values, expressed stronger feelings of isolation, and adhered more strongly to religious attitudes and practices.³ These findings are the more significant because the levels of communication and literacy are high throughout Sweden which might be expected to encourage urban dominance.

CHARACTERISTICS ACCORDING TO SIZE

Our daily lives are affected by many other influences than the size of place we live in. Size of community is not everything. For instance, from a group of towns of exactly 5,000 inhabitants, one may be industrial with most of its working population employed in a textile factory; another may be an agricultural town, because it depends largely on trade with the surrounding farmers; another may be a college town; still another, a health resort. So also there are different types of

¹ Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society: Class, Power and Religion in a Rural Community* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958).

² Richard Dewey, "The Rural-Urban Continuum: Real but Relatively Unimportant", *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 66, pp. 60-6, July, 1960.

³ Harald Swednar, *Ecological Differentiation of Habits and Attitudes* (Lund Studies in Sociology, Lund, Sweden: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1960).

cities, a pleasure resort like Blackpool or a place where there are many retired elders, like Brighton. Then there is the home of a government like London. Some cities are mainly commercial, others are largely industrial. Very large cities usually cannot be classified by any one type of economic activity. For each has a high development of trade and many different kinds of industry, though the industry in New York City is generally light industry like the garment industry and in Chicago it is heavy industry like steel and metal-working.

Another factor which causes cities of the same size to be different is the culture of the regions in which cities are located. If there is a high degree of illiteracy in the region, illiteracy will be high in the city. So also if at one time a society has more highly developed religious activities than at a later age, this change will be reflected in the society's cities. A city takes on some of the characteristics that are common to the culture of the region at the time.

Cities differ, too, because of variations in one element of material culture, namely, transport, especially local transport. The streets of Bangkok are filled with rickshaws, bicycles, taxicabs, horsedrawn carts, as well as a few automobiles.

Large cities differ from one another less than small places. There is a good deal of similarity in the appearance of most American cities, with their bus lines, neon signs, advertisements, drugstores, cafeterias, suburbs, etc. In India, where the transport is less well developed, there are greater differences. Delhi is spacious, Patna lies along one street, Calcutta is a congested conglomeration, and Bombay is like a city of the West.¹

There are various factors causing communities of the same size to differ. That the urban factor, and size and complexity, are only two among a number of factors that differentiate communities has been reported by a factorial analysis of 88 county community systems which found that educational effort, welfare status, population influx, economic status, and class composition are additional independent factors.²

Urban and Rural Communities. For a long time, differences in communities according to size have been noted for just two kinds, rural and urban ; and the differences are usually exaggerated by a delineation into what is called ideal types, a term which seems to make exaggeration scientifically acceptable. Where shall we draw the line between rural and urban ? For the United States the line was drawn long ago by the U.S. Bureau of the Census at a population of 2,500, except for a few incorporated places of lesser population, and a few larger places that were not incorporated. In Iceland it is drawn

¹ W. F. Ogburn, *The Social Characteristics of Cities* (Chicago : International City Managers Association, 1937).

² Christen T. Jonassen, "Functional Unities in Eighty-eight Community Systems", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 26, pp. 399-407, June, 1961.

at 300, but in Holland only municipalities of over 20,000 inhabitants are called urban. For certain functional purposes, the figure of 20,000 would seem to be more realistic than the figure of 2,500 for the United States. At least, a study of 3,890 communities which in 1930 had 2,000 population or more found that the urban-rural break seemed to come at 25,000 population, if the test was availability of certain facilities such as speciality shops, social welfare agencies, and recreational facilities. Further marked differences in percentage of possible facilities occurred at 100,000 and 500,000 population.¹ In the United States farmers usually live on their farms, not in villages or hamlets. A similar practice exists in Norway, but in most areas of the world farmers live in villages from which they go out to cultivate the land. Where the size of farms varies from one acre to twenty, the villages are necessarily small. Our concern in this analysis is not so much with the life of the farming population scattered in isolated farms in the open country as in the more closely knit hamlets and villages.

An outstanding sociological characteristic that differentiates a little community and a large one is the extent of the acquaintances of an inhabitant among the other residents, and particularly an acquaintance that brings frequent contact. In a very small place each person knows every other person. In a mining town of 1,500 inhabitants in the United States it was found that an average person had a speaking acquaintance with about one-fourth of the people in the town, and knew by sight, name, or reputation about nine-tenths of the adults.² In Chicago an inhabitant may spend a whole day on State Street and never see a person he knows, though he may see tens of thousands of people.

From frequent face-to-face contacts among the members of a little community there flow several results. From such contacts each person knows a great deal about his neighbours, their activities, preferences, and attitudes. If the citizens do not read or travel very much, then much of their interest is in the activities of their fellow citizens, which become a subject of conversation. Hence there is gossip, to which we are sensitive, since our conception of our self comes from the opinion of others. Gossip, like slander, may be serious. Since gossip is feared, it acts like the police and is better than the police in forcing conformity. Since the inhabitants are continuously "sizing up" everyone else, status or "standing" in the community is important and well known. One knows those with whom one does business, and written contracts are less important than a word of honour. If a youth marries in a little community,

¹ Fenton Keys, "The Correlation of Social Phenomena with City Size", *Social Forces*, vol. 86, pp. 311-15, May, 1958.

² Albert Blumenthal, *Small Town Stuff* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1932), p. 124.

he does not marry a stranger. Written life histories are not required in employment. Crime involving property is rare, although crimes against the person may be more common. Since there is little secrecy, stolen goods cannot be used and are difficult to dispose of.

Little communities of the twentieth century do not show these traits as strongly as did the more isolated communities of several centuries ago. Contacts with the world outside the little community through the post office, the bus, the private automobile, the telephone, radio, television, motion picture, and the importation of goods for sale bring outside interests and lessen the preoccupation with local affairs.

In a little Community there are not many Social Organisations. Such a community is too small to support a missionary society, a Y.W.C.A., or a Rotary Club. The few organisations most frequently found in a small community are the family and some religious organisation. These two organisations perform many functions other than procreation, child-rearing, and worship that in a large community would be found in single special purpose organisations such as a factory or a sports club. Hence the family and the religious organisation become powerful and influential. In more recent times small communities have one or more stores, a petrol pump, and a school. There may be informal groupings for a particular time and a special purpose. Thus there may be an occasional dance with one or more local musicians furnishing the music. Women may find sociability in doing work such as washing clothing together. For these functions there is no formal organisation with a president and secretary.

Of special interest is the absence of organisation for help in case of misfortune or distress. There may be leaders but in many communities no organised government. There are no old age pension commissions. The task of aid and protection may be largely assumed by the family, or in part by a religious organisation. Since there is much hardship in life, family and kin are very important. Punishment and the function of courts is a task of the family. Into what family a youth marries is of great concern.

When there is not much money circulating in a small community, there is not a great deal of barter of goods either, for it is a cumbersome process of exchange. Under conditions of slow barter and little money, there is likely to be a good deal of borrowing, especially between families that are kin to each other. If there is no rule of community exogamy (the rule that one must go outside the community for a marriage partner), there will be few families in a community that are not kin to other families. Borrowing may become a community trait. It is the same with services. There is much mutual aid. If a house is to be painted, a feast given, a body to be buried, a sickness nursed, neighbours come in to help, especially relatives. There is under this system reciprocation of an undesigned nature at some undefined

time in the future, say, at harvest time, or at the birth of a child. Gifts are a means of exchange ; and giving gifts may be frequent, even if the gifts be small.

This system of mutual aid extends beyond crises to minor events, so that in the small community there is an atmosphere of kindness not so often evident in the monetary economy of the cities where dealings are with strangers.

Since there is very little organised recreation in a small community, there is likely to be a good deal of visiting, several times daily, especially between relatives. These are called "open families", since the door is open for children and adults to come and go.

The reaction of a Community to Property. In tribal society there is little property in the community. In such a society, reputation rather than possessions becomes most desired. But with cultivation by the plough, with domesticated animals, and with some trade, property enters into the value system of the community. Ownership of property may enhance reputation, or it may permit the person, without injury to his status, to commit acts which would injure a person with lesser property. With property there is an additional leverage for power.

The property holdings of one person will be larger than those of another, since individuals differ in thrift, judgment, persistence in work, etc. A unique type of property is land, as the single-taxers have emphasised, in that it is limited, cannot be created, so that if one person acquires much, another person may be without any. Since land cannot be stolen, except by war or violence, and does not run away, it is readily passed on by inheritance. Landed wealth may continue in the same family for many generations.

So when little agricultural communities become large, there is unequal distribution of property and the beginnings of a class system. Hence communities have their powerful families. Such families, having the security of property, can afford to quarrel over boundaries, herds, transgressions, indignities, and personal differences. The atmosphere of kindness is rent by factionalism and feuds, often between big families. But in large communities of several thousands, outlets for rivalries may be found in religious organisations and in games.

In a small community every person occupies a rank recognised by all. Property enters into the ranking process. Also occupations get ranked. Landowners, the clergy, and the military are ranked high. Families try to acquire or maintain a high status by holding members and relatives up to some standard. Hence a relative, a son, or even a daughter may be banished from a family because of some ignoble deed. Standards are maintained by belittling those with inferior standards. Consequently communities have prestige and discrimination. These are factors in the process of maintaining standards in any organisation, as well as the family.

A large Community means life among Strangers. Living among people who do not know you personally and are not interested in you or your conduct means a freedom unattained when living under the watchful eyes of acquaintances and friends. Though one lives in a community of 100,000, the circle of friends is limited, except among professionals such as politicians running for office. The average person to-day probably receives from 25 to 150 Christmas cards, though a candidate for the vice-presidency may send out 10,000. Announcements of weddings are sent to a limited number. The limited number of recipients of such greetings may live in different communities and in different parts of a large city. They are likely to be, though, in the same economic class and ethnic group.

In a city, or in a county with a mobile population composed of farmers, villagers, and urbanites, kinfolk may not all be in the same economic class. They may differ in tastes and educational attainments. Furthermore, where people move a good deal, the kin become separated. On the other hand, living in a large community there are many opportunities to make friends outside one's kin, as among fellow workers, at church, as members of clubs and associations, among tradespeople. The dwellings of these acquaintances may be widely separated. Contacts with them may be made by telephone, bus, or private automobile. Thus a neighbourhood in a city has much less influence than in a little community. A neighbour is one who lives nearby; and in some big cities the interaction of a resident with his neighbours is frequent, and with persons outside the neighbourhood infrequent. Such a neighbourhood is like a little community within a big city. These folk societies within a city achieve their compactness and isolation often because of different language, race, or ethnic characteristics, and sometimes occupational features and income.

It is not size of the city alone that is turning a neighbourhood into a mere collection of families with little interaction, for one could conceive of a city with a large population made up of hundreds and thousands of neighbourhoods with interacting families. The disintegration of the neighbourhood is due to transportation, which separates the residence far from the place of work, the market place, and places of recreation. The communication inventions make for contacts much wider than those of a little neighbourhood.

Large communities of strangers bring then the freedom of privacy, more freedom to act independently of the opinion of others, and some freedom from the obligatory ties of kinship; but they also bring possibilities of isolation for the timid and the introverts.

Large Communities make possible a multiplicity of Social Organisations, with the consequent advantages of Specialisation. The variety of organisations in a city is very great. For instance, there are many different kinds of educational institutions. There are probably a thousand or

more types of recreational organisations, including those commercial establishments which offer recreation for sale. Many are organised around hobbies, such as stamp-collecting or camera clubs. The classified telephone directory of Chicago lists 1,050 different associations, 448 different clubs, and 217 different social service organisations. These great numbers of special purpose social organisations in cities reduce the social functions of the family and church as seen in little communities, but they add many new group activities.

Of special importance are the economic organisations developed since the advent of railroads and factories. Before the Industrial Revolution and the invention of the steam engine, the manufacturing units of industry were small. Many were located in the family households. The corporation had not become common. Large industry was obtained by the partnership of heads of families.

But with large factories, stores, and office buildings, members of families were dispersed in their work. The family in cities in the age of factories and corporation was no longer a centre of production, and its power dwindled. Corporations that owned factories and commercial establishments became the great centres of power. An idea of the number and variety of economic organisations in a large city may be had by looking at the business directory. The classified telephone directory of Chicago has over 2,000 large pages. This fact is not surprising, since people live in cities because there they can get good jobs in manufacturing and trade.

The many and varied organisations in a city bring the advantages of specialisation and of organised teamwork. These advantages are absent in the little community, where the community as a whole and the family are "Jacks-of-all-trades"; it is through these two organisations—the community and the family—that nearly everything is done. Functions of community and family drift away in the city to specialised one-purpose organisations, and new functions are added. Hospitals, with their ever-improving techniques, heal better than families can; schools are likewise superior to homes in the exercise of the educational function.

The residents of a city become affiliated with a variety of organisations, though any one person is not likely to join a very great number. Members of a single family frequently belong to different organisations, for different organisations exist for men, women, boys, and girls. Since these various organisations have different customs and procedures—a boys' gang differs in attitudes from a ladies' sewing circle—there is opportunity for confusion and lack of understanding. Some homogeneity is attained, however, in a heterogeneous city because of income, class, and ethnic stratification. There is a "consciousness of kind" that acts as a magnet in drawing together people of the same background and interests in neighbourhoods, recreations, clubs and churches.

The Density of Population in large Communities requires more Regulation and Services. When families live close together in large numbers, the disposal of garbage and refuse cannot be left to voluntary action. Some would dump their garbage in the alley, an empty plot, or in the street.

The government of a city acquires many functions, some of which are community housekeeping duties. Not all of these duties are prohibitive or regulatory. Some are of the nature of services: providing free schools, erecting houses, providing hospital service, keeping the streets clean and repaired. Density of a population in a community means much government, which, of course, must be paid for.

In general, the bigger cities have the more crowded conditions. The island of Manhattan in New York City with a population of 1,698,000 has 76,150 persons per square mile or a plot of ground 41 yards square per person. Even smaller would be the residential area per person, for in the total area are included the area of parks, streets, and land covered by public and business buildings.

Large Cities differ from the average City in other characteristics than Density. Large populations attract certain types of activities that depend upon large numbers; New York City is important politically, for example, partly because of its very large number of votes. Also large numbers make a large market; hence wholesale houses and distributing agencies are found in metropolises. Expositions and world fairs are generally held in large communities. The best newspapers are generally in big cities.

The average income is greater in the larger places. Thus the median income of males in 1949 in the United States in urbanised areas of 3,000,000 or more population was \$3,078, and in urbanised areas of less than 250,000 and more than 50,000 it was \$2,692. In places of 10,000 to 25,000 it was \$2,484, and for communities of 1,800 to 2,500, it was only \$2,268.

Also the range of income is greater in the large cities. Thus there are more millionaires than in small places. This is not simply because there are more people in large cities; in 1949, in American cities of more than 3,000,000 people, 6.5 per cent of the population had annual incomes of over \$6,000, whereas in communities with populations ranging from 2,500 to 10,000, the corresponding percentage was only 3.4.

COMMUNITY PATTERNS

As communities grow larger and more stable, a variety of patterns appear. Two may be mentioned. One is the grouping of a community around a castle, fortress, or stockade. The castle of the Middle Ages was on a hill with space for food and water storage, for horses, living space for families seeking refuge, an arrangement for manœuvring of soldiers. The ordinary dwellings were placed close to the castle.

together in the same locality. Particularly do they like to have their children associate in school and on the playgrounds with other children of similar tastes with whom they may later wish to do business or intermarry.

Segregation of residences is affected by other factors than income. Ethnic bonds draw people together. Thus there are Polish areas, Bohemian communities, and Italian neighbourhoods. In addition to language, other ties are food habits, social customs and traditions. Races also tend to live together, as in "Chinatown" or in Negro quarters of the city. But even inside ethnic and racial residential areas there is some segregation on the basis of income.

Research in a central area of a modern metropolis¹ indicates that residents perceive their city as composed of named and bounded areas with ethnic and class connotations. These residential areas are viewed as having status-ascriptive functions or differential prestige value, a matter of no small significance in urban social relations. Such areas as Beacon Hill and the West End in Boston, the former being identified as white collar, North European and Protestant, the latter as working-class.

Residential segregation by occupation was more evident when local transportation was poorly developed. Factory workers lived near factories. Workers in the stockyards of Chicago lived near by, "back of the yards". But when streets become congested, there are still advantages in living near one's place of work.

ECONOMIC PATTERNS

Cities are built around manufacturing and mercantile establishments. People live in cities not necessarily because they like them as places of residence but because they can get jobs there.

The jobs in cities come from making objects or rendering services for sale or by selling goods for more than was paid for them. The sale of these goods and services is both to insiders and outsiders. These outsiders may be nearby farmers or villagers, or they may come from afar. Such is the primary economic activity of a city. Citizens engaged in these primary economic activities need to be serviced by others, such as lawyers, dentists, barbers, carpenters, merchants, restaurateurs, repairers, and hundreds of others. Particularly essential are vehicles for transporting goods into and out of the city, and, especially if the city is large, within the city as well.

There are exceptions to this arrangement of the economic activities of a community. A peasant village may sell very little to outsiders. The farmers living in the village raise enough food close by, and the exchange of village manufacture is almost solely within the village. Some cities to-day, such as Washington, D.C., or Atlantic City, have

¹ H. Laurence Ross, "The Local Community: A Survey Approach", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 27, pp. 75-84, February, 1962.

a negligible amount of manufactured products sold outside. In some, money may be brought into the community by mining or by a college or some governmental activity. In Europe many large cities grew up around the palaces of royalty, governmental buildings, and ecclesiastical structures. To these capitals there came trade and some manufacture.

In the cities of the United States, somewhere between one-fifth and one-fourth of the working population are engaged in trade. The percentage engaged in manufacture varies more, usually from 25 to 50 per cent, though it may go as high as 65 per cent and as low as 10 per cent. Trade and manufacturing, then, usually occupy from 55 to 65 per cent of the labour force. Transportation and communication workers constitute less than 10 per cent of the labour force, particularly in the towns. Construction workers comprise around 5 per cent. The small cities and towns have more variations in industrial employment.

City Patterns. Trade in a city is of two kinds, that for family consumption or individual buyers and the trade between industries for parts and materials.

For the first kind of trade, American cities have a downtown shopping centre where nearly all types of goods and services are sold. In very large cities there are several subcentres, but none nearly so large as the city centre. Then scattered throughout the city are many local markets selling groceries and articles frequently bought. In the centre are the offices of wholesalers and also the administrative and executive offices of manufacturers whose plants are located elsewhere. Other salesmen, such as insurance agents and physicians, have locations in the central shopping area.

The second kind of trading, that which takes place between manufacturers, consists in the purchasing of parts and materials of which there are thousands of kinds. The sales places for most of this material are seldom in the central downtown shopping area.

The industrial areas of a city are near to railroad, which may run to some terminals close to the centre of cities. Along these railroad tracks manufacturing plants may be strung. But there is an advantage in having manufacturing plants in the same area. There may be several such areas in a city some distance from the city centre and the residential districts. These industrial areas are also on or near through highways, since large amounts of freight are transported by truck.

Railroads and highways come into a city as radials like the spokes of a wheel pointing to the hub. Within the city these highways are often lined with stores and shops. Outside the city they are the location of villages and towns. The most important of these radial highways are being converted into expressways which carry traffic to the centre of the city without cross streets or stoplights.

Neighbourhoods with children tend to be constructed on side streets along which pass few cars except family automobiles and milk and delivery wagons.

Commercial airports are located on the outskirts of a city several miles from the city centre, but smaller airports may be closer in. Certainly heliports will be in the heart of the city, perhaps on the tops of buildings.

There are exceptions to the foregoing outline of the location of stores, offices, factories, transportation terminals and routes. Such exceptions are found in older cities of Europe and the Orient which were built before there were railroads. Markets and handicraft manufacture were more scattered. To a certain extent the scattering is true of Los Angeles, built since the automobile and before the development of express highways. Once the pattern of a city is laid out, it is difficult to change. However, new technological developments, especially the automobile, are forcing changes.

CHANGING PATTERNS

Factories are being built outside Cities, and Shopping Centres are arising at the periphery. Trading and manufacturing are increasing faster in the outskirts of metropolises and metropolitan areas than within the centre. But factories and stores are not being abandoned or sold within the centre of the city and few are moving to the suburbs.

The factories which are springing up in suburbs and satellite towns are more likely to be new concerns than ones which have moved there from the central city. But there are also many new factories being located within cities. It is costly for a company to move a factory. It cannot always sell profitably, and the new factory costs a good deal of money. In fact, there is a certain permanence about buildings. This resistance to change is so great that buildings must actually be demolished to make way for change.

The development of branches of big and famous department stores near the wealthy suburbs and the building of supermarkets near the boundaries of cities are due to the fact that these outlying areas are increasing in population faster than the areas within the city boundaries. There are new and growing markets to be captured there. Cities, even when they are young, grow faster at the periphery than at the centre.

The increasing population at the periphery of small cities can trade in the central shopping area, but this becomes more difficult when the city grows and covers a greater area and has a larger population. Increase in population means greater use of the streets leading into the central shopping district. Typically, these streets are laid out before the cities become populous. In an old city the streets are sometimes very narrow indeed, as in the old sections of Paris and in many European and Asiatic cities. The population increases quicker

than the streets can be widened. So difficult is it to widen streets in many metropolises that subways are more easily constructed.

Automobiles have increased the congestion, since there were 16 cars of all kinds for every 10 families in the United States in 1962. Street congestion is an important factor in the development of supermarkets and the location of department stores in sections where streets are less crowded and where free parking space is readily available. Restaurants and motion picture theatres are also moving into more open areas. Factories, too, need parking places, and also a fast approach, since factory employees now own automobiles.

City families move to the Suburbs, but others move into the City. The attractions of space, quiet, sunlight, playgrounds, lawns and gardens have always existed, but in the past they have not been readily available for families whose heads and members work in the city. To-day they have been made available in a large way by the addition of the family car to the suburban railway.

The rapid growth of the suburban population is indicated by the rate of increase of population of the central city as compared with that of the outer ring surrounding the city. The increase was 48.6 per cent from 1950 to 1960 for the ring, as compared with 10.7 per cent for the central cities of 125 American standard metropolitan areas of 1960.¹ (During the same period, the population of the United States as a whole increased 18.5 per cent.)

Suburbia. The shift to the suburbs is one of the major changes in the distribution of population in the United States in recent decades. The growth is masked by municipal annexations.² If we consider the nation as a whole, the unadjusted data show that the rings outside the central cities grew about 4.5 times as fast as the cities and captured about 75 per cent of the increase in population in the metropolitan areas between 1950 and 1960. But when adjusted for annexations by the central cities, the data show that the rings grew over 40 times as fast as the cities and the suburban rings captured almost 97 per cent of the metropolitan increase. Many people live in the suburbs and work in the city but a study of the New York metropolitan area finds that more and more people both live and work in the outer counties of the region and signs indicate the thinning out process will continue.³

The appeal of the countryside is often reflected in the place names, which show a fondness for trees (Streamwood, Elmwood, Lakewood, Kirkwood), the rolling country (Cedar Hill, Cockrell Hill, Forest Hills), and the primeval timberlands (Forest Grove, Park Forest, Oak Park, Deer Park). But there are also venerable names, such

¹ U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population: Summary, XXXIX*, 1960.

² Leo F. Schnore, "Municipal Annexations and the Growth of Metropolitan Suburbs", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 67, pp. 406-17, January, 1962.

³ New York Metropolitan Region Study, *Anatomy of a Metropolis* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959).

as Salem, Greenwich, Chester, Berkeley, Evanston, Sewickley and Rye.¹

One of the salient characteristics of many suburbs is the relative homogeneity of the population as to age and income. The 1960 census revealed numerous examples of communities where 70 per cent or more of the adult population has a range in age of only ten or twelve years. In some communities, especially those with new housing developments and small split-level homes, the adults are almost entirely in the young-married category, with ages ranging from 28 to 40. The children are almost entirely in the playschool, kindergarten and lower grades. Scarce are sub-teenagers and teenagers, and scarcer still, older people. The explanation, in part, is that in our society—with its numerous housing developments and high rate of physical mobility—as a young family increases its income, it moves to a new community where the neighbours have roughly the same income and are a bit older. The children play indiscriminately in a community backyard behind a dozen houses, and in the houses as well. As the parents grow older, many find the play of the young children of other parents a bit strenuous, and move to another type of community. In the end, the process finds many parents living apart from their married children and their grandchildren.

Most suburbs are middle-class but not all. The increase in incomes of some blue-collar workers in recent years and the mobility provided by modern transportation make possible working-class suburbs, which are less transient and less status-thriving than those of the organisation men.²

Theories of Patterns of Urban Growth. There have been various attempts to develop generalisations about the process of the growth of a city outward. One process is outward expansion in concentric circles, another is growth along radial lines, and a third is the addition of segments or blocks to population in various places where there is vacant land, sometimes called multiple nuclei. American cities have both radial lines and concentric circles, though these are somewhat idealised descriptions. The radial development is very noticeable in the metropolitan areas, as is the growth by multiple nuclei, that is, by satellite towns and villages. European cities seem to grow more by multiple nuclei than American cities (Fig. 15).

The concentric and sector theories of the internal structure of cities have been put to an empirical test, using the structural dimensions suggested by Shevky and Bell. These researchers have developed three indices of urban neighbourhoods which appear to summarise much of the available census data for census tracts. These indexes,

¹ *Time*, June 20, 1960, p. 14.

² Bennett M. Berger, *Working-Class Suburb: A Study of Auto Workers in Suburbia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960).

which relate to urbanisation, social rank and segregation, show a rather stable structure from one city to another in the United States.¹ Urbanisation is measured by the percentage of multi-family dwellings,




FIG. 15.—Structure of Cities : Three Theories.

Sociologists want to know the patterns of growth of cities, because knowledge of such patterns can help in city planning. The three theories of the way cities grow as shown in the accompanying designs are really three different processes, although the development of many cities represents a composite of these three processes. Perhaps buses and nonstop through streets favour development into sectors. Cities built before mechanised transportation were somewhat more likely to develop multiple nuclei. (From R. B. Mitchell, ed., "Building the Future City", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, November, 1945, in W. S. and E. S. Woytinsky, *World Population and Production*, p. 132.)

the per cent of females in the labour force, and the fertility ratio. Social rank, based on occupation and education, reveals the prestige value of a neighbourhood. These two indices were studied in the residential areas of four cities, selected because they had a roughly

¹ Maurice D. Van Arsdol, Jr., Santo F. Camilleri and Calvin F. Schmid, "The Generality of Urban Social Areas", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 23, pp. 277-84, June, 1958.

circular total shape and because the population was between 200,000 and 500,000. The results indicate that the concentric zone hypothesis is essentially supported with respect to urbanisation but not with respect to social rank, whereas the sector hypothesis is supported with respect to social rank but not with respect to urbanisation.¹ The assumption that suburbanites have higher socio-economic status than those in the central sections of the city is not supported by this study, except for Indianapolis, the biggest of the four cities.

Neighbourhoods are changing in the City. The shifts in population tend to redistribute the segregated groups who make up a city's population. The changes in the neighbourhoods near to the central business district have brought many social problems. Part of this area in the nineteenth century contained homes of the wealthier citizens. As these wealthier families moved outward, what happened to their large fine dwellings? Since a single family could not afford to live in one, they became apartments and rooming houses largely for men, or the larger houses were occupied by several families, with sometimes more than one person per room. Some were rented out for small businesses, such as restaurants, repair shops, or for associations or clubs. Some houses are torn down to make room for a filling station or a small store. A business area makes contact with a residential neighbourhood which was at one time occupied by the wealthy. There are also often warehouses, junk yards, railroad shops, and light manufacturing establishments in this interstitial area. These contacts seem quite commonly to lead to a deterioration of a neighbourhood. Into this slum drift homeless men, and here is a high rate of juvenile delinquency. Here also come unusually large numbers of alcoholics; and commitments of the insane are greatest from this "blighted" section of the city.

Neighbourhoods change also because of new immigrants, such as Mexicans or Negroes. New homes are not provided in advance for these in-migrants with low incomes. Instead they get cheap accommodations by crowding several families in a small space where they pay a rent which is high enough per room to make it profitable to the owners. They come in kinship groups or from the same village, and speaking the same language, cluster in the same neighbourhoods. As they come into the neighbourhood, the former residents move out. And so a section once occupied by, say, the Italians becomes inhabited by Puerto Ricans.

The neighbourhoods occupied by foreign-born immigrants in American cities may change quickly, particularly if immigration is restricted. These immigrants and their offspring prosper and move to better neighbourhoods, making room for new immigrants. This process is called "succession". Deterioration is hastened by the wear

¹ Theodore R. Anderson and Janice A. Egeland, "Spatial Aspects of Social Area Analysis", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 26, pp. 392-8, June, 1961.

and tear on houses and the unwillingness of a *laissez-faire* property system to keep the homes in adequate repair. Very large areas of a city may thus become deteriorated and a shame to civic pride. This process of succession affects property values, the nature of churches, the types of attendance at schools, the kinds of customers at stores, and indeed many of the values that families hold important.

Transportation is an important factor in changing Urban Patterns. Inventions of local transportation are changing the pattern of cities and particularly of metropolitan areas. As factories are built in the outskirts of cities not too far from the labour supply, industrial suburbs arise. These tend to be in the same general area, as, for instance, south of the city.

The effect of the location of a large commercial airport is to discourage the building of residences near by because of the noise. The use of commercial helicopters will probably have some effect of increasing the scattering of suburbs further. With highways and helicopters families can live farther apart ; but the costs of electric wiring, sewerage, pipes, and paving are still pressures to make families in the outer ring of the metropolitan area live close together.

ADJUSTMENT AND COMMUNITY LIFE

Human beings have lived for many millennia in small, face-to-face groups, and for five or ten thousand years such groups have settled in particular localities. So long an experience of living in a little community implies a measure of adjustment to this type of community. The ancestors of man lived in trees without a roof, then they lived in caves or within the shelter of a lean-to. But only for the last two centuries has a part of humankind lived in cities in buildings with temperatures controlled.

THE CAVE MAN IN THE MODERN CITY

Survival. When Charles Darwin wrote of adaptation to environment, survival was the test. If we apply this test to cities, city dwellers seem well adapted to their new environment, since the populations of cities are increasing rapidly in numbers. Furthermore, they live a long time. The average expectation of life in the United States in 1949-50 in cities of over 100,000 was 62 years. If, however, we compare this measure of adaptation of urban populations with rural populations, the adaptation is better in rural areas, for the expectation of life there is 64 years. The death rate is lower in rural areas despite the fact that rural counties spend very little money on public health, while the cities spend much ; and in cities the facilities for preserving life, such as hospitals and the presence of medical specialists, are many and excellent.

The differences in the death rates of rural and urban areas are not very great, and the postponement of death through science and

public administration proceeds. The urban environment may become even more favourable in the future.

Mental Disorders. Survival is not the only test of adjustment. A person who is sick is not well adjusted. We do not have comparative statistics for cities and farms on morbidity. But in general where there are high death rates there are high sickness rates. So it can thus be inferred that sickness rates are probably higher in cities.

One type of sickness that indicates a psychological maladjustment is psychosis. There are more admissions to hospitals for mental disorders per 10,000 population from the cities of the United States than from rural areas. This fact may not mean that the urban environment causes more of this type of maladjustment than does the rural. For these statistics are for first admissions to hospitals and not statistics for all those who develop psychoses. Some psychotics are cared for by the family at home. There may be more of such care on farms than in city homes.

Also, it is argued, a greater incidence rate of mental disorders in cities would not prove that the urban environment is more conducive to mental illness. It is possible that those who go to the city to live (and modern cities grow through migration as well as by births) are of an unstable type more likely to become mentally ill, anywhere. This argument seems to rest somewhat on the assumption that psychoses are inherited. Though there is probably some hereditary factor, as is discussed in Chapter XI, there is also a large factor of experience. We do not know that those who leave farms and villages to live in cities are any more unhealthy or have any worse heredity than those who remain in small communities. The rejection rate for mental disorders of boys for military service in 1918-19 were not very different for urban and rural areas, except for the large cities, where they were higher. A careful review of the evidence leads to the conclusion that urban living *per se* is not more conducive to mental illness than rural living. Apparently the type of city and especially the degree of social integration it manifests are more important for the prevalence of mental disorder than the fact that a community is a city.¹

Crime. Criminals are not adapted to the laws of the community in which the crime is committed ; but it is not certain that they are maladjusted for biological reasons. The criminal population may not be biological deviants. If they differ from the general population at all, it is probable that these differences lie in the direction of lower intelligence quotients, more personality difficulties, and lower incomes. Certainly much criminal behaviour is a function of the regulations imposed.

¹ Eleanor Leacock, "Three Social Variables and the Occurrence of Mental Disorder", in *Explorations in Social Psychiatry*, edited by Alexander H. Leighton, John A. Clausen and Robert H. Wilson (New York : Basic Books, Inc., 1957).

TABLE 7

INDEX OF CRIME, UNITED STATES, 1960

	S.M.S.A.	Other Cities.	Rural.
Murder and non-negligent manslaughter . . .	4.9	3.8	6.4
Rape	10.3	4.0	6.8
Robbery	70.7	14.9	11.9
Aggravated assault . .	88.7	49.0	42.2
Burglary	568.9	360.0	210.9
Larceny (\$50 and over) .	340.8	185.8	102.8
Auto theft	243.7	111.3	42.1

* B.B.I., Department of Justice, *Uniform Crime Reports*, 1960, p. 33.

There are fewer regulations in rural areas than in cities ; and there are probably lower crime rates in rural areas than in cities in the Western world, though such may not be the case in India or in Afghanistan, or may not have been true of medieval Europe, with its unpoliced highways. In the United States, crime rates are smaller in the smaller cities and towns, as shown in Table 17.

In the United States, the rates are much higher for crimes against property in cities than in rural areas. For crimes of violence against the person, there is not much difference between the rates in the cities and in the country. The rates are also higher for taking property illegally in the larger cities than in small ones.

The greater amount of crime in large cities certainly shows maladjustment, though little of it may be due to inherited or physical development factors. The maladjustment is due to cultural variations. There can be maladjustment between cultures as well as between culture and biological inheritance.

THE TIMES ARE OUT OF JOINT

In a picture puzzle, the parts must be fitted together properly to make a unified whole. Some of the parts of the urban culture are not fitted well together. This bad assembly is due in part to the rapidity with which cities have grown and are changing. Even in Elizabethan times, Hamlet's complaint that the times were out of joint was prompted by the difficulties of sudden change.

Blighted areas. One of these out-of-joint parts is the large and growing "blighted" area. For with this deteriorated circular strip around the edges of a fringe business area, there are found deplorable social conditions. Recovery of these areas requires planning, much money, co-operative action, and government aid.

Other areas of a city need to be protected from this creeping blight. Succession occurs, and neighbourhoods change in various

parts of a city ; and in all there is the threat of deterioration. If a local neighbourhood in a city had the right by majority opinion to order repairs by particular owners, to decree against atomising houses for rooms and small apartments or instead to acquire the property by purchase, and then exercised this right, deterioration could in some measure be prevented.

Congested Streets. To meet the maladjustment of streets crowded with vehicular traffic, there are several proposals. One, for cities like




FIG. 16.—Relative location of London County Council Development Areas outside London.

Modern city planning includes the development of satellite towns to take over certain functions of the central city—housing a part of its population, absorbing some of its industries, providing space for auxiliary services of some of its commercial establishments. While the administrative area of London lies largely within a circle with a five-mile radius, the residential settlements designed by the London County Council are dispersed over an area that has a radius of 20 miles and includes many towns. (Diagram from the London County Council, in W. S. and E. S. Woytinsky, *World Population and Production*, p. 133.)

New York and Chicago, is to close the streets to private automobiles. Another is to increase the facilities for underground travel and at the same time to construct parking places below street level and to erect certain tall buildings with each floor devoted to car parking. In the London metropolitan area, city planners have attempted to plan for whole towns outside the city.

Municipal Finances. To meet the strains of growing and changing, cities require large sums of money, many billions of dollars. To raise this money, the personal and real property of only those who live in the city limits are taxed. Many people—tens of thousands of them—who live outside the city limits use the city streets and various services without paying any taxes for them, which would not be the case if there were a tax on earnings, within the city, or if the city limits were extended to include suburbs and satellite communities.

Metropolitan areas have a superabundance of different governments. In Cook County there are 400 different political units empowered to levy 600 different kinds of taxes. There are too many local governments with too little local government.

Schools. There are many other maladjustments in the different parts of urban culture ; one of these revolves about schools. As




FIG. 17.—The Sketch shows the Layout of Crawley, one of the New Towns 30 miles south of London.

The town's centre is in the inner circle, where shops and public buildings are located. Surrounding it are nine neighbourhood areas each with shops, schools, and park. The basic New Town pattern is one of ring-road and radials. The area in black at the top is the factory area. The community, designed for 50,000, is surrounded by a green belt. The people live close to their work, schools, and shops. Absenteeism of workers is reported to be lower than in London before the factories moved out, and the people are said to like the new communities better. The New Towns are examples of what planning can accomplish. (Plan by courtesy of Crawley Development Corporation.)

neighbourhoods change, the pupils change, leading to the mixing of students from different income classes and from distinct ethnic and racial groups, which theoretically is an excellent situation in which to learn to be democratic ; but there are many practical difficulties in values, such as differences in preparation by age groups, etc. More serious is overcrowding. When the birth rate rises sharply for several years, there will be an increase in school attendance six to a dozen or more years later. But too often new schoolrooms are not built. Educational costs are usually the largest item in a municipal budget, and if there is financial stringency, the schools suffer.

The Future of Cities. The traditional assumptions regarding the city as a particularly unfavourable environment are not supported

by the evidence on length of life and prevalence of psychoses. Also, recent studies have reported that anomie is not peculiar to large urban environments.¹ Comparison of an urban centre of over 300,000 with a rural county seat of less than 3,000 showed that level of education rather than urban residence accounts for apparent urban-rural differences in anomie among whites. Whites who place themselves in the upper or middle class are more likely to evidence high anomie if they live in the city rather than in the small town. For Negroes, high position in the social structure plus urban residence diminishes anomie.²

While man may be learning to improve his adjustment to the urban community, the urban community itself is changing. From 1940 to 1950 nearly all large cities increased in population, but from 1950 to 1960 most of the large cities lost population. A new order in the organisation of inhabited space is the huge cluster of central cities, outlying suburbs and related rural areas stretching along the Atlantic Seaboard from north of Boston to south of Washington, which has been dubbed a *megalopolis*.³ In such a region, behavioural differences as between urban and rural areas, and between central cities and suburbia, are greatly diminished.

There are those who believe that "the flight to the suburbs" will be stemmed and even reversed in the future. They see suburbanites weary after twenty years of commuting to the city and, with their children grown and no longer in school, keen to return to Times Square, if adequate housing is provided in the city.⁴ The city offers many advantages which the suburban areas cannot offer. The image of the city as the cultural centre has appeal.⁵ The advantages which were afforded by the suburbs in the past, it is said, are diminishing as they become more crowded and noisy. But if what we are witnessing is a progressive disenchantment with Suburbia, the statistics of population redistribution do not yet reflect it.

SUMMARY

Ecology studies the community in relation to environment, which sets limits to human habitations and supplies the food and the elements of material culture. Culture modifies the influence of natural environment, and as culture changes, communities change. Hunters and food-gatherers, and some pastoral people, live in small, unstable communities—that is, in semi-nomadic

¹ Ephraim Harold Mizruchi, "Social Structure and Anomie in a Small City", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 25, pp. 645-54, October, 1960.

² Lewis M. Killian and Charles M. Grigg, "Urbanism, Race, and Anomie", *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 67, pp. 661-65, May, 1962.

³ Jean Gottman, *Megalopolis: The Urbanized Northeastern Seaboard of the United States* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961).

⁴ Hon. Robert C. Weaver, U.S. Housing Administrator, at Ford Hall Forum, Boston, November 26, 1961.

⁵ Anselm Straus, *Images of the American City* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961).

bands, whereas agriculture encourages the development of the more stable village. With the growth of culture, communities also get bigger. It was the development of mechanical power applied to manufacture, transportation and communication, and supplemented by improvements in agriculture, that led to modern urban society, where most of the people live in cities, often with populations numbered in millions. Changes in technology furnish the chief key to changes in the type and structure of communities.

Developments in local transportation, especially *via* the internal combustion engine, have ushered in the largest local area, the metropolitan community, with places of work, residence, and trade more widely separated than ever before, but all together constituting an economic area.

The internal pattern of a community results from (a) the segregation of the population by classes or subgroups and (b) the distribution of different types of business. The segregation of residences is primarily affected by differences in income, occupation, ethnic bonds, and race. The pattern is affected also by the distribution of factories, wholesale houses, shopping centres, and offices. Recent changes are for factories to be built outside cities with shopping centres at the periphery. The population in recent decades has been increasing more rapidly in the outer ring surrounding the city than in the city itself. But the cities have gained in population, too; and the density of population of cities has become greater.

As the community gets larger and more complex, it tends to lose its primary-group quality and to become more impersonal. This expansion results in greater freedom for the individual but in a weakening of group integration, a decrease in consensus, and an increase in social disorganisation in some areas. However, the city is a relatively new environment to which man may in time learn to make a better adjustment. Also modern transportation and communication are decentralising population, and it is possible that man will show a better adjustment to the new metropolitan community than he has to the city as we have known it.

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. Compare the relations between the town and the wider society in medieval and modern Britain.
2. What factors are responsible for the differentiation of the city into "natural areas"?
3. The comparative study of the ecology of medieval and modern cities.
4. Examine critically two of the theories that have been put forward to account for the pattern of urban growth.
5. Compare the tendency towards one-class areas in British towns with the growth of ethnic enclaves in American cities.

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CHAPTER XIII

THE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION

WORLD DISTRIBUTION

Much of the world population is concentrated in three areas : India, Ceylon and Burma ; Eastern China and Japan ; and Europe. Or expressed even more briefly, people are found mainly around the rim of the North Atlantic Ocean and on the Asiatic border of the Pacific Ocean. There are small concentrations in the north-eastern part of the United States, on the islands of South-east Asia, and in spots in Latin America. There are very few clusters of population in the Southern Hemisphere. Over most of the surface of the earth the density of population is low, especially in the dry cold north of Asia and America, and in the vast interior of South America, Africa, and Australia.

If we ask why there is this unequal distribution, the answer is found in geography and in culture.

GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION

Extremes of Climate and Topography limit the Habitation of Mankind. Men, women, and children can live almost everywhere—in the Arctic cold of the far north as do the Eskimo and in the hot humid rain forests of Eastern Bolivia as do the Siriono. This they can do by virtue of the aid culture gives them. They can hunt, fish, cultivate plants, build fires, provide shelter, and make clothing.

Though human beings can live almost anywhere, thanks to their culture, they cannot live everywhere in large numbers. A climatic map of the world shows that, in general, in the places where the climate is unfavourable or hostile (especially to plants and animals), the population is relatively sparse, as in the dry climates of Siberia. In some of the hot humid climates, as in south-eastern Asia, which appear more uncomfortable to dwellers in the temperate zones than to the South-east Asians, there are dense populations. This area has an abundant food supply. Some hot climates permit two or more crops per year.

While a climatic and topographical map would permit one to guess the highly populated areas and the sparsely peopled regions of the world, such a map would hardly lead us to expect that 68 per cent of the population of the world would be crowded into 8 per cent of the land. This is possible because of the fertility of the soil, the presence of minerals, and routes of transportation—all made utilisable by inventions.

DISTRIBUTION BY CONTINENTS

The Old World and the Northern Hemisphere have the largest proportions of the population. The Southern Hemisphere has one-third of the land of the world (18·1 million square miles), but only approximately one-tenth of the population. Europe and Asia together hold 78 per cent of all the people.

The distribution of population by continents is shown in Table 8.

TABLE 8

THE POPULATION OF THE WORLD BY CONTINENTS, 1650 AND 1960

Continent.	Number (in millions).		Per cent.	
	1650.	1960.	1650.	1960.
North America . .	1	200	·2	7·1
Middle America . .	6	66	1·1	2·3
South America . .	6	140	1·1	4·9
Europe	100	427	18·3	15·1
*Asia	330	1,679	60·6	59·3
Africa	100	300	18·3	10·6
*Oceania	2	16·5	·4	0·6

Source: *U.N. Demographic Yearbook*, 1961, p. 120.

* From 1934 to 1951 the Philippines were included in "Other Oceans", from 1952 to 1961 in "Other Asia".

The Americas had only 2·4 per cent of the total population in 1650 but 14·3 per cent in 1960. Africa had between one-sixth and one-fifth of the people of the world in 1650 (18·3 per cent) but one-tenth in 1960 (10·6 per cent).

WHERE THE DIFFERENT RACES LIVE .

The Whites are more scattered, and the Negroid races more localised. The distribution of races with the whites so widely dispersed is contrary to the expectations of half a century ago when there was concern in the United States over "the rising tide of colour". The colour tide has not swept as far as the white tide. The concern about races has perhaps lessened since then, for many of the so-called racial traits are now known to be not inherited but acquired by virtue of the influence of culture.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF RACES

The distribution of races may be indicated only in broad outlines. The white races, which include the dark-skinned peoples of India, occupy also Europe and North and South America, in part. They

number perhaps about 1,300 million. The principal home of the Negroid peoples, Africa, remains the dark continent, although there are some whites in the north and in the extreme south.¹ Before the coming of the whites, Australia was peopled by a black people, as is still the case in the Melanesian Islands. There is a scattering of Negroes in the Caribbean islands and in local areas of South America, due to migration in historical times.

The Mongoloid races occupy Asia, with the notable exceptions of India and Asia Minor. The peoples popularly described as having brown and red skins are rightly classed with the yellow-skinned peoples, for many physical measurements other than skin colour are used in classifying races. The brown peoples occupy the islands south of Asia and many of the scattered islands of the Pacific, while the so-called red-skinned peoples, some 20 or 25 million in number, with many more mixed bloods, live in the Americas. The Eskimos, who live in the lower parts of the Arctic, are also Mongoloid, but in comparison their number is negligible. Altogether the Mongoloid races number perhaps 800 million persons.

MIGRATION

The factors that cause people to migrate may be summarised under the terms, push, pull, and means of travel. A land flowing in milk and honey beckoned the ancient Jews, but there was also a push coming from the cruelty of the Egyptians. America was a promised land to the oppressed of Europe. It was a land of hope where immigrants might turn over a page in the book of life and start anew. The principal attractions here were probably economic opportunity and religious and civil liberty, while the push came from such situations as the potato famine in Ireland, the religious oppression of the Huguenots in France, and the revolution in Germany.

The pull exerted by the United States has been measured by a coefficient of correlation between waves of immigration and periods of prosperity in this country. The correlation is much higher than it is between the waves of emigration from Europe and hard times in Europe.² It would thus seem that often the attraction of the new home may be greater than the dissatisfaction with the old, as measured by mobility. This point is important because of the claim that population pressure makes for war. If the pull is greater than the push, it may be that the love of booty is a greater incentive to war than hardships at home. Certainly some densely populated countries, such as China and India, have been peaceful, whereas less densely populated Europe and America have frequently engaged in wars.

When migration is viewed through a long stretch of time, it is

¹ It is to be noted also that all the Negroes of Africa are not equally dark-skinned; many Africans unmixed with whites have a brownish-coloured skin.

² Harry Jerome, *Migration and the Business Cycle*, p. 204.

seen that the volume or rapidity of movement depends on the available technology. Other factors are also significant, such as the accessibility of new land and the absence of restrictions on mobility. While the latter no doubt played a part in the migration of 30,000,000 Europeans to the United States in less than a century, this great redistribution of population is not conceivable without large-sized steamboats.

The Facts of Recent Migration. Accurate facts about migration are available only for the past century. The outstanding movement has

TABLE 9

Net gain (+) or loss (−) by migration in England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, 1871-1951 (000's) *

	1871-91.	1891-1911.	1911-31.	1931-51.
England and Wales	− 765	− 570	− 790	+ 758
Scotland	− 310	− 307	− 631	− 220
N. Ireland	− 299	− 133	− 170	− 73

* D. C. Marsh, *The Changing Social Structure of England and Wales, 1871-1951* (1958), p. 13.

been the dispersal from Europe, caused by factors associated with the industrial revolution. Before the middle of the nineteenth century about 300,000 emigrants a year crossed to other continents. When industrialisation got well under way, the emigration increased to between a million and a million and a half a year.

In the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century over half the emigrants from Europe came from England. About the middle half of the century Germany was sending forth about one-quarter of the emigrants from Europe to other continents. By the beginning of the present century, however, Great Britain and Germany had become industrialised. They had a high standard of living and needed labour in their factories, and hence only one-quarter of the emigrants came from these two countries. On the other hand, good methods of transportation were reaching Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, agricultural countries not yet industrialised and with a low standard of living. In this period they supplied about three-quarters of the emigrants to other lands. The shift in the course of emigration was from north-western Europe to southern and south-eastern Europe. Emigration practically ceased in the highly industrialised countries; the agricultural countries with a higher birth rate and a lower standard of living began to supply the emigrants.

The United States has received by far the largest proportion of European emigrants. Canada and the Argentine have taken the next largest portion, as is shown in Fig. 23. Brazil and other

American lands were also large recipients, as were Australia and New Zealand.

The homelands of immigrants to the United States from Europe are quite similar to the origins by countries of emigrants shown in Fig. 18. However, Spain and Portugal contributed their population largely to South America, and rather large proportions of the British went to British possessions in America, Africa and Oceania. The early twentieth-century immigrants to the United States have come from Mexico, Italy, and south-eastern Europe.

Have these new immigrants changed radically the racial composition of the United States? In recent years there has been concern about what the racial nature of the United States should be. The Japanese, a different race from the whites, have been prevented by law from migrating to California. There also has been some concern on the part of the legislative representatives about the infusion of peoples of a different racial subtype from southern and south-eastern Europe. In the middle part of the twentieth century, between 1946 and 1961, the largest number of immigrants came from West Germany. For a number of years Canada has been the source of more immigrants than any other country and in the 1925-30 period, immigration from Canada reached a peak of an average of 70,000 a year. It is of interest to note that Canada has been one of the most favoured destinations of immigrants from Europe but the movement of Canadians to the United States has in most years greatly offset this large immigration from Europe. It has been estimated that since 1880 at least one Canadian has migrated to the United States for every three immigrants received in Canada.

With their high birth rates these immigrant racial types have for a time increased more rapidly than the native stock in America. Despite this fact, over 80 per cent of the present population of the United States comes from stocks of north-western Europe.¹

Next to European emigration, the greatest population movement has been from China, chiefly into Manchuria, involving perhaps between five and ten million in the twentieth century. In all, there were 9.5 million Chinese living outside the bounds of China, not including Manchuria, before the war with Japan.² Nearly 4 million Indians were living abroad. The Indians and the Chinese emigrants settled largely in nearby Asian countries. As for Japanese emigration, it may be said that the volume has been relatively small. There are less than a million and a half Japanese living outside Japan proper. These for the most part are found in Formosa, Manchuria, and Hawaii. From Africa the non-voluntary movement of peoples amounted to sizable numbers during the slave trade. This movement is supposed to have actually reduced the population of Africa, but no reliable figures are available.

¹ A. M. Carr-Saunders, *World Population*, Oxford, 1936, p. 165. ² *Ibid*, pp. 57-8.




FIG. 18.—Number of Immigrants entering Selected Countries, by Decade, 1850-1940.

The influence of legislation restricting immigration into the United States, which occurred after World War I, is apparent in this chart. (Data from W. S. and E. S. Woytinsky, *World Population and Production* New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1953, Table 36, p. 77.)

Wars and recent migrations. Wars emphasise the feeling of nationalism and hostility towards the enemy people and their allies. These attitudes result in restricted migration of some groups and also of forced migrations of others. Thus after the First World War immigration to the United States was restricted, while from Turkey the large number of inhabitants of Greek origin were forced to return to Greece. After the Second World War, many Germans were expelled or transferred from lost territories and enemy countries.

These nationalistic feelings were not without influence on the migration of Jews into Palestine. Because of anti-Semitic persecutions in the early and middle thirties, Jews moved into Palestine at a rate of some 40,000 a year ; and following the Second World War and the creation of the state of Israel in 1947, the immigration was 119 thousand in 1948, and 239 thousand in 1949. Although the peak of migration was reached in 1949, both the year 1950 with 169 thousand and 1951 with 174 thousand immigrants were the second and third most important years in the immigration history of Israel. After 1951 the migration diminished greatly, reaching a low point in 1953 of only ten thousand. Since 1951 the highest number of immigrants for any one year was in 1957 when 68 thousand were reported to have migrated to Israel. There has been a shift in the country of origin of the immigrants to Israel. In 1949 which had the largest number coming into Israel, well over half were from Europe ; in 1951, over half of the immigrants came from Asia. In 1960 over half of the immigrants came from Europe and America.

In India a great movement of people was stirred up by the fighting at the time of the partition into Pakistan and India. The transfer of peoples was much greater than the transfer of Jews to Israel. Approximately six million Moslems migrated from India to Pakistan and some 4 million Hindus and members of other religious groups left Pakistan.

The Korean War produced some 7 million refugees from North Korea and nearly a million Viet-nameese left when their country was partitioned.¹ In China it is estimated that some 1.5 million have fled to Macao and Hong Kong but that this is due primarily to the seeking of better economic conditions rather than political asylum. In the future, political conditions rather than the traditional economic motives are likely to become the primary reasons for population redistribution.

The free movement of peoples is restricted. After the First World War, barriers to the free movement of peoples between countries were quickly and widely erected, although there were exceptions, as in France.

The United States made its first restriction in 1921, and this legislation has been amended several times since. The restriction was aimed at countries outside the Americas and particularly at the countries of southern and south-eastern Europe. In 1930 and thereafter, 150,000 entries per year were to be allocated among the different countries according to the number from those countries or their descendants in the United States in 1920. After the Second World War permission for some 350,000 displaced persons to move to the United States was granted. But the administration of the act has not resulted in much immigration beyond the quotas permitted.

¹ Catherine and A. F. K. Organski, *Population and World Power* (New York: Knopf, 1961), p. 124.

The "Golden Age of Migrations" has come to a close. The period of the great migrations was the last three-quarters of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth. During this time 65 millions left Europe to find homes elsewhere, largely in the Americas. This was a period of "*laissez-faire*" in population. Now governments control the flow of population as well as of money and of goods.

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN THE UNITED STATES

DENSITY

The Unequal Distribution of Population has Social Implications. About two-thirds of the population of the United States live east of the Mississippi River, where there is only about one-quarter of the land ; and 73 per cent of the land, that portion west of the Mississippi, has only 35 per cent of the population. The states east of the Mississippi have twice as much weight in electing a president of the United States as do the states west of it.

The causes of this unequal distribution are not to be found in temperature, for all parts of the United States have a pleasant temperature. The climatic factor is rather in shortage of precipitation of moisture. The climate is dry for the area of the beginning of the Great Plains in western Texas through the middle of the Dakotas to the Pacific Coast states, except for areas contiguous to the Rocky Mountains.

Climate and topography are not, though, the sole determinants of the location of populations. In the north-eastern part of the United States—where the rainfall for agriculture is no better than elsewhere east of the Great Plains—eight states, comprising only 4 per cent of the country's land area, account for 31 per cent of the country's population.

Although geography is certainly not the only explanation for this concentration of population, nevertheless two geographical factors do account for some of it : (1) coal and iron, which have been in great demand since the Industrial Revolution ; and (2) the waterways that connect with the markets and homeland in Europe.

History may also be a factor in creating the density. Before the War of Independence from Britain, the population of the United States was within a hundred miles of the Atlantic coast, and largely north of North Carolina. These settlements may be seen as markets, which, once started, continue to grow as long as transportation lines and food supplies are available.

MIGRATION WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Migration Westward still continues. Horace Greeley's advice, "Go west, young man", is still acted upon by families as well as by young

men. The movement westward is slowing up. The centre of population moved westward twice as far from 1850 to 1900 as it did from 1900 to 1960.¹ At earlier times the drive to go west raged like a fever, especially when gold was discovered. For agriculturists, especially if they are self-sufficient farmers, empty lands are the lands of opportunity. Lands go up in price, and this unearned increment in land values is one reason why young men went west. It is the pull rather than the push that gives the motivation to follow Greeley's advice.

Not all the migration has been westward. The cold smoky cities of the North have been a magnet to peoples on the move as well as the balmy climate of sunny California. The attraction of the North seems to have been the good pay in the factories of this industrial area. In the South, Florida has an appeal also, though most of the states of the South have had more people move away than have moved in during the decade from 1950 to 1960. The distribution of population is also affected by the ratio of births to deaths. In some states the excess of births is greater than in others; and hence as time passes, these states with greater excesses of births over deaths acquire larger proportions of the population.

The Negro Population is moving to all the States of the Union. At one time the Negroes were rather highly concentrated south of the Mason-Dixon Line. But with the restriction of immigration from Europe in the 1920's, the shortage of the labour supply was made up in part from the South. Both Negroes and whites moved towards the industrial cities of the North and the Pacific coast.

This scatter of the Negro population is also shown by the fact that in 1930 there were 17 states outside of the South that had Negro populations of over 10,000 and in 1960 there were 23. There were only 2 states in 1960 with less than 1,000 Negroes.

Though Negroes have scattered to all the states, the Negro residents in southern states in 1960 numbered nearly 700,000 more than in 1940. Though the South may be losing some of its Negro population, there are more Negroes in the South each decade.

A good indication of the dispersal of the Negro population is the decreasing proportion of the country's total Negro population living in the South. In 1940, 73.2 per cent of the Negroes in the United States lived in the southern states, whereas by 1950, this figure had dropped to 67.8 per cent.

RURAL-URBAN DISTRIBUTION

THE WORLD

The Movement of Populations to Cities is creating a new Distribution. Peoples not only move to different geographical areas but also within

¹ U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1962, p. 8, Fig. IV, Table 5.

TABLE 10

URBANISATION OF SELECTED COUNTRIES AS SHOWN BY THE PERCENTAGES OF THE POPULATION LIVING IN PLACES OF OVER 10,000 INHABITANTS, 1930-1951 *

Country.	Percentage of Population in Places of Over 10,000 in Population.
United Kingdom	75
Holland	70
Australia	57
Argentina	52
Italy	50
Spain	49
United States	48
Finland	47
Belgium	46
Hungary	46
Sweden	42
Denmark	42
Chile	41
Canada	38
France	38
Switzerland	33
Union of South Africa	30
Mexico	26
Egypt	23
Rumania	21
Turkey	18
Yugoslavia	17
Portugal	16
India	11

* Adapted from the *United Nations Demographic Yearbook* (1948) with some additions from later censuses.

an area they move into cities. Historically, it is a relatively recent phenomenon, aided by mechanical inventions of production and transportation. So we find the proportion of people living in cities high only in the advanced countries or in spots in the less advanced.

It would be interesting to know the extent to which different countries are urbanised, but the different countries do not define urban and rural in the same way. However, in Table 10 are shown, for a few countries on which data are available, the percentage of the population living in places with more than 10,000 inhabitants. Thus in Holland in 1946, 70 per cent of the population lived in places of over 10,000 inhabitants, while in the United States in 1950, 52.4 per cent lived in places of more than 10,000 population. Holland has very little agricultural land, while the United States has much. The New England states, with about the same population as Holland, have almost the same percentage of their population living in places

of less than 10,000. So the degree of urbanisation is a function of geographical terrain as well as of the development of trade and manufacturing. Nevertheless, it is a fact that Holland is more urbanised according to this definition than the United States, whatever be the reason.

One other reason why Table 10 should not be interpreted too literally is that the years of the censuses vary, and for some countries the data are not very recent. However, the table does present data with enough precision to permit some useful inferences about the degree of urbanisation in different parts of the world.

The urbanisation of different countries, as shown in Table 10, suggests that several countries not notable for a high degree of manufacturing are nevertheless highly urbanised, as, for instance, Argentina. This high degree of urbanisation in the absence of a high degree of industrial development can be explained in some instances by the existence in these countries of cities located on seacoasts and other places which make them well-situated for intercontinental trade. Many of the largest cities in the world are found on the seacoast or in a place readily accessible to the ocean.

TABLE 11
THE RURAL POPULATION OF ENGLAND AND WALES EXPRESSED AS
A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL POPULATION, 1851-1951 *

Date.	Rural Population.
1851	49.8%
1881	33.3%
1891	28.0%
1911	21.9%
1921	20.7%
1931	20.0%
1939	17.6%†
1951	19.3%†

* From S. V. Pearson, *The Growth and Distribution of Population* (London, 1935), p. 209, and Preliminary Report, Census, 1951.

† Administrative changes decreased rural areas from 638 in 1931 to 479 in 1939.

THE UNITED STATES

The Farm Population is diminishing. In 1790 the U.S.A. was a nation of farmers. Ninety-five per cent of the population was rural—that is, lived in places of less than 2,500 population, though not all of these were farm families. Since then the percentage of the population that is rural has been getting smaller. In 1950 it was only 36 per cent.

The farm population in 1950 is 7 million less than it was in 1910. The largest farm population in the United States was in 1916. In 1910 the farm population was 35 per cent of the total population. In 1950 it was only 16 per cent. Yet there are 68 million more people

in the United States (1950) to feed than there were 40 years earlier, with 7 million fewer persons on farms to produce the food.

The reason for this diminishing rural proportion of the population is the increasing efficiency of agricultural production. A farmer produces more to-day because he uses more insecticides, better tools and machines, and also because he has a greater scientific knowledge of fertilisers and of plant and animal breeding. In 1820, one farm worker produced enough to support 4 persons, whereas in 1955 he produced enough to support 19 persons.

These remarks clearly show the redistribution of the population away from the rural communities, but they do not indicate how little city life there was in 1790. At that time only 3 per cent of the population lived in places of over 8,000 inhabitants, and it was not until 1820 that there was a city of 100,000 population in the United States. Large cities became prevalent only after the Civil War. In 1950 almost a third of the population (30 per cent) lived in cities of over 100,000 population, and about one-eighth in cities over 1,000,000.

SUMMARY

A combination of geographical and cultural factors determines the distribution of population at any given time. Modern societies rest on agriculture, which demands fertile soil, and also on manufacturing, which requires coal and iron ; since these resources are unevenly distributed, the population of the world is unevenly distributed, with concentrations in the Old World and in the Northern Hemisphere.

The Industrial Revolution originated and flourished among Europeans. As a result, the white race is the most numerous and the most widely dispersed. The popular belief among whites in the rising tide of colour is based on fear and prejudice rather than on fact.

Changes in the distribution of population result from the operation of two factors, migration and the ratio of births to deaths. People migrate because of the attraction of the new region, or the repulsion of the old, or both. In the past, the most outstanding dispersal of population has been from Europe and has led to migration over great distances ; but the development of nationalism in recent decades has brought limitation on emigration and immigration. The result has been a curtailment of international migration and an accentuation of mobility within the nation in quest of a higher standard of living. In the United States there has been a pronounced shift in population from the farms to the towns, cities, and metropolitan areas. An important effect of the decline in farm population is to accentuate urban patterns of social behaviour.

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. How have the distribution and density of population, by races, been altered during the last three centuries ? How do you account for these changes ?
2. What factors cause people to migrate ? How do you rank these factors in importance ?
3. How valid is the theory that population pressure causes war ?

4. What are, at present, the chief barriers to international migration? Are they likely to increase or decrease in the future?
5. What factors account for the drift of population from farms to urban areas? Will the trend continue?

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CHAPTER XIV

THE GROWTH OF POPULATION

HOW THE POPULATION OF THE WORLD IS GROWING

The population of the world is reckoned at 3,115,000,000. When men lived by hunting, fishing, and food-gathering, with only rough stone implements, the world's population probably numbered only a few hundred thousand—not as many people as are found at present in any one of twenty different cities in the United States. The increase was so low, probably a fraction of a per cent a century, that the population could be called stationary.

With the coming of agriculture, its spread and development, population grew faster, up to the time of the Roman Empire, probably at a rate of 6 to 10 per cent a century.¹ This increase is slight, being less than 0.1 per cent per year. In some areas the growth was faster than in others; but in terms of the memory of a family the growth was negligible, and population would have appeared to a family as stationary. For the next thousand years the growth may have been even slower. But by 1650, the population of the world was around 500,000,000; and in 1850 it was 1,200,000,000. During these 200 years, the growth of population was at a rate of 48 per cent per century.

From 1850 to 1960 the world's population grew 140 per cent. In fact, during this period this increase was greater than in all previous time since the beginning of mankind. The population is increasing more rapidly to-day than ever before. In 1700 the average rate of growth would have doubled the world's population in 178 years. Population has been growing at such a rapid rate that by 1950 it would take only a little more than 41 years to double the world's population. It is estimated that the rate of growth will increase between now and A.D. 2000 to the point where the population will double every 23 years.

The most rapidly growing continents in the next 15 years will be Latin America, Asia, and Oceania. Hauser² estimates that these continents during the period 1950-75 will grow at an average annual rate of 3.4 per cent, 2.4 per cent and 2.4 per cent, respectively. This would indicate that Latin America will double its 1950 population of 163,000,000 in a little less than 20 years, while Asia will double

¹ These estimates are taken from a paper read by John Durand at the Thirtieth Institute of the Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation held in Chicago in 1954.

² Philip N. Hauser, "Demographic Dimension of World Politics", *Science*, June 30, 1960, vol. V, p. 131, No. 3414.

its 1,380,000,000 population and Oceania its 13,000,000 in a little less than 28 years.

On the one hand it has been pointed out that population is growing at an ever-increasing rate. On the other, it is equally true that the earth's land area is not increasing. What is the relationship between man in the land he lives in? In 1960 the earth's population was estimated to be 2,900,000,000. If each of these individuals were given an equal share of the earth's land area, it would represent 12.5 acres. However, it is clear that the entire earth's surface cannot be used for cultivation. It is estimated that 20 per cent of the earth's land area is too cold, 20 per cent too hot, another 20 per cent too arid, and about 10 per cent of the soil consisting of almost bare rock, leaving about 30 per cent with adequate moisture, temperature and soil to be potentially cultivated. If the remaining 30 per cent were distributed equally among the inhabitants of the world, the acres per individual would be reduced to 4. This represents the land which is potentially useful for cultivation. If we look at the land actually in cultivation to-day, we find that it is about 1.1 acre per head. Another way of stating this would be that it takes the produce of 1.1 acres to support one person.

Whereas this is the picture of the man-land ratio to-day, the question might be raised as to what will happen in the future with the rapid rate of population increase. This is a difficult question to answer. While the statement of President Truman in his Point 4 Declaration, that "for the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve the suffering", may be true, the knowledge and skill are not easy to come by. Exactly how many people the land can support rests on a number of assumptions. Where necessity demands, as many as 4,000 persons have been supported by the produce of a square mile of farm land against the world's average of 600 persons. But the potentially arable land is not evenly distributed. Most of it is in Africa, Oceania, and in the Americas. What of the ratio of land to population in the twenty-first century, which is not far off? We can accommodate more people by eating less. Or we can discover new ways of producing food, assuming the world's population continues to increase in the next hundred years as it is increasing now.

We need to inquire further into the possible increase in population ; but in order to do so, we must examine the trends in birth rates and in death rates which determine the rate of growth.

THE PESSIMISM OF MALTHUS

If the world continues to grow as it has in the past three hundred years, in another three hundred years the population will be nearly 8,500 million, and by 2500 there will be nearly 25,000 million. But if to-day's population of 3 billion continues to grow at the present rate

of 1.7 per cent a year, it would double in only 40 years. This would mean that the world population would reach 6 billion by A.D. 2000. Malthus (1766-1834) viewed such a possibility of great growth of population as a tragedy.

Not all people are optimistic about the growth of population. As the first major student of the question, Malthus was opposed to population growth as it was then occurring. His objection was that population grew faster than the food supply. He claimed that if there were four children in the first generation, then in the second, if the same fertility rates prevailed, the four offspring would in turn have 16, and these 16 would be succeeded by 64, and so on. The population would thus grow very fast. Even if the population were just doubling instead of quadrupling each generation, it would go forward very rapidly, as is seen by the geometric progression 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1,024, and so on. The total numbers increase very rapidly after the series has run a while, even though the rate factor remains the same. But food, he argued, increased in an arithmetical series, such as 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12.

TABLE 12
WORLD POPULATION GROWTH *

Year.							Population (millions).
1650	545
1750	728
1800	906
1850	1,171
1900	1,608
1948	2,300

* Adapted from A. M. Carr-Saunders, *World Population*, and United Nations Statistical Office, *Statistical Papers*, Series A, No. 6, June, 1949.

The situation he depicted was of a race between the supply of men and the supply of food. The number of men must inevitably outrun the food supply, no matter how big the handicap. For instance, a male and female rabbit were introduced into Australia in the nineteenth century. In a few years the whole continent, with its great food supply, was overrun by rabbits. They became a pest. Similarly, according to Malthus, if the Pilgrim Fathers alone had come to the United States, and they had found an empty continent, their progeny would have eventually filled it.

But winning the race between the supply of men and the supply of food really meant losing. If there are few eaters and much food, the standard of living is high, but if there are many eaters and the food supply is relatively small, the standard of living is low. Thus Malthus saw mankind doomed to hunger. What if the Black Death killed off a third of England, and as a consequence wages and the standard of

living rose? It was only a question of time before the breeding propensity of the people produced as many people in relation to the food supply as existed before the plague. What if the standard of living in America is due to the scarcity of population? Soon the population will be so large in relation to the food that poverty and misery will result. Such are the implications of the Malthusian theory.

Limitation of Malthusian theory. Malthus' logic was good but unfortunately his observations were not sufficiently extensive. The first weakness in Malthus' theory is its failure to appreciate the power of birth control, a cultural factor. Since Malthus' time the peoples of the Western world have learned how to lower the birth rate. In 1860 the average birth rate for nine countries of north-western Europe was 34.1 per thousand population. Seventy-five years later the birth rate had been cut in half.¹ A falling birth rate can quite invalidate Malthus' idea that man must inevitably increase in geometric ratio.

The second weakness in the theory lies in the failure to appreciate what culture in general can do. It is culture that has invented birth control. Culture has increased the yield of agriculture. Some day culture may show us how to get food by combining carbon dioxide, water, sunshine, and chlorophyll—thus freeing us altogether from the cultivation of the soil. Culture has extended trade and developed the occupations of city dwellers, who do not farm for their food. All this is not to say that the natural resources of the earth do not practically set limitations, sometimes sharp and severe, to population growth. These limitations, though, are being changed by culture from time to time, particularly by chemistry, which makes new and unheard-of molecules and now creates new atoms.

In the twentieth century, the case for population control will have to rest on fertility control. In one sense the question of whether men can produce sufficient food for 3 billion or 6 billion population is academic. There are many practical problems of politics and economics which would postpone the day when goods could move freely to areas in need. In addition, subsistence levels for the world's population are not enough; along with the increasing number of people in the world, there is an increasing awareness and expectation of higher levels of living.

The observation of Malthus can be translated into to-day's terms by substituting fertility control for death control of population, and by substituting adequate standard of living for mere subsistence. Contraceptives, abortions, and sterilisation as means of fertility control now become the way culture adapts to population pressure.

THE STANDARD OF LIVING AND POPULATION

The standard of living is a function of four variables, not just two (food and population), as Malthus said. That is to say, the plane of

¹ A. M. Carr-Saunders, 1936, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

living goes up or down according to the changes in four conditions : (1) natural resources, (2) invention, (3) social organisation and (4) population.

Natural Resources. The effect of a diminution of natural resources is to lower the standard of living. Those countries that have poor land, no coal and few minerals have not much possibility of getting a large share of the good things of life. Similarly, the countries that are rich in resources have rich people. If the inhabitants of the United States use up all their oil, diminish their easily accessible coal and iron supplies, let the fertile soil of the sloping hillsides wash away, and allow the dust bowl to become a desert, the standard of living will be lowered. One of the reasons why England has a higher standard of living than Norway is because she has more abundant natural resources.

Invention. The effect of invention is also to raise the standard of living, as was done by the bow and arrow, the hoe, the plough, the steam engine, and the dynamo. The plane of living is higher in America now than before the discovery of America by the Norsemen, because the whites have more inventions than the red men had. China's plane of living will be higher when it has a better technology. The utilisation of natural resources is not independent of the state of inventions. Waterfalls were of no use to the American Indians, but they add greatly to the wealth of the present inhabitants of the United States.

One of the most optimistic signs of a better material future is the continued growth in the number of inventions in chemistry, electrical goods, communication, transportation, and other fields which will add to the prosperity of the country.

Social Organisation. The standard of living is further increased by a highly efficient social organisation. Division of labour, more trade, a good money and credit system, efficient labourers, all tend to increase production, which means more goods to distribute among the people. On the other hand a social organisation highly disorganised by war tends to lower living conditions. War sometimes means a bar to trade, currency fluctuations, bad credit, and disarranged production. For these and other reasons, Europe was slow to recover after the World War of 1914 to 1918. Revolutions also disorganise production.

There is some discussion as to whether the economic system is less or more productive when it is closely related to government. It may be argued that the planning made possible by governmental control increases the efficiency of production. Controversy also exists as to the relative efficiency of Communism as seen in Russia, of National Socialism as found in Germany, of the co-operative systems of Scandinavia, and of the free enterprise system of the United States and Great Britain. These questions need not be gone into here, but they illustrate how variations in the economic organisation affect the standard of living.

Population. On the whole, a small population means a higher

standard of living than a large one, as Malthus said. In the southern states of the United States the farm population is much more dense than in the north central states. India and China and Japan are densely settled and have a low standard of living. The newer countries are less densely settled, as evidenced by the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and these countries have the highest standards of living to be found anywhere in the world to-day.

Interrelationship of All Four Factors. It is seen, then, that the standard of living is not a matter solely of the relation between population and food supply, but is the result of at least four factors. These must be taken into consideration in examining any population situation. Thus Italy, a rather densely populated area, had before the war a rising standard of living in the face of a growing population. The reason was that Italy has many new technologies to utilise and perhaps had a social organisation that increased its efficiency. If there had not been the adoption and use of many new inventions, and if there had been no improvement in the economic organisation, the standard of living would probably have been lowered as the population increased.

This analysis shows that there are other factors that have to do with poverty and plenty besides population and the fruition of the earth. Any attempt to appraise the influence of population must consider also the natural resources, the state of the industrial arts and the efficiency of the economic organisation. A change in one of these factors may counteract the influence of another. The next step in our discussion concerns the birth rate, the only source of population increase for the world as a whole.

CAUSES OF POPULATION CHANGE

THE DECREASING BIRTH RATE

For a hundred and fifty years the birth rate of Iceland was about 35 per thousand population. Iceland is mentioned because its birth records go back to 1750 and because its population was stationary until 1900, though there were fluctuations from year to year. The birth rate of the United States and of western Europe to-day is about half that for Iceland; Iceland's figure is probably about the same as the birth rate in western Europe a hundred years ago. How the birth rate has fallen in different countries of the world is shown in Fig. 19.

The decline is hardly due in any significant degree to biological change in fecundity of the peoples concerned, though there may have been some slight variations due to the spread of disease or other factors. The postponement of marriage could only account for a small change in the birth rate, for the delay in marriage has not been great. In the United States, for instance, early marriages increased in number between 1890 and 1930, a period when the birth rate was falling.

Influence of the Diffusion of Contraception. The fall in the birth rate is due to the discovery of how to limit the size of the family, and to the spread of this knowledge. The discovery seems to have been made in France and to have spread to the surrounding regions. It spread first to the prosperous classes in the cities, who experienced the first decreases in birth rate. In England, the decline in family size first became apparent in the middle-classes in the 1870's. Many factors




FIG. 19.—Birth Rates in Selected Countries, 1751-1954.

Birth rates have been falling in western Europe for nearly a century. This decrease is thought to be due to more efficient methods of birth control and to the growth of cities. But to the surprise of nearly everyone, they rose sharply in the 1940's, and now it is an open question whether they will rise further or continue the decline begun in the middle of the nineteenth century. The points plotted are averages of the yearly number of births per 1,000 population for each five-year interval preceding the date indicated. The central and western European countries are Belgium, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. It was not possible to carry the index through later years to the present. The data for these countries are from R. R. Kuczynski, *The Balance of Births and Deaths*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1928-31. The data for the other countries are from their published statistics, except those for Sweden, which were taken from W. S. and E. S. Woytinsky, *World Population and Production*, Chap. 5. Data for the last interval shown on the chart, 1951-4, are from the *United Nations Demographic Yearbook*, 1955.)

were associated with this decline, including changes in ideas about the place of women in the home and in society associated with the movement for the emancipation of women. Moreover, the large family of Victorian England was itself a relatively new problem; the result of the decline in infant mortality. This added to the burden of frequent pregnancies, the task of rearing large families. The threat to middle-class levels of living following the depression of trade in the

1870's, may well have been the stimulus to limit the size of the family by using the growing knowledge of contraception.¹ But family limitation spread much more slowly to the poorer classes of the cities. The professional and business classes have lower birth rates than skilled labour classes, while the families of unskilled labourers have the highest birth rate of any class except the miners.

TABLE 13 .
FAMILY SIZE IN DIFFERENT SOCIAL STRATA
(Great Britain, Marriages under 45 years of age) *

Occupational Category of Husband.	Live Births per Woman married in		Births in 1920-4 as % of those in 1900-9.
	1900-4.	1920-4.	
Non-manual :			
Professional	2.33	1.75	75
Employers	2.64	1.84	70
Own account	2.96	1.95	66
Farmers and Farm managers	3.50	2.31	66
Salaried employees	2.37	1.65	70
Wage-earners	2.89	1.97	68
Manual :			
Wage-earners	3.96	2.70	68
Agricultural	3.88	2.71	70
Labourers	4.45	3.35	75
All categories	3.53	2.42	69

* Adapted from A. M. Carr-Saunders, D. Caradog Jones, and C. A. Moser, *Social Conditions in England and Wales* (Oxford, 1958), p. 25.

The spread of the decreasing birth rate to the farms has been much later than to the cities. Thus in 1940 in the United States, 100 farm women under 45 years of age had had 445 children, while in the cities women of the same age had had only 291 children.²

The habit of limiting the size of the family spread from western Europe outwards. The movement soon reached the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. In the countries of eastern Europe, such as Hungary, Russia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Poland, the birth rate is still high. It is even higher in Central and South America. In north-western Europe in 1938-47 the average birth

¹ See J. A. Banks, *Prosperity and Parenthood* (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954) for a scholarly and readable analysis of the Victorian middle-class family. The extension of the use of contraception is analysed in *Report on an Enquiry into Family Limitation* (E. Lewis-Fanning), Papers of Royal Commission on Population, 1949.

² Calculated from *The Statistical Abstract*, 1943, pp. 53-55.

rate was 17.4, in southern Europe it was 21.2, and in eastern Europe it was higher. These conclusions may be readily seen in Table 14.

The case of Japan may be cited as a country which consciously attempted to control population. Its birth rate has fallen from 29.4 in 1940 to the 1960 low of 17.2 per thousand. In understanding the experience of Japan, a distinction between prevention of conception and interference with the developing embryo is necessary. As Irene B. Taeuber states, "The availability of an operation to induce abortion is one of the major facts in the demographic situation of contemporary Japan, however, and it is related directly to the rapid reduction of the rate of population increase."¹

TABLE 14

BIRTHS PER 1,000 POPULATION IN COUNTRIES IN VARIOUS SITUATIONS, 1952 *

Country.							Rate.
Sweden	15.4
Britain	15.9
West Germany	15.3
France	18.7
Italy	19.9
Spain	20.6
Ireland	21.0
Yugoslavia	28.3
Poland (1950)	30.5
Australia	22.9
United States	24.7
Japan	21.5
Ceylon	39.4
Burma	49.2
Peru	30.6
Argentina	24.6
Venezuela	46.1
Mexico	44.6
Guatemala	51.3

* *United Nations, Demographic Yearbook (1954).*

The spread of the knowledge of how to limit the size of families has been somewhat like the diffusion of the motor-car. The motor-car was adopted by the well-to-do inhabitants of the cities first, then it spread to the farms, perhaps more rapidly than did the decline in the birth rate. Only a few of the unskilled labourers have motor-cars. Motor-cars are not so numerous in eastern Europe, while

¹ Irene B. Taeuber, *The Population of Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 276.

in the Orient they are even scarcer. The parallel should not be carried too far. It is not cited to indicate any causal connection, but rather to show that any invention has a pattern of spread ; it is not diffused over the world instantaneously, but some classes and countries adopt it first. In a similar manner the course of the spread of coffee drinking or the use of tobacco can be traced. There are, of course, peculiar features to the spread of any invention or discovery ; these features involve its cost, manufacture, localised oppositions, and the like.

To the limitation of family size there is much opposition from various sources. Some religions are opposed, on moral principles, to limitation of the number of offspring. Other groups believe that children add much to the joy of living and bring comfort and joy to old age, and hence are opposed to very small families. On the other hand, many people feel that children should be given a full education and the various opportunities of life and therefore favour some limitation of family size unless the children can be given the advantages which modern society offers.

The Rise in the Birth Rate. The historical trend of the birth rate in the U.S. has been a downward one, but in 1934 this was reversed and it began an upward climb which reached a high in 1957. Since that time the birth rate has been slowly decreasing each year. Although the birth rate may continue to drop, there will be more babies born than ever before in the U.S. in the decade 1960 to 1970. The reason for these two conflicting statements is the fact that the number of women in their twenties will increase over a third during this decade. In 1961, 4,268,000 babies were born and it is estimated that at present rates of fertility some 4,900,000 babies will be born in 1970. Some of the causes of the baby boom from 1934 to 1957 will be analysed, but it is important to note that the decade of the sixties will see the beginning of another baby boom because the babies of the 30's and 40's will be in the child-bearing years. Even if these children of the first baby boom have smaller families than their parents, the number of babies born in this decade will increase.

War as a Cause. Soldiers who have been away for years in combat zones, on returning home raise birth rates. After the War of 1939-45, the birth rate in the United States rose from a pre-war low rate (18.4 in 1936) 8.2 points to a post-war high rate of 26.6 in 1947. Rates were also raised in western Europe and elsewhere, as shown in Table 15. The rise in birth rates was not confined to countries that had sent away their young men to fight. The data in Table 15 show that countries which were not in the war and which were not occupied, as, for instance, Sweden, experienced a rise in birth rates, as did also the Roman Catholic states, Spain and Ireland, and countries remote from the arena of war such as Guatemala. The influence of war was felt in these countries through the stimulation which the demand for

TABLE 15

RISE IN BIRTH RATES FROM PRE-WAR LOWS TO POST-WAR HIGHS,
AND TO RATES IN 1952, IN SELECTED COUNTRIES *

Country.	Differences in Points between High and Low Rates.	Differences in Points between 1952 Rates and Low Rates.
Norway . . .	7.3	3.3
France . . .	10.7	6.2
Denmark . . .	5.7	0
Holland . . .	9.9	2.1
Britain . . .	6.3	1.3
Italy . . .	4.7	- .5
Spain . . .	6.7	4.2
Ireland . . .	4.2	2.9
Sweden . . .	6.1	1.0
Switzerland . . .	4.9	2.2
United States . .	8.2	6.7
Canada . . .	8.3	6.5
Australia . . .	6.0	5.7
Japan . . .	7.7	-3.1
Mexico . . .	2.6	.4
Guatemala . . .	6.5	3.0

* Rate is births per 1,000 population. The pre-war rate varies from 1935 to 1944. Most countries are for 1941. Post-war rate is 1945 to 1947. Data from *United Nations Demographic Yearbook*.

war supplies gave to production, and hence incomes. War influences the birth rate not only through returning soldiers but also because it brings for a time increased production and incomes and employment, except where devastation is great.

Economic Production increases the Birth Rate. Birth rates are high in times of prosperity and low in periods of economic depression, as is shown in Fig. 20. In this figure the per capita disposable income (which comes from economic production and is an index of prosperity and depression) was low in the 1930's, as were birth rates. As production increased in the late thirties and forties, birth rates rose. This relationship between economic conditions and the birth rate may help to explain why the high birth rates held up better after World War II than after World War I. Economic conditions also explain why the birth rate increased more from pre- to post-World War II than in the case of World War I. The birth rate was abnormally low in the 1930's, for those were depression years, whereas the years immediately

preceding the Second World War were relatively prosperous and the birth rate was not abnormally low.

The reason why prosperity increases the birth rate is sometimes thought to be the better chance of financing a child in good times than in bad. There are indications, however, that this is not a very significant reason. Rather the more important reason seems to be that prosperity increases marriage and marriage increases the birth




FIG. 20.—The Relationship of Income, the Birth Rate, and the Marriage Rate in the United States, 1920-49.

In the figure above, income is defined as per capita disposable income in 1935-9 dollars; the marriage rate is the number of marriages per 1,000 females between the ages of 17 and 29; birth rate is the number of births per 1,000 population. The marriage rates follow rather closely the increases and decreases in per capita income, except during the war years of 1942-4, when many young men were in the armed forces. The birth rates, in turn, follow the marriage rates rather closely—after a short interval. The chart is an interesting illustration of the influence of the economic factor on love and family life.

rate. In other words, economic conditions have their influence on the birth rate largely through the marriage rate.

Increases in Marriage Rates cause rises in the Birth Rates. The birth rate moves more closely with the marriage rate than with business conditions as shown in Fig. 20. The movement of the birth rate of the first born is almost identical with the movement of the marriage rate of young women 17-29, which is the age period for nearly all first marriages. The birth rate of the first born is much more closely associated with the marriage rate than business conditions. First-born children are about a third of all the children born, hence the birth rate of the first born has a considerable effect on the birth rate for all children.

The birth rates of the second, third, and higher orders of birth do not follow very closely the curve of business conditions, which is approximately like the curve of the birth rate of the first born in this figure. The influence of the marriage rate on the higher orders of birth is suggested by the low points of each. The low point of the marriage rate was 1932, and the low point of the birth rate of the first born was 1933, and of the second born 1935, and of the higher orders at successively later years. The influence of the marriage rate is then clearly seen from this figure, if the lag in successive births of higher orders is taken into consideration.




FIG. 21.—Comparison of Annual Birth Rates and of Annual Birth Rates of First Born, United States, 1920-49.

The birth rate of the first born fluctuates a little more widely than does the birth rate of all orders of birth taken together. Probably the birth rates of the higher orders of birth are more highly influenced by practices of family planning. (Redrawn from Frederic Dewhurst *et al.*, *America's Needs and Resources*, New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1955, p. 56.)

No such close relationship is shown with the business cycle. It has been shown elsewhere that the influence of business conditions on the birth rate in areas where the marriage rate is the same is negligible, but that the influence of the marriage rate on the birth rate where the business conditions are the same is appreciable.¹

The increase in the number of couples marrying was achieved through an increase in early marriage. In the United States the age of marriage was lowered, and the percentage of young women 15 to 20 years of age who were reported as married in 1940 and 1950 increased from 12 to 17.

¹ W. F. Ogburn, "The Comparative Influence of Increases in Early Marriage and of Increase in Per Capita Income on the Increases in the Birth Rate, 1940-1950", paper read at the 1955 meeting of the International Statistical Institute, Rio de Janeiro.




FIG. 22.—Cumulative Rates for All Births Prior to Selected Ages, 1920–50.

This figure shows that the fluctuations in the birth rate of the first born (and hence of the birth rate in general) are much greater than the fluctuations of the cumulative birth rates of all children born to women who have passed the child-bearing period and hence have completed the size of their families. In other words, the fluctuation in the birth rate is much greater than the fluctuation in the size of completed families. A change in the birth rate may not mean a similarly great change in the size of completed families. (From P. K. Whelpton, *Cohort Fertility*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954, p. 94.)

Conclusion on Factors causing the recent rise in Birth Rate. Of the measurable factors causing an increase in the birth rate, the increase in early marriage was quite important. The increase in marriage in the United States was due in part to the high degree of economic prosperity, which in turn was stimulated a good deal by the preparation for war and the economic recovery after the war. Whether there has been an increase in the desire of married couples for more children irrespective of these factors just discussed is not known. If there is such an increase in desire, it would be interesting to know what factors brought it about other than those mentioned.

With regard to the future course of the birth rate, if the age of marriage is lowered still further, there may be increases in the birth rate. If the age of marriage remains low, then the birth rate may resist being lowered. If mild or serious depressions occur, then the marriage rate will decrease and also the birth rate.

The fluctuations in birth rates per year are greater than the fluctuations of the rate of total births per lifetime, as is shown in Fig. 22. The fluctuation from year to year as shown in this figure of the rates for all the children ever born to women reaching 18 years of age is much greater than the fluctuation for women reaching the age of 47 who are at the end of their child-bearing period. The children born to women who have reached 18 years of age are nearly all first-born children, and the top line in Fig. 22 showing this fluctuates widely between 1920 and 1949, much as does the annual rate of first born. On the other hand, the cumulative rate for women who have reached the age of 47 is almost a straight line, downward sloping all the way. This line, it is noted, includes the period of the great depression of the 1890's, which is not indicated by any fluctuations in the line. If women who have only three children and who space them, change their pattern and have them quickly after an early marriage, there would be a rise in the annual birth rate but no change in the cumulative rate for women reaching 47, for they would all have had only three children.

In other words, an increase in first births and second births does not necessarily mean an increase in the total number of children born by the time the women reach 47 years of age.

The possible factor of an increase in the desire for a larger family, irrespective of the age of marriage and of economic conditions, is intangible and difficult to assess as an indicator of the future birth rate.

Differential Fertility. When the birth rate of a society begins its downward trend, the question may be asked as to how this decrease in births is distributed among the families. Do all families begin to decrease their size at the same time or do certain segments of a society restrict size of family? Differential fertility has most often been identified with socio-economic status. The early studies in

this area have pointed to an inverse relationship between socio-economic status and fertility: the higher the social status, the lower the fertility. This finding has been explained in terms of the differential rate of diffusion of knowledge and values associated with family control. These factors operate first at the higher occupational and educational levels and then sweep down to the lowest socio-economic level. This process leads to marked differentials in size of families of professionals, workers, and labourers. In some early studies marked differences between populations based on rural and urban residence were also found, with rural fertility rates higher than urban. Jaffe found these rural-urban differences in an analysis of the 1800 to 1840 census material,¹ which suggests that these differentials were present in the United States even at this early date. Marked fertility difference has also been noted by regions of the U.S., by nativity, and by ethnic groups.

The inverse relationship between socio-economic status and fertility shows signs of disappearing, beginning in the 1940's. During the period 1940 to 1950 there seemed to be a convergence of fertility, that is, an increase in fertility in the higher socio-economic levels combined with a continual decrease at the lower levels. With the knowledge of birth control available to more and more families, the future should see a continual convergence of fertility experience, with more frequent short-term fluctuations in the birth rate.

Social and Psychological Factors. Fertility has in the past varied with such indices as residence, race, religion, education, income and occupational groups. In 1939 the Milbank Memorial Fund planned the Indianapolis study, designed to test twenty-three hypotheses relating social psychological factors to fertility planning and fertility. Perhaps the major contribution of this study has been to reinforce the analytical importance of socio-economic status. A further study of fertility undertaken in 1956-7 defined its population as all couples who had their second child in 1956. This sample was drawn from the eight largest standard metropolitan areas of the country (New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Detroit, San Francisco-Oakland, Pittsburgh and Boston). The sample included 1,165 couples, representing only the urban population of these areas. In summarising their finding on fertility planning and socio-economic status, the authors state, "In general, the expectation that higher socio-economic status would associate with desire for larger families and with a successful contraceptive record has been only partly borne out and with major exceptions."² The data from this study tend to confirm the

¹ A. J. Jaffe, "Differential Fertility in White Population in Early America", *Journal of Heredity*, vol. 31, September, 1940, pp. 407-11.

² Charles F. Westoff, Robert G. Patten, Jr., Phillip C. Sage, Elliot G. Mishler, *Family Growth in Metropolitan America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 234.

results of other recent studies on fertility, particularly those of Freedman, Whelpton, and Campbell¹ that only slight associations can be observed between socio-economic status and fertility. There appears to be a convergence of fertility rates among socio-economic groups in American Society.

Another significant factor in differential fertility is religion. Precision matching has been used to determine whether fertility differences between major religious groups result from socio-economic differences.² The 66 Jewish couples from a national sample of fertility were matched with Catholic and Protestant couples as to duration of marriage and socio-economic characteristics. These controls eliminated most of the Protestant-Jewish differences in fertility but did not reduce the Catholic-Jewish differences. Catholic fertility patterns cannot be explained by socio-economic factors. In another study,³ religion is said to account for as much of the variance in size of family of Detroiters as economic factors.

THE DECREASING DEATH RATE

The population of an area may suffer loss in two ways : through death and through emigration. In Iceland two hundred years ago the death rate was around 35 per thousand population, thus equaling the birth rate and maintaining a stationary population. Probably the same situation held in much of Europe at that time. But now the death rate in western Europe and in the United States is about a fourth of this figure. The decrease in the death rate of several countries is shown in Fig. 23, particularly for two countries for which data are available as far back as the beginning of the nineteenth century. The movement of the death rate is similar for other countries of the West for which there are data. The average death rate for Sweden, Norway, Denmark, England and Wales, and Scotland fell from 20 per 1,000 population in 1871-80 to 10.1 in 1961. For France and Belgium the decline was from 23 to 11.9 ; and for Spain and Italy from 30 to 9.0.

Causes of the lower Death Rate. The cause of this better adjustment is not due to any change in our biological heritage or in the natural environment. Rather the changes lie in our culture. It is our culture that has produced the discoveries which prevent the diseases that make us sick and take our lives. The mass application of these discoveries has been possible through sanitary engineering, through the dissemination of education, and through public health movements.

¹ Ronald Freedman, Pascal K. Whelpton, Arthur A. Campbell, *Family Planning, Sterility and Population Growth* (New York : McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959).

² Ronald Freedman, Pascal K. Whelpton and John W. Smit, "Socio-Economic Factors in Religious Differentials in Fertility", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 26, pp. 608-14, August, 1961.

³ Gerhard Lenski, *The Religious Factor*.




FIG. 23.—The Decline in Death Rates, 1812-1952

Death rates have been decreasing for a longer time than birth rates. As the gap between birth rates and death rates has widened, there has been a corresponding great increase in population. The same phenomenon is occurring in such already densely populated countries as Japan, Ceylon, and India.

Reduction in deaths from childhood diseases and in infant deaths occurred first. The prevention of various epidemics then followed. No great progress has yet been made in the conquest of the cardiac dangers or cancer. These remarks apply to the Western, industrialised states. In the village populations of the Far East, a later start is being made, but rapid success is expected.

Death Rates at Various Ages. How the mortality rate has been lowered at the different ages is shown in Table 16 which gives mortality rates at different periods throughout life. It shows that in 1850, there were 73.9 deaths per thousand young children, compared with only 6.95 one hundred years later. Childhood and youth are now relatively free from the visitation of death. High death rates begin to rise sharply after 55 years of age. The death rate has been lowered more in the early ages than for the years over 60. The reason why the death rate has not been lowered as much for the older ages is the lack of success of scientific medicine in attacking the degenerative diseases.

Since infancy and old age are the times in life when we are most likely to die, it follows that a community with many babies and elders will have a higher crude death rate as measured by total deaths per 1,000 total population, than a community with a large proportion of youth and middle-aged, merely because of the age distribution.

TABLE 16

DEATHS per 1,000 IN EACH AGE GROUP.
ENGLAND AND WALES, 1851-5, 1951-5 *

Age.	Males.		Females.	
	1851-5.	1951-5.	1851-5.	1951-5.
0-4	73.9	6.95	63.8	5.40
5-9	8.75	0.55	8.54	0.39
10-14	5.15	0.48	5.32	0.34
15-19	6.98	0.86	7.75	0.50
20-24	9.24	1.23	8.90	0.70
25-34	9.95	1.39	10.3	1.09
35-44	12.9	2.71	12.6	2.11
45-54	18.6	7.93	15.8	4.89
55-64	31.6	22.5	27.8	11.8
65-74	66.7	54.6	59.7	33.1
75-84	150.9	126.7	137.2	92.4
85-	310.9	265.9	292.1	222.0

* Adapted from A. M. Carr-Saunders *et al.*, 1958, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

Such is the case with some of the small villages, from which many youth have moved away, leaving a larger percentage of babies and old people.

On the other hand, a rapidly growing city is likely to have a large proportion of young men and young women, for these are the people who are most ready to migrate. A low death rate is favoured by such an age distribution, for most of the population are at ages when there is little death. Hence the comparison of crude death rates between communities is misleading.

The Average Length of Life. There is a numerical relationship between the death rate and the average length of life. It is measurable, when the chances of death remain the same throughout the life span and when the age distribution, that is, the percentage of old and of young, remains the same, too.¹ Then 1 divided by the average length of life is the death rate. Thus $1 \div 35$ is .0286, and the death rate is 28.6 per 1,000 population; and the death rate when the average length of life is seventy is 14.3.

The actual average length of life is practically impossible for the collector of vital statistics to obtain. But it is possible to get for any one year the average length of life that the babies born that year will live, if the chances of death remain the same as they are in that year. This average length of life is called the average expectancy of

¹ These are the conditions for the "life table" discussed in a later paragraph. It is a "life table" average length of life as compared with the actual average length of life, but usually not greatly different.

life. This in the United States in 1953 was 68·8 years. Thus the babies born in 1953 will live, on the average, nearly threescore years and ten, if the chances of death remain throughout their life as they were in 1953. Very probably more diseases will be conquered, and the chances of death will be somewhat less. In which case these 1953 babies may on the average live longer than the traditional threescore and ten.

This average "life table" expectancy of life is obtained in the following manner. Of the babies born in 1957, say 100,000, 2,643 died, for the death rate for babies during their first year of life was 26·43 per 1,000. There would then be 97,357 survivors at age 1. In the same way, the survivors at every age through 100 years until all have died can be determined, by applying the specific death rate of 1957 to the survivors at each age. We thus have a "life table" of the babies born in 1957. From this table the average length of life can be computed; that is, the average expectancy of life, if the death rate of 1957 should continue throughout their lifetime.

With the average length of life in 1957 being 69·3 years, the death rate is the reciprocal of 69·3, or 14·4. But the actual death rate was 9·6. The reason that the actual death rate is lower than the expected death rate is that actually in 1957 there was a larger proportion of population in the healthier ages of youth and middle age than is found in the life-table population, which is a population with a "stable" age distribution. A country will have an age distribution favourable for a low death rate when it has immigration, for it is usually the young and middle-aged who migrate.

The average expectancy of life at birth, and its reciprocal, the expected death rate, constitute a somewhat better comparative measure than the actual crude death rate, for they are based on a stable age distribution. Furthermore we usually compare death rates to get some idea of the "healthfulness" of communities, that is, the chance of living, for high death rates are correlated with high sickness rates.

Our Longer Life. The extension of our stay on this fair earth is one of the great achievements of all time. The struggle to live is the great characteristic of all animal life, as Huxley observed. At the beginning of the age of metals, the expectation of life has been estimated at eighteen years, owing largely to the high infant mortality. In the Middle Ages we have somewhat better data. Then the expectation was around thirty-five years. To-day, in the middle of the twentieth century, it is about twice as long. In the United States the expectation of life at birth was 70·2 in 1961. There is a differential in life expectancy in favour of females over males, as shown by the following data: Canada (1955-7), 73 for females, 67·6 for males; England and Wales (1960), 74·1 and 68·3 respectively; France (1960), 73·8 and 67·2; Portugal (1957-8), 65·0 and 59·8; and New Zealand

(1955-7), 73.0 and 68.2. For other countries and for very rough comparison, the crude death rate may be used.

In the United States the expectation of life is somewhat different for the various states. In general, the people in agricultural states with native white population live the longest, while in the states with a large proportion of urban dwellers or with a high non-white or foreign-born population, the people die a few years sooner. Women live on the average around five years longer than men.

THE INCREASE IN POPULATION

The Natural Rate of Increase. The population of an area grows in two ways, an excess of births over deaths and an excess of immigration over emigration; and, of course, it decreases by the reverse of these




FIG. 24.—Age Distribution in the United States in 1870, 1940, and 1956.

A diminishing birth rate—not a stable low birth rate—makes an age distribution like that of 1940 in the United States. An influx of young immigrants has the same effect. The age distribution for 1956 shows the effect of the high birth rate since 1945. The dips in the sides of the age pyramid for 1956 will move upward in successive decades.

two flows. The first way, an excess of births over deaths, is called a natural increase, the only way the population of the whole world can increase.

In England and Wales for 1951-5, the number of live births was 15.2 per thousand, and the crude death rate was 11.7, giving a rate of natural increase of 3.5 per thousand or somewhat under $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent for that year. This represents a considerable decline in the rate of natural increase from 14 per thousand in 1871-80, when the birth rate was 35.4 and the death rate 22.5. But it shows a slight increase over 1931-40, when, with a birth rate of 14.8 and death rate of 12.3, the increase was only 2.3 per thousand.

Age Distribution. This excess of population at certain ages is an

excess over the population in these ages when the "age distribution is stable". How age distributions differ is seen in Fig. 24. In the 1940 distribution there are few children because of the drop in the birth rate during the twenties and thirties and a large proportion in the ages 40 to 45 because of migration in the first quarter of the century. In 1960, there is a large percentage of children because of the high birth rate after the war.

The age distribution of rapidly growing cities is somewhat like that of the United States for 1940, chiefly because of the migrants to the city, who are usually young and middle-aged adults. When age distributions become "stable", their pattern is somewhat like that of the United States in 1870, pyramidal in shape, though with perhaps not quite so sharp a slope in the early years.

The age distribution of the population in England and Wales is very similar to that in the U.S.A. The decline in the birth rate after the 1870's resulted in the contraction at the base of the age pyramid, while the more recent increase has produced a pyramid comparable to that for the U.S.A. for 1956.

The Net Reproduction Rate. The rate of natural increase in the United States is high partly because it has an excess of population in the ages when the death rate is low and when procreation is high, as is seen in Fig. 24. With a "stable" age distribution, the rate of natural increase would be 10.7 per 1,000 population instead of the actual increase of 14.8.

These rates of natural increase when the age distribution is stable are important measures and are frequently used, but in a slightly different form. Instead of computing these rates of natural increase (or decrease) with a stable age distribution *on a yearly base*, they may be computed *on the base of a generation*, which is about twenty-seven or twenty-eight years in the United States at the present time. The population at the end of a generation may be expressed as a multiple or a fraction of the population at the beginning of the generation. This multiple or fraction is called a net reproduction rate, a measure in common use. Thus when the net reproduction rate is 1, the population at the end of a generation is the same as at the beginning and the population having a stable age distribution is stationary. If the net reproduction rate is 1.50, the population will have increased 50 per cent in a generation. If it is 0.90, it will have decreased by 10 per cent. A net reproduction rate, as the term implies, of 1.50 means that 100 females will leave when they die 150 females; and when the net reproduction rate is 0.90, 100 females will be replaced by only 90 females, assuming birth and death rates remain the same.

The net reproduction rate, though computed for a change over a period of a generation, is nevertheless calculated on the bases of birth and death rates for a particular year. It therefore fluctuates from year to year, much as do birth rates and death rates. Thus the net

reproduction rate for the United States in 1954 was 1·65. That is, if the age distribution had been "stable" with the birth and death rates of 1954, the population would have increased 65 per cent in a generation. But in the late 1930's the net reproduction rate was 0·98, which meant a loss of 100,000 a year in population, if the age distribution had been "stable"; while actually the population was increasing, naturally, at the rate of 800,000 a year because, of course, of the excess of population in the procreating ages. For England and Wales, the rate in 1935 was 0·75, and 1947, 1·2. In 1955, it was a fraction over 1.

The net reproduction rates of cities are of particular interest. We know that most cities are growing rapidly, but that is partly because of a net immigration. It is also partly due to an age distribution that is favourable to a high birth rate. What we want to know is whether the cities could maintain their populations without these favourable factors. This is what the net reproduction rate tells us. Up to 1940 the cities of the United States were not maintaining their populations without these favourable factors; for the net reproduction rates were less than 1. Thus in 1935-40, 100 urban females would have been replaced by only 73 females. In 1944-49, however, the birth rates had risen; and the urban net reproduction rate in the United States was 1·19. One hundred females living in cities were being replaced by 119 females.

TABLE 17

THREE DIFFERENT RATES OF POPULATION INCREASE FOR
SELECTED COUNTRIES IN 1952 OR 1953 *

Country.	Annual natural rate per 1,000 Population.	Annual natural rate per 1,000 Population, "Stable" Age Distribution.	Net Reproduction rate.
Great Britain	4·5	0·4	1·01
Sweden	5·7	0·7	1·02
France	7·1	8·5	1·25
Japan	12·6	9·3	1·29
U.S.A.	15·0	10·7	1·56
Israel (Jewish Population) .	23·9	21·7	1·79
Ceylon	28·5	26·4	1·99

* Data from *United Nations Demographic Yearbook*.

Though the cities are increasing by excess of births over deaths without the influence of favourable age distribution, for the first time since the beginning of the century, the farm population is increasing even more rapidly. The net reproduction rate for the rural farm

population, 1.81 in 1944-9, was greater than for the urban population, 1.19, even though the farm population was decreasing. The decrease was due to outward migration.

Different Rates of Change, compared. Three measures of population change, that is, decrease or increase, have been described. One is the difference between the actual crude annual birth and death rates and is called the natural rate. Another is the annual natural rate for a "stable" age distribution. The third is the net reproduction rate which shows, after subtracting 1, the rate of change over a generation. These rates are compared in Table 17, which shows each for several different countries. There is a wide variation among different countries. Ceylon's population is increasing at nearly 3 per cent (2.85) a year, and by 99 per cent (or nearly doubling) in a generation when the age distribution is stable. One hundred females in Ceylon will be replaced by 199 females. The birth rates have all risen while the death rates have not in these countries in the past decade, hence their increases are greater than they were a decade or more earlier.

THE FUTURE POPULATION

In the United States. Forecasting the future population of the United States has several uncertainties. The main uncertainty concerns the future birth rate. The change in the death rates in the near future is not likely to be particularly great. About immigration, the attitude at the present seems to be opposed to permitting very much immigration, and there are few indications that this attitude will change soon.

In view of this uncertainty about the future of the birth rate, the projection of the curve of population growth in the United States has been made by the United States Bureau of the Census¹ on the basis of four different hypotheses about the future birth rate. These four hypotheses are derived from different ideas about the future course of fertility. The first is that fertility will average 10 per cent above the 1955-7 level throughout the projection. This yields the largest result, a population of 272 million in 1980. The fertility level of 1955-7, remaining constant until 1980, gives the next highest result of 260 million. If the fertility level of 1955-7 declines to the 1949-51 level by 1965-70, and then remains constant until 1975-80, it will give an expected population in 1980 of 245 million. The lowest projection is 231 million, based on the assumption that fertility will decline from the 1955-7 level to the 1942-4 level by 1965-70, and then remain at that level until 1975-80. The projection of the United States population to 1980 ranges from 231 million to 272 million.

In considering which projection is most likely to occur, the factors

¹ U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, No. 123, October 20, 1955.

affecting the rise and fall of the birth rate should be considered. These were discussed in the first part of this chapter. In this connection it is well to remember that the births calculated by years fluctuate much more than cumulated births calculated over the whole




FIG. 25.—Annual Births, Great Britain, 1858-1947, and as projected, 1947-2047, on three alternative assumptions about the size of families in future.

In each case future marriage rates are assumed to be intermediate in effect between the marriage rates of men and women in 1942-47, mortality rates are assumed to decline from 1947 to 1977 at approximately the same rates as over the last 50 years, and net migration is assumed to be nil. From *Royal Commission on Population Report* (London, June 1949).

fertility period of the female. It is possible that the young married couples after the war are having their babies earlier than in former years when the babies were spaced out further, although there also may be more children born by the end of the fertility period.

What happens to the marriage rate will be important in determining the future births; for the influence of prosperity seems to operate very little on the birth rate of the third- and fourth-born children, and its influence on the birth rate is largely through the marriage rate. Another factor is the diffusion of birth control practices. These may be further extended to religious and rural groups who do not now practise birth control. Also those who do practise it may learn to do so more effectively.

On the other hand, the rise in the birth rate of the higher-income groups and of the city population, who are supposed to have a knowledge of birth control, suggests that they want larger families, even though they know how to keep them small.

Possible future population trends in Britain are shown in Fig. 25. But with the tendency towards earlier marriages and larger families,

it is likely that the future increase will be greater than that considered probable by the Royal Commission in 1947.

The future Population of the World. The projection of the curve of the world population growth into the future is best done for a few large areas of the world with similar demographic characteristics. These demographic characteristics are the way in which the birth rates and death rates are increasing.

The course run by these rates in the past for, say, Western Europe has been somewhat as follows. The birth rates and death rates were about the same from year to year, and hence the growth of population was negligible. Then the death rate decreased more or less rapidly with little change in birth rate, and the population increased more or less rapidly. Then the decrease in the death rate slowed, and the birth rate continued to decrease until it approximated the death rate and the population tended to become approximately stationary again.

There are few countries in the world with records of birth and death where the birth rate equals the death rate. Where records are kept on vital statistics, there is likely to be some modern control over contagion and infection. The populations of most such countries are increasing at a low rate. Their death rates are expected to decrease a good deal earlier than their birth rates do. The gap between the birth rate and the death rate is expected to widen. Hence a great increase of population is probable. Much of the vast population of Asia has this high growth potential, as do also parts of Africa and South America.

In other areas, such as Eastern Europe, the gap between births and deaths appears to have ceased becoming greater, and a narrowing seems to be ahead. In countries in this transitional phase, there should be a slowing up of growth.

In some countries of Western Europe the gap between births and deaths is almost closed and perhaps would be but for a temporary age distribution favourable to a high birth and low death rate. In such countries a stationary or very slow rate of growth is looked for.

The Population Division of the United Nations has made projections to 2,000 for the different demographic areas of the world. These are shown in Table 18. Somewhat common demographic characteristics are found in Europe and North America and these regions will grow at the slowest rate annually, about 12 to 17 per 1,000 population. The fastest growing area with a rate of 34 per 1,000 is Latin America. Africa seems to be growing at about the same rate as the world as a whole, which is around 21 per 1,000. These are average rates for the period 1950-75. Estimates of the average annual increase for the period 1975-2000 are slightly higher for the world as a whole and for all the continents with the exception of North America and Europe.

By 2000, Europe will have a smaller proportion of the world's

population than she had in 1950, dropping from 23 per cent to 5.1 per cent, while Asia's proportion will have increased from 55.2 to 61.8 per cent and North America's decreased from 6.7 to 5.0 per cent, assuming the median projections are an accurate forecast.

TABLE 18

ESTIMATED POPULATION BASED ON UNITED NATIONS' MEDIAN ASSUMPTION OF THE WORLD AND OF SEPARATE CONTINENTS FOR A.D. 1975 AND 2000

Area.	Population (million).		
	1960.	1975.	2000.
World	2,995	3,828	6,267
Africa	254	303	517
North America . .	199	240	312
Latin America . .	206	303	592
Asia	1,679	2,210	3,870
Europe	640	751	947
Oceania	17	21	29

U.N. Demographic Yearbook, 1961 and 1959.

These projections are much affected by the expected growth of those great masses of people in Asia and Latin America, where the fall in the death rate is starting but where there is little evidence of a decline in the birth rate. In the past the fall in the birth rate has lagged far behind the fall in the death rate. Such may be the case in the future. However, it does not appear to be inevitable that this should be so. The technology involved in a decrease in the birth rate is much less complicated and costly than is the case with the death rate. But though an earlier or synchronous fall in the birth rate is possible, we have no evidence that it will happen. Experience points in the direction of an earlier decrease in the death rate, which gives a push to population growth.

The careful projector of population growth curves does not like to go beyond, say, thirty years. We would like to know what the population of the world will be throughout the lifetime of our children, say, until the year 2035. But the error in a projection for so long a period is quite great, even assuming no great devastating wars. We would particularly like to know whether our children and grandchildren will be hungry or have to live on an inferior diet, and whether there will be enough petrol to run their cars.

World Resources and the Support of Population. A thousand million more people than the earth now contains is the expectancy for the next twenty-five or thirty years. Can they be fed, and can their plane of living be maintained or raised? It will be most difficult in the densely

populated areas of Asia, where over 1,000 million people now live. The intake of food is now low there, about 2,200 calories as compared with 3,200 in North America, where, too, the diet is superior in minerals, vitamins, and amino acids. Technical writers on the subject of food and population generally agree that the knowledge exists to produce and distribute adequate food for a 50 per cent increase in population. The difficulty is rather the practical one of changing the habits and agricultural practices of such a vast population in remote rural areas in thirty years' time.

Resources other than Food. In the villages in China and India, probably 70 or 80 per cent of the income of a family goes for food. In the United States the percentage is 30. The remainder of the income is spent for products that come from fuels, other minerals, forests, and products of nature other than food. If the level of living is to rise, then the consumption of minerals and products of the earth other than food will increase faster than the consumption of food. Since all peoples want a higher standard of living, the demand for minerals is expected to increase.

While the consumption of food increases only a little faster than population, the consumption of minerals increases at a much greater rate. The curve of industrial production, based upon other products than food, goes up much faster than does the curve of agricultural production. Thus for the world, industrial production from 1938 to 1953 increased at an annual rate of 3.7 per cent, while population increased at about 1 per cent a year.¹ In the United States the mineral output in physical volume increased nearly six times in the first half of the twentieth century,² while the agricultural production was doubling.

Looking as far ahead as 2000, we may say that although complete exhaustion of any of the important minerals of the world is not forecast, the demand is expected to increase very greatly—indeed, in many cases, as high as 100 per cent or more. This fact indicates rising costs and a struggle to obtain these minerals.

As to resources, we shall have inexhaustible supplies of oxygen, nitrogen, carbon dioxide, radiation from the sun, and much cultivable soil. It looks as though we need not be greatly worried about supplies of inanimate energy in view of researches on nuclear fission, on solar radiation, and on photosynthesis. Indeed, the abundance may be much greater than now. We do have fears, though, because of a possible shortage of minerals.

The problem should not be viewed as one of the carrying capacity of the earth merely to sustain life in so many billion human bodies.

¹ Woytinsky and Woytinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 752.

² W. S. Woytinsky, "World Resources in Relation to Population", read at the Thirtieth Institute of the Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation held in Chicago in 1954.

We should want to provide for them a more abundant living. The adjustment we want is not merely to live but to attain a higher standard of living.

The knowledge necessary for avoiding impending crises of imbalance between population and resources and for raising our standards of living can come from two sources, either or both of which may be needed. The first is the field of chemistry, which can create new products. The other is the knowledge of how to limit the number of offspring. To utilise both these weapons, effective social organisation is a prerequisite.

SUMMARY

This chapter has been concerned with changes in population and their significance for social welfare. Malthus some years ago pointed out the danger that growth of population might exceed the food supply, resulting in a lower standard of living and human misery. Malthus did not reckon with the dynamic factor of culture. Contraception has produced a falling birth rate, easing the population pressure; and science applied to agriculture has increased the food supply. Yet Malthus did dramatise the important principle that the standard of living is determined by the relation of the size of population to resources, although he neglected the rôles of effective economic organisation and the state of technological knowledge.

The invention of contraception, which has made possible a falling birth rate in the principal countries of the world, was diffused first among the prosperous classes and the urban population, and is only gradually being diffused among the poor and the rural people. Recently the course of the birth rate has been reversed, and since 1933 in the United States it has been rising irregularly because of the business prosperity associated with war and preparation for war. Prosperity increased marriages, and increased marriages resulted in higher birth rates.

The death rate has been falling, principally because of the saving of lives of infants and young children. The expectancy of life has risen to about double what it was 150 years ago, a signal achievement.

The population of an area can increase by immigration or by excess of births over deaths, called a natural increase. This measure may be affected by the age distribution of the community, hence a more realistic measure, with the age distribution stable, is needed. Such a measure, computed on the basis of a generation, is the net reproduction rate, which tells the number of female offspring 100 females will leave behind. Up to 1940 United States cities were not, *via* births, maintaining their numbers; but in 1944-9 the urban indications were a net increase of 19 females per 100 per generation.

The projections of the population of the United States to 1980 range from 272 to 231 million, depending on different hypotheses concerning the future birth rate. For the world as a whole, an increase in population of 1,000 million is expected during the next 25 or 30 years, raising important questions about how they are to be fed and supplied with fuels, minerals, and other products. To avoid a disparity between population and resources, help can come from scientific discovery and from the limitation of offspring, which calls for discipline and effective social organisation.

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. What factors did Malthus overlook in formulating his famous theory, and how do they affect the theory?
2. If the knowledge of how to limit births were evenly diffused over the population, would the poor have fewer children than the rich?
3. How do you account for the decline in the birth rate after 1870 in Britain?
4. In what ways are changes in the population related to social change?
5. How do you explain the recent rise in the birth rate in the U.S.A. and Britain? Do you think it is likely to continue?
6. Examine the social consequences of changes in the age structure of the population.
7. Will the spread of the mechanical power age to China, India, and Russia lead to still further increases in these immense populations? Elaborate.
8. Why is the age distribution of certain communities unstable?

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PART VI : SOCIAL ORGANISATION

Monkeys and apes do not have much social organisation. They hunt food together in family bands which sometimes fight under leadership one with the other, especially over hunting territory or females.

Pre-literate human groups in the hunting and food-gathering stages of culture have families, hunting parties, and recognised leaders ; there are also sometimes clans, age societies, men's clubs, and ceremonial organisations in religion and in recreation.

The social organisation of communities is a function of size ; the larger the population the more organisations there are. In small communities with 10 to 50 families, there cannot be very many social organisations without much overlapping of membership. It is easier in such communities to have one organisation with several functions than several organisations with one function each. In modern communities of 200, there are about four or five formal social organisations ; in villages of 1,000 about 15 ; and in cities of 50,000 there are around 400 or 500.

Social organisation is also a function of the accumulation of culture. The Eskimos do not have chess clubs, for culture has not accumulated to that extent.

Social organisation is also a function of the division of labour, that is, of specialised activities. Thus one area produces cotton and another makes woollens. Group specialisation and division of labour depend on transportation to exchange products and services, as well as population and cultural accumulation.

As social organisations grow in number, there are more single-purpose organisations, as for instance, a football team. Also as social changes occur, an organisation having many functions may lose some to a single-purpose organisation, or functions may be transferred to another multi-purpose organisation. Thus the protection against violence may be transferred from the family to the government.

Of the social organisations there are some which have a bundle of functions and which have existed over hundreds of thousands of years and in many different cultures. These are the major social institutions, such as family, religion, and government. Other institutions may not be so widely spread over time and areas, as for instance, corporations. Social institutions usually have more than one function ; thus the family has procreation, education, and production.

Associations are social organisations with a shorter history, are less widely distributed, and often have only one function or very

few functions. Examples are a parent-teacher association, an athletic club, or a secret fraternal society.

Both social institutions and associations have, as subdivisions, minor social organisations, such as individual businesses, committees, or social clubs, which are even more short-lived, less widespread, and more specialised. Not all of these group organisations are face-to-face groups. Some never assemble, but the communication between members or officers and members is at long-distance.

In addition to the types of formal organisation indicated, there are also various types of informal organisation, such as friendships, gangs, and cliques. These develop to supply needs neglected or not fully met by the formal organisations. Thus a clique is a small selected number of congenial persons within a formal group who band together informally for fellowship and/or prestige. These informal organisations are important in all societies but particularly so in complex modern societies where formal organisation is highly developed in the interests of efficiency, often at the sacrifice of human values. To achieve these personal values, informal groups develop within the formal organisation.

Thus the group activities of a people over an area are organised, formally or informally, into a variety of types, and they have proliferated into large numbers. The evolution of social organisations means that modern society is very highly organised, and there is no indication that it will be any less so in the near future.

CHAPTER XV

THE SOCIAL ORDER

The social world at times appears to be chaotic, as when a mob riots, or when there is a hysterical rush from an impending crisis ; but soon leaders may appear and movement is directed towards specific objects, in which case crowds become organised. Indeed order is the rule in the social world as truly as it is in the physical world. The sociologists call society the "social order". The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the order of society.

STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION

Structure is Subordinate to Function when the interest is in Social Life. Basically, order in society consists of the groupings of persons and the arrangements of their behaviour. Already much of this book has been concerned with such groupings, as in the chapters on groups and communities, and with such arrangements, as in the paragraphs on folkways and social controls.

Orderliness has two fundamental aspects. One is the structure and the other is the functions performed by the structure. In society the organisation of a group of persons is the structure. What the group does is the function. Both have form.

Whether the function determines the structure or the structure determines the function need not detain us. Because we are interested in both anatomy and physiology, our interest lies in both structure and function. But observation seems to indicate that we have an especial concern with function. We are particularly interested in the behaviour of groups. The social sciences are sometimes called the behavioural sciences. When we show an interest in structure, it often has to do with the relation of structure to function. That is, we want to know how effective is a given type of structure in achieving a given function or goal compared to some other type of structure. Thus we may want to know the relative effectiveness for particular purposes of the congressional and parliamentary forms of government.

ORDER IN FUNCTION

A Label for Established, Recurrent Social Activity is Custom. The basic unit of the functioning of social structure is the act.¹ Thus we speak of social action and of social interaction. Acts of an actor involving another person are social acts.² Among masses of people such social

¹ G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, 1934).

² Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory* (Rev. ed. ; Glencoe, Ill. : The Free Press, 1954).

acts are repeated ; and when the repetition is frequent enough, they become customs, in the same way that individual acts, if repeated, become habits. Customs are social habits and through repetition become the basis of an order of social behaviour. When the customary behaviour is organised around the social position or statuses of individuals in groups, it is referred to as social rôles.

There are many different names for customs depending upon the characteristic emphasised or the situation in which the custom is followed. "Folkways" has been used as a term to characterise certain minor customs among primitive or folk societies. The term is sometimes applied to certain acts of modern urban dwellers, too, as, for instance, shaking hands. The term "etiquette" is used for certain customs in "polite society" generally involving protocol. "Manners" are customs that are supposed to be based on the consideration of others in the smaller affairs of social life. "Convention" emphasises common agreement about a custom. "Morals" are customs the departure from which is of great concern to the group, and unlike certain laws which are also customs do not always carry specific punishments. "Traditions" are customs of very long standing. "Laws", enacted by legislation, may originate customs. "Rituals" are customs having symbolic significance and emphasising means to ends. "Ceremonies" are customs signalling important events.

In the preceding paragraph no attempt has been made to define these terms which denote different kinds of customs. Rather, some outstanding characteristic is indicated. To most such customs, conformity is expected. Those who do not conform may expect criticism, as is discussed in the chapters on deviation and social control.

For new Social Practices in a rapidly changing Society the term "Custom" is seldom used. A social practice must be in existence some time before it is called a custom. If it is only of temporary duration, we may refer to it as a fashion, or even as a fad. A term is needed to name new social practices. It is possible that the term "norm" may be so used, as well as to designate old practices. Norm, in popular usage, means a standard ; and in statistics it means the mode, that is, the act or object of most frequent occurrence. But in both cases the implication is of failure to come up to a standard or of deviation from the mode or average. So that when one speaks of standards or modes, one is likely to be concerned also with deviations therefrom. Deviations may be of concern to society and be the subject of reprimand, punishment, or ostracism. Thus in the army a private who does not salute an officer is subject to reprimand. Moral values may therefore be attached to norms. But there may be modal practices to which no social valuation is attached. Thus in a community, most of the workers may commute from place of residence to place of work ; but

it makes little difference to society whether a worker rides or walks to work. There is no moral value attached.

Whether individual norms are socially valued or not, norms as such are of great importance to society, for it is their adjustment one to another that makes social order. In a well-organised society the norms are articulated, as are the parts of a machine. The dovetailing of norms produces equilibrium in society.

ORDER IN STRUCTURE

We have been discussing the orderliness of function. There is also an orderliness of structure. There are many different terms we use to characterise this orderliness of structure, the most common being group, status, society, or community. Each of them implies some sort of orderly arrangement. These have been discussed in earlier chapters.

Structure in Society is Organisation. Perhaps the most widely used descriptive term of social structure is social organisation, which means an arrangement of persons or of parts. There are many different kinds of social organisation, such as the family, the members of a church, a political party, the personnel of a factory, an athletic team, a community, an empire, a league of nations. In all these cases there is an arrangement of persons or parts that compose the organisation. Such is true even of an informal play group. This arrangement is sometimes called a pattern. These patterns may be viewed as varying organisations of social positions or statuses.

There are other aspects of organisation. If the reader wished to organise a sociology club, a meeting would be called and a temporary president would be chosen. Somebody would have to arrange programmes ; so a programme committee would be appointed. Notices must be sent out, and, of course, the minutes must be kept and read ; so a secretary would be needed.

There may be many Different Units of an Organisation. The constituent units of a social organisation in human society are persons. Thus the units of a parliament are human beings. But these basic units may themselves be organised into sub-units which are parts of the social organisation. Thus the work of the Congress of the United States is performed through committees made up of members ; there is a Committee on Foreign Relations, a Finance Committee, a Rules Committee, and so on. The work of individuals outside committees is usually rather ineffective or perfunctory as compared with these powerful committees, which determine when a bill shall be reported and when not. Similarly a unit of a federation of states may be a state as well as a person. A nation, a state, or a city is a social organisation, though each is composed of other social organisations.

There are many kinds of Organisations. A state is frequently called a political organisation, as is a legislative body, because it is concerned

with political matters. A factory is called an economic organisation, as are many other organisations engaged in production and distribution of wealth. A church is a religious organisation. But they are all social organisations, that is, organisations of society. A bank is a financial organisation, but it is also a social organisation. In a similar way a school is an educational organisation, but it is also a social organisation. The reader will appreciate that there are often several different uses of the same word. Thus the word "society" is used to describe a well-to-do prominent social set which gives parties, dinners, and dances, and into which a young woman makes a formal debut. But society is also quite generally an organised group of interacting individuals.

Similarly, there is more than one use of the term "social organisation". In academic circles, an economist may not apply it to an economic organisation but applies it to some non-economic organisation, such as a family or racial organisation. But the term social organisation is also used quite comprehensively to designate any organisation of society.

A useful fourfold classification of formal organisations is based on "who benefits" from the organisation.¹ Each of the four types has its special problems. In the first type, the mutual benefit associations, it is the members who are the principal beneficiaries, as in labour unions. Here the central problem has to do with maintaining internal democratic processes avoiding overbureaucratisation and the centralisation of power in the hands of officials. In the second type, represented by business concerns, it is the owners or managers who mainly benefit. Here the central problem is how to maintain efficiency in a competitive situation; overbureaucratisation impairs efficiency. The third type of organisation is client-centred, as in service organisations. Such organisations have to cope with the problem of the conflicts between professional service orientations and administrative procedures. Finally there are common weal organisations which serve the public at large and which have as a core problem the development of mechanisms for external democratic control by the public. In such agencies, overbureaucratisation impedes professional services or services to the public. Although one organisation may serve all of these publics, any organisation still exists primarily for the benefit of one party and benefits to the other parties are viewed as "Costs".

Complex Social Organisation: Bureaucracy. There is special interest at present in complex organisations, those having many parts, and particularly in bureaucracies, which are formal organisations of administrative officials. The increased interest in bureaucracies stems mainly from the greatly increased rôle which these organisa-

¹ Peter M. Blau and Richard Scott, *Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1962).

tions play in modern society, characterised by bigness in, for example, government, industry, church, labour unions, and the military establishment. Max Weber taught that one precondition for the emergence of a stable bureaucracy is a money economy, another the existence of a "legal" authority rather than a "traditional" or personal authority. Weber denies the use of the term bureaucracy to a staff where, say, government is personal and where the office-holders serve at the pleasure of the chief. Weber was impressed by the increasing rationalisation of social acts in industrial society in the West, the increasing specialisation of function, and the shift from charismatic leadership to leadership based on technical competence.¹ In recent years, the great growth of nationalism, the revolution in social expectations in underdeveloped nations, and the vast technical assistance programmes have further accentuated the growth of public bureaucracies.²

Weber emphasised certain norms of bureaucratic behaviour: rationality, impartiality, impersonality (the accent is on the office, not the occupant), subordination to one's superiors, limited degrees of initiative, selection through technical qualifications, the exercise of discretion, and remuneration and tenure governed by fixed principles. These norms, although overgeneralised and abstract, are not without influence on the personality of the bureaucrat.³

The Weberian model has limited utility. There are types of bureaucracies and varieties of each type. Thus bureaucracies have been classified according to the type of compliance or power used: coercive, economic, and symbolic.⁴ A prison is an example of the first, a corporation the second, and a church the third. Most organisations utilise all three patterns of compliance but differ in distribution of emphasis.

Having described the structure of the social order and its nomenclature, we wish to return to the functioning of this structure.

FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL ORGANISATION

Two kinds of function. The function of a social organisation may be seen from two points of view. One is the relationship of the functioning of the parts of the organisation to each other; and the other is the relationship of the functioning of the organisation as a whole to some task other than the interaction of its members. For example, in the case of the family, a set of internal functions has to

¹ Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, ed. by Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 333-6, 342-5.

² Morroe Berger, *Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt. A Study of the Higher Civil Services* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957).

³ Robert K. Merton (ed.), *Reader in Bureaucracy* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1952).

⁴ Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations* (The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961).

do with the interactions of the members, organised around co-operation or conflict and resulting in satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The family has also a set of externally oriented functions, including reproductions and the socialisation of the young, serving directly the needs of the larger society. All social organisations may be seen from the two points of view because each has an identity of its own and is also a part of the total social system. The interpersonal functions, having to do with the morale of the group, have been called *expressive* functions and the others, *instrumental* functions.

Social organisations differ, however, in the relative importance which they attach to the two sets of functions. Morale is such an important consideration in the family that most societies agree that divorce is preferable to an unhappy marriage. But an army exists primarily to win battles, not to please the soldiers. Attention must be given to the interaction of soldiers among themselves in order to win battles, but the emphasis is on fighting the enemy or defending the country, and the interaction of the army personnel is subsidiary to this outside objective.

Manifest and Latent Functions. Quite evident is the fact that social organisations exist to serve certain ends. A function of the family is to provide the population and a function of the school is to educate the population. Such intended and expected behaviour has been referred to as manifest functions. Not so obvious however is the observation that social organisations, in fulfilling their manifest functions, sometimes have unexpected, unintended, and even unrecognised consequences, which have been termed latent functions.¹ Thus, a manifest function of the educational system in a democracy is to provide equal opportunity for all. But a latent function of such an educational system is often to widen the inequalities between individuals, for the superior individuals take fuller advantage of the opportunities offered to them. Another latent consequence of democracy is an increase in envy, which is promoted when the members of the group are encouraged by the prevailing ideology to believe that they are all equals. As a further example of the disparity between manifest and latent functions we cite the findings of research² during World War II which revealed that American soldiers felt admiration for Nazi efficiency after viewing propaganda films, the manifest function of which was presumably to create critical or negative attitudes towards the enemy. That some of the consequences of social action may not be intended or anticipated is a compelling social fact, of particular significance for social planning.

There is another sense in which the term latent is used and that is *sub rosa*. In complex societies, certain unofficial social organisations

¹ Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1957), pp. 72-82.

² S. A. Stouffer *et al.*, *The American Soldier* (Princeton University Press, 1949.)

develop because of the failure of the official structure to satisfy the needs of particular subgroups. Merton has shown how bossism and the political machine thrive because they provide certain services which the official structure finds it more difficult to provide: all manner of assistance (cash, food, fuel, jobs) to deprived groups; political privileges desired by certain businesses, such as construction and traction companies; avenues of social mobility to those who have had little access to legitimate avenues, as the Irish in Boston; and aid to illegitimate businessmen in the form of protection from interference.

The Effectiveness of Organisational Achievement. We have order in society, not for the attractiveness of an orderly pattern and to avoid the formlessness of chaos and confusion. Organisations exist because they are effective in getting things done. If eleven men want to carry a ball down the field against opposition, they can do it much better if they are organised. Not all organisations are effective. Some once were but have ceased to achieve much. They persist by inertia.

SOCIAL SYSTEM

System is Orderly Arrangement. We may find an illustration of a system in the human body. The interrelationship of parts of the human body was the lifelong subject of research of Walter B. Cannon,¹ who made several dramatic discoveries, one of which was the relation of the adrenal glands to the production of blood sugar which gives the body energy. He explored the regulative mechanism that controls the flow of glucose into the blood. We know there are mechanisms that prevent the bodily temperature from fluctuating widely. These relationships of the parts of the body are a systematic arrangement—or, in other words, they constitute a system.

L. J. Henderson, a student of physiology, and Pareto, the economist, used the concept of system as an interrelationship of parts. Recently Talcott Parsons² has given the concept of system currency in modern sociology. A social system may be defined as a plurality of individuals interacting with each other according to shared cultural norms and meanings.³ The interacting units are basically persons but may be groups of organisations of persons within the system. All social organisations are social systems, since they consist of interacting individuals. Until recently sociologists fared very

¹ Walter B. Cannon, *The Wisdom of the Human Body* (Rev. ed.; New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1939).

² Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951).

³ This is a simplification of a definition by Parsons which is as follows: "... a social system consists in a plurality of individual actors interacting with each other in a situation which at least has a physical or environmental aspect, actors who are motivated in terms of a tendency to the 'optimisation of gratification' and whose relation to their situations, including each other, is defined and mediated in terms of a system of culturally structured and shared symbols." *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

well without much use of the word "system", for they dealt with the phenomenon as a phase of social organisation; but we need a term which puts the emphasis on the arrangement and interaction of parts. The concept is important, because the effectiveness of organised activity rests upon the interaction of the parts.

In a social system such as a religious organisation, each of the interacting individuals has a function to perform. The pastor is the leader, preaches and assists his parishioners with problems needing spiritual or religious advice. Church members attend church and make financial contributions. When these functions are publicly recognised and appreciated, they are called rôles. Each interacting individual in a social system has a rôle or several rôles to perform.

Adjustment of parts. The authors of this book have frequently used the term "adjustment" to characterise the functioning of the parts of a social structure. The parts of a clock are adjusted to each other; otherwise, the clock would not run. Businesses have failed because the sales department was not adjusted to production. If the streets of a city were wider or if there were not so many automobiles, there would be a better adjustment.

Equilibrium. Still another term to describe the interaction of units in a system is balance or equilibrium. Cannon's ¹ study of the bodily system centred on the mechanisms for maintaining equilibrium. To this process he gave the name homeostasis. Likewise, the physicists speak of the steady state. Systems tend toward conditions of minimum stress and least unbalance—that is, towards equilibrium. Experience with a social system reveals a balance between units which facilitates operation. Thus a ratio of one teacher to twenty pupils has been found to work well. When a community recognises and evaluates such a situation, the best operational ratio in view of all the circumstances becomes a norm.

The Human Factor affects the harmonious working of a Social System. Where the units of a social system are individual persons (instead of, say, committees or departments), their interaction is complicated by personal factors such as ambition, intrigue, or animosity, because of the fact that a human being is a psychological being and not merely a cog in a machine. For instance, a factory, viewed as a social system, is not only composed of interacting departments, bureaus, and committees, such as the purchasing department, the employment bureau, etc.; but these departments and divisions are composed of human beings. Their interactions may be a help or a hindrance to production. Rivalries, dissensions over rank, jealousies over status, dictatorial actions on the part of foremen—all effect the working of the system. There may be a balance of the parts, but at the same time there may not be a harmonious relationship of the human units.

¹ Cannon, *op. cit.*

DISORDER

Where social order as described in preceding pages of this chapter is not habitual and automatic, the establishment and maintenance of order is peculiarly the function of government, as is indicated in the later chapter on governing institutions. But often governments do not work well. They may be weak, unstable, inefficient, corrupt. Some countries change their cabinets so frequently that there is not enough responsibility or stability for them to do business, especially if long-term projects or relationships are involved.

Social Life is not always ordered Automatically. The American frontier was an area where law and order were absent but greatly desired. Occasionally factories, schoolrooms, and streets become disorderly. Political and social revolutions are occasions of great disorder, as were the French and Russian and Chinese revolutions.

Order, in and of itself, is something many people are proud of. They want peace at any price. But there are others who do not value order for its own sake. If they do not like the existing order, they may believe that disorder may be necessary to achieve a new social order based on different values.

Where the behaviour of members of a group is such as to sustain the existing social structure, the behaviour may be termed functional. Where it does not sustain the social structure, the behaviour is dysfunctional. This conception of function is relative to the *status quo* and is non-normative.

Disorder in society is the subject of two chapters which follow, "War and International Relations" and "Social Disorganisation".

Change often disturbs Equilibrium. A social system implies order among the interacting units of the systems. This order, be it equilibrium or harmonious relations between individuals, is likely to be disturbed, for a time at least, by social changes occasioned by innovations which force new conceptions of rôles and norms. Thus the rôle of the husband in the family was changed when steam took production out of the home into the factory. The passing of economic production from the home to factory was accompanied by more separation and divorces. The rôles of parents were disturbed by the passage of legislation against child labour and by the development of schools where some of the authority over the child was shifted from parents to teachers. Maintaining the orderliness of a social system is difficult when social changes are frequent.

We next consider a special type of social organisation called social institutions about which several chapters follow.

SUB-SYSTEMS

To the average citizen, an institution is a school, a prison, a church, or some organisation that is housed in a big building.

To sociologists, a social institution is exemplified by government, the jury, the family, marriage, schools, war. To them, institutions are a constellation of socially significant customs collected around some function or set of functions, such as ruling, fighting, and worshipping, and important enough to be found in various places at different times.¹

Social institutions are one of several types of social organisation. Like all social organisations, they are social systems. Other types




FIG. 26.—Functions of a Church.

The church, a major institution, represents a cluster of functions, not just one. The major function of worship is quite generally found in different cultures and regions, but the correlated functions vary from place to place and from time to time.

of social organisations are associations, crowds, and publics. There is no sharp dividing line between institutions and associations except that generally institutions are more important.

The Great Social Institutions. There are a few social institutions that are found very widespread in all eras. These are called the great social institutions. Four of these are the subjects of chapters in this section of the book. They centre upon getting food and other items of wealth, procreation, worship, and ruling. Getting a living, begetting and rearing children, believing in higher powers, and enforcing order are repetitive activities found in Babylon and in New York, among the Australian aborigines and among the Australian whites.

While these basic activities are everywhere, they differ from place to place and from time to time. The governing system is much more

¹ The precise meaning attached to concepts such as institution and association varies. See, for example, M. Ginsberg, *Sociology*, Chap. II.

extensive in America than it is among the natives of Africa, and the organisations that govern are also more numerous.

There are organisations that perform these repetitive activities. The group called the family is the organisation around which sex activities and child-rearing form a constellation. For the exercise of economic functions, there are the hunting party, the family, the community, the factory, the store, etc. So also there are religious and political organisations.

Other Institutions. There are many other needs or desires of human beings than those of propagation, of food-getting, of worshipping, and of maintaining order that might lay claim to being similarly basic, as, for instance, the educational function. Until relatively recent times, however, there was not a special organisation whose central purpose was education. The function of education either in inculcating habits in the young or in passing on traditional knowledge was an additional function of the family or of the community. Marking off a few social institutions as great or basic is, therefore, somewhat arbitrary.

We have discussed international relations along with these basic institutions, partly because attempts to prevent disorder or to maintain order between communities, small or large, is a nearly universal function. Government, we have seen, seeks to maintain order within the group where disorder is likely to disrupt. But there has been little effective authority to govern the relations between independent political groups. Yet political groups have everywhere been in peaceful contact, and sometimes in disorderly contact, though there are peoples who have been remarkably free from war.

Other Organisations. The few basic needs which the great institutions are designed to satisfy are only a tiny sample of the innumerable desires of mankind which become central activities of organisations, as, for instance, the wish to travel, the love of bestowing honours, the pleasure of collecting things for their own sake.

Furthermore in the large societies of modern times, the wishes behind the great institutions, such as the economic institutions, become specialised in particular organisations. Thus the need for purchasing petrol at a cheaper price, or the desire to obtain legislation favourable to a particular economic interest, become central activities for special-purpose organisations.

These organisations which perform such minor and specialised functions and are not found throughout long historical periods are generally called associations.

ASSOCIATIONS

In popular usage the word "association" does not have as wide a scope as is given it by sociologists. Thus a golf club would not be called an association by the general public, nor would a literary society. Sociologists use the term as a rather general one to cover a great variety

of relatively minor formal social organisations, for instance, those found in the following list :

athletic clubs	civic organisations
garden clubs	organised reform movements
music societies	public administration organisations
debutante societies	military organisations
bridge clubs	patriotic societies
hobby societies	political parties
schools	trade associations
parent-teacher associations	labour unions
literary societies	occupational societies
art societies	credit unions
scientific societies	co-operatives
missionary societies	farm organisations
young people's religious organisations	women's organisations
charity societies	youth groups
social work organisations	men's societies

Associations are those organisations developed around rather special interests, but as such are a part of the general picture of the orderly way in which social affairs are performed. The pursuit of these special interests quite naturally develops into associations, for organisations are efficient ways of getting these interests gratified.

Size of Community affects number of Associations. The reason why there are few associations in little communities is the small population of the community. For instance, if a small community of ten families with twenty-five adults had twenty-five associations, there would be much duplication of membership. The members have twenty-five interests or needs or desires, which would be met by the two or three organisations having more than the one main function. Thus the family, with propagation as its main function, also provides food, educates the children, affords protection. And the hunting band itself has not one function but several, which can be seen in its ceremonial recreations and organised hunting parties, and in games. The basic institutions in little communities have a bundle of functions.

If a community has 50,000 population, there is the possibility of many associations—say 500—although any one inhabitant will be a member of only a very few—say, three or four—the limitation of time alone preventing a person from being active in very many associations.

That associations increase in number, the larger the community, is seen in Table 19. These are communities at the present time in the United States. Thus in a community of a population of 100 there are on the average only 3 associations, while in a community of 2,000 inhabitants there are 23. Probably many thousands are to be found in a city the size of New York. In addition to these are also many quite informal groupings, like gangs and play groups.

When associations proliferate in this manner, a very large proportion of them are probably single-purpose organisations, such as a

TABLE 19

NUMBER OF ASSOCIATIONS IN COMMUNITIES * OF DIFFERENT SIZES

Population of Communities.						Number of Associations.
100	3
200	5
300	6
400	8
500	9
700	12
900	15
1,300	20
2,000	23
6,000	85
17,000	350
42,000	450

* Associations do not include stores and factories or the major social institutions, but do include athletic, recreational, socio-religious, fraternal, political, musical, patriotic, socio-economic, social reform, rural, youth, military, and other varieties of association. The data in the main are from Edmund Brunner *et al.*, *American Agricultural Villages* (Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1927), but to these have been added a score or more collected by mail from friends of the authors. All are for the United States and are for recent years. The number of cases for the communities under 1,000 is 60, and the numbers for each size of the small places are taken from a line fitted to these 60 villages. The village of 1,300 is an approximate average of 57 communities, while the size 2,000 is also an approximate average based upon 23 cases. The larger places are for one each. The numbers of associations are rounded.

camera club to exhibit photographs—though even in this case the club may be educational and concerned with many aspects of photography.

The Increase in the number of Associations. In the United States the growth of associations has been particularly noteworthy. De Tocqueville commented on it in his book about America, based on his observations made in the 1830's.

In no country in the world has the principle of association been more successfully used, or more unsparingly applied to a multitude of different objects, than in America. . . .

Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds—religious, moral, serious, futile, extensive or restricted, enormous or diminutive. The Americans make associations to give entertainments, to found establishments for education, to build inns, to construct churches, to diffuse books, to send missionaries to the antipodes; and in this manner they found hospitals, prisons, and schools. If it be proposed to advance some truth, or to foster some feeling, by the encouragement of a great example, they form a society. Wherever, at the head of some new undertaking, you see the Government

in France, or a man of rank in England, in the United States you will be sure to find an association.¹

De Tocqueville was not writing statistically but was interested in drawing a vivid picture. His report reflects a common observation of many visitors from Europe. Why the inhabitants of the United States have organised so many more associations than other countries is not known. Perhaps the reason may be that the settling of a new continent and the building of another culture by peoples who had broken old ties demanded more associations. Many American "joiners" affiliated with associations without being very active in them or knowing much about them, thus enabling a few active radicals to dominate them.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF ASSOCIATIONS

Associations are less universal and more specialised than institutions, and hence show some adaptation to the social classes. The veterans' organisations include members from all ranks of society, for the reason that war is no discriminator of persons in modern times. But many clubs and societies are exclusive. Other special-purpose associations are likely to recruit members from the same social class, as, for instance, trade unions, scientific societies, and property owners' associations.

A number of findings regarding associations have been reported based on two surveys, one in 1954 and the other in 1955, of national samples of the population of the United States.² They indicate that between 36 and 55 per cent of all Americans belong to voluntary associations. The number increases with educational level, income, and occupational status. There is a general tendency for membership rates for each class to rise with increase in size of community. Men and women belong in approximately equal numbers, regardless of class. Age is a factor in membership, with men under 40 predominating, and women over 40, but the rate is relatively low for the young and the old. More members are married than single. Membership is more characteristic of the white than of the Negro population; more characteristic of Jewish than Protestant persons, and of Protestants than Catholics.³ Men living in low economic status neighbourhoods are much more likely to belong to labour unions than men living in high economic status neighbourhoods. Otherwise, a larger percentage of persons holding memberships in

¹ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, translated by Henry Reeve; edited with an Introduction by Henry Steele Commager (New York & London: Oxford University Press, 1947, pp. 109, 319).

² Murray Hausknecht, *The Joiners (A Sociological Description of Voluntary Association Membership in the United States)*, (New York: The Bedminster Press, 1962). This is the source for all findings reported here except for those otherwise indicated.

³ The source for this sentence is Charles R. Wright and Herbert H. Hyman; "Voluntary Association Memberships of American Adults: Evidence from National Sample Surveys", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 23, pp. 284-94, June, 1958.

other formal associations live in neighbourhoods with high economic status.¹

The frequency of associations varies by type. The rank order, from those with the largest percentage of members to those with the smallest is as follows: civic and service; lodges and fraternal; church and religious; social and recreational; veterans, military, and patriotic; economic, occupational, professional; cultural, educational, alumni; political and pressure. This distribution shows a reluctance on the part of Americans generally to use political power for community ends. In church groups, the great preponderance of the members, 77 per cent, are women. Membership and reading are related, even with education controlled. This indicates that membership bolsters education and is associated with a heightened interest in society. Joiners know more about the community and participate more in community activities than do non-joiners.² Another study reports that joiners also show more community satisfaction and optimism about the community than non-joiners.³

Most associations, especially the big ones, are oligarchical in organisation, not democratic, and make only a limited contribution to an informed citizenry. The growth of government in recent years has been at the expense of associations, since governments now perform functions which associations used to advocate. Other findings suggest that associations may be more important for the diffusion than the formation of public opinion and serve to provide greater tolerance for the ambiguities of modern society. The lack of organisation of the working class, apart from labour unions, keeps them invisible. New stimuli to the organisation of associations are not so strong as formerly. Civil rights is a major new focal point of interest but other issues are not salient enough to mobilise sentiment and are less important than in the past when there were more urgently felt internal moral issues. The big issues now are in the field of foreign affairs, regarding which it is difficult for citizens to have information adequate for action, and which they must therefore entrust to government.

INFORMAL ORGANISATION

Recent studies of social organisation have shifted attention away from the purely formal organisation of an institution or association (as represented by an organisational chart showing the lines of authority and communication) to a concern with what is often termed an

¹ Wendell Bell and Maryanne T. Force, "Social Structure and Participation in Different Types of Formal Associations", *Social Forces*, vol. 34, pp. 345-50, May, 1956.

² Hausknecht, *op. cit.*

³ Howard E. Freeman, Edwin Novak and Leo G. Peeder, "Correlates of Membership in Voluntary Associations", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 22, pp. 528-33, October, 1957.

"informal" organisation. The latter does not appear in the organisational chart nor is it planned. Rather it is a spontaneous growth which arises wherever and whenever human beings are in contact with one another over a period of time ; it is, in fact, a species of primary group, which Cooley emphasised so strongly, and is particularly noteworthy as an adjustment to, and escape from, the highly organised formal (secondary) groups, so common in modern times. An illustration is the Army¹ with its authoritarian organisation demanding rigid obedience ; its highly stratified social system with hierarchies of deference formally and minutely established by official regulation and subject to penalties for infraction, on or off duty. The rigidity of the formal structure is partly offset by the informal system of friendships and "buddies" that plays such an important part in sustaining morale.² The formal system requires deference to superiors ; but when in World War II, Navy pilots were asked to name men they would most like to fly with, some squadron commanders were never mentioned, while some low-ranking officers were mentioned often. The informal organisation is sometimes a spontaneous growth within the formal, and often highly essential to the effective functioning, or even to the actual survival, of the formal structure.

ORGANISATION AND FREEDOM

An interesting question is : how does the individual fare in a highly organised society ? More specifically, does organisation restrict individual liberty ? We have seen that society has achieved order, but has the individual thereby lost freedom ?

Membership in an organisation seems to curtail some freedom of action. When young men and young women marry and form a family organisation, they lose some freedom. Membership of a football team results in some restriction on liberties. Indeed the very fact that an individual is born into a group means he must respect the rights of others, and is hence not free to do as he pleases.

Organisations that have rules and required activities obviously restrict behaviour, for a member who must conform cannot act in violation of that conformity.³ If a person is a member of an organisation that has no requirements save, let us say, attendance, he loses

¹ Samuel A. Stouffer *et al.*, *The American Soldier*, Vol. I (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1949).

² Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 12, pp. 280-315, Summer 1948.

³ W. H. Whyte has argued in his *Organisation Man* that there is an increasing tendency in American society towards conformity. He attributes this to the growing influence of the public corporation which requires conformity from its workers in the interests of efficiency. The "social ethic" of conformity is replacing, he believes, the "protestant ethic" of rugged individualism.

little freedom, except that when he is attending he loses the freedom to do other things.

But group life, through organisation, provides opportunities which come because of the achievements which organisation brings. Daniel Boone living in a wilderness had no such opportunities as has a person living in a city. A person may willingly give up liberties in order to have the advantages of organisation.

The trend over the centuries has been towards increasing organisation. If trends are projected into the future, the indications are for still more organisation of our activities. From these will come many achievements and opportunities, but with them may come loss of freedom, even though it be voluntary.

SUMMARY

Sociologists call society "the social order" because order in society is the rule, as in nature. The order in society consists in groups of persons and the organisation of their behaviour. Correspondingly, there is order in structure and in function. Since structure exists primarily to perform functions, our interest lies primarily in function or behaviour.

Order in function appears in custom and in social rôles; and the orderliness in structure inheres in social statuses, the patterned arrangement of persons or social groups.

Functions of social organisations are of two kinds: those having to do with the interrelationship of parts and those relating the organisation as a whole to an outside goal. The test of the effectiveness of an organisation is its success in achieving desired ends. Effectiveness depends on the arrangement of parts, or the social system. When there is harmony between the parts, the achievement is greater than when the parts are not in balance. A social system implies order among the interacting units of the system, but the equilibrium may be disturbed by social changes, which require reorganisation.

A special type of social organisation is the social institution, a widespread constellation of significant rôles revolving about basic functions. A few social institutions, four of which are subjects of chapters that follow, namely, economic, political, family, and religious organisation, are called the great institutions because they are very extensively found in all eras. Less widespread and more specialised are the associations, which have become very common in complex modern society.

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. What do you understand by the concepts social structure, social system, and social organisation?
2. What do you consider to be the main elements in the social structure?
3. What is the relation between social structure and social institutions?
4. Examine the relations between structure and function in any one aspect of society.
5. What do you understand by "functionalism" as a social theory? Can all the elements in the social system be explained in terms of their functions?
6. How would you account for the proliferation of associations in advanced industrial societies?
7. What are the manifest and latent functions of education in advanced industrial societies?

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CHAPTER XVI

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

In the classic parable by George Orwell, the "animals" on Mr. Jones' farm revolt and establish Animal Farm.¹ They immediately promulgate Seven Commandments stating the principles of animalism. As the history of the farm unfolds, the conditions become increasingly similar to the conditions under Jones but are explained by the leaders as "revolutionary necessity". One by one the Commandments are modified, although not openly. After each change, the animals are told that, so far as the earlier conditions are concerned, they "remembered them wrong". Finally, some animals, the leaders, acquire special privileges under the excuse of "need" and even begin walking on two legs. By this time, the seven commandments have shrunk to one, which reads: "All animals are equal but some animals are more equal than others."

Mr. Orwell's parable is a fitting introduction to this chapter which is centrally concerned with the inequalities of privilege on the part of the constituent groups of society. We shall consider the nature, causes, concomitants and consequences of social stratification. We devote a separate chapter to these matters because the social consequences of stratification are exceedingly important. Variation in the socio-economic status of groups probably accounts for as much of the variation in their social behaviour as does variation in any other factor.

Society compares and ranks Individuals and Groups. Members of a group compare differing individuals, as when selecting a mate or employing a worker or dealing with a neighbour. They also compare groups such as athletic teams, colleges, cities. These comparisons are valuations, or judgments of relative worth; and when members of a group agree, these judgments are social valuations.

All societies differentiate their members in terms of rôles and all societies evaluate rôles differentially. Some rôles are regarded as more important or socially more valuable than others, and the persons who perform the more highly esteemed rôles are rewarded more highly.

When Groups are ranked with some degree of Permanence, there is Stratification. The process by which individuals and groups are ranked in a more or less enduring hierarchy of status is known as stratification, probably because of the figurative resemblance of social hierarchies to the sedimentary rocks in layers in the earth's crust. But there is considerably less permanence in the social hierarchies than in the geologic strata.

¹ George Orwell, *Animal Farm* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1945).

Is there some Stratification in all Societies? The answer to this interesting question depends upon one's definition of the term, stratification. If one asks whether there are equalitarian societies that are pure, in which every individual has the same rank and the same privileges, the answer is no. In all societies there is social differentiation of the population by age, sex, and personal characteristics. The rôles and privileges of children differ from those of adults ; those of women differ from those of men ; and those of the exceptionally capable hunters or warriors differ from those of the rank and file. It is not customary to speak of a society as stratified if every individual in it has an equal chance to succeed to whatever statuses are open. A child if he lives long enough becomes an adult and can enjoy the privileges of adulthood. Women, however, cannot become men and are automatically excluded from certain rôles, as in the religious life, if in the society the religious rituals are reserved for men, with all the power and advantage the sacred rituals imply. So, strictly speaking, there are no purely equalitarian societies, only societies differing in degree of stratification.

It is instructive to observe that inequality of rank occurs even in societies which have an ideology precluding social classes.

In the new state of Israel there are a number of collective or communistic farming settlements, although they constitute a small minority of all farms. In these *Kibbutzim* the land, farming equipment, houses and furnishings are owned by the group as a whole and no wages are paid. Food, clothing, and shelter are furnished by the *Kibbutzim*, plus a small sum of money for incidentals. So there are no significant differences in wealth and no economic classes. Two groups of individuals are favoured, however.¹ They are the managers or administrators, and the old-timers. A person who is both one of the pioneers and a manager is doubly esteemed. The rewards are not in money but in prestige, power, and perquisites. The managers are freer to leave the settlements since they have occasion to represent the group in dealings with outsiders. They also make decisions affecting the other members of the collective farm. They, as members of a committee, decide, for instance, how much spending money each member shall receive.

The Rank-fixing function of Competition. That the function of competition and conflict is to fix the rank of the contestants, and that this is generally effected in terms of superordination and subordination, is brought out by certain observations of the animal world. For example, it has been observed that a definite "pecking order" is established among hens when they are grouped. Hen A pecks Hen B, but the latter does not retaliate. Instead B pecks C, while C takes it out on D. There are some curious and unexplained

* ¹ Eva Rosenfeld, "Social Stratification in a Classless Society", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 16, pp. 766-74, December, 1951.

sequences, for D may peck A. In part the pecking order results from previous encounters where the relative prowess of the hens was determined, but also it may be due in part to accident. The pecking order does not involve the opinions of others and hence any social valuation.

A hierarchy of rank, of superordination and subordination, may be observed among the primates. The stronger male baboons build up harems of females which they protect from the advances of the weaker males. The leadership in these cases is settled by earlier overt combat among the males. Among human beings, a comparable situation exists in boys' gangs where the chief is likely to be the fellow who can beat up all the rest, or who excels the rest in exploits which call for courage.¹ Competition and conflict, past and present, play a significant part in determining the status of individuals and groups.

Among mature human beings competition generally takes place on the psychological rather than the physical level. Society seeks to prevent conflicts between persons from taking direct, physical form, because of the disturbing effects of such uncontrolled conflict on group life. Physical dominance is socially esteemed mainly in its socialised forms; for instance, prize fighting according to rules is valued, but street fighting is condemned.

Involved in *social stratification* is the extremely important point of social inequality. Some individuals and groups are rated higher than others, and with such differences in rating go differences in opportunities and privileges. For example, using survey research methods and a national representative sample, it has been found that in the United States doctors are rated higher than college professors.² That is, as a class they have a higher prestige rating. They also have a larger income, one of the rewards of preferential status. It is not entirely clear on what bases these prestige ratings are made, but some of the considerations are said to be the amount of training required and the degree of responsibility for public welfare.³

Income is a factor in occupational prestige, but it is not the only factor. This observation is borne out by an analysis of the data in Table 20, listing prestige ratings and median wage or salary income of selected occupations in the United States. The correlation (Kendall's tau) between the rankings on these two bases is +.56, which means that about two-thirds of the variation in occupational prestige is accounted for by factors other than income. Additional factors are responsibility for the public welfare and highly specialised training.

¹ F. M. Thrasher, *The Gang* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1927).

² Richard Centers, "Social Class, Occupation, and Imputed Beliefs", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 58, pp. 543-55, May, 1953.

³ National Opinion Research Center, "The Quarter's Polls—Occupations", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 11, pp. 658-64, 1947-8.

TABLE 20
PRESTIGE RATINGS AND MEDIAN WAGE OR SALARY INCOME OF
24 SELECTED OCCUPATIONS

Occupation.	Prestige Rating.*		Median Wage or Salary Income in 1949.†	
	Score.	Rank.	Dollars.	Rank.
Physician	93	1	7,555	1
College Professor	89	2	4,168	6
Minister	87	3	2,319	22
Chemist	86	4.5	4,004	7
Lawyer	86	4.5	7,013	2
Civil Engineer	84	6	4,453	4
Artist who paints pictures	83	7	3,500	9
Public school teacher .	78	8	3,353	14
Farm owner and operator	76	9	4,598	3
Electrician	73	10.5	3,453	10
Trained machinist	73	10.5	3,300	15
Bookkeeper	68	12.5	3,370	12
Insurance agent	68	12.5	3,566	8
Policeman	67	14.5	3,164	16
Railroad conductor . . .	67	14.5	4,266	5
Mail carrier	66	16	3,381	11
Carpenter	65	17	2,483	19
Plumber	63	18	3,360	13
Garage mechanic	62	19	2,879	18
Barber	59	20	2,172	23
Streetcar motorman . . .	58	21	3,079	17
Lumberjack	53	22	1,140	26
Taxi driver	49	23	2,482	20
Clothes-presser in laundry	46	24	2,476	21
Bartender	44	25.5	2,049	24
Janitor	44	25.5	1,843	25

* Based on a national cross-section of Americans interviewed by the National Opinion Research Center. The chief factors in job prestige are highly specialised training and responsibility for the public welfare. The occupations are those from a longer list appearing in *Opinion News*, vol. 9, pp. 3-13, September 1, 1947, for which 1949 income data are available.

† From Herman P. Miller, *Income of the American People* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1955), Table C-1. Some of the categories are not strictly comparable with those used in the prestige ratings. For instance, artists and art teachers are grouped together; also college presidents, professors, and instructors. The income reported for physicians and lawyers is for salaried persons only, in keeping with that for the other occupations. The income for the lawyers is for 1950, all the others for 1949. Data from American Bar Foundation, *Lawyers in the United States: Distribution and Income*. Part Two: Income, Chicago, 1958. *Survey of Physicians' Incomes*. Bulletin 84, Bureau of Medical Economic Research, American Medical Association, 1951.

The assignment of rank depends upon both (a) the nature of the group which is making the evaluation and (b) the group membership of the individual being ranked. The ratings of doctors and

college professors mentioned above are national ratings, statistical averages of ratings made by a plurality of groups. There are marked differences in ratings according to certain background characteristics of the raters, such as section of the country lived in, size of place, urban or rural residence, rater's occupation, age, sex, education, economic level, and so on. So a person's judgments of social rank depend on his own position in the social structure. In addition, rank is a function of the group being ranked. In a study of social cleavages in women's organisations in New Haven,¹ it was found that racial cleavages were the sharpest, religious cleavages the most pervasive, with ethnic divisions being contributory.

Status Conflicts. Classically, the status structure of society has been described as a single hierarchy. We have been inclined to speak of persons as having high, intermediate, or low rank. The single categorisation is satisfactory if the several statuses which a given person occupies are highly correlated, which is usually the case. The situation is different where there are contradictions of status, as in the case of the highly educated man with a very low income or the business executive with a limited education.² Because in general the co-existing parallel status hierarchies are imperfectly correlated there is need for a measure of the consistency of status, which has been termed status crystallisation.³ Such a measure has been developed for status in the four hierarchies of income, occupation, education, and ethnic affiliation. The higher the intercorrelation of a person's rank-order positions in each of the four hierarchies, the more highly "crystallised" his status is said to be. As an indication of the significance of the measure, high and low crystallisation groups were compared in their voting behaviour. The proportion of respondents supporting the Democratic Party is substantially greater in the low crystallisation category and there is an association between low crystallisation and political liberalism.

SOCIAL CLASS

A person has as many statuses as he has group affiliations. For example, Mr. Smith has status as a male, an adult, a husband, and a father. Mr. Smith also has the status of elder in the local Baptist church. Mr. Smith has status, too, as an assistant professor in a small college. The Smiths have ample private means, belong to the best clubs, and move in the best circles.

The term status is used in the singular, suggesting that status may

¹ Mhyra S. Minnis, "Cleavage in Women's Organizations: A Reflection of the Social Structure of a City", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 18, pp. 47-53, February, 1953.

² Everett Hughes, "Dilemmas and Contradictions of Status", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 50, pp. 353-9, March, 1945.

³ Gerhard E. Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 19, pp. 405-13, August, 1954.

be generalised, that the status of a person is the sum total of all his separate statuses, but it is doubtful that this concept is valid. It is difficult to see how statuses can be added up, any more than how two apples and two oranges can be added. When we speak of a man's social status, we ordinarily make not a generalisation but a selection. We have in mind one status in particular: his social-class status. We consider the family to which he belongs, the size of his fortune, the circles in which he moves. In thinking of Mr. Smith's status, we pass over his neutral status in the church and his inferior status as a teacher, and dwell largely on his status in the social set.

Class status seems to overshadow other kinds of status. Most people in our culture would like to be identified with the upper class because it is correlated with power, a high standard of living and with social acceptability, although a scientist, let us say, might care a great deal more about his status as a research worker, or a scholar about his reputation in his profession.

In addition to the age and sex categories in which he is placed, every individual is at birth assigned to a particular social class. By a social class we mean one of two or more broad groups of individuals who are ranked by the members of the community in socially superior and inferior positions. Persons of both sexes and of all ages are included in a social class, which is mainly a group of families of comparable status, augmented by a number of individuals whose social status is higher or lower than that of their parents.

Where societies are composed of social classes, the social structure generally resembles a truncated pyramid, with the lowest social class at the base and the other social classes arranged above it in a hierarchy of rank and distinction. The fundamental attribute of a social class is thus its social position of relative superiority or inferiority to other social classes. The arrangement is much like the army with its officers, non-commissioned officers and privates. In Rome, for instance, there were the slaves, the large plebeian or common class and the five superior classes. In medieval European society the base of the social pyramid was taken by the *theow* class. Successively higher in rank were the *cottars*, *villeins*, free tenants, and lesser gentry, with the nobility, royalty, and ecclesiastical officials at the top. The members of the *theow* class were slaves, hence could be sold at will. The *cottars* and *villeins*, on the other hand, were serfs, that is, bound to the soil. They could on this account be sold into the services of every purchaser. The free tenants, on the contrary, had land of their own. They were obliged to do a certain amount of work and pay certain fees to their lords. All governmental power rested in the hands of the nobles, the ecclesiastics, and the king.

The Concept of Class. We need at this point to examine the concept of class more closely. The problem is made difficult by a certain confusion in terminology. For example, the terms class and status

may be used interchangeably. Moreover, classes may be defined as the way in which individuals classify themselves (class consciousness and class identification). Or they may be defined in terms of some objective criteria, such as occupation or income. The tendency in some American studies is to classify individuals according to their own estimate of their social standing, or according to the way in which they are ranked by other members of the community. Defined in this way, it is found difficult to differentiate sharply between classes. Moreover, a large proportion (three-quarters in one survey) frequently rank themselves as middle class. Similarly, in England, nearly half the population rank themselves as middle class.

A more satisfactory approach is to define class in terms of some objective, usually economic criterion, such as income, occupation, or wealth. Thus Marx differentiated between the bourgeoisie who own productive resources, and the proletariat who do not. Max Weber,¹ however, differentiated between "class" and "status". Class, he defined in economic terms, broadly similar to Marx. Class, he argued, was determined by a person's market situation, which depends largely on whether or not he owns property. Market situation determines income, and the life chances which depend on this. Similarly, Ginsberg² considers that the primary determinants of class are economic. By status, however, Weber means social honour or social esteem, and this, he says, "normally stands in sharp opposition to the pretensions of sheer property". Thus the acquisition of wealth is not by itself a sufficient basis for entry into a high status group, such as the aristocracy. The value of Weber's differentiation for the analysis of stratification in modern industrial societies is well illustrated by Dr. Lockwood³ in his study of the clerical worker in Britain. Judged in terms of market situation, it is difficult to differentiate between the manual worker and the clerk. They both sell their labour for a money income, while the differences in income, never very large for the majority of clerks, have recently been narrowed. In terms of economic class, differentiation would be difficult. But the clerk has enjoyed a superior social status to the manual worker, has identified himself with the gentry, and has attempted to adopt a "middle-class" style of life. Of course, class and status are inter-related. Thus Lockwood argues that the economic superiority of the clerk in the past has been in part a reflection of his superior status. Moreover, it is difficult to maintain a "style-of-life" appropriate to high social status, without the necessary income. Thus the bases of the superior status of the "black-coated" worker are threatened by his declining income differential, and by his loss of any earlier monopoly of literacy.⁴ Yet the distinction

¹ *Essays in Sociology* (trans. Gerth and Mills), Chap. vii.

² *Sociology*, Chap. vi.

³ *The Black-coated Worker* (Allen & Unwin, 1958).

⁴ A similar situation has been described in America by C. Wright Mills, *White Collar* (New York, 1952).

between class and status remains, and is reflected in the differences between the hierarchies of income and prestige in Table 20.

One further difficulty in understanding the concept of class arises from the confusion between class and class consciousness. Marx argued that the experience of similar economic situations would tend to result in members of a class developing similar attitudes and beliefs, and a consciousness of their similar interests. But there is no necessary coincidence between class membership defined by economic criteria, and subjective class consciousness and identification. It is important, however, as Tawney says, to avoid confusing "the fact of class with the consciousness of class which is a different phenomenon. The fact creates the consciousness, not the consciousness the fact."¹ In an inquiry into the subjective aspects of class, Martin found that about one-third of those who could be classified as middle class by occupation, identified themselves with the working class, and similarly, one-quarter of those engaged in manual work, considered themselves to be middle class.² For some empirical studies, it is useful to subdivide middle and working class into two sub-groups based on these differences of class identification. It is not surprising to find that researches have discovered significant differences in voting behaviour between such sub-groups.

For practical empirical purposes, a classification of the population into class groups based on occupation has been found to be most generally useful. Occupation is closely related to income and education, and to attitudes, beliefs and style of life. Moreover, it has the advantage of being a relatively simple criterion. Occupation is also an index of a person's social standing, and although this is not identical with class, it is closely related. In the study of mobility in Britain, for example, occupations were classified into status groups, after first establishing that there is considerable agreement about the relative social standing of a number of typical occupations.³

THE SOCIAL CONCOMITANTS OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

Social Class and "Life-chances". Practically, the significance of a class system is that it greatly affects the social rewards of people. The members of a particular class have more or less the same "life-chances", that is, the same probability of securing the good things of life, such as freedom, a high standard of living, leisure, deference, or whatever things are highly valued in a given society. "The

¹ R. H. Tawney, *Equality* (London, 1938), p. 50.

² F. M. Martin, "Some Subjective Aspects of Social Stratification", Chap. 3 in Glass, *op. cit.* (1954.)

³ C. A. Moser and J. R. Hall, "The Social Grading of Occupations", Chap. 2, Glass, *op. cit.* (1954). But see also a discussion on the rejection of this ranking by some manual workers in M. Young and P. Willmott, "Social Grading by Manual Workers", *Brit. Journ. Soc.*, December, 1956.

influential", as Lasswell aptly puts it, "are those who get the most of what there is to get."¹ Hence if we regard a social class as a group based on certain resemblances of its members, we must view it as a group of persons with similar social chances.²

How do the social chances of different classes, say the rich and the poor, vary in our own society? Let us consider the chances of staying alive. What chance of surviving the first year of life does the average infant born into a lower-class family have compared with an infant born into a middle-class family? The advances in medicine in the last 30 years have brought a marked decline in infant mortality from 79 per 1,000 in 1921 to 29 per 1,000 in 1950. Yet despite the extension of health and welfare services since 1945, a baby in class V is still more than twice as likely to die in the first year of life as one born in class I (Table 21).

TABLE 21

SOCIAL CLASS DIFFERENCES IN INFANT MORTALITY RATES PER 1,000
LEGITIMATE LIVE BIRTHS, 1921, 1939, 1950 (TOTAL UNDER 1 YEAR)*

Social Class.	1921.	1939.	1950.	1950 as % 1921.
I. Professional, well-to-do commercial, etc.	38.4	26.8	17.9	46.6
II. Intermediate between I and skilled workers	55.5	34.4	22.2	40.0
III. Skilled workers	76.8	44.4	28.1	36.6
IV. Intermediate between III and unskilled workers	89.4	51.4	33.7	37.7
V. Unskilled workers	97.0	60.1	40.7	42.0
All classes	79.1	47.4	29.3	37.0

* Based on Table 16.1⁵ in Carr-Saunders, Caradog Jones, and Moser, *Social Conditions in England and Wales*, 1958, p. 222.

Despite this selective influence, which probably means that those with sounder physiques tend to survive, the babies that grow up to be men and women of the lower class do not have such good chances of staying well as do those with more income.

There are marked differences in the incidence of various diseases, among social classes. Tuberculosis is nearly 2½ times as prevalent in class V as in class I, pneumonia nearly 4 times, and bronchitis more than 5 times, though for some diseases such as hypertension,

¹ Harold Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How* (New York, 1936), p. 3.

² An interesting statement of this operational point of view is that by T. H. Marshall, "Social Class—A Preliminary Analysis", *Sociological Review*, vol. 26, p. 60, January, 1934.

class V has only $\frac{2}{3}$ of the class I rate.¹ There is also evidence of class differences in medical treatment received,² and in mortality (Table 22).

TABLE 22

STANDARD MORTALITY FOR DIFFERENT SOCIAL CLASSES STANDARD POPULATION, MEN AGED 20-64. ENGLAND AND WALES 1921-3, 1930-2, 1950.*

Social Class.		1921-3.	1930-2.	1950.
I.	Professional . . .	82	90	97
II.	Intermediate . . .	94	94	86
III.	Skilled	95	97	102†
IV.	Partly skilled . . .	101	102	94
V.	Unskilled	125	111	118

* From Carr-Saunders, Caradog Jones, and Moser, *op. cit.*, p. 13 (1958).

† Figures for 1950 are based on a 1 per cent sample and must be treated with caution.

Most indices of formal social disorganisation are negatively correlated with income. The chances of a boy's becoming a juvenile delinquent or a public charge are in direct ratio to the economic status of his family, those on the lowest levels furnishing the greatest number of delinquents. The matter of happiness in relation to social class has been studied among workers in several countries, namely, the United States, the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Norway. Findings are that those who occupy top positions are, as a rule, more satisfied than those in lower positions. Those with high incomes, those with more education or those with special training and skill more often report themselves happy, joyous, laughing, free of sorrow and satisfied with life's progress.³

The matters so far considered, those of survival and of good physical and mental health, are of course basic. We ask next how the chances of a boy or girl going to college are affected by social class. This is important because higher education is a prerequisite to many jobs. Conant, in a study of schools in metropolitan areas,⁴ describes the suburban high school from which 80 per cent or more of the graduates enter college and compares it with the high school in the city slum, where as many as half the children drop out of school in grades 9, 10 and 11. The expenditure per pupil in the first school system is as high as \$1,000 per year and in the second, less

¹ Registrar-General, Decennial Supplement, 1951.

² Martin, *Social Aspects of Prescribing*. See also on these topics, J. M. Blomfield and J. W. B. Douglas, *Children under Five* (1958).

³ A. Inkeles, "Industrial Man: The Relation of Status to Experience, Perception and Value", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 66, pp. 1-31, July, 1960.

⁴ James B. Conant, *Slums and Suburbs* (A Commentary on Schools in Metropolitan Areas), (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961).

than half that amount. Despite the fact that a good deal of higher education is provided by the state at a low cost to the student, an extensive investigation¹ of all Minnesota high school graduates in 1938 and 1950 indicates that 67 per cent whose fathers were professional and semi-professional men entered college as compared with 26 per cent whose fathers were factory workers, craftsmen or unskilled workers.

Similarly, in England, although manual workers make up 72 per cent of the population, they form only 66 per cent of the grammar school entrants, and 48 per cent of those achieving two passes at "A" level in G.C.E. Moreover, only 26 per cent of those entering universities are the children of manual workers. There are also considerable differences in the social backgrounds of students at various universities. At Oxford, 13 per cent and Cambridge, 9 per cent of students are the children of manual workers, while at London, the proportion is 21 per cent and the University of Wales, 40 per cent.²

What are the chances of the lower class obtaining justice in the courts? Much is made of "equality before the law" in our culture, but such equality exists in principle rather than in fact. Since it costs money to ask for justice, notwithstanding the legal-aid bureaus available to the poor in a few places, the poor are less likely to seek redress for wrongs. If charged with a criminal offence, a poor man is under a substantial handicap. Except in extreme cases, like murder, the rich man so charged will be summoned, then released on bail. The poor man is likely to be arrested, and in default of the bail which he cannot furnish, will be remanded in gaol—not the best place to build up a defence against the charges. Studies in the Southern District of New York indicate that over one-third of those required to post bail of \$500 or less were unable to do so, and that those who cannot make bail are more often convicted and receive stiffer sentences than those who can.³ The rich man may secure the ablest lawyers, expert witnesses, changes of venue, and delays. If he is at last found guilty, the usual sentence is a pecuniary fine, which means little to a man of means, but much to a poor man.

The most careful studies report a low but positive relationship between social status and the measured personality adjustment of children.⁴ The personality test performance of middle-class children is higher than that of lower-class children. In other words, the

¹ Dael Wolfe, *America's Resources of Specialised Talent* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), p. 160.

² *Applications for Admission to Universities*, R. K. Kelsall, 1957. See also Floud, Halsey, and Martin, *Educational Opportunity and Social Class*, 1956; (ed.) D. V. Glass, *Social Mobility in Britain*, 1954; and *Early Leaving*, Ministry of Education, 1954.

³ An address by Attorney-General Robert F. Kennedy, American Bar Association, House of Delegates, San Francisco, August 6, 1962.

⁴ William H. Sewell and Archie O. Haller, "Social Status and the Personality Adjustment of the Child", *Sociometry*, vol. 19, pp. 114-25, June, 1956.

middle-class children are better adjusted. This is true even when the variables known to be related to either status or personality or both are controlled. Still, the magnitude of the relationship of status and personality is small and contributes little to the explanation of the variance in measured personality adjustment. Status is a factor but not a major factor.

The explanation of the poorer adjustment of the lower-status child may be as follows. His early socialisation results in his internalisation of lower-class values. Later, when he goes to school, he confronts a different set of values and social expectations, since his teachers are middle class. The child comes to feel that some of these middle-class values are superior, so he tries to adopt them. Since these values and those of his parents are in conflict, he develops concern about the social status of his family. He also worries about his ability to measure up to middle-class levels, especially in school. He rejects his family which he holds responsible for his difficulty. His nervous behaviour is indicative of his general anxiety. This general explanatory formulation rests on the findings of a study of the factors underlying the relationship between social status and personality adjustment. A factor analysis of personality test items most highly associated with social status in a group of 1,462 elementary school children revealed four factors that accounted for 90 per cent of the variance: worry about status, worry about achievement, rejection of family, and nervous symptoms.¹ This analysis supports the theory advanced by Merton, and considered in an earlier chapter,² that social deviance is related to differential access to dominant goals.

Before leaving the discussion of the relation of social class and deviant behaviour, we may observe that sociologists have almost exclusively viewed class as the independent variable and deviance as the dependent variable. A recent study, however, using intergenerational occupational mobility as a measure of class and juvenile anti-social behaviour as a measure of deviance, offers evidence that deviance is a factor in class. Former child guidance clinic patients who were seen for severe anti-social behaviour were found 30 years later to have more unfavourable occupational mobility than either former patients seen for other problems or normal school children. Juvenile anti-social behaviour is thought to affect later occupational status by interfering with both educational achievement and job performance.³

¹ William H. Sewell and Archie O. Haller, "Factors in the Relationship Between Social Status and the Personality Adjustment of the Child", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 24, pp. 511-20, August, 1959.

² Chapter XI.

³ Lee N. Robins, Harry Gyman, and Patricia O'Neal, "The Interaction of Social Class and Deviant Behaviour", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 27, pp. 480-92, August, 1962.




FIG. 27.—Attitude Differences of Urban Occupational Strata.

According to these responses to questions on important social issues, based on a representative cross-section of the adult white population, groups that live differently think differently. Their thinking reflects their special interests. (Data from Richard Centers, *Psychology of Social Classes*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949, p. 63.)

SOCIAL CLASS AFFECTS "LIFE-STYLE"

Since classes are broad groups between whom there exist barriers to intimate association ; since, moreover, classes differ in their opportunities for education, recreation, and the like, they differ also in what they learn, how they behave, and how they regard the world about them. Before the organisation of society by classes was emphasised, it was customary for social scientists to give a generalised picture of social life, to describe, for example, " the American character " or " the French way of life ". It is now recognised that such a generalised account, although valuable in identifying the universals of the culture, is unrealistic because it ignores the diversity of outlook and behaviour of the several social classes. A considerable literature has recently accumulated showing that how people vote, the positions they take on economic and political questions, the churches they affiliate with, and so on, are influenced by their socio-economic status.¹ The lower classes tend predominantly to vote the Democratic ticket in national elections ; the upper classes, the Republican ticket. Upper-class Protestants attend mainly the Episcopal, Congregational, and Presbyterian Churches, lower-class Protestants, the Baptist, Lutheran, and Methodist Churches. There is considerable overlapping on these and other traits, but the correlations with social class are positive.

Detailed studies of voting behaviour in Britain show that the Conservative vote is correlated with such factors as income, business ownership, and whether manual or non-manual. While 87 per cent of well-to-do business proprietors voted Conservative at the 1951 election, 52 per cent of the lower-paid black-coated workers, and 26 per cent of the poor manual workers voted Conservative.² Moreover, as might be expected, class identification as well as objective class membership influenced voting behaviour. While 32 per cent of the manual workers who considered themselves to be middle class voted Conservative in Greenwich, only 12 per cent of the manual workers identifying with the working class voted Conservative in the 1951 election.³ There are also class differences in religious behaviour and in leisure. A survey in Derby found that Roman Catholics were predominantly working class, while nonconformists were mainly middle class. It was found that 30 per cent of non-manual workers attended church at least once a month, but only 17 per cent of manual workers. Similarly, rather more working class were regular cinema goers than middle class, but fewer had television sets, and practised a hobby.⁴

¹ Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949).

² J. Bonham, "The Middle Class Elector", *Brit. Journ. Soc.*, September, 1952.

³ F. M. Martin, "Social Status and Electoral Choice in Two Constituencies", *Brit. Journ. Soc.*, September, 1952. See also Mark Benney, A. P. Gray, and R. H. Pear, *How People Vote : A Study of Electoral Behaviour in Greenwich* (Routledge, 1956).

⁴ Cauter and Downham, *The Communication of Ideas*.

We have an interesting study¹ of the life-style of the working-man's wife, based on a sample of 480 wives between the ages of 20 and 44, chosen from among the readers of the "Family Behaviour Group" Magazines (*True Experience*, *True Love Stories*, *True Story* and *True Romance*), known to be mainly working-class women. They were compared with a group of 120 middle-class wives. The life of the working-class wife is bounded physically by her home, the community shopping centre, the homes of relatives and, to some extent, church. She thus moves in a narrow circle of friends and relatives. She is identified with her home and children, and her deepest satisfaction is to make a comfortable home and be of service to her family. She lives on the surface and lacks a deep understanding of her own motivation and that of her husband and children. She tends to feel that her life is dull and monotonous. Her chief outlets are T.V. programmes and the Family Behaviour magazines. In sharp contrast, the middle-class wife is more independent in thought, more understanding of the personality of her children, and more active in seeking wider experience in the community.

Working-class people associate relatively more with kin and participate relatively less in formal associations than do those of the middle class.² For those of the middle class who participate in voluntary associations the sense of commitment to a cause is likely to be less than in the case of upper-class women. In general, the function of middle-class participation is primarily to help the woman to adapt to changes in the family life-cycle, whereas with the upper class the participation tends to be viewed as a matter of obligation to family and class.³

It is frequently believed that the poor stress the present, and the middle class, the future. In keeping, it is held that the working class is more inclined to immediate gratification of desires and the middle class more disposed to self-imposed postponement of satisfactions. For example, there is said to be more obesity among the lower class, presumably reflecting a failure to inhibit gustatory impulses. A recent study⁴ does not support the hypothesis of a positive relationship between socio-economic status and a "Deferred Gratification Pattern". Learning to defer need gratification is associated with all socio-economic levels. Also, aspiration for achievement is correlated with a pattern of defined gratification. Need deferment appears to be functional for social mobility in American society.

Another interesting question has to do with the attitudes of

¹ Lee Rainwater, Richard P. Coleman and Gerald Handel, *Workingman's Wife: Her Personality, World and Life Style* (New York: Oceana Publications, 1959).

² M. Young and P. Willmott, *Family and Kinship in East London* (Routledge, 1957).

³ Joan W. Moore, "Patterns of Women's Participation in Voluntary Associations", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 66, pp. 592-8, May, 1961.

⁴ Murray A. Straus, "Deferred Gratification, social class, and the achievement syndrome", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 27, pp. 326-35, June, 1962.

different social classes towards security on the one hand and opportunities for increased earnings on the other. Some jobs offer security but without much prospect of eventual high earnings ; other jobs offer the possibility of winning high stakes if successful or little or nothing if unsuccessful. Workers choose security over earnings more often than do those higher in the occupational or income hierarchy.¹ A study of parents in the Detroit area reports a contrast between the "older" and the "newer" middle classes. The former, consisting chiefly of individual entrepreneurs, stress self-control, independence and autonomy in the education of their children ; the latter, comprising persons who were in large bureaucratic organisations, emphasise accommodation and security.²

It is instructive to compare the two extremes of the social scale,³ that is, the upper-upper and lower-lower classes, as observed in Newburyport, Massachusetts, a town of 17,000. The lower class had more males of all ages, largely because it included so many immigrants who did not bring their wives or other female relatives with them. The upper class showed a surplus of women, mainly unmarried females who remained in the old family homes after their parents had died and their brothers had married and moved elsewhere. Since lineage is emphasised in the upper class, the group was highly endogamous and there was found to be no taboo on marriage between first cousins. Because it was necessary to marry within the group and because many of the males had left the community, many upper-class females chose to remain single rather than marry beneath themselves socially. The lower-class youth married earlier, the median age being 23.3 years as compared with 27.9 for the upper class and 24.4 for all classes. That the upper class tends to have the smallest families and the lowest class the largest families is well known.

As to economic characteristics, none of the upper-class families was on relief, although some were without funds, whereas one in three lower-class families was receiving governmental aid. Expenditures for food, shelter, and clothing required about three-fourths of the total budget of the lower-class families, which means that most of the income of this class is spent for necessities ; whereas one-third of the income of the upper class was spent for these three items, permitting larger expenditures for travel, education, charity, and gifts. Particularly interesting is the expense for house operation, which was the largest item of expense for the upper class. To the upper class the home is perhaps the most important symbol of status, reflecting cultural differences in family life and the unequal distribution of

¹ Inkeles, *op. cit.*

² David R. Miller and Guy E. Swanson, *The Changing American Parent : A Study in the Detroit Area* (New York : John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958).

³ Warner and Lunt, *The Social Life of a Modern Community* (New Haven, Conn. : Yale University Press, 1941).

wealth and possessions among the classes. The upper-class homes of Yankee City ranged from eight to twenty rooms, providing separate space for different members and for different functions. Children and servants usually occupy the top floor, adults and other members of the family the second floor, while the family rooms are usually on the ground floor. The living-room, usually with its fireplace symbolising family unity, and the dining-room are the centres of intimate family relationships. Preparation and serving of meals involve ritual relations of the family to the servants and traditional and aesthetic objects, as well as expressing the family communion around the table. Whereas the home is an important locus for the upper class, poor housing and crowding may be important reasons for the observed predominance of "street life" among the lower class.¹

Whereas 41 per cent of the total Yankee City population belonged to associations, this was true of 72 per cent of the upper and 22 per cent of the lower classes. About one in 14 of the upper class belonged to 10 or more associations, but this was not true of any member of the lower class—an understandable difference since membership in associations usually costs money. Other studies show that low-income groups have more informal, unpaid participation, like visiting relatives and neighbours.²

The upper class supported the Presbyterian, Episcopal, and Unitarian Churches, and limited lower-class membership in upper-class congregations by maintaining branches in the lower prestige areas of the town. The lower class mainly attended the Catholic and Methodist Churches.

Most of the members of the upper class sent their children to private schools in Boston or to boarding school rather than to the local high school, particularly for the last two years of high school. Those who did attend the high school usually took the course which prepared them for college. Yale, Harvard, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology were the colleges usually attended, while the lower classes, if they went to college, often attended a Y.M.C.A. College which alternates school attendance and outside work. Most of the lower-class youth took the commercial rather than the college course.

The reading habits of the classes differed. Though there was a large library, it was used mainly by the middle class. The upper class bought its own books, while the lower class did not read many books. The upper class preferred scientific, historical, and biographic books, while the lower class read more adventure stories. Detective stories had great appeal to both classes. Lower-class people went more often to the movies.

¹ W. Halbwachs, *La Classe ouvrière et les niveaux de vie* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1913).

² Floyd Dotson, "Patterns of Voluntary Association Among Working Class Families", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 16, pp. 687-93, October, 1951. A study of an East London borough showed a similar tendency to visit relatives, etc. (*Kinship in East London*, M. Young and P. Willmott, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958).

Life of the Upper Class. An account of a section of the upper class of Chicago as of the late 1920's has been given us by Zorbaugh.¹ The so-called "upper 400" he describes are those who have arrived socially. They form a self-conscious group and are recognised leaders of "society", which consists of about 6,000 persons whose names appear in the Social Register of Chicago. To be listed "one must not be 'employed', must not make application, and must be above reproach". This class has newspapers of its own, the *Club-fellow* and *Town Topics*, and of course receives special space in the daily papers. There are certain clubs in which membership is almost obligatory, since a man is placed by clubs. . . . The élite live apart not only socially but geographically as well. It would be interesting to know to what extent the account still describes the life of the upper class in Chicago.

The Bases of Upper-class Position. Money and family are the two keys to the doors of "society". Those with the highest social-class status are generally those who have been wealthy the longest, allowing the family reputation to be firmly established. The significance of wealth, as the German sociologist Georg Simmel² has so ably shown, lies in the freedom it affords, freedom from drudgery and the routine of everyday work, thus releasing time and energy for the cultivation of fine taste, good manners, and the like. The *nouveaux riches* have the wealth but not the family reputation, hence meet with some difficulty in securing recognition from the élite. It may take more than a single generation to acquire the "good breeding" and to obtain social acceptance on the higher levels. But if the family retains the wealth over a number of generations the breeding is likely to come and so, too, the social-class status.

How those who have been wealthy a relatively short time play "the social game" in their bid for status and prestige is described by Zorbaugh in the study already cited. "The social game" calls for a great deal of publicity, display, and lavish spending, for unless there is "conspicuous consumption", the fact that a family possesses wealth may not be recognised. Although there is generally a lag between the acquisition of wealth and the attainment of social recognition, given time, the lag is likely to be taken up.

Since class membership, once obtained, is socially inherited, upper-class position is often retained by families that once had wealth but have it no more. Upper-class status does not require the continual underpinning of economic pre-eminence. For example, in the South, as Dollard³ shows, a person may have little money, but still be one of the "aristocracy". If a Southerner, reading through a history book, stops now and then to say, "Oh, yes, that is Governor So-and-so ;

¹ Harvey W. Zorbaugh, *The Gold Coast and the Slum*.

² N. Spykman, *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel* (Chicago, 1925)

³ John Dollard, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

he was my grandmother's brother," or "General Blank married a second cousin of my mother; she was one of the South Carolina Blanks, you know," he is an upper-class person, even if he is not rich.

These families still enjoy the status that goes with upper-class position, even though they do not have the standard of living. In India, the exigencies of life have brought about a similar situation, in that the Brahmin caste still rates highest in social status, but has been put in seventh place in a national rating according to solvency and credit.¹

Social Rank and Prestige. One of the consequences of social stratification is the amount and kind of attention one receives. The flow of communication is towards the leaders and other persons with influence. They are sought after for advice, reassurance, help. The higher the status of an individual the more likely he is to receive attention from others. How does the leader cope with his load? He communicates mainly with persons on the same or closely related status levels. The more nearly equal the status of two individuals, the more likely they are to communicate with each other.²

Towards those in superior positions, those in inferior positions tend to show deference, by yielding to the wishes, opinions, or judgment of the superior or by courteous or obeisant gestures, like the bow or the salute. The effect of superior position, power, and adulation is to give the superior classes an exaggerated notion of their own importance, while the converse leads to an exaggerated self-abasement on the part of the inferior classes. These observations were borne out in an experiment³ in which three members of ten adolescent cliques—the leader, the middle-ranking, and the lowest-standing member—were asked to estimate their own future performance and that of the other two status occupants on an experimental task. The results showed that the higher a person's status in the group, the more he tended to overestimate his own future performance and the greater was the tendency of the other group members to overrate his performance. The lower the group status of an individual, the less he tended to overestimate his own performance and the less other members tended to overrate his performance, even to the extent of underestimating it.

Social Class and Power. Prestige is an important phenomenon; but it should not be stressed to the neglect of power, with which it is highly correlated. Power is significant, because it means influence over the services of others and command over goods. The question we have to consider here is the distribution of power among the social classes. Who has the power to formulate policy, the most significant

¹ S. S. Nehru, *Caste and Credit* (London, 1932), p. 15.

² John W. Riley, Jr., and Jackson Toby, "Status and Interpersonal Communication in Informal Groups" (Unpublished paper delivered at Berkeley, California, August 31, 1953).

³ O. J. Harvey, "An Experimental Approach to the Study of Status Relations in Informal Groups", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 18, pp. 357-67, August, 1953.

type of power? A theory advanced by Mosca,¹ for which he has some evidence, is that if one looks closely at any society, whether it be a dictatorship, a monarchy, an oligarchy, or a republic, one always finds that actual power is never in the hands of only one person, nor is it wielded by all the citizens, but is rather exercised by a group which is always small compared with the total population. Pareto called such ruling cliques "élites".

The question of who wields power is considered also in a later chapter on political institutions,² where it is stated that the distribution of power has to be seen in terms of place and issue. Who wields power at the local level may be different from who exercises influence at the state or national level. The pattern of power in the small, relatively isolated community may be quite unlike that in the large metropolitan area. Businessmen exert predominant influence in decision-making in "Southern City" and in "Pacific City" in the United States but not in "English City" in South-western England. In the latter, the key influentials come from a broad representation of the institutional sectors of the community.³ In the context of India, with its caste system, the concept of dominance includes elements such as numerical strength, economic and political power, and ritual status. These elements may be unevenly distributed among different castes. If a caste ranks highest in all or most of these respects, it has decisive dominance. In Rampura the peasants are decisively dominant over castes with higher ritual rank because numerical strength gives them political power in a system of elective government.⁴ One wonders whether the situation may not be quite similar in other complex democratic societies.

A study of the British political élite shows that the majority of cabinet ministers (for the period 1886-1935) were drawn from the aristocracy and the middle class—only 24 out of 193 coming from the working class. But whereas Labour cabinets had included 20 working-class members, Conservative cabinets had contained only 1.⁵

SOCIAL MOBILITY

One of the two big questions about social stratification is the amount of social inequality existing in a society, discussed in earlier paragraphs. The other big question is the degree of opportunity. Opportunity means chances for changing and improving one's social

¹ Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1939).

² Chapter xviii.

³ Delbert C. Miller, "Industry and Community Power Structure: A Comparative Study of an American and an English City", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 23, pp. 9-15, February, 1958.

⁴ M. N. Srinivas, "The Dominant Caste in Rampura", *American Anthropologist*, vol. 61, pp. 1-16, 1959.

⁵ W. L. Guttsman, "Social Structure of the Political Elite", *Brit. Journ. Soc.*, June, 1951. See also G. D. H. Cole, *Studies in Class Structure*.

status. Opportunity is related to social mobility, or change in social status, although mobility may be downward as well as upward. Moreover, mobility does not necessarily lessen inequality. This is a point of some importance, since it is commonly and erroneously assumed in our democracy that if we give equal opportunity to everybody, social differences will be lessened. We sometimes see great differences in social achievement and social status among members of the same family because of differences in talents or luck, where the members of the family initially shared the same status and had comparable opportunities.

The term, social mobility, is used in the singular, which implies that it is a unitary concept. However, research has shown that there are not high intercorrelations among all the dimensions presumed to comprise the concept. Thus the subjective and objective dimensions of mobility are not interchangeable, and neither are intergenerational and intragenerational mobility.¹ Likewise, occupational mobility may be differentiated from class mobility. Mobility among business élites is as great as ever but entrance into the *Social Register* of Philadelphia has become more difficult. In the period 1900-10, additions of families to the Register increased 68 per cent. In each succeeding decade, there has been a decrease both absolute and proportionate, with the increase for 1930-40 being limited to six per cent.² It appears that social mobility is a complex, multi-dimensional concept consisting of a number of components.

SOCIAL MOBILITY, CLASS, AND CASTE

In a society with social classes, generally the child at birth automatically becomes a member of the social class of his parents and ordinarily remains a member of this class throughout his lifetime. Usually he marries someone of the same class. All societies, however, provide some opportunity for social mobility, that is, a change of social status, either upward or downward. In some societies it is not uncommon for individuals to move up or down the social ladder because the barriers to mobility are not great. Where this is the case the society is said to have "open" classes. In other societies there is very little shifting from one class to another, and individuals remain throughout their lives in the class into which they chance to be born. Such classes are said to be "closed", and if they are extremely differentiated, they constitute a caste system. "When a class is somewhat strictly hereditary," says Cooley,³ "we may call it a caste."

Although evidences of caste are to be found in many parts of the

¹ Charles F. Westoff, Marvin Bressler and Philip C. Sagi, "The Concept of Social Mobility: An Empirical Inquiry", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 25, pp. 375-85, June, 1960.

² E. Digby Baltzell, *Philadelphia Gentlemen* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958), p. 68.

³ C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909-1929), p. 211.

world, India is usually cited as the most perfect instance. There we find a social organisation "as elaborate in its heaped-up storeys as one of its own pagodas—and vastly more intricate".¹ Below the ranking Brahman or priestly caste are the Kshatriya or warrior caste ; the Vaisya or agriculturist and mercantile caste ; and the Sudra or artisan and labouring caste. These castes in turn are divided and subdivided into a variety of subcastes, which are hereditary occupational groups. Entirely apart is the group of Outcastes, now called Harijans.

An individual's caste, it is alleged, rather definitely fixes his rôle in life. It determines not only the work he will do, the group into which he will marry, but the very routine of his daily conduct. "There is," writes one who was born a Brahman,² "a ritual for every hour of the day in India ; the ritual of the peasant and the workman, and the ritual peculiar to the Brahman household like ours. The members of my family, the townspeople, the labourers in the field, the many beggars—each followed an intricate and age-old pattern of life, from sudden sunrise, through fervid noon, to the heavy fall of night and silence."

Relations between caste members are highly regulated. There are definite limitations on the contact of members of different castes, and of caste and outcaste individuals.

The foregoing is an idealised picture, and in reality the caste system of India exhibits great diversity. The light-skinned Indo-Europeans who invaded India from the north do not have a caste system like that of the dark-skinned Dravidians of India. The government has made illegal caste discrimination in education, public services, and state employment. Intercaste marriages were legalised in 1887 and in 1949. A study in Nagpur District, Bombay State, in 1958, found frequent intergenerational mobility in both the rural and urban areas, although it was generally restricted to occupations of comparable rank.³ The Hindu caste system is a reality, but it is not so rigid as Brahman concepts would lead us to believe.⁴

Caste in Ceylon, described and analysed in a distinguished monograph,⁵ has historical connections with the Indian system but differs strikingly from it in a number of important respects. There is no priestly caste ; caste organisation and government are virtually

¹ C. M. Case, *Outlines of Introductory Sociology* (New York : Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1924), p. 516.

² D. G. Mukerji, *Caste and Outcaste* (New York : E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1923), p. 6.

³ Edwin D. Driver, "Caste and Occupational Structure in Central India", *Social Forces*, vol. 41, pp. 26-31, October, 1962.

⁴ Edward W. Pohlman, "Evidences of Disparity Between the Hindu Practice of Caste and the Ideal Type", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 16, pp. 375-9, June, 1951.

⁵ Bryce Ryan, *Caste in Modern Ceylon : The Sinhalese System in Transition* (New Brunswick, N.J. : Rutgers University Press, 1953).

absent. There is no "untouchable" caste, caste is not legitimatised by specific religious prescription, and the etiquette of deference is moderate. Extremes of class differences are found within the same caste.

According to some observers, American society is organised not only along class lines but along caste lines as well, particularly in the South. The rule has been that Negroes and whites must not associate on the basis of equality, especially in relations of intimacy.¹ Since the most intimate relationship of all is marriage, the strongest taboos are levelled by the laws of many states and by the mores of all against intermarriage of Negroes and whites. The Southern white boy is taught not to say ma'am to a Negro woman, not to tip his hat to her, and not to give her the right of way on the pavement. Theatres, restaurants, hotels, and other commercial establishments often exclude Negroes or provide separate services for them. The facilities provided for Negroes are usually much less adequate than those available to whites.

There are those who take issue with the view that the relations of whites and Negroes in the United States constitute a caste system.² They point to the statutes in many states permitting intermarriage and to the lack of a specific association of race and occupation. The Supreme Court has outlawed segregation in education. Brahmanic-Indian society, it is alleged, represents the only authentic caste system and is not to be confused with Negro-white relations, which are race and not caste relations.

Whether one believes that Negro-white relations in the United States constitute a caste system may depend on how caste is defined. If caste is identified with the East Indian social structure, then all systems that are less rigid than this one may be considered not to be caste systems. On the other hand, social systems may be distributed on a continuum of social mobility ranging all the way from extreme social immobility to extreme mobility. Actually the polar type of extreme immobility is an ideal type to which existing social orders only approximate. The East Indian society with its names for castes, its myth of a common origin (namely, that all Brahmins trace their origin to the first Brahman who is said to have sprung from the mouth of Brahma), its endogamous subcastes, and its caste sanctions, probably comes closest to the extreme; but the phenomenon of stratification is one of degree.

Moreover, it may be helpful to view the situation from the standpoint of social change. The stratification system of Negroes in the United States was much more rigorous under slavery, and more

¹ John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1937), p. 96.

² Oliver C. Cox, *Caste, Class, and Race* (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1948).

nearly approximated that of India. During the past few centuries, cultural changes have been much more extensive in the United States, affecting the relations of the races. But even in India the caste system has not been unaffected by social change. Ideally, Brahmans should be priests, but according to the Census of 1931 only 166 out of 1,000 earners of the Brahman caste were engaged in the traditional occupation of priesthood.¹




FIG. 28.—Caste/Class Structures of the United States.

The figure on the left is Warner's schematic representation. The diagonal lines separate the Negro caste from the white caste, and the broken lines in each segment separate the classes in each caste from one another. The double-headed arrows show that movement does occur up and down the class ladders. However, there is no movement or marriage across caste lines. Since slavery, the caste line has swung on its axis (C), so that the top Negro group is higher in class than the lowest white group. (From W. Lloyd Warner, "American Class and Caste", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 42, pp. 234-7, September, 1936.)

The right-hand figure shows the reported caste/class composition of "Georgia Town", a market centre and county seat in South-east Georgia, with a population of about 5,000 with 30 per cent of these Negro. A comparison of the class structure of Georgia Town with an all-Negro community in Oklahoma (not shown here) suggests that in a bi-racial community there is likely to be a larger proportion of lower-class Negroes than in a racially homogeneous community. (From Mozell C. Hill and Bevide C. McCall, "Social Stratification in 'Georgia Town'", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 15, pp. 721-30, December, 1950.)

In the United States to-day, as the result of the emancipation of the Negroes, of industrialisation, and of the migration to the cities, a wide range of occupations has been opened up to Negroes. The result is class mobility within the Negro caste, so that at present some Negroes are on a higher class level than some whites. Warner² illustrates the situation by means of the diagram in Fig. 28.

A social system, whatever its type of social organisation, cannot

¹ Jyotirmoyee Sarma, *The Hindu System of Caste in the Province of Bengal in India* (Master's thesis, University of Chicago Libraries, 1942).

² W. Lloyd Warner, "American Class and Caste", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 42, pp. 234-7, September, 1936.

endure unless it has utility. In the case of societies with a caste system, one advantage is that it minimises envy or unhappiness. Why fret or strive if one's status is preordained and can be changed only in the next life by exemplary behaviour in one's assigned station in this life? Since there is identification of work with caste, and little thought of change, there is more pride in workmanship. An instructive comparison is afforded by waiters in India and the United States. A major social limitation of caste is that it does not utilise fully the talents and capabilities of the population and is therefore a barrier to optimum productivity.

THE RELATION OF CLASS AND CULTURE

Social classes are rarely to be found in the lowest primitive barbaric societies. "There is", writes Hobhouse,¹ "always the distinction between its own members and outsiders; there is also a greater or less distinction in the rights enjoyed by the two sexes. In other respects the obligations constituting its ethical life are fairly uniform." That is, equality of rank generally prevails among those on the very lowest levels, such as the Andaman Islanders, the Shoshone and Tierra del Fuegians. Individuals differ in prestige according to personal traits such as skill in hunting or ability to entertain, but there are no distinctions of rank enjoyed by particular groups.² There are no rich or poor people because existing property is too limited in amount to create significant differences in wealth.

As material goods increase in volume, however, conditions become more favourable for the creation of classes. Accumulated wealth is not distributed evenly, but accrues to some more than to others. Wealth means power, that is, command over services and goods, and is accompanied by respect and influence. Wealth affords a more permanent basis for social differentiation than personal qualities, for wealth is more easily transmitted from one generation to the next. Wealth is also retained by intermarriage.

While a higher development of material culture is favourable to the growth of social classes, the situation is not uniform on any given cultural level. In general it may be said that the American Indians north of the Rio Grande developed societies which were relatively free of class distinctions,³ whereas in Polynesia, and more particularly in Africa, class lines came to be sharply drawn. Indeed, Africa presents stratified societies which rival those of literate peoples.

Factors Favouring the Growth of Social Classes. Cooley⁴ taught that the three principal conditions favouring stratification are: (1) marked

¹ L. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution* (London, 1915).

² Gunnar Landtman, *The Origin of the Inequality of the Social Classes* (London, 1938), Chaps. I-VI.

³ A noteworthy exception is afforded by the Kwakiutl Indians of the North-west, whose society consists of noblemen, commoners, and captive slaves.

⁴ C. H. Cooley, *Social Organisation*, pp. 217 ff.

differences in the constituent parts of the population ; (2) little communication and enlightenment ; and (3) a slow rate of social change. The presence of racially dissimilar peoples in the same region suggests invasion, and invasion in turn suggests conquest. Conquest facilitates the formation of castes by providing a servile group in those who are conquered.

The principal key to social classes is probably to be found in a slow rate of social change, with which is generally associated the factor of a low level of communication and education, mentioned by Cooley. When culture develops to the point where differences in wealth are significant, and conditions remain much the same from generation to generation, we have the bases for the development of social classes. This is the situation in agricultural societies, and it is no accident that the most extreme cases of stratification exist in old farming cultures like those of India and traditional China. A precondition of social stratification beyond age and sex is the production of economic surpluses and the differential control of them within the society. A study of the degree and form of stratification in 14 Polynesian societies, as related to ecological conditions, reports evidence in support of the thesis that "other factors being constant, the degree of stratification varies directly with productivity".¹ The index of stratification rests on the degree of forceful confiscation of goods, differential prerogatives in consumption, insignia of rank, decision-making power, intra-status marriages, taboos surrounding the individual, and manifestations of deference.

When the material culture changes rapidly, when physical mobility increases, and when cities develop, it becomes more difficult to maintain a rigid social class system. It is instructive to observe what has been happening in India under the impact of recent changes. In the relatively static agricultural society that existed for more than three thousand years, the Untouchables were not permitted to enter the temples or attend the common schools or use the public wells. They were so low in the social scale that it was thought that their shadows falling upon food would pollute it. These restrictions first began to break down in the cities, where the anonymity of social life made caste identification more difficult, and where the demands of new occupations clashed with the principle that occupations are determined by caste. Especially in the larger cities, outcastes were permitted to engage in occupations above their degree. And now that the forces of industrialisation are bringing further changes, the constitution of the new nation, India, has recently banned Untouchability.

¹ Marshall D. Sahlins, *Social Stratification in Polynesia* (Seattle : University of Washington Press, 1958).

AMERICAN VERSUS EUROPEAN SOCIAL CLASSES

There is a widespread belief in the United States that class lines are not drawn so sharply in America as in England and Europe and that there is considerably more social mobility. It is therefore surprising to find that there is no significant difference in rates of social mobility, as measured by the shift across the manual-non-manual line in both directions, in countries for which sample survey data exist. Table 23, which relates to urban populations, shows that there is appreciable mobility in all six countries; from about one-fourth to one-third of the non-farm population moves from working class to middle class or vice versa, from one generation to another. These

TABLE 23
COMPARATIVE INDICES OF UPWARD AND DOWNWARD MOBILITY
(percentages)

Country.	Non-farm Populations.		
	Upward mobility (non-manual sons of manual fathers).	Downward mobility (manual sons of non-manual fathers).	Total vertical mobility (non-farm population mobile across the line between working and middle classes).
United States	33	26	30
Germany . .	29	32	31
Sweden . .	31	24	29
Japan . .	36	22	27
France . .	39	20	27
Switzerland .	45	13	23

Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1959), Table 2.1, p. 25.

In Britain, for those born between 1890 and 1929, the proportion of sons achieving a higher status than their fathers varied from 31.1% to 44.1%. D. V. Glass (ed.): *Social Mobility in Britain* (London, 1954).

data are based on postwar national samples, but similar findings are reported for the first four decades of the twentieth century.¹

The similarity in the rates of social mobility in countries with diverse social structures suggests that these structures do not determine the rates, even though some cultures encourage and others discourage social mobility. Rather, the principal determinant seems to be the occupational structure which is quite similar in the several Western industrialised societies. Nor is the rate of economic expansion (industrialisation) highly correlated with the rate of mobility, since there are comparable mobility rates in societies with varied rates of economic expansion. It appears that there is a "take off"

¹ Pitirim Sorokin, *Social Mobility* (New York, 1927), pp. 414-80.

point in industrialisation and that once this stage of economic development is reached, it brings relatively high mobility rates, which do not substantially increase with further industrialisation.

There is a great deal of occupational shifting, or change of jobs, but generally within the same occupational class, that is, manual or non-manual. There is also considerable temporary shifting from one side of the line to the other but not much that is permanent. These observations are based on a study of the complete job histories of a sample of 935 principal wage-earners in Oakland, California, in 1949.¹

It may be noted, as a point of some significance, that extensive social mobility may be consistent with stratification. The class structure may remain while the composition of the classes changes, like a bus that is always full but of different passengers.²

The social consequences of upward mobility vary by society. In the United States the upwardly mobile are generally more conservative than those born into the middle class, whereas in Germany and Scandinavia the former are more radical. A possible explanation is that it is more difficult to change consumption patterns and life style in Europe than in the United States, and the greater status discrepancy leads to more social rejection. With reference to the downwardly mobile, there is little variation in the several countries; this group generally retains its middle-class values, presumably because it hopes to rise again. The socially mobile are also more politically inactive, the inaction being a form of withdrawal in the face of cross pressures.

While industrialised nations do not appear to differ meaningfully with respect to rates of mobility, they do differ significantly in the images they hold of the status system. The United States may not actually show more mobility than, say, England, but the idea is widely prevalent that this is so. There is an American myth of ideological equalitarianism, that all men are born equal and have equal opportunity to rise economically and socially. There is in fact a limited amount of validity to the idea. In some respects the United States does have an equalitarian code. Thus it is not considered good taste in America to emphasise differences in taste.

The reasons for the equalitarian myth are many. There is the absence of a feudal past and the lack of an hereditary aristocracy. Albert Guerard, in his autobiography, remarked that it was a relief to come to the United States without its military, its aristocracy, and its clergy; these groups are present in America, but they do not exist as social classes the way they do in Europe. Especially significant has been the influence of the frontier,³ where "the rifle and the

¹ S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*, Chapters v and vi.

² J. Schumpeter, *Imperialism and Social Classes*, pp. 127-9.

³ F. J. Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York, 1921).

axe made all men equally tall". With a great continent available for development, dissatisfied and dispossessed individuals could go west and start life anew. Likewise the great waves of immigration into the United States favoured social mobility, for it was on the backs of the more recent immigrants that the earlier immigrants could shunt the burdens of society. More recently, internal migration (urbanisation) has been substituted for immigration. The Constitution of the United States specifically states that the government may grant no titles to its citizens, nor may officials receive honours from foreign powers without the approval of Congress.

American social conditions such as those just mentioned have given to the masses a psychology unlike that possessed by the English people. The son of an English labourer has considerably more expectation of following in his father's footsteps than has the son of an American worker. The latter is more likely to have his mind set on acquiring a little capital and becoming an entrepreneur. The concern of the American worker has been not so much to identify himself with his class as to rise above it, although an evaluation of the motivation of 62 auto workers in a mid-western city indicates acquiescence and passivity on the part of workers where the means available to them made the goals of the dream unattainable.¹ This ambition is suggested by the results of polls showing that most Americans if asked to state whether they are upper, middle, or lower class, report themselves as belonging to the middle class. When given a fourfold choice of upper, middle, working, or lower class, 51 per cent identified themselves with the working class. In the minds of many persons, a stigma attaches to the phrase "lower class", which is seen as a group that is not just poor but deservedly poor because it is disreputable and irresponsible.

In his celebrated study of American life and government, Lord Bryce² took note of the fact that American classes differed from those of his own country. He found that American classes were much less distinct. "Their specific characters, as a naturalist would say, are less marked even in typical individuals than would be the case in Europe, and are in many individuals scarcely recognisable." He comments on the fact that the wives and daughters of working-men dress with so much taste that "on Sunday . . . you would take them for persons in easy circumstances". Indeed, the working-men themselves can often not be distinguished by their dress from persons in better positions. Bryce was also impressed by the fact that the American shopkeeper "has not the obsequiousness of his European congener, and is far from fancying that retail trade has anything degrading about it".

¹ Ely Chinoy, *Automobile Workers and the American Dream* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1955).

² James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (New York, ed. 1917), vol. ii, pp. 297 ff.

Are Class Lines becoming tighter? In what direction are social classes tending in the United States? Is mobility decreasing or increasing? Gone are many of the social conditions that gave us open classes. There are now no new geographical frontiers; immigration has been checked; and in general a larger amount of capital is required to establish a new business. Mobility is reported to be largely within manual and non-manual occupations rather than between them.¹ The ratio of actual to expected variations in the social origins of occupational groups over time has not changed significantly.² A study of intra-generation mobility, using city directories of Norristown, Pennsylvania, showed both upward and downward mobility increased, 1910-50.³ An analysis of the social origins and careers of some 8,000 major business executives of the largest firms in the United States in 1952, when compared with findings made

TABLE 23A
CHANGES IN OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY IN AMERICAN BUSINESS LEADERSHIP
BETWEEN 1928 AND 1952*

Occupation.	1928 Ratio.†	1952 Ratio.†
Labourer	0.24	0.32
White-collar worker	0.71	0.80
Professional man	4.33	3.50
Businessman	9.67	4.73
Farmer	0.32	0.33

* From W. Lloyd Warner and James C. Abegglen, *Occupational Mobility in American Business and Industry, 1928-1952*, p. 48. Copyright 1955, University of Minnesota.

† Proportional representation = 1.00. This means that if the number of business leaders contributed by an occupational group were proportional to the population of that occupation, the ratio would be 1.

twenty-five years earlier by Taussig and Joslyn (*American Business Leaders*) showed that the sons of labourers and white-collar workers, while under-represented in big business in both periods, increased their representation, whereas there was a marked decline in the business leadership of sons of businessmen.⁴

A comprehensive study of social mobility, based on an approxima-

¹ Seymour M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, "Social Mobility and Occupational Career Patterns", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 58, pp. 494-504, March, 1952.

² Natalie Rogoff, *Recent Trends in Occupational Mobility* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953).

³ Sidney Goldstein, "Migration and Occupational Mobility in Norristown, Pennsylvania", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 20, pp. 402-8, August, 1955.

⁴ W. Lloyd Warner and James C. Abegglen, *Occupational Mobility in American Business and Industry: 1928-1952* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955).

tion to a random sample of 3,497 adult civilians 18 years old and over in England, Scotland, and Wales, classified the subjects by decade of birth from 1890 to 1930. The data show no significant change over time in the proportion of subjects with the same social status as their fathers, which for each decade was close to the percentage for the whole sample, namely, 35.1 per cent.

Comprehensive data for Sweden also fail to show that class lines are tightening in that country.¹ The same is true for Denmark.²

A contrary trend in social classes in the United States is the decrease in those classes with lower social rank and an increase in those with higher social rank. If we may call large occupational groups social classes, then the class lowest in rank is that of unskilled labour, as shown in Fig. 30. The occupational groups with the highest rank are the professional persons and the proprietors. The unskilled workers were a much smaller proportion of those at work in 1960 than in earlier decades, whereas the high-ranked occupational groups existed in larger proportions in 1960 than before. The white-collar group, which is usually ranked above skilled labour, has increased greatly.³

In England, there has been a similar increase in the number of non-manual occupations. For example, clerks have increased from 4 per cent of the labour force in 1901 to 10.5 per cent in 1951. But any substantial increase in the proportion of males employed in non-manual occupations has been offset by the entry of females into clerical and sales occupations. Female clerks have increased from 13.4 per cent of the total in 1901 to 59.6 per cent in 1951.⁴ The proportion of males employed in non-manual occupations has, consequently, increased from 24.7 per cent in 1911 to 26.9 per cent in 1951.⁵

The reasons for these shifts in the numbers of the social classes are probably economic and technological. Machines, such as steam shovels, have taken away some of the work of the unskilled; some work of the skilled has also been taken, as, for instance, that usurped by the bottle-making machines. The machine tenders, whom we call semi-skilled, have thus increased. The clerks have increased because of the growth of trade and office work.

It also appears that the percentage of owners of their own businesses has decreased. These are in the main farmers and proprietors (excluding officials). More people are working for fewer employers.

Another significant change has occurred in the distribution of personal income in the last three decades or so in the United States.

¹ Gösta Carlsson, *Social Mobility and Class Structure* (Lund, Sweden: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1958).

² Kaare Svalastoga, *Prestige, Class and Mobility* (Toronto: William Heinemann Ltd., 1959).

³ C. W. Mills, *op. cit.*

⁴ D. Lockwood, *The Black-coated Worker* (Allen & Unwin, 1958).

⁵ D. V. Glass, *op. cit.*, 1954.




FIG. 30.—Classes of Higher Rank are Increasing.

Strictly comparable data are available only for the decades 1940-60, but the trend since the turn of the century has been to increase the percentage of the population in higher occupational classes. The lowest class, unskilled labour, was more than one-third of the number of workers in 1910 and only one-quarter in 1940, and even smaller in 1960. This conclusion may be drawn from the data shown above (from 1960 Census of Population, *Supplementary Reports*, PC(S1)-40, December 31, 1962) and from data (not shown) on 1910-40 from Alba Edwards, *Comparative Occupation Statistics for the United States, 1870 to 1940*.

The rise in income was general, which means that the income received by the poor has increased substantially, and those at the lower economic level have a higher level of living than most people in other countries. As to relative shares, there has been a narrowing of the gap since 1929 between the top fifth and the bottom fifth, although since 1944 there has been no change. The earnings differential between whites and non-whites did not change from 1950 to 1960, although both increased greatly.¹ There has also been a decline in the assets of the top wealth-holders in the United States, 1922-56.²

This discussion has been concerned with whether social-class lines have been getting tighter or looser in the United States. A review of inferences drawn from historical trends, as well as the direct study of the mobility of various groups, shows that the evidence is inconclusive and that there is no clear answer to the question of whether there is any significant change in vertical mobility in American society.³ There have, however, been great changes in the size of occupational groups and in income levels, representing a general upgrading of the population. If the per capita income in the United States rises during the years 1950 to 2000 as it did from 1900 to 1950, the wage-earners of the second half of the century will have the purchasing power of the middle class of the first half of the century and perhaps also the culture.

SOCIAL CLASSES AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Whether social mobility is increasing or not, there are certain forces of social change at work in the United States and other complex industrial societies which moderate the influence of social class, retard the growth of class consciousness, and make classes more difficult to detect.

Social change takes a number of forms, one of which is the circulation of individuals from one region to another and from one section of a community to another. Physical mobility is pronounced in the United States. Even as early as 1900, only 68.3 per cent of the American population resided in the state of their birth, while a census taken in India about the same time showed more than nine-tenths of the population living in the districts where they were born.⁴ In 1930 the proportion of the population living in the state of their birth was 67.3. The effect of pronounced physical mobility is to produce strangers, for people living in the same apartment house in a modern

¹ Herman P. Miller, in the *New York Times Magazine*, November 11, 1962, pp. 50 ff.

² Robert J. Lampman, *The Share of Top Wealth-Holders in National Wealth 1922-56* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962). Top wealth-holders are defined as living persons with assets of \$50,000 or more in 1953. Wealth equals all assets with a market value.

³ Ely Chinoy, "Social Mobility Trends in the United States", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 20, pp. 180-6, April, 1955.

⁴ *Census of India 1901* (Calcutta, 1903), vol. 1, pp. 88-9.

city often do not know one another. To which social class do these people belong? To answer this question accurately calls for knowledge of their family background, knowledge which we may not possess.

Another way in which modern culture affects class is through the marvellous development in the field of technology and the correlated mass-production system. The effect of these developments is to blur, and in some cases obliterate, the earmarks of class. It is no longer possible to distinguish a man's class by the clothes he wears, while education is further reducing class differences.

Moreover, the economic classes no longer live in isolation where individualistic traits are nourished, for the effect of modern communication inventions is to break down the barriers between groups. The radio brings to all classes the upper-class culture of the opera, the Wimbledon tennis matches, and the religious services of the fashionable churches. It would be a mistake, of course, to think that inventions do not also create class distinctions, when, as at present, the élite are the only ones likely to have private planes and air-conditioned homes. But details and exceptions aside, it is clear that social classes are fostered by stability of social conditions, the perpetuation of things as they are. Rapid social change like that of modern society is hostile to class organisation, which depends on the maintenance of a formalised established social order.

Social Classes and Nationalism. An interesting question to-day is the relation of nationalism and class-consciousness. The growth of nationalism in our time is a product of modern cultural change. The welding together of separate units of a people is due in part to modern methods of communication and transportation which break down the barriers between local communities and make possible the effective administration of larger areas. Nationalism has been a favourite cause of leftist political movements, directed against colonialism and imperialism. Yet they say that nationalism is an opiate which lulls workers into unawareness of their own interests. Thus Communists frequently refer to the class movement as the Internationale. Fascism, which in theory commands the subordination of the interests of separate classes to the interests of the state, is said to be only a desperate resort on the part of frightened capitalists to bolster a tottering economic system.¹

Communism, to be sure, turns the tables so far as partiality to the economic classes is concerned. But it is doubtful if communism is immune to the influences of nationalism. The 1937 Chinese Communists ceased fighting the other classes in China when their country was threatened from without and made common cause against the Japanese. In 1939, many thousands of French Communists severed

¹ Cf. Joseph Barnes, "The Social Basis of Fascism", *Public Affairs*, vol. 9, pp. 24-32, March, 1936.

their connection with the Communist Party and hence with their comrades in Russia, when that nation moved against Poland and Finland. In Russia, Stalin favoured building up the nation first and instituted the five-year plans for the development of Russian resources. Present Russians appear to be quite nationally minded. Modern nationalism may act as a curb to the growth of class consciousness, especially when the nation is threatened from without.

SUMMARY

In the interests of continuity and efficiency, social life is organised on the basis of formal positions or statuses which accompany the rôles individuals play in the group. Society compares and ranks individuals and groups. Stratification exists when groups are ranked in a hierarchy with some degree of permanence.

An especially significant type of status is social class, because it has high explanatory value in accounting for variations in social behaviour. Classes differ in their opportunities or life-chances, and since classes are subcultures, they differ also in their patterns of behaviour. There is also a subjective orientation to class, or a class-consciousness which leads socially inferior groups to show deference to socially superior groups. In times of rapid change, however, the attitude towards the upper class may become one of hostility and result in class conflict.

Social classes are broad groups of individuals between whom there are barriers to social intercourse, especially in relations of intimacy. A position in a social class is provided by the family into which one is born, and ordinarily that position is retained throughout one's lifetime. In all social systems, however, there is some movement of individuals, or social mobility, up and down the social ladder. An open-class society is one in which social mobility is maximal; a caste society one in which it is minimal. The routes of mobility include marriage, education, wealth, and special talents.

Social mobility is favoured by the conditions of modern life, such as rapid cultural change, migration, and city life. Modern technology through mass-production also obscures the earmarks of class.

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. Why is there stratification in all societies?
2. How would you distinguish between the main varieties of stratification (castes, estates, and social class)?
3. Describe Max Weber's use of the concepts of class and status. Illustrate their use by examining the changing position of the clerical worker over the last 100 years.
4. What do you understand by the terms "middle class" and "working class"? Compare them with the concepts "bourgeoisie" and "proletariat".
5. How is the American caste system different from that of India?
6. In what ways does social class influence life-chances?
7. Examine the ways in which class has influenced educational opportunity over the last 100 years.
8. What are the social consequences of equality of educational opportunity?
9. How would you apply the concepts of "middle class" and "working class" to an analysis of (a) British, (b) U.S. social structure?

10. Examine the relations between class and property in any two societies.
11. Are class lines tightening in (a) the United States, (b) Britain? Elaborate.
12. Is it more difficult to describe the trend regarding class-consciousness than that regarding stratification?

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CHAPTER XVII

SOCIETY AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

Economic needs and activities are fundamental in society. Modern men spend most of their waking hours making a living. What kind of work we do, therefore, and for whom we work have much to do with our happiness and welfare. The nature of our working life is determined for us by our economic institutions.

Since economic pursuits are fundamental, it is not surprising that they should also be pervasive in their effects on social life. The getting and spending of wealth is the subject of a vast literature, which traditionally treated these phenomena as if they were a closed system. Modern economists concern themselves mainly with economic phenomena *per se*, but recognise the interrelations of economic and other societal factors. Sociology studies the economy solely as a sub-system of the wider society,¹ stressing the community interrelations of economic behaviour.

Why Economic Activities are Social. Economic institutions are closely interwoven with the other institutions of primitive peoples. As is shown in the first part of this chapter, with a people in a rather stationary society, such as the Eskimo or the Kwakiutl Indians, "making a living" is tied to ideas of supernatural powers, to traditional taboos, to prestige and status, to communal welfare, and to informal social pressures. Among the Hopi Indians, planting corn is accompanied by much religious and recreational ritual.

Since food, clothing, houses, and tools are essential, their acquisition and use influence other phenomena, such as family life and the kind and size of community. The family was a more important institution for economic production before the development of trade and manufacture created factories and enlarged villages into cities. Recent research has shown that the type of family is related to the type of subsistence economy.² The small nuclear family with which we are familiar in the industrial West is also associated with hunting culture, whereas the extended family is more common in agricultural societies. The changes in the various social institutions will be incompletely understood unless stock is taken of changes in the economic institutions.

In modern times, economic activities are so numerous and extensive that, aside from self-sufficing farming, they cannot be controlled

¹ Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser, *Economy and Society* (Glencoe, Illinois : The Free Press, 1956).

² M. F. Nimkoff and Russell Middleton, "Types of Family and Types of Economy", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 66, pp. 215-25, November, 1960.

or aided by the family, which has been replaced as an economic institution by a variety of other organisations such as corporation-owned plants. Since the local community is too inadequate to exercise much control, there is an increasing amount of national legislation affecting industry. The main problem concerning present-day economic institutions is how in all their variety and magnitude they can be best integrated with the other parts of society—a condition well fulfilled among stationary primitive peoples. We are interested in how economic institutions can be controlled when they use ruthless power, how they may be made to evolve towards greater efficiency and production, and at the same time how they may be aided, particularly in times of disturbance.

The treatment of economic institutions in this chapter will be in terms of their relationship with various other social institutions. It is the social aspects of economic life, not discussed in textbooks on economics, that constitute the subject matter of this chapter.

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT

FOOD GATHERERS AND HUNTERS

The anatomical analysis of man's foot and hand suggests that he once may have been a tree dweller, in which case his earliest economic activities consisted largely in searching for fruits, nuts, and green shoots. We find him first, as man, living in the food-gathering cultures. Here

TABLE 24
SEX SPECIALISATION IN OCCUPATIONS *

	Males Exclu- sively.	Males Predom- inantly.	Males or Females.	Females Predom- inantly.	Females Exclu- sively.
Pursuit of sea mammals .	34	1	0	0	0
Hunting	166	13	0	0	0
Trapping	128	13	4	1	2
Fishing	98	34	19	3	4
Gathering shellfish . . .	9	4	8	7	25
Gathering fruits, berries, nuts	12	3	15	13	63
Preservation of meat and fish	8	2	10	14	74
Gathering herbs, roots, and seeds	8	1	11	7	74
Cooking	5	1	9	28	158

* George P. Murdock, "Comparative Data on Division of Labour by Sex", *Journal of Social Forces*, vol. 15, p. 551, May, 1937. The peoples included in the table are not all hunting peoples.

the general picture is one where the procuring of roots, fruits, berries, greens, grains and seeds is supplemented by some hunting and trapping of land and water animals. The proportion of food from animals and plants varies, but in general the proportion of plant food is large. In some of these cultures, however, the reliance on meat is preponderant ; for instance, the Plains Indians depend mainly on the buffalo. Indeed, where animals are abundant, the technique of hunting becomes highly developed so that it may be desirable to separate the hunting cultures from the other food-gathering cultures which rely largely on plant food.

Sex Division of Labour. An early organisation in the procuring of food and its preparation is the division of labour between men and women. Men, and not women, are generally the hunters where hunting is an important source of food. Women are more often the gatherers of roots, berries, nuts, and grains. Sometimes there are exceptions and variations from one people to another. The division of labour between the two sexes is shown in Table 24 for a large number of peoples of different cultures. This table indicates that there are not many places where men and women share the same jobs ; the occupational cleavage is fairly sharp.

The Family and the Community as Economic Institutions. The family is an important institution in both the production and consumption of goods. The wife ordinarily prepares the food, which the men, or the men and women of the family, bring in. However, the family is not the only producing and consuming organisation. Some hunting, for instance that for the buffalo or caribou, is undertaken by parties of men larger than the number of men in a single family. The walrus and other big game are best hunted by groups of men also. The hunting parties may be away for weeks or months. The consuming organisation is generally the family group, but even so on many occasions there are groups of eaters much larger than the family unit, especially at festivals and ceremonies. Accordingly it may be seen that the community as well as the family, at times, becomes the producing and consuming unit.

The Origin of Trade. The early primitive communities are self-sufficient economically, and hence do not depend upon trade. Moreover, the distance between settlements is often great and the means of transportation rudimentary. Those who have boats or who drive dogs hitched to sleds may travel considerable distances. But since in general the hunters do not have domesticated horses, the means of transportation do not favour much intertribal trade. Another obstacle to trade is the absence of a standard medium of exchange. Durable objects of an ornamental nature, such as jade or shells, seem to have a wide acceptance and occasionally assume the nature of money. Generally, however, trade is between neighbouring tribes and the procedure is barter. The earliest trade results from differences in natural resources in particular areas, which occasion abundance or

scarcity of desired commodities, such as fish, nuts, or skins. But, as has been suggested, trade plays a relatively small part in the total economy of the hunter.

Some hunting peoples do not seem to know how to trade. Early white traders sometimes found well-mannered primitive hunters who depreciated their goods and insisted they were not worth enough to trade. They professed surprise that anyone would want their material possessions. In other places there is the custom of silent trade. One group leaves on a designated spot the objects it has to offer. Later, upon return, they find that the objects have disappeared and other goods have been put in their place. Trading does not appear to be instinctive or even natural.

The Gift as a Medium of Exchange. For many early cultures the mechanism of exchange seems to have been effected by hospitality or by gifts. A gift is a social substitute for money among moneyless cultures. Thus, if a wedding occurs, gifts are brought, which some time later are reciprocated. The system is much like our Christmas giving, which effects a rudimentary exchange of goods. As among us, the people of the hunting cultures remember with great precision the value of the gift. If a task is to be done which calls for co-operative service, such as building a dwelling, and if one co-operator works vigorously and another lazily, this fact will be remembered with exactness for a long time and the reciprocation made with the proper vigour or laziness.

Hospitality as an Economic Service. We have seen that before the invention of money and credit, gifts rendered a function like that which money renders with us. In the absence of banks and before the inventions of rent and interest, these service functions were rendered by the practice of hospitality. Hospitality, which is sometimes mistaken for communism, is the rule everywhere in hunting communities. This system of extending hospitality works out reciprocally in the long run and is not wholly one-sided. Any traveller is entitled to food and rest without payment. Indeed, no person in the community is allowed to starve if anyone else possesses food.

The practice of hospitality is at times quite extreme. It even permits the borrowing of a great variety of material objects that are not in use. The custom of lending for money, or of renting, had not been invented among hunters. The ever-present custom of hospitality was extended to cover borrowing, which again is reciprocal. The objects used in the hunt, such as the hunting boat and the harpoon, are not allowed to be lent to others, for they must always be at hand. But other objects may be taken, sometimes even without the owner's knowledge. Moreover, if in use another person's property becomes damaged, it is not always obligatory for the user to make restitution.¹

¹ Among the Bering Strait Eskimo, "if a man borrows from another and fails to return the article he is not held to account for it. This is done under the general

To a modern observer such practices suggest common ownership. This generosity is especially notable in cases where everyone on a hunt gets a share of a big catch or kill whether he gives the death stroke or not. Also the common use of land for hunting is very widespread.

We have seen how the economic functions of wages, rent, interest, trade, and money are largely absent from early economic organisation. However, the functions which they render are achieved in early economic life by two widespread practices, the giving and receiving of gifts and of hospitality. Marketless economies, characterised by the lack of institutions of exchange, operate through the mechanisms of reciprocity and redistribution.¹ As an example of the former, the coastal villages of the Trobriand Islands supply the inland villages with fish and the inland villages reciprocate with yams. Redistribution occurs when the produce of the group is brought together, either physically or by appropriation, and then distributed among the members.

Early Attitudes towards Property. These habits of gift-giving, hospitality, free borrowing, and lending, and the common use of land have led to the idea that communism existed among the primitive hunters. Did communism exist among primitive peoples, or was there individualism and private ownership of property? The point is considered by many to be of value because it appears to throw some light on the nature of man. In the private capitalism of to-day the pursuit of money and private possessions seem to be a part of our nature. Many individuals feel that a common sharing of goods would be unnatural. There are others who argue that primitive hunters were communists throughout the hundreds of thousands of years that man was in this stage of culture, and that communism mirrors man's nature. Private property, it is claimed, was a late development, and man's original nature has been twisted abnormally into selfish patterns by the rise of the institution of property.

With reference, however, to the economic life of primitive hunters, it is apparent from the preceding paragraphs that there are both common usage and private ownership. Clothing, ornaments, weapons, tools, utensils, lamps, and usually houses were individually owned, much as with us. Primitive hunting lands, on the contrary, would be called by a modern the property of the clan or band. Indeed the

¹ Walter C. Neale, "Reciprocity and Redistribution in the Indian Village", in Karl Polanyi *et al.* (ed.), *Trade and Market in the Early Empires* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press and The Falcon's Wing Press, 1957).

feeling that if a person has enough property to enable him to lend some of it, he has more than he needs. The one who makes the loan under these circumstances does not even feel justified in asking for the return of the article, and waits for it to be given back voluntarily." Nelson, *Bulletin of American Ethnology*, vol. xviii, Part 1, p. 294.

idea of property among many primitive peoples was not applied to land any more than we apply it to air. In general what we call public property consisted of the basic means of production. Certain essentials of life, such as land and the food supply, were generally identified with the group, whether it was the family, the clan, or the whole tribe, rather than with the individual.

The communal practices appear to have been the outgrowth of the conditions of life. The mobility of animals hunted and the distance to be covered would seem to make individual ownership of hunting lands difficult. The absence of money was naturally accompanied by a system of gifts. The relative scarcity of material inventions and of property seems to mean that property was much more subdued as an element in the social life of primitive peoples than it is with us, where it is plentiful. The prestige of wealth and property is very great with us. Among primitive peoples the prestige of prowess, or reputation in lines other than wealth, was great, as evidenced by the fact that often among primitive hunters slander or malicious gossip was severely condemned and might lead to serious punishment or even to death.

Economic Incentives : Property versus Reputation. The modern economic system with all its elaborate structure moves, it is said, because of man's desire to make money. The socialists call this driving force which puts all the capitalistic machinery in motion, the profit motive. If there were not this lure for private gain, why would a man work long and hard? Such is the capitalistic view of economic incentives. It is argued that communism will not work because it removes the great incentive to effort, namely, the lure of gain. On this interesting point, the primitive economic system should throw some light, since it was a system where there was very little private property, where wealth was poorly developed, and where much of what we call property, like land, was communal.

It should first be stated that the lure of gain is not non-existent in primitive economies. The food gatherer who works the hardest has the most food to eat and can give the biggest feast. But observation shows that the best hunter not only has the most food ; he also has the biggest reputation. The lazy hunter receives the scorn of the community. If the incentive for property is slight, certainly the incentive of reputation is very great among peoples with little property. It spurs men to action.

A very interesting illustration is the potlatch competition of the American Indians of the North-west Pacific Coast. These Indians meet in a great celebration and certain goods are distributed by the wealthy. These are usually blankets, which are highly prized. The person who takes them is expected to return them with interest, that is, more blankets. The individual who returns the blankets with the most additional blankets receives the greatest honour. One borrows them at the highest rate of interest possible, instead of at the lowest

rate as with us. Glory goes with the payment of high interest. As Barnett¹ puts it, "Virtue rests in publicly disposing of wealth, not in its mere acquisition and accumulation. Accumulation in any quantity by borrowing or otherwise is, in fact, unthinkable unless it be for the purpose of immediate redistribution." Thus the goals men work for are determined by their culture.

Curious, indeed, from our point of view, are the motives underlying the economic activity of men in different cultures. Linton tells how he once bargained with a native merchant at Tananarive for a piece of raffia cloth, finally securing it at a price about a fourth greater than any native would have paid. Linton² then offered to take the merchant's entire stock at the same price, but the offer was flatly refused. If he sold out, the merchant explained, he would have the rest of the day on his hands with nothing to do.

The Correlation of Economic Life with Culture in General. These examples illustrate a general aspect of economic processes in primitive society: they are woven into close relations with other institutions. The potlatch is related to celebration and festival. The exchange of goods is facilitated by gifts at weddings or ceremonies. The custom of hospitality prevents the complete control of personal property. Also, hunting is sometimes closely tied in with religion and magic. Some animals become the totem for a clan and may not be killed. Again, as was seen, the beginning of trade among hunters is often governed by what we would call good manners. There is thus a close connection between economics and group standards. The economic processes concerning exchange, trade, production, and distribution are very much in accord with the values of the community. Primitive economic life is closely interrelated with family, religion, and community folkways and mores.³

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

ECONOMIC LIFE AND MATERIAL CULTURE

Economic life is not only related to community standards; it is also decidedly a function of tools and inventions. Two great discoveries eventually were made which gradually replaced the hunting life with new superior economic forms and greatly speeded the development of some of the economic processes familiar to us. These

¹ H. G. Barnett, "The Nature of the Potlatch", *American Anthropologist* (new series), vol. 40, p. 353, July-September, 1938. This summary points to a more refined and definitive concept of the potlatch than is given above. In certain respects, the psychology of the potlatch is not unlike the psychology of "conspicuous consumption" by certain people of wealth in our own day. (Cf. Thorstein Veblen, *Theory of the Leisure Class* [London, 1924].) Status goes with the possession of wealth, and is enhanced by the conspicuous display of wealth.

² Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York, 1936), p. 144.

³ L. T. Hobhouse et al., *Material Culture and the Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples* (London, 1915).

discoveries were, first, the domestication of animals, particularly the big animals such as cattle ; and second, agriculture. Most of the hunting peoples had already domesticated the dog, which aided in the hunt and helped somewhat in transportation. With planting and domestication came other discoveries and mechanical inventions. The course of economic organisation is closely dependent upon the new inventions in material culture.

EARLY AGRICULTURE

Agriculture tended to emphasise the private ownership of land, though there are many agricultural peoples whose land is owned by the clan as in the hunting cultures, and is assigned in plots for use to different families. The crops, however, are the property of the individuals working them. In some cases planting or harvesting may be done co-operatively, so that the food belongs to a number of families collectively.

Farming without a plough, and where the main implement is a digging stick, is called hoe culture. Hoe culture, like hunting, is not as simple as it may seem, but becomes quite an art. For instance, when the Hopi of the south-western American desert plant corn, the days of planting are announced by the town crier. The land is then allotted. The Hopi methods are so expert that modern students of scientific agriculture have not been able to offer any improvements, if the same tools and seed are used. Even so, the Hopi must keep one year's supply of corn ahead as insurance against drought, for despite all their careful methods of agriculture some crops are lost.

With the stable life of agriculture there seem to have been associated other inventions. Pottery-making is partially correlated with agriculture and seldom found among hunters. The weaving of hair, or wool, or cotton is more often found among agricultural groups, for whom it replaces somewhat the hunters' use of skins as clothing. With agriculture, housing is more highly developed, since habitation is more settled and invention has made some progress.

With cloth, pottery, baskets, and crops, property begins to accumulate and to become of considerable significance. Moreover, the advanced skills required in these pursuits lead to further specialisation. Out of one hundred individuals, some will do a job better than others. These are the ones likely to specialise. The foundations of exchange are thus laid. Under agriculture there is greater chance of trade.

DOMESTICATION OF ANIMALS

Domestication means the continued presence of food, in contrast both to the uncertain supply in the wild state, and to the capricious situation in the case of crops. Also, if the herds increase there is more wealth for exchange and trade. The domestication of cattle is clearly

a man's work and frequently the male assumes a more dominant position among pastoral peoples than he does in the hoe cultures.

In so far as pastoral peoples wander with their herds, their life is more like that of hunters than that of settled agriculturists. They are not so likely to carry pottery with them, for instance. Shelters that can be quickly constructed are most suitable. The wandering type of life of some herders seems to fit them for marauding expeditions, the stealing of cattle, or raids on agricultural granaries. Such is the case especially where the horse has been domesticated. The horse is a great aid in war, comparable relatively to the gun or the airplane in later times. The horse is swift and can be ridden ; sudden attacks and departures are readily possible, and one may fight from horseback. Cavalry are a great advantage in a fight against people who do not possess horses.

THE GROWTH OF THE HANDICRAFTS

With the development of the domestication and breeding of animals, pastoral life and farming eventually became fused in many lands so that farmers possessed some sheep, cattle, and horses. Such was particularly the case where the plough pulled by an animal had been invented. At this stage of plough culture, property had become quite highly developed. There was individual ownership of farm land, equipment, and products. By planting in rows dug by a plough and by using the power of domesticated animals, a much larger and more certain food supply was possible, and the population became still more dense. In favourable locations the agricultural produce was sufficiently plentiful to exchange. Where the boat and horse were practicable, travel occurred over great distances and the means for carrying on trade were thus established. Meanwhile progress was made in many of the arts. The potter's wheel made better pottery, and glazing was developed. Spinning, which was done earlier by twirling a stick across the knee, was improved with the spinning wheel. There were also improvements in weaving.

The economic significance of the development of the handicrafts is varied. In the first place, it meant a growth of property. In the competition between man's quest for possessions and his desire for intangible values such as reputation or affection, the former was gaining ground. Second, the greater the variety and number of such objects of hand manufacture, the greater the requirement of labour, and hence there was an impetus to an extension of the division of labour beyond the principles of sex and age.

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT CAME WITH THE PLOUGH AND CATTLE

Land and Property. When the plough and domesticated animals were added to the hoe in agriculture, land became very important. The yield of land was increased by improvement in methods, as the

decades and centuries passed. Individual ownership became the rule, though some pasture and woodland may have been held in common. By individual ownership is meant individual family ownership; and the family, including kin, was sometimes a very large one. Since land was the basis of wealth, and men desire wealth, large land holdings resulted by purchase, by marriage, or by force, where enough labour could be had to do the work. This labour was in some places kin, in others slaves or serfs, and in still others sharecroppers. There thus arose social classes, peasantry and landed aristocracy. The large landholders fought among themselves. Wealthy families became very powerful and assumed governmental functions, including the judicial and the military. They sometimes sponsored art, architecture, and religious undertakings. Gradually and sometimes by revolution, family control was wrested away from a single family; and states were born. And villages, sometimes owned or dominated by rich landlords, worked their way to freedom and grew into independent towns and cities.

Feudal Organisation. Preceding the emergence of our modern order, the necessity for protection against marauding groups in Europe led to the feudal type of organisation, especially where a central government did not exist or was breaking up. Owners of property and large holders of land found they could exact payments of money or goods from weaker farmers. With this money soldiers could be maintained. A big farmer, called a lord, with little farmers grouped round him, could do the same. These lords lived in large houses called manors, or castles, near villages or farms. They secured control over surrounding neighbours, exacting material tribute and giving them protection from robbers, pirates, and marauding groups in general. There was thus built up a type of economic organisation much larger than the family. It led to greater division of labour and to an increase in the variety of goods, because of the potentialities which exist when wealth is accumulated in the hands of a few. The manor and feudal systems were very widespread, being found even among many preliterate peoples, sometimes in incipient forms and sometimes well developed.

In feudalism, government was closely tied to the economic system. The most powerful family that extended control over smaller and weaker families and that controlled—often by brute force—a large amount of land, exercised the sort of control over the smaller farmers, serfs, and slaves that the head of the family had exercised over the family and labour on the family farm. The lord was a head family man and an autocratic ruler.

As feudal states grew and became integrated into larger national states, out of the nobility there evolved the autocratic monarch, who, of course, endeavoured to control and derive unusual benefits from economic production, then largely agricultural.

The Growth of the Division of Labour. Specialisation was furthered by the discoveries of the use of copper, tin, gold, bronze, and iron. Such metals were very valuable as tools, weapons, and ornaments, and were put to uses formerly served by clay, wood, stone, grass, and beads. The distribution in nature of metals was less widespread than the substances they displaced, and on this account it was not easy for each household or each male in a household to become adept in the working of metals. Thus specialists such as the tinsmith arose. When the water wheel replaced the mortar and pestle, the miller appeared. And with the use of the wheel, invented in only one place in the world, there came the wheelwright. The development of specialists outside each family meant that there had to be a further exchange of goods.

The exchange of goods over distances means transportation as well as trade. The boat possessed by all peoples living near water was a great agency for transportation even after the domestication of the horse. A horse can be ridden over plains, but it cannot be driven well through the woods without roads. Road-making is a fairly late development of man. Roads that would carry a wagon were, until quite recently, very poor. All during the Middle Ages the mileage covered by a loaded wagon over the rough roads was around a dozen or a score a day.

The Origin of the Commercial and Industrial City. With specialisation in the handicrafts and improvements in transportation, the volume of trade increased. One evidence of this was the city, which may be thought of as a place where the inhabitants do not grow enough food to feed themselves. They therefore must import it from outside, which means transportation and trade. They cannot get food gratis, so they must make cloth, leather, metal goods or something else to exchange for it. Within these early cities, located on water routes, there developed certain places for trade. The goods were assembled at certain places on certain days to be inspected, bought, and sold. Such an impromptu market-place was the origin of the store. Although trade was predominantly by barter, there were some goods in frequent demand which were exchanged most often. When such goods were light and durable, as was the case with gold and silver ornaments, money developed. The volume of trade coincident with a city's life was a stimulant for the use of money. Special stores dealing in money alone, that is, banks, did not flourish until modern times, though there were pawnbrokers in the Middle Ages and money-changers in Biblical times.

The economic life of cities soon became linked with the institutions of war. Cities on or near the coast were able with their wealth, power, and population to conquer territories near and far with the aid of their ships. The cities became city states, and some expanded into empires, as, for instance, Rome.

The student who has followed the development of technologies in the preceding paragraphs must be cautioned against reading into the argument any notion of unilinear evolution, namely, the idea that all societies in their development go through the same set of sequential stages, which is an outmoded theory. It is only when cultural evolution is examined as a whole, that is, for the world as a whole and over the whole range of time, that some stages of technological and economic development are seen as preliminary to others, making it possible to reconstruct a general set of stages of increasing complexity and productivity.

THE MODERN ECONOMIC ORDER

Capitalism is the designation for the system that makes use of capital, usually expressed in terms of money but really consisting of capital goods, namely, the instruments of production. The capital goods of a state may be owned by individuals or by the government. In the former case the economic system is spoken of as *private capitalism* or simply *capitalism*. It is the system under which most of the readers of this book live. When the capital goods are owned by the government we call it state capitalism or *socialism*, a system under which many millions of people in Asia and Europe live.

To understand private capitalism we must designate its essence, which is the drive to sell for more than costs, the difference going to the private sellers. When exchange is by barter, instead of by the use of money, it is more difficult to measure the gain in a trade. The idea of profit may not exist. But to-day under the system of private capitalism, if business men did not sell for more than costs they would either go bankrupt or get no money reward for their work and risk.

The development of the notion of profit and interest was not easy. For the ideology of the Christian church of the Middle Ages was one of service and production for need, in opposition to usury, the charge of a monetary return for a loan, as Max Weber and Richard Tawney¹ have reminded us. They also argue that the ethics of the Protestants of Northern Europe were based upon such conceptions as thrift, individualism, the virtues of hard work, and proper rewards for personal industry. The Protestants denied that the Scriptures were in opposition to an interest rate. Thus the ideology of the Protestants was less hostile to capitalism than was that of the Catholics; and the institution of religion was related to the adoption of the new economic system. It should also be observed that coal and iron, a fundamental part of the structure of modern capitalism, are found more extensively in Protestant Northern Europe than in Catholic Southern Europe. This moral approach of the medieval Church to

¹ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, tr. by Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950); Richard Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., 1952).

capitalism is found in arguments of socialists who would have the government take over the production, and produce according to needs or for social objectives ; if sales are more than costs, the difference would accrue to the government, which under socialism is supposed to belong to the people.

The Industrial Revolution. The second outstanding characteristic of modern economic life is the application of mechanical power to production, a development which has paralleled the rise of capitalism.

In 1850, in the U.S.A., of all the energy used, only 25 per cent was from mechanical sources, whereas in 1950, the figure had risen to 98.6 per cent. In 1850, before the Industrial Revolution had developed very far, a worker produced 34 cents (1950 prices) worth of goods per hour, but in 1944 he produced \$1.94 worth, or about six times as much.¹ Another way of showing how increased efficiency of production has raised our income is the following. In 1950 the labour force of the United States produced 204 thousand million dollars of income to spend. But if this same labour force had worked at the same rate of productivity as in 1900—that is, with the same tools and machines and for the same number of hours—they would have produced only 79 thousand million.²

Mechanical power actually brought two revolutions. One was the extensive and rapid change in the making of material goods and services, and was evidenced in the flowering of many economic institutions. The other was the revolution in the many social institutions that were closely linked to the economic activities.

The Economic Revolution. In the economic revolution, factories replaced the households as centres of production, except on farms. In factories the work was divided up into little pieces, each worker doing a single piece, as, for instance, in a clothing factory where one worker may only mark the cloth for a slit to be cut for a pocket. Machines also do work without human workers ; thus music is now supplied by machines. The process still goes on. The machines that watch and control other machines usher in the age of automation.

Machines duplicate easily and rapidly. The result is that they turn out their products in great quantities. Mass-production raises the plane of living by making available at cheap prices consumer goods that cover the land like the dew. Thus pins and cloth and lamps are much more plentiful and cheap than if produced by hand. Even such expensive goods as automobiles are mass-produced.

With mechanical power came large plants, and particularly large corporations owning many plants. Sometimes these corporations own all the plants in a particular industry, thus becoming monopolies.

¹ J. Frederic Dewhurst and Associates, *America's Needs and Resources* (New York : The Twentieth Century Fund, 1955).

² W. F. Ogburn, "Technology and the Standard of Living in the United States", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 60, pp. 380-6, January, 1955.

Production processes become highly interrelated, which is not the case with self-sufficient farming or primitive hunting.

These developments of mass-production, specialisation, exchange, division of labour, and interrelationships of industries are accompanied by different systems, notably socialism and private capitalism.

Finally, with the Industrial Revolution there was a proliferation of economic organisations such as banks, stock markets, brokerage houses, insurance companies, industrial corporations, advertising companies, trade associations, chambers of commerce, merchants' associations, and lobbyists.

Social Relations in Industry. In the household economy, when the family was the prevailing organisation, the labour force commonly consisted of members of the family and kin. When it was made up of slaves, serfs, or peasants, the numbers were small on an estate, and the head of the family knew them as persons and by name. Face-to-face contact was a common occurrence.

With the coming of the Industrial Revolution, factories or company-owned industries began to employ thousands of workers whom the owner or manager did not know. These workers were engaged in repetitive monotonous tasks and were so mechanically viewed that they began to be called factory "hands". A factory was seen as a mechanistic arrangement and not as a society of human beings. From the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, social workers, legislators, religious leaders, and some socially minded employers protested against this lack of the human touch in employer-employee relations. Labour unions argued that labour was not "a commodity" like pig iron and insisted upon the dignity of man. Laws were passed to safeguard the life and health of workers, to prevent employment of children and to provide a measure of security in case of accidents, unemployment, sickness, and old age.

During the World Wars when the supply of labour was short, when immigration had stopped, and when production had to be continuous, sociologists and other social scientists were drawn into industry in the United States to improve the relations between employees and management, with the goals of preventing work stoppages, reducing labour turnover, and increasing efficiency.

Industrial Sociology. Sociologists had developed a science of the interaction of individuals, as has been described in earlier chapters. They showed that a factory employee was not merely a factory "hand" but a social being sensitive to status and rank, who had ideas of what his rôle should be, which were often different from those of the management. Sociologists proved that consultation on work problems was often more efficient than dictatorial decisions. The sociometry of group positions reduced friction and intrigues and led to increased output and decreased labour turnover, as well as increasing the satisfaction of the workers. For instance, in one experiment work partners

were reassigned on the basis of preferences. As a result, there was a 5 per cent saving in total costs and a reduction in labour turnover.¹ Sociologists introduced the concept of the factory as a social system.

Analysis of the interaction of the members of this social system in their place of employment was not the sole contribution to the sociology of modern industrial life. Outside the plant, the lives of workers are lived in communities.² The factory is located in a town or city. The community situation also affects the life and production in workplaces. Ethnic and race relations are important for successful employment outside the factory as inside. Social mobility, status and rôle in the community are not without significance to modern industry.³

In this manner management of mass factory production in large units has learned the importance of social and community relations, a systematic knowledge of which was less urgently needed for production in the times of the household economy.

Agriculture. In agriculture, manpower had been supplemented many centuries ago by the power of animals as pullers and carriers. Not until petrol was used in the light internal-combustion engines in the first quarter of the twentieth century did farming begin to be mechanised. Tractors are rapidly replacing horses and mules on farms. Machines now exist for most of the agricultural crops. Cotton, for instance, is now planted by the use of the tractor, cultivated by a mechanical chopper and weed-killers, dusted by an airplane, and harvested by a mechanical cotton-picker. Concurrently science has brought to farms better seeds, superior fertilisers, more thorough pest control, and finer breeds of animals. Science and technology have increased the production per man hour and production per acre.

This increased productivity means that fewer farmers are needed. They are moving in the United States to towns and villages. The farms become bigger and the income per farmer greater. In many parts of the world, though, technology and science are coming very slowly to the quite small farms.

THE ACCOMPANYING CHANGES IN SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The revolution in industry did not occur in a vacuum. It produced another revolution in the related social institutions, as is shown in many different chapters of this book.

For instance, a revolution was produced in the family, which

¹ R. H. Van Zelst "Sociometrically Selected Work Teams". in John B. Knox, *The Sociology of Industrial Relations* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1956).

² W. L. Warner and J. O. Low, *The Social System of the Modern Factory* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1947); W. F. Whyte (ed.), *Industry and Society* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1946).

³ John B. Knox, *op. cit.*; W. E. Moore, *Industrial Relations and the Social Order* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946); F. J. Roethlisberger and W. I. Dickson, *Management and the Worker* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939).

was formerly the chief economic institution of society. The homestead was the "factory" of the agricultural economy, which is sometimes called the household economy in comparison with the factory system of to-day.

The Industrial Revolution brought cities. In the United States in 1790, 97 per cent of the population lived in the open country or in places of 8,000 population or less. Even in China in 1940, only about 10 per cent of the population were non-farmers living in cities.¹ Cities not only became more numerous but the existing ones became larger. Rome had a population of 150,000 in 1800.² In 1960 it was fourteen times as large. With cities came radical changes in other institutions and ideologies, as, for instance, in government, in the Church, in recreation, and in attitudes towards morals.

Under the modern economy, the material plane of living has been greatly raised for the masses of the people. The average unskilled worker in the United States to-day has many more conveniences than did royalty in the days before the Industrial Revolution, when kings and queens were without radios, electric refrigerators, and automobiles. Even bathtubs with running water were not common among the aristocracy of the agricultural era.

The application of inanimate power to metal tools and machines brought changes in social classes and a different type of distribution of wealth. In the household economy there had been slaves, serfs, peasants, and rich large landowners. But with factories the wage earners of the cities were a new low-income class, called in European writings, the proletariat. The rich were designated capitalists.

The inequality in incomes is shown in Table 25. In 1960 in the United States, the richest fifth of those with incomes received 45.5 per cent of the total income, while the lowest fifth received 4.6 per cent. The inequality is probably greater in most other countries. It was a little greater in the United States in 1935 when the top fifth received 51.7 per cent and the poorest fifth received 4.1 per cent. Recent changes in the United States have lessened somewhat the differences between incomes of the wealthy and the poor.

A similar inequality in the distribution of incomes exists in Britain. Prof. Paish has estimated that the richest 5 million incomes in 1955 (incomes over £680) received 42.6 per cent of the national income, compared with 51.6 per cent in 1938. But the highest $\frac{1}{2}$ million incomes (over £1,625 in 1955) had dropped from 21.5 per cent of the total income to 12.3 per cent. The second five million with incomes between £510 and £680 received 22.6 per cent of the total income in 1955 compared with 16.8 per cent in 1938.³ The share

¹ Gerald F. Winfield, *China: The Land and the People* (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948), p. 34.

² Warren Thompson, *Population Problems* (3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1942), p. 312.

³ Carr-Saunders *et al.*, 1958, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

TABLE 25
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME
FAMILY PERSONAL INCOME RECEIVED BY EACH FIFTH OF FAMILIES
AND UNATTACHED INDIVIDUALS : 1935 TO 1960

Rank by size of Income.	1935-6.	Percentage of Income.					1960.
		1941.	1950.	1957.	1958.	1959.	
Lowest fifth .	4.1	4.1	4.8	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.6
Second fifth .	9.2	9.5	10.9	11.1	11.0	10.9	11.0
Third fifth .	14.1	15.3	16.1	16.3	16.3	16.3	16.3
Fourth fifth .	20.9	22.3	22.1	22.4	22.5	22.6	22.6
Highest fifth .	51.7	48.8	46.1	45.5	45.5	45.6	45.5

Statistical Abstracts, 1962, p. 329.

of the remaining incomes had risen from 31.6 per cent to 34.8 per cent.

These figures, however, do not represent the incomes which the recipients were free to spend since there is an income tax progressively greater for the higher incomes, and the amount collected, particularly from those receiving very large incomes, has been quite a large proportion, especially since the beginning of World War II. Thus a person with a net income of \$350,000 in 1961 may have paid in

TABLE 26
PERSONAL INCOMES BEFORE TAX, U.K. 1938-1956 *

	1938.	1948.	1956.
	%	%	%
Wages	38	42	43
Salaries	18	20	22
Other income from employment . .	3	6	7
Total income from employment . .	60	68	72
Rent, dividends, interest	22	11	11
National Insurance benefits . . .	5	7	7
Other	13	14	10
	100 £m (5,078)	100 £m (9,976)	100 £m (17,050)

* From *National Income and Expenditure* (1954), Central Statistical Office.

federal income taxes approximately \$269,000,¹ in which case the person's "take-home pay" was not \$350,000 but \$81,000. Actually, many people with large incomes do not pay income taxes at this rate because they are able to take advantage of stock options, tax-free expense accounts, retirement benefits, as well as the lower tax rates on capital gains. The distribution of income is further modified by the provision for those with low incomes of many free or nearly free services, such as schools, libraries, relief money, and insurance against unemployment and old age.

TABLE 27
DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME BEFORE AND AFTER TAX *

Range of Income before Tax.	1954.			1962.		
	Number of Incomes. ooo's.	Income before Tax. £ million.	Income after Tax. £ million.	Number of Incomes. ooo's.	Income before Tax. £ million.	Income after Tax. £ million.
£50-£250 . .	8,750	1,440	1,433	4,370	754	753
£250-£500 . .	8,480	3,175	3,051	5,580	2,082	2,009
£500-£1,000 . .	7,740	5,170	4,850	11,620	8,678	8,053
£1,000-£2,000 . .	965	1,265	1,025	4,973	6,242	5,524
£2,000-£10,000 . .	302	1,044	620	632	2,167	1,510
£10,000 and over	13	216	56	25	422	153

* From *National Income and Expenditure*, 1963 (H.M.S.O., 1963), Table 22.

There are, however, some who see such an unequal distribution of income as just, for they argue that the higher incomes are the result of superior ability and that those with little ability, rightly, should not receive so high an income. Variation in wealth is seen as caused by variation in ability. It is true that some are more able than others by nature. The distribution of such inherited ability is thought to be shaped like the contour of a bell, with few of great ability and few of little ability and many of ordinary abilities. Such is the shape of curves of nearly all biological traits, such as stature and weight. The curve of mental ability of students entering colleges, as shown by psychological tests, is bell-shaped like that of the normal probability curve. In Fig. 31 is shown the distribution of the mental abilities of 49,229 students entering 203 colleges in 1931, as measured by the psychological tests of the American Council of Education.²

¹ If a married taxpayer filing a joint return. If single, or married and filing a separate return, the tax would have been higher.

² L. L. Thurstone, "Primary Mental Abilities", *Psychometric Monograph*, No. 1 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 21. The form of the distribution is affected somewhat by the design of the tests, yet not wholly so. For the same tests were given to a selection of 103 students of highest mental ability, and the form of distribution of these selected students with this same test was like a normal probability curve.

The curve of mental ability in Fig. 31 is quite different in shape from the curve of the distribution of income. The one resembles the outline of a bell, and the other is like a right-angled triangle. The curve of income distribution, like the distribution of the personnel of the army, is shaped in part by social determinants as well as by heredity.




FIG. 31.—Do the Rich have more Brains?

If the amount of money we make depends upon the mental ability we have then the distribution of income shown in the upper half of the chart would match that of mental ability shown in the lower half. Some correlation between mental ability and income is compatible with distributions shown by charts; but there must be a great deal of mental ability among those with low incomes. Why are the shapes of the two charts different?

The income chart is based upon income tax data for 1945, taken from the *Statistical Abstract of the United States* for 1948. The mental ability chart is based upon scores made on psychological tests (American Council of Education) taken by 40,229 students entering 233 colleges in the United States in 1933. Data are from the *Educational Record* for April, 1934.

Observers of social classes since the Industrial Revolution often note that the "proletarians" of the cities do not own the tools with which they work and have no income-bearing property, facts which no doubt colour their political views. However, income from property does not go exclusively to the rich. In the United States of all those males with incomes between \$2,000 and \$3,500 in 1953, 12 per cent received some income other than from their earnings. Income from dividends, interest, and rent probably affects the political and economic views of the recipients.¹

Under private capitalism in the United States, the average family income, in money of constant purchasing power, doubled during the first fifty years of the twentieth century, and urban poverty has been reduced about 85 per cent during that time.² The greatest amount of poverty at the mid-century in the United States is in rural areas, and especially among non-white populations, though there is some urban poverty, too.³

The Stages of Economic Growth. The preceding discussion has traced the evolution of economic development from earliest times up to the present, together with some of the accompanying changes in social structure. At the present time, there is a special, practical interest in this evolution which is being shown by the underdeveloped nations, interested in policies and programmes designed to help them industrialise and raise their standard of living. These nations are mainly agricultural or peasant economies. As a recent study⁴ indicates, these traditional societies, governed by a set of pre-Newtonian attitudes towards the physical world, are limited by a ceiling which exists on the level of attainable output per capita. The preconditions for take-off (stage 2) in quest of a modern society, are an effective centralised national state and a shift to a predominance of industry, trade and services rather than agriculture. Political instability is an obstacle to economic development. The take-off (stage 3) occurs when resistances to steady growth are overcome, when the rate of investment and saving rises from, say, 5 per cent to 10 per cent or more. The proximate stimulus for take-off in Britain was mainly technological, leading to the rapid expansion of new industries and the diffusion of new techniques in agriculture also. Stage 4 is the drive to maturity, activated when 10 to 20 per cent of the national income is invested. At this stage of economic development, the nation can produce anything it chooses to produce, although generally

¹ U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports: Income of Persons in the United States, 1953*, Series P-60, No. 16, Table 7, p. 20. See Chapter VII for references to the relation between income and voting behaviour.

² W. F. Ogburn, *op. cit.*

³ Staff of the Subcommittee on Low Income Families, *Characteristics of the Low Income Population and Related Federal Programmes*, 1955.

⁴ W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth (A Non-Communist Manifesto)*, (Cambridge: University Press, 1960).

it does not produce everything. Historically, sixty years have normally been required from take-off to maturity. Stage 5 is the age of high mass-consumption, exemplified by modern America. In 1948, 54 per cent of American families owned cars and in 1958, 73 per cent. Rostow expresses the hope that "the end of all this is not compound interest forever"; rather that it may be "the adventure of seeing what man can and will do when the pressure of scarcity is substantially lifted from him".¹ Meantime, Kuznets has warned of the danger of "over-consumption", indicating that the rate of economic growth in the United States in recent years has been checked by the limited availability of savings.²

PROBLEMS OF ADJUSTMENT

With our modern economic institutions, are we better adjusted or less so? With the speed of turning wheels and moving machinery there are more accidents than in the age of handicrafts, though probably not so many as in the hunting cultures where big game was pursued. In the United States there are some 10,000,000 disabling accidents per year—of which 100,000 are deaths—an accident a year for every sixteen persons, and a death by accident for 1,600 persons. But the total death rate has been lowered to 9 or 10 per thousand from perhaps 35 or 40 per thousand.

Conditions of Work. In the early factories in England, children worked twelve to fourteen hours a day, much of the year starting work while it was still dark and leaving after dark. Hours of labour were around sixty a week one hundred years ago. Some factories were not sanitary, and in others workers were stricken by industrial diseases. But by the middle of the twentieth century, working conditions have been greatly improved.

The above description of the early factory system, while true, exaggerates the evils because it does not present the alternative. It pictures the little factory hands engaged in monotonous routine and compares them with children frolicking carefree in the countryside, unmindful of children succumbing to hunger in the rural hovel or in the ditch by the wayside. The reality of the situation in the early nineteenth century was that the poverty of the agricultural labourers surpassed that of the factory workers, and for certain segments of the labour force at least, the factory system meant an improved standard of living.³

Work in factories is repetitive, speedy; and, with minute division of labour, it is not highly varied. Therefore, the modern factory

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

² Simon Kuznets, *Capital in the American Economy: Its Formation and Financing* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1961).

³ W. H. Hutt, "The Factory System of the Early Nineteenth Century", in *Capitalism and the Historians*, edited by F. A. Hayek (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

worker does not feel the joy of creation. But he has more leisure time apart from the job in which to be creative or to play or relax than the worker of the past.¹ Even as machine power and mass-production upgraded unskilled labourers into semi-skilled operatives, so the promise of automation is in part that it will up-grade semi-skilled operatives into highly-skilled technicians.² Some see in automation the prospect of increased unemployment for the worker, whereas others like Norbert Wiener anticipate the greater "human use of human beings" owing to greater stress on the use of the mind.³ One competent observer⁴ sees the research scientists, the mathematicians, the economists and the managers of the new computer technology as the new leaders of the modern economy, replacing the businessmen and the executives. He believes that the answers to the crucial questions regarding the growth and balancing of the economy will come from research on new products and processes, including "simulation techniques" to test alternative consequences of economic decisions. The leadership, according to this view, will in the future rest less with traditional corporations and more with research corporations, industrial laboratories, experimental stations and universities.

Working conditions are now greatly improved. Social legislation was partly responsible, as were shrewd and farsighted employers who saw that improvement was good for the quality and quantity of output. Lately sociologists have shown the way to better relations among all concerned in factory production, as described in a previous section of this chapter.

Business Depressions. In the agricultural era there were crop failures which brought hunger and sometimes death by famine. In the industrial era there are business depressions that bring business failures and unemployment. These hard times come because production increases faster than does the demand for the products at the prices

¹ A recent study claims that the reduction of hours of work has been exaggerated because (a) part-time workers, now almost one-fifth of the labour force, are included with full-time workers in the computation of the length of the working week; (b) there is an increasing number of "moonlighting" or multiple job-holding (typically with one full-time and one part-time job), and the added hours of the part-time job do not appear in the calculations of the average work week; nor does (c) the time consumed in commuting, reckoned at 10-20 per cent of working time. Sebastian de Grazia, *Of Time, Work and Leisure* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962).

² The effect is uneven. A study of the impact of electronic data-processing equipment on the clerical labour force and the structure of jobs in the office reports that automation (1) reduces the number of clerical jobs, (2) does not raise the skill level or grades of jobs, and (3) does not generally provide greater job interest or challenge. Ida Russakoff Hoos, *Automation in the Office* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961).

³ For a comprehensive symposium on the promise and problems of automation, see *Automation and Society*, edited by Howard Boone Jacobson and Joseph S. Roucek (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959).

⁴ Daniel Bell, "The Post-Industrial Society", Background Paper, Liberty Mutual Forum on the Impact of Technological and Social Change (Boston, Mass., June 14, 1962).

charged. The idea that business fluctuations are a necessary concomitant of economic growth is supported by many scholars, although more confirmation is needed.¹ Hard times alternate with good




FIG. 32.—The Business Cycle.

Business conditions alternate from good to hard times. When the latter are very severe, great tragedy and suffering are caused to business and all of society. These violent swings are one of the problems of the capitalistic system. (From The Cleveland Trust Company, Cleveland, Ohio.)

¹ Moses Abramovitz, "Economics of Growth", in Bernard F. Haley (ed.), *A Survey of Contemporary Economics*, vol. II, pp. 132-78.

times as shown in Fig. 32. In the bad years businesses fail and workers lose their jobs. The number of unemployed per 1,000 workers is much greater than the number of business failures per 1,000 businesses. The averages per year are 98 unemployed and 5 failures per 1,000. In the long stretch of years of good business since 1940, the unemployment has been around 3 per cent and business failures about 0.3 per cent. But during the great depression of the 1930's, failures were approximately 1 per cent and unemployment 20 per cent. In the early 1960's the unemployment rate was over 5 per cent.

Why is unemployment in the United States so high, 5.6 per cent in 1960, compared to less than 2 per cent for France, Germany, Sweden and Japan when the rates for these countries are adjusted to United States definitions? The problem is complex but the differences are explained mainly by the economic characteristics of the labour force, namely, the relatively small proportion engaged in agriculture and the large proportion of wage and salary workers in the United States. The per cent of the labour force in agriculture in the United States in 1960 was 8, compared to 26 in France, 14 in Germany (F.R.), 15 in Sweden, and 37 in Japan. An additional important reason is the slower rate of economic growth in the United States, which from 1951 to 1960, was 2.9 per cent in terms of real gross national production, whereas the rates were 4.2 for France, 7.2 for Germany, 3.7 for Sweden, and 8.7 for Japan.¹

It has been said that business depressions eliminate the weaker businesses and thus encourage efficiency. The same idea was once expressed regarding the unemployed. But the loss of a job in a depression is not the fault of the worker in the sense that the failure of a business is the failure of the owner. When masses of unemployed exist, there is no selection on the basis of ability. The workers lose their jobs because great numbers are laid off or because the factory shuts down.

Unemployment is a terror to the wage earner and a tragedy to his family.² A business depression is a great loss to the country. The unemployment of 1930-38 amounted to a loss of 43 million man-years of employment in the United States.³ Also in this decade of business depression, 165 billion dollars of income, as measured in 1940 purchasing power, were lost. There were idle factories, idle skills, idle mines, idle money. All the ingredients existed for production, but they could not get together in an operating whole.

¹ Robert J. Myers and John H. Chandler, "Toward Explaining International Unemployment Rates", *Monthly Labor Review*, September, 1962, pp. 969-74.

² For a discussion of the social consequences of unemployment, see J. Bakke, *The Unemployed Man* (London, 1933), and *Men Without Work* (Report to the Pilgrim Trust, Cambridge, 1938).

³ Statement of Isador Lubin before the Temporary National Economic Committee, *Investigation of the Concentration of Economic Power*, Part I, 1940, p. 13.

The bad adjustment of production to purchasing power leads to bad individual adjustments.

During the good times of the 1940's and 1950's there was optimism over the prospect of reducing the intensity and duration of depressions. But in the 1920's prior to the depression of the 1930's there was optimism, too, for it was said then that depressions had been banished. Difficulties lie in our lack of knowledge (but not of theories) of causes and also in the difficulties of administration and policy-making. Perhaps the fluctuations of business will be lessened in time, though hardly eliminated.

Big Business. Bigness is frequently said to be a characteristic of modern economic institutions. General Motors had assets of 8 thousand million dollars in 1962. Standard Oil of New Jersey, with assets of 10 thousand million dollars, has wells, refineries, and sales outlets scattered over the world. The American Telephone and Telegraph Company in 1962 had more than 2 million stockholders.

In 1962, there were 4.5 million business enterprises in the United States, most of which were small. Of these businesses, 13 per cent were corporations, of which only a relatively few were big. But, of 263,000 firms in manufacturing, 361 employed 40 per cent of all the employees in manufacturing. Firms having research and development staffs totalled 15,500 but 44 firms employed 45 per cent of the scientists.¹ The significance of the latter statement lies in the fact that scientists provide the new products and processes which are important bases for the further growth of the firms in the future.

The problem of the big size of economic institutions lies in their power, particularly the power to control prices. If a single company manufactures all the corn-binders made, it has power over the prices of corn-binders; though, if the prices are high, few will be sold. The fewer firms the greater is the opportunity for reducing the range of competition. Thus four companies produce 90 per cent of the output of cigarettes. By contrast, it is difficult for several hundred thousand cotton farmers to control the price of cotton.

These few big companies, even though they control a large proportion of the output, are nevertheless competitive, generally, and some quite keenly so. The competition may be more on terms of advertising and product differentiation than in terms of price. They may compete often with companies in other industries which offer substitutes. Thus a purchaser may buy rayon clothing instead of cotton, or synthetic rubber instead of natural rubber. These big industries compete for the consumer's dollar. A television set may be bought instead of a "deep freeze" box.

However, these large companies show power in other areas than prices. They possess, because of their size, certain advantages over

¹ W. Lloyd Warner, *The Corporation in the Emergent American Society* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962).

little businesses, as in advertising or purchasing. Their power may be co-ordinated, as, for instance, in regard to lobbying for legislation to control labour unions. This co-ordination is helped by the fact that the president of one company may be on the board of directors of several other companies. Big business acts somewhat in concert on some political issues and on national policy.

Wealth has always had power, in the agricultural era as well as in the industrial. The maladjustment appears in the lack of protection of the weak or the small. This need of correcting and preventing the abuse of power does not invalidate the obvious excellent achievements of great productive units.

Divorce between Ownership and Control. The problem of economic power has been made more complex by the development of new forms of property under capitalism. The joint stock company was a device to mobilise the large quantities of capital required by expanding industry, and to limit risk. But the rights of the shareholder are limited mainly to a share in the distributed profits, plus (usually) voting at the meetings of the company. The property of the company is vested in a legal personality, the corporation, whose powers are exercised by the officers of the company, elected by the shareholders at the annual general meeting. The precise location of power, therefore becomes problematic. Berle and Means¹ have documented the devices such as pyramiding and holding companies by which relatively small amounts of capital can control vast industrial empires. J. H. Burnham² has argued that effective control is passing to the new managerial class of experts on whom the efficient working of the increasingly complex organisation of private capitalism is more and more dependent. P. Sargant Florence³ has shown that control by the majority of shareholders is difficult or impossible, partly because the numbers involved are frequently very large indeed, but primarily because in the larger companies a few shareholders usually hold about one-third of the voting shares.

Big Unions. A phenomenon of our times in the United States is big unions, a far cry from the situation in the 1930's when the unions fought just to survive. In earlier decades of the century, the power of the private employer was monistic and the bargaining power of workers with grievances was generally very weak, although permanent associations of wage-earners have existed since about 1700 in the British Isles⁴ and since 1792 in the United States when the shoemakers of Philadelphia organised.⁵ The central problem of the

¹ *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* (New York, 1933).

² *The Managerial Revolution* (London, 1943).

³ *The Logic of British and American Industry* (London, 1953), Chap. v.

⁴ Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *The History of Trade Unionism* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1911).

⁵ Selig Perlman, *A History of Trade Unionism in the United States* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923), p. 4.

1930's for the workers was "unions of their own choosing". Only the federal government, responding to the crisis of the deep depression, could through legislation help to redress the balance of power through government-sponsored security for workers. In doing so, government added to its own powers, leading to the present pluralistic, tripartite system, with the distribution of power divided among big business, big government, and big unions.

Unions negotiate contracts covering income, leisure, job security, retirement, pace of work, job opportunities, and discipline, but their influence now extends beyond industry into the political process, affecting the selection and election of candidates for office. The number of union members in the United States in 1962 totalled more than 17 million. Big unions are powerful and sometimes corrupt, and in terms of social responsibility, some of them in their evolution are now at a stage which may be roughly where big corporations were in the 1930's. The main current issue respecting the unions, it is said, is the freedom of the worker.¹ Some loss of freedom is inevitable as an industrial society gains in efficiency² through organisation, but the issue is how much? Unions are now firmly established and it is clear that they have contributed to industrial peace, and not—as had been feared by some—to industrial turmoil.³

National unions are less subject than local unions to democratic pressures.⁴ A study⁵ of the relationship of size of locals and union democracy reports that the smaller locals generally contribute less to the democratic processes at the national levels and also tend in some respects to be less democratic internally than the larger locals. Smaller locals are less likely to send a delegate to the national convention. Smaller locals have better attendance at meetings, a higher proportion of the membership voting in elections and more frequent turnover in leadership but also a higher proportion of uncontested elections. Lipset has argued for two-party government⁶ in the interests of union democracy but others argue that it is not realistic because the idea of one union in one jurisdiction is firmly established in American policy.⁷ Other methods of achieving democracy which have been proposed as more feasible include increased membership interest, professional labour leaders, local autonomy, union decertification, and the dismissal of leaders through rebellion of the members. Studies of American trade unions have reported that the objective conditions

¹ Clark Kerr, *Unions and Union Leaders of Their Own Choosing* (New York: The Fund for the Republic, 1957).

² Allen, V. L., *Power in Trade Unions* (London, 1954).

³ Robert Dublin, "Prospects of Industrial Conflict—A Prediction", in Arthur Kornhauser, Robert Dublin, Arthur M. Rose (ed.), *Industrial Conflict* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954).

⁴ Kerr, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

⁵ William A. Faunce, "Size of Locals and Union Democracy", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 68, pp. 291-8, November, 1962.

⁶ S. M. Lipset, M. Trow and J. Coleman, *Union Democracy* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1956).

⁷ Kerr, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

conducive to union activity are those which encourage personal contact with work colleagues, those which stimulate job satisfaction, and those which promote acceptance of the work group as a salient reference group.¹

To big business and big unions in contemporary America we must add big government. The people accept government as a balancer of the conflicting interests of business and labour.² Greatly affecting the economy are government policies regarding purchases, credit regulation via the Federal Reserve Board, taxes, defence expenditures, tariffs, and outlays for research, to mention only some of the more important areas. With reference to research and development, a key to economic growth, government expenditures for fiscal 1963 came to \$12.3 billion, twice the amount spent by private industry, universities, foundations, and other nonprofit organisations combined.³ The growth of independent administrative and regulatory agencies is a further evidence of federal governmental power. Of the 30 most influential agencies in 1962, only two were in existence in 1900, only seven by 1920 and nine by 1930. The critical problems of the economy during the great depression led to the establishment from 1930 to 1940 of ten additional regulatory agencies that still exist, and eleven were added from 1940 to 1960. As big government has in the relatively recent past developed regulatory policies with respect to big business, so in the future it may, in the public interest, move further in the direction of regulating big unions.

Imbalance in the Social System. The rapid development of economic institutions in size and in power since the coming of steam and steel has led to an imbalance in the social system, as shown in the labour struggle, in the protests of little businesses, in governmental regulations and legislation. The attempt to adjust to these great centres of power in the economic institutions and to control or regulate them led to such close connection with government that the subject of economics was called political economy. But economic institutions are not only to be balanced with the governmental institutions but with all the other institutions of the social system. Economics may yet become social economics.

SUMMARY

Economic activities are a proper concern of the sociologist because economic and other aspects of social life are closely interrelated. In the hunting cultures where our present elaborate economic organisation had its humble origins,

¹ William Spinard, "Correlates of Trade Union Participation: A Summary of the Literature", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 25, pp. 237-44, April, 1960.

² Burton R. Fisher and Stephen B. Withey, *Big Business as the People See It* (The Survey Research Centre, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, December, 1951).

³ A. H. Raskin, "Our Economy: Mixed and Mixed-Up", *The Reporter*, October 11, 1962, pp. 27-31.

there is no separate economic organisation such as we have to-day. There is a division of labour between men and women, and the family carries on important economic activities, which are supplemented by those of the community.

Since the early hunters are self-sufficient, they do not depend on trade. Within the community, the chief mechanisms of exchange are hospitality and gifts. Services are rendered or goods given without payment but with the expectation of a later return in kind. Land and food are shared but there is also private ownership of personal property such as clothing, weapons, and songs. Because material goods are scarce, primitive people generally strive not so much for private gain as for status and reputation.

The development of agriculture and of the parallel pastoral economy meant a more certain and substantial food supply, a larger population, and further development of the handicrafts which led in turn to trade, exchange, payment, and specialisation. Eventually the pastoral and agricultural economies were combined in the farm as it appears in historical times.

Another great step forward was taken with the development of power beyond that supplied by human beings and domesticated animals—especially the development of steam in making steel tools, later augmented by electrical power and industrial chemistry—which contributed fabulously to the enrichment of our material life.

The older family and feudal economic organisations were not adequate to finance the new abundance. The extensive use of money ushered in capitalism; the application of steam power to tools brought the Industrial Revolution. There were actually two revolutions, one in goods and services, and the other in the many social institutions closely linked to the economic activities. Thus the Industrial Revolution brought drastic changes to the family, to cities, to social classes; changes sometimes resulting in serious maladjustments. For instance, human relations in industry are affected by social factors like the large size and impersonal nature of the modern factory which may result in low morale among the workers, and in friction between workers and management. Also our complex economic system depends for smooth functioning on the synchronisation of many parts which are easily thrown out of gear, with resulting depressions and unemployment.

When business declines, production is cut but not necessarily prices, because of the growth of monopolies fostered by the large-scale capital requirements in certain lines of business. As a protection, government undertakes to prevent large monopolistic enterprises, to regulate them, or to absorb them. The regulation of economic activities by the group is not a new phenomenon but is as old as society itself. Only the form of the control, which changes with changing conditions, is new.

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. How does the economic rôle of the family in primitive society compare with that in modern society?
2. How does the incentive of reputation compare with the desire to gain property, in stimulating economic activity?
3. How and why do social relations involved in production differ in the household economy and in industrial society?
4. Social consequences of increasing economic productivity.
5. Informal social organisation in a factory.
6. Social aspects of automation.
7. Examine critically the views of Max Weber on the relation between religion and the rise of capitalism.
8. How would you differentiate between capitalism and industrialisation?

9. What are the social consequences of the growth of the joint stock company?
10. Analyse the nature of economic power in advanced industrial societies.

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CHAPTER XVIII

THE GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS OF SOCIETY

Government is one of the major factors in our lives to-day. When we are born our birth must be registered with the government. Governmental regulations regarding sanitation and contagion protect our childhood. Education is furnished for us by the government. In building a house to live in we must conform to the legal specifications regarding space, light, plumbing, and water. A fair-sized proportion of all the money we earn must be paid to the government in taxes. State policies affect the price and amount of food and clothing and fuel we consume. They also regulate our recreational activities and tell us what we can and cannot do. In many countries government provides medical care for us when we are sick, gives us aid when we are out of work. It protects us from enemies on the outside of our state and from hazards within our community. If the state is in danger we fight for it. As we become too old to work the government helps to take care of us. Even our passing, through death, must be registered with the government, and if we have no money for a burial the government will bury us. So from the cradle to the grave every day of our lives we come in contact, directly or indirectly, with the government.

GOVERNMENT IN THE SIMPLEST MATERIAL CULTURES

Among the peoples living to-day with the simplest material cultures government is very simple and hardly discernible. Such people are, for example, the Andaman Islanders, the Tierra del Fuegians, the Bushmen, and the Shoshone. They have no specially constituted government, as may be seen from the fact that they have no established rulers. "There is not", writes Thomas,¹ "one story about a chief or a chief's daughter in all Bushman folklore known to me." The Ona of Tierra del Fuego are likewise without constituted leadership. When a special occasion arises which calls for group action, a temporary leader may be selected. In the case of murder, a relative of the man to be avenged is generally chosen to lead the punitive expedition.²

Small bands and very little communities do have a "headman", who exercises leadership when occasion demands it. The headman in these simple groups has no sharply defined power, and the position is generally not hereditary. The position is attained through various abilities—abilities of a physical kind, for example, when he is a mighty hunter and saves the band from a winter of starvation, or

¹ W. I. Thomas, *Primitive Behaviour*, p. 422.

² R. H. Lowie, *An Introduction to Cultural Anthropology* (New York, 1934), p. 223.

mental abilities, when his judgment is good about weather and the timing of seasonal migration. The headman also has skill in dealing with people. He is thus a "natural leader of men", or what Max Weber calls a charismatic leader. At one time his rôle is that of a judge, at another, as in hunting, that of the chief executive. There seems to be in him little of the legislator, however. Often there is around him a group of elders, who play the rôle of an advisory council.

The Limited Need for Government in the Simpler Cultures. There are several factors that limit the amount of disorder among peoples with simpler cultures and diminish the need for government. One is the size of the groups, which are small in comparison to modern communities. As we have seen, among food gatherers and hunters the supply of food is not large enough to maintain a big population. The communities usually range in size from 15 or 20 persons to 150 or 200. Under the circumstances, each person knows every other person well ; gossip and public opinion are always available as potential sources of social pressure. In a large modern community with its impersonal contacts, things are very different. Indeed it may be doubted if any practicable system of policing can be supplied which is entirely adequate to the needs of a modern city.

A second characteristic of these simple societies which makes a formal government unnecessary is the stationary character of the culture. When social conditions are the same for long periods of time, lessons may easily be learned from experience and the best ways of doing things may be worked out and made known to each member of the group. Elders, like our libraries, become storehouses of this knowledge. In a heterogeneous, rapidly changing culture like our own, on the contrary, many different points of view and conceptions of right and wrong develop, which pave the way for misconduct.

Finally, a third condition is the scarcity of property. Most of the crimes to-day are against property. In a very small community the personal property of each individual is known to every other individual ; hence there is not much a thief can do with stolen goods, especially if trade and travel are little developed. Causes of discord are adultery, jealousies, malicious gossip, personal friction. In the absence of property, there is great concern about reputation, reflecting an extreme sensitivity to the opinion of others. A good reputation is a proud possession.

In modern times, government is thought of as the chief agency of control, partly because the function of keeping order is formalised and may utilise physical force. But there are many other ways of keeping order than by the use of governmental authority.¹ In simple cultures when there is little formal government there are nevertheless many procedures for control.

¹ Edward A. Ross, *Social Control* (New York : The Macmillan Company, 1918)

Very important among these is the opinion of others, discussed in Chapter VIII, manifested in critical comment, blame, ridicule, shaming, and gossip. These hostile opinions of others restrict individual behaviour to the conventional. At the same time there is a positive stimulus to approved behaviour in the opinions of others who bestow praise and applause. Among the Crow Indians, for instance, the extravagant praise a lad gets for feats of daring such as stealing the horse of an enemy chieftain is a regulator of this conduct.¹ His choice of a mate is facilitated by such bravery.

Citizens in our democracy boast that they have freedom because they are not, as in certain totalitarian states, threatened by laws, police, and imprisonment for voicing opinions. But freedom to talk is restricted by these informal social pressures based upon the opinion of others as well as by threats of jails. A citizen of the United States would hardly have been free to praise Hitler during World War II, even though he would have been free from arrest. Informal pressure would probably have prevented such expression, even if he had wanted to speak of what he thought were good qualities in the German Fuehrer.

Institutions other than the state are also concerned with orderliness in society, as, for instance, in our society, the family, the schools, and the church. In primitive society, the rôle of the family is especially important in governing small units within the community. Thus we have the expressions matriarchal and patriarchal types of families, implying authority. Even in the mountainous and semi-isolated areas of modern society, the family resists the intrusion of courts and peace officers in dealing with affairs which they think are functions of the family, such as feuds, duelling, making liquor, etc.

Families are not only important in maintaining order, but family conflicts are sources of disorder, especially in societies where property in land and goods has developed. Such feuds arise over boundaries, animal-stealing, dowries, marriages, and fights which are backed by family support and loyalty.

Thus it may be said that among the lower hunting cultures several different organisations maintain order, deal with crime, and enforce discipline. The question arises as to whether there is present also a separate organisation whose main function is governing, as is the case with the state in modern society. Was there a state in the lower hunting cultures? Has there always been a state? Or was it a social invention occurring later than the early hunting cultures? If it was a social invention, how did it originate?

THE POLITICAL STATE

A State is an Organisation which Rules by means of a Supreme Government

¹ Robert Lowie, "Takes-The-Pipe, a Crow Warrior", in E. C. Parsons, *American Indian Life* (New York: B. W. Huebsch, Inc., 1922), pp. 17-33.

over a definite Territory.¹ The state maintains order through a government, though other aids are used in ruling, as, for instance, common law ; and not all government is synonymous with state, for there is private government. However, government is so important a feature of the state that the two words are often used interchangeably. Also the state involves the concept of a territory whose boundaries are known. Wandering tribes are not so boundary-limited and do not have a state. The state has an over-all government, which is sovereign and supreme in authority over other governing agencies and other groups.

The Origin of the State. Before the state took definite form in an organised government over a delineated territory, there were rudimentary beginnings.² Thus the hunting party often has a leader, as when the Masai round up lions who raid their cattle. Such a leader's authority is like that of the leader of a war party. In other cultures the heads of families may get together to decide a course of action, and their decision is supreme. Reprisals of one sort or another as in head-hunting raids constitute authority over collective action. A good example of the beginnings of a larger group unity is furnished by the experience of the southern Bushmen, who were described above as living in small groups without definite leadership or government. In periods of crisis they resort to organisation, as when they unite to meet the invasion of the Hottentots and Kaffirs.

These threads of authority do not get woven into the state, though, until there is war and conquest of territory. Early wars seem to evolve from stealing raids for stored grain, cattle, women, or slaves, but do not lead to dominion over territory. In early Norway, feuds between warlike farming households led to one conquest after another by Harold Fairhair (he's always so called) and led to the imposition of tribute, which had to be collected, sometimes by armed force or by physical threats.³ He used this tribute to collect and pay for his retinue, which enabled him to collect taxes and handle revolt. Thus was the beginning of rule.

In ancient Peru, a somewhat similar series of conquests by the Inca led to the state. It differed from the Norwegian pattern in that the tribe rather than the individual farmer with a retinue made the conquests. The territory over which sovereignty was established was often not so large as in Norway or in the Inca Empire.

The incentive to war is greater where there is property such as

¹ As defined by Robert MacIver, "a state is an association which acting through law as promulgated by a government endowed to this end with coercive powers maintains within a community territorially demarcated the universal external conditions of social order".—*The Modern State* (Oxford : The Clarendon Press, 1926), p. 24.

² Robert H. Lowie, *The Origin of the State* (New York : Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., 1927).

³ *Heimskringla Saga* (Everyman's Library edition ; London, Dent).

grain, metals, and fine cloth and where land, because of cultivation, is the source of wealth. The need of labour seems at times to have led to wars in order to capture slaves. The state is fostered by the domestication of animals and the development of the plough culture.

War and the Growth of the State. War is favoured by new means of transportation. The radius of the group's action is thus increased. The boat of the Vikings became an agency of aggression all along the western coast of Europe, as did the horse on the borderland between Asia and Europe. When the Plains Indians in America took over the horse from the Spanish, the tribes were thrown into closer contact and friction leading to war developed.

War, piracy, and raids, like the hunting party, develop agencies of discipline, especially when tribute is exacted from the conquered peoples. When a war leads to slavery of the conquered peoples another step in the development of rule is taken. The war chief was probably a factor in the origin of the state. A leader seems to arise at times almost spontaneously in any group, as the leaders appear at hunting parties, in festivals, and in ceremonies among the old men ; the idea could be taken over in war, even if the exigencies of war did not make the need fairly obvious. The hereditary transmission of leadership is a later development. It is found widely scattered in Africa, Polynesia, and Micronesia, but rarely among the American Indians. The hereditary factor in leadership is correlated in primitive society with the inheritance of property and with the idea of social class or caste. Since these were generally lacking in the Americas, the democratic principle was more in evidence here.

These war chiefs were in our language early called kings, even though their kingdoms were quite small. While the king was a war leader and maintained his sovereignty by military skills, in the administration of a state he resembled the head of a large household. Indeed the model of an early sovereign's civil administration was that of a patriarch with a large farm with many workers, of whom some were favoured kin. What such a farmer learned about administration would be useful to him in ruling a state. Like the headman of a hunting band and like the father of a family, he combined in himself the executive, judicial, and legislative functions of government.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE

The control of conquered farmers, tribes, and communities by military force can for a time prevent revolt. To the subject people, the king is a tyrant ; and a revolt is a fight for liberty and justice. Had such revolts succeeded, states would have remained small a much longer time. The large state would have been a long time developing, if its coming had depended alone on the growth of transportation inventions and the diffusion of custom, without the aid of conquest.

The unification of disparate conquered units requires a long time. It is achieved through processes of accommodation and assimilation, discussed in Chapter VI. For the units to be integrated, there must be common interests, as in defence against invaders, common norms, or the mutual advantages of domestic trade. The feeling of solidarity is facilitated by a common language and similarities in customs. Linkages of travel routes safe from robbers also aid in integration, as does division of labour. The development from an unstable state to a naturally stable one is a long social process, rather than a military or a governmental one.

In this process, government evolves. It ceases to be merely a strong arm to prevent revolt and physical disorder. The state takes more definite shape as the leaders do more things for the group as a whole. The collectivistic idea was especially strong among the Inca, the preliterate people of Peru who, without the aid of a written language, built up an empire of three million persons along the South American coast,¹ comparable in size to those of Persia, Rome, and Byzantium. The Inca state rendered all sorts of services for the people, such as the frequent partition of the land among the dispossessed, the provision of steady employment, and the institution of old age insurance. Although the rendering of such services is not an essential part of the definition of the state, still it clearly helps to build up the state into a more significant entity.

GOVERNMENT IN MODERN TIMES

The setting of government in modern times differs in three ways from that of earlier times. First is the very large area governed ; second is the complexity of social conditions in this large area ; and third is the rapidity of change in the society being governed. These characteristics mean big problems and add up to big government.

Territorial Size. The government of U.S.S.R. controls 8,473,444 square miles. The areas of China, India, the United States, and Brazil are all large. To govern territories of such size presents problems of a magnitude not experienced by very small states, even though in modern times there are many contact inventions, such as boats, railroads, or telephones and radio, without which such large areas could not be governed.

Complexity of National Life. It is heterogeneity rather than homogeneity which describes the society of a large state. In the United States there were (in 1950) 22 different national stocks with over 100,000 foreign-born residents each ; and four different races with significant numbers. The number of different religious bodies with over 50,000 members in the United States in the 1960's was 82. Obviously with such heterogeneity as is illustrated by these figures,

¹ This estimate of population is made by A. L. Kroeber, "Native American Population", *American Anthropologist*, vol. 36, p. 24, January-March, 1934.

the problems are much greater than for a homogeneous people. These difficulties become apparent in the conflicting interests that are often manifest in the pressure groups trying to get their way and in the lobbyists who often want to obtain special benefits from the legislatures. Indeed such conflict in 1860-4 destroyed the government of the United States temporarily and very nearly permanently.

Change. Fifty years ago the automobiles in the United States were negligible in number. In 1961, 76 per cent of all families owned a car. Within that time we have changed from an agricultural to an industrial nation. Such rapid changes mean that government is continuously facing the new. We pass a labour law at one session of Congress and discard it for another at the next session.

In the distant past, control was by custom. But the more rapid the change, the less reliance there can be on custom, precedent, and the past; and hence this source of aid and strength to government recedes. Governments find it difficult to keep up with changes. The various state governments should have passed workmen's compensation laws a half century earlier than they did.¹ Since it is difficult for governments to anticipate changes or even to adjust to them, lags tend to accumulate.

So much for the three conditions underlying modern governments. Let us consider next the three characteristics of modern governments, one an old one and two relatively new.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN GOVERNMENT

Government still has the function of maintaining order over its territory, but in addition government has come to engage in many activities other than keeping order, and an important question is just what other functions the government should perform. A third feature of governments occasions the question of who should govern.

Keeping Order. The problem of keeping order is somewhat greater for local governments than formerly, because of the growth of cities. Cities have much higher crime rates than do rural areas or villages. As property has increased there are many thefts and many lawsuits over property. The coming of uniformed police in cities—in London in 1829—provided a needed machinery for handling the problem. Even so, enough police to maintain order in large cities seems an impossibility.

Political disorder is also a problem in many states, particularly in the countries of South and Central America, where political revolutions are frequent. Disorderly demonstrations also occur. The Fascists marched in Rome and took over the City. The Nazis used force in Germany, the Bolsheviks captured the centres of control in Russia in 1917, and there was civil war in the United States in the 1860's.

¹ W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change* (New York: The Viking Press, 1922), p. 236.

Other Functions of Government. Some of the activities of government are listed in the opening paragraph of this chapter. Great differences of opinion exist among the peoples of a country over what a government should do. At one time, the attitude was expressed by the slogan, "The government which governs least, governs best." This opinion was popular among the people when governments had been autocratic monarchies and when rulers had tried to control the economic activities of business and commerce, and in countries where the governments were imposed by foreigners as in the case of the thirteen colonies of America, which became the United States.

On the other hand the people who pay little to the government in direct taxes and who are the recipients of governmental services such as public schools, the collection of garbage, the provision of public parks, and aid to old people, do not oppose the extension of governmental functions. They look upon this type of government as a friend. However, the citizen who pays large amounts in income taxes or in property taxes is not so happy about the growth of governmental functions, since they cost money which he has to provide.

There is some evidence to indicate that governmental functions increase inevitably without too much regard to these attitudes of opposition. Thus in the United States, governmental functions increased under the administration of conservative presidents as well as under the more liberal or progressive ones. Governmental functions increase under wartime presidents but recede somewhat after the war is over. Also, in most of the countries of the world the trend is towards the growth of government, even though the conditions are highly varied in the different countries. The increase in what the government does is at times a necessity. Thus if a country's security is in jeopardy, its government prepares for war and this means many executive undertakings. Furthermore, there are no other institutions so well suited to handling problems of wide scope. Such nationwide problems are beyond the efforts of the family, the church, and most businesses. This is not to say that there are not many functions which it may be unwise for the government to undertake.

One indication of the expansion of government is the number of governmental employees. These have increased from 4.1 per cent of all employed workers in 1900, to 15.5 per cent in 1962. Thus nearly 1 in 7 employed workers works for the government.

Bureaucracy. The existence of a large number of governmental employees is called a public bureaucracy, for the administrative unit under which they work has been called a bureau. The system of similar employment in large private business is called a private bureaucracy. Since a bureaucracy is also defined as a government by bureaus, bureaucrats are thought of as white-collar workers. The proportion of the labour force who work in bureaus for a government is quite large in Russia, where factories are owned and administered

by the government. Also when the government of Britain nationalised the coal mines, the steel industry, and transport, bureaucracy grew greatly. Including the nationalised industries and public services, government workers constituted 24.3 per cent of the total working population of Great Britain in 1950, compared to 3.6 per cent in 1891.¹ Excluding the nationalised industries and public services other than the post office, the figure for 1950 was 13.9 per cent, still about four times the figure of half a century before.

There is a degree of permanence of employment in working for government; such large numbers are said to create a new social class, an unanticipated phenomenon in the Soviet Union, which was supposed to abolish social class.

This new social class arouses interest on several counts. As a group they are assumed to have a vested interest in the growth of government, and are hence viewed critically by those who oppose the extension of governmental functions. There is a fear, too, that they will become a tool in the hands of a political party to maintain itself in power by favouritism. In the United States, employees of the federal government have had their organised political activities restricted.

These conditions of public employment resemble those in large corporations in that there is a hierarchy, and each person is working for someone else. Each is thus like a cog in a great machine.² These conditions are different from life in small businesses, where the distance to the top is not great, where relations are less impersonal, and where there are many entrepreneurs who are their own bosses. Spokesmen for bureaucracy are neither as numerous nor as emphatic as are the critical commentators. Nevertheless, the prestige of career men in governmental service has been increasing. J. Edgar Hoover, the Chief of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation—the F.B.I.—is a career man, and that the foreign service needs more career diplomats is commonly agreed.

More government employees are expected in the future from the projection of present trends; and if there is to be efficient government, their good work must be appreciated and honoured.

Bureaucracy, Power and Political Parties. Bureaucracy provides the machinery through which power is administered, both in government and industry. Max Weber argues that a bureaucracy may itself acquire power. Its officials are experts, and as such they are in a position to exercise an independent influence on the administration

¹ Moses Abramovitz and Vera F. Eliasberg, *The Growth of Public Employment in Great Britain* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

² Cf. Roy G. Francis and Robert C. Stone, *Service and Procedure in a Bureaucracy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956). This is a case study of the U.S. Employment Service Bureau in Louisiana, testing theories advanced by Max Weber and Robert Merton that modern large-scale organisations foster the development of rigid rules, red tape, and impersonality.

through the power which such expert knowledge confers. Moreover, Weber argues, once established, bureaucracies become stable political structures. Indeed, he fears that the dictatorship of the bureaucrat may well be a dominant trend in modern rational industrial society.

Bureaucratic organisation also extends to political parties. Michels has argued that this organisation results in the concentration of power in the hands of those who control the party machine. Once the leaders become professional leaders, they are "stable and irremovable". This "Iron Law of Oligarchy" has however been questioned in more recent studies.¹

RECENT TRENDS IN GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS

Governments have been increasing the number of their functions rapidly in the past century and a half. A tabulation² of the growth of state functions in Minnesota shows the increase to be very rapid. There were 14 administrative units in 1858, and at subsequent ten-year intervals the numbers were 19, 36, 58, 91, 123, and 155 in 1918. Similar increases are noted in a study of Detroit.³ These increases are not all additions of totally new functions, though there are new administrative units. These particular compilations have not been carried forward.

Since 1929, there have been no statistical studies of the growth of governmental functions in the United States. During the 1930's, a decade of unemployment, the multiplication of governmental activities was so great that the practice developed of abbreviating the titles of the commissions by using only the initials, as, for instance, NRA for the National Industrial Recovery Authority, the WPA, the AAA, etc. There were some sixty-five such commissions authorised during this period. Following the depression came the war, which produced the greatest proliferation of governmental activity yet known in this country. Since the war there has been a reduction—though this is undoubtedly more in the nature of a fluctuation in the trend rather than a real reversal.

These new functions of government include a multitude of activities, which, however, may be thought of as of three kinds: social service, production, and war.

The Social-service State. Most of the activities of government aside from "policing" are designed to serve citizens and the various institutions of society. Thus, agricultural price supports aid the farmer;

¹ See R. T. McKenzie, *British Political Parties* (for a detailed analysis of the question of inner-party democracy).

² M. B. Lambie, *Administration of the State of Minnesota* (Minneapolis: League of Minnesota Municipalities Publication, 1924), p. 6.

³ L. D. Upson, *The Growth of a City* (Detroit: Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research, 1921). Some of the increases cited are apparent rather than real. The point is discussed by F. S. Chapin, *Cultural Change* (New York: The Century Company, 1928).

a high tariff protects infant industries ; old age insurance cares for the old people ; and the regulation of money and credit is a help to everyone. The social services which the state may render seem almost infinite. Even though the principle of service by a friendly government be admitted, there is a question of how far to go and when to stop.

The social-service state not only aids the sick, the unemployed, the aged, and the destitute. The United States government also renders financial aid—often indirectly—to business. It aids American ship-owners in the building of ships, for example ; a subsidy of approximately \$40 million towards the total cost of \$76·8 million has provided for the construction of the superliner *United States*, a private luxury ship that plies between the United States and Europe. It grants millions in mail subsidies to the airlines and the publishers of magazines and newspapers. Mail subsidies during the 12-year period to January 1, 1960, cost the taxpayers \$6,546 million, just about equal the amount of CCC farm price-support losses for the 27-year period up to 1960.¹ Economic and military aid to foreign countries benefits American industries indirectly in that the aid is spent largely for goods produced in the United States.

It should be observed that city governments were the first to develop these social services. When people live close together as they do in cities, it would not be wise to leave the disposal of garbage to individual families, or to permit each individual to say what is a fire hazard, or how to behave in case of a contagious illness in the family. From such aid the city proceeded to create playgrounds for children, to provide musical concerts, etc.

The Production State. Socialists argue that governments should extend their functions to the production of economic goods. Governments have for a long time supplied water, owned and run railroads in some countries, or produced electricity as by the TVA in the United States. The operation of such essential enterprises as public utilities and coal-mining was undertaken in Britain. In Russia governmental production extends to agriculture and to distribution, as well as to all major manufacturing.

Most of the economies of Western Europe and of North America are mixed economies, with modified free enterprise predominant. That is, there are varying degrees of government ownership, sometimes in partnership with private ownership. In Sweden, for example, the division in the production of power was in the 1950's, about three-fifths private and two-fifths public. There was some private ownership of railroads but about nine-tenths public ownership, whereas with respect to timber, the distribution of ownership was three-fourths private and one-fourth public. Taking production as a whole, 91

¹ *Government Subsidy : Historical Review.* Printed for the use of the Committee on Agriculture. (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960).

per cent was privately owned, 5 per cent publicly owned, and 4 per cent owned by co-operatives.¹

In countries largely agricultural but wishing to industrialise, there is the great problem of how to get the money to build the factories and transportation systems. Governmental ownership or governmental aid has the advantage of supplying capital oftentimes faster than will be supplied by private investment from outside.

This question of the state in production is immeasurably important. It involves the merger of two of the greatest groups of modern organisations—governmental institutions and economic institutions—and affects the standard of living and the distribution of wealth and power. Quite important is the method of acquisition of the economic institutions, whether by purchase at a fair price or by appropriation from the owners without pay.

Also of great significance is how well the government will do this immense job of production on a large scale. Under private ownership and under the incentive of profits, production has been phenomenal ; and enterprise in developing the new has been vigorous. In Russia government ownership has been carried on under unusual conditions, namely, under the stimulus of an ideology to which the leaders adhere with great zeal and also under the motive of self-preservation during wartime. The experience of such a bureaucracy over a long stretch of peacetime remains to be seen. There are, of course, values involved other than those of economics.

All over the world governments have had a reputation for inefficiency and even corruption. The national governments of Western Europe and of North America have perhaps been freest from the charge of corruption. But in the United States, hardly a big city has escaped the bad reputation for graft at some time in its history. Some students argue that corruption in government is difficult to avoid because of the latent functions that government fulfils.² There is also the question of inefficiency in government without corruption. When inefficiency in business brings the costs above the price, bankruptcy results and thus the inefficient are removed. This safeguard does not exist in government. Nevertheless, corrupt and inefficient administrations have been succeeded by honest and efficient ones.

The growth of social services and of production by the state in recent times has been signalled in the preceding paragraphs. In certain nations these functions are sufficiently developed to warrant designating the states as welfare or social service states and production states, respectively. It would however be a mistake for the student to infer that there is a necessary relationship between the two. While

¹ *Sweden's Mainspring : Private Enterprise* (Stockholm : Information Section of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce).

² Lincoln Steffens, *The Shame of Cities*. Robert Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*.

it is probably true that production states are also generally welfare states, it is of course not true that most welfare states are production states. Thus the Scandinavian countries have highly developed systems of social welfare and modified free enterprise systems.¹ Another way to put it is that they have mixed economies, with a preponderance of private ownership.

The War State. Noteworthy characteristics of a war state are three: a vast extension of the executive functions, action with speed, and unity.

During a modern, all-out war, government pervades social life far more extensively than was described in the opening paragraph of this chapter.

This pervasiveness of government continues to a certain extent during peacetime, if during peace there is active preparation for war. War preparedness means a state ready for war and may be called a garrison state.² War preparedness has profound implications for democracy; for the great extension of the executive power of the government, as noted in the increasing burden of the presidency in the United States and the demand for speed and unity, implies some sacrifices of such democratic procedures as deliberation, debate, and popular control. Such sacrifices are acceptable in wartime, but are generally not thought needed in peacetime. And they are not, except in the garrison state. It looks as though the countries of the world may have to maintain garrison states for some time, a serious thought.

The military establishment, important in the evolution of the state, is especially important in modern times characterised by chronic cold war and the garrison state. In the past, the military establishment experienced rapid expansion in times of emergency and rapid dismantling following the cessation of hostilities. Now, because of revolutionary changes in weapons and because of the balance of terror, we have a permanently expanded military profession.³ The military profession itself has been transformed by the need for an increased number of technically trained persons, so that the concentration of persons engaged in purely military occupations is now a minority. The scope of the public responsibility of the military has greatly increased and with it, in turn, come new problems in civilian control of the military. President Eisenhower, himself a military hero, has warned of the danger in the expanded power of the military-industrial complex.

¹ *Freedom and Welfare* (Social Patterns in the Northern Countries of Europe). Edited by George R. Nelson and others. Sponsored by the Ministries of Social Affairs of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, 1953.

² An apt term used by H. D. Lasswell in an article called "The Garrison State", *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1941.

³ Morris Janowitz, *Sociology and the Military Establishment* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1959). Also, *the Professional Soldier* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960).

GOVERNMENT BY WHOM?

Who shall govern is important at all times. With the rise of democracy the government has tended to pass into the hands of the people. Indeed, the definition of democracy is government by the people. Voting and elections are often thought of as the evidences of democracy, whereas the socialists charge that voting is a sham unless there is a redistribution of economic power. Democracy superseded government by a class and by a hereditary family. The people are a great mass, too unwieldy to do the actual governing. So they elect periodically representatives who do govern directly, or appoint executives to govern or to administer laws.

Not all modern governments are elected periodically by the people, as, for instance, the government of Germany when the National Socialist Party was in power and the government of Italy when the Fascists ruled. Since the problems of modern government are usually so extensive that they are beyond the competence of any one man, dictators have a group around them who exercise this dictatorial power. In this group the nominal dictator generally has the most power, but there is some distribution of power among the group. The power set-up of modern dictators resembles somewhat that of monarchs of several centuries ago, except that there is not the inheritance principle. Also the use of the mass communication inventions, such as radio and press, among literate peoples enables some public opinion to operate on dictators, perhaps more than on the monarchs of old.

Even so, dictators must keep the free flow of opinion within rigorous bounds, lest their power be challenged. In the Soviet Union, the three main instruments of control available to the leaders are the Communist Party, the Secret Police and military forces, and the Soviet apparatus of technical administration. The politically positive functions, designed to elicit the kind of behaviour from the population that the regime desires, are fulfilled mainly through formal education, differential incentives, propaganda and control of the media of communication, the use of living "models" (usually party members), and the network of party organisations, such as the Young Pioneers and the Komsomol. The politically negative functions, which are those to prevent people from engaging in undesired behaviour, rest in the final analysis upon the Secret Police and the armed forces. The threat of arrest is very real, affecting approximately one in five men at some point in their lives.¹

Even in a democracy such as the United States, sometimes the will of the people is defeated by lobbyists, bosses of urban political machines,

¹ This figure, for the 1950's, is a rough estimate, based on the conservative figures of Naum Jasny on the population of the concentration camps and the rather liberal estimates of the refugees from the Soviet Union. Barrington Moore, Jr., *Terror and Progress USSR* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954).

or by special interests such as those of railroads after the Civil War. Also newspapers owned by businessmen and supported by advertisers exercise great power over voters. The will of the people is unknown or more often ignored, perhaps, on such small issues as the treatment of the American Indian or on technical ones such as reorganising the executive branch of the government, than on simple questions such as prohibition of the liquor traffic.

The question as to who actually wields political power has been investigated at the level of the local community more than at the state and national levels. The investigators are not in agreement on how power is distributed in the local community. In "Middletown" (Muncie, Indiana) a single wealthy family is said to have exercised control on major issues in the second decade of the century.¹ In "Regional City" (Atlanta) in the early 1950's the top power élite is identified as a group of 40, including 7 bankers, 5 corporation lawyers, 5 industrialists, 1 professional man, 4 government officials, 2 labour leaders and 5 social leaders.² It is interesting that none of the city's ministers or doctors is included in this account of the top policy-making leaders. Another study³ presents evidence in support of the theory that the power structure of the isolated community tends to be monolithic but as the community becomes increasingly involved and interrelated with the larger society, its power structure bifurcates, resulting in two relatively separate power groups, those powerful in business and those influential in community affairs. Four periods in the economic history of a mid-western city dubbed "Cibola" are traced, a city just beyond the metropolitan area of one of the largest urban centres in the United States. In the earliest period of pre-industry (1823-60), twelve persons were identified as economic dominants and ten of them were public office holders. As the community moved through succeeding phases of development, namely the period of local industry (1860-1900), the period of metropolitan involvement (1900-40) and the period of absentee control (1940-54), the percentage of economic dominants who were office holders decreased. The view expressed here is that following the turn of the century, a marked withdrawal of the economic leaders from overt participation in public life occurred. The theory is however incomplete because of its inattention to the covert aspects of public influence.

Still another view, based on a study of Bennington, Vermont, is that there is no single stable power structure in the community, but instead a multiplicity of power structures associated with a variety

¹ Robert S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929). The population at the time of the study was about 40,000.

² Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1953).

³ Robert O. Schulze, "The Bifurcation of Power in a Satellite City", in Morris Janowitz (ed.), *Community Political Systems* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1961).

of political issues. General leaders are those who hold formal positions of power over wider areas or greater numbers of people or a greater variety of issues.¹

A study of who makes the decisions in New Haven favours the theory of the separation and dispersal of the elements of power.² The notion that somebody behind the scenes really runs the city is denied, as is also the belief that there is a simple power élite. No one group unites economic, social and political power. Where the elements of power were once unified, they are now scattered. The pattern of power in New Haven is said to be one thing with respect to the schools; a different combination with respect to political parties and nominations; and, with respect to urban redevelopment, still another. On such evidence as the foregoing, Rossi has undertaken to formulate the general proposition that in large and heterogeneous communities with well-developed political parties organised along class and ethnic lines, and where the party favoured by the lower status group has a good chance of winning elections to local office, the community power structure tends to be polyolithic rather than monolithic.³

The right of the people to vote does not assure a government by all the people. In the first place not all persons vote. For instance, in the elections for the President of the United States in 1960, there were 107,880,000 persons old enough to vote. But only about 69,000,000 voted. Some who were old enough to vote were not eligible because of residence and other requirements, and many of the others did not have sufficient interest in voting. The people are also handicapped in ruling because of the vast number of decisions that must be made by legislators and by bureaucrats in conducting the large number of functions of government too vast to follow carefully or even at all. It is more difficult for the people to pass judgment on all these issues than would be the case where all the government did was to keep order. In 1953 alone, 50,000 statutes and regulations were passed in the United States.

As the executive business of government expands and the demand for quick action increases, there is a great need for leadership and the use of the newer tools to aid in the democratic process—namely, the newspaper, the radio, telephone, telegraph, motion picture, television and the public opinion poll—and to supplement the slower process of elections, town hall meetings, and deliberative assemblies. But leaders must be watched and checked at election times. If leaders

¹ Harry Scoble, "Leadership Hierarchies and Political Issues in a New England Town", in Morris Janowitz (ed.), *op. cit.*

² Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.

³ David B. Truman, "Theory and Research on Metropolitan Political Leadership: Report on a Conference", *Items*, vol. 15, No. 1, March, 1961. Social Science Research Council.

are not watched, special power groups may exercise a leadership for selfish interest rather than for the public good—a step in the direction of dictatorship.

The Behaviour of the Electorate. The prevalence and significance of voter apathy have led to its scrutiny. Where freedom to vote or not to vote exists, the usual behaviour is apathy, which may be why some nations make voting compulsory. In a study of Glossop, a small English industrial town of 18,000 located about thirteen miles from Manchester, 56 per cent of the sample of electors said they had no interest in politics.¹ In Germany, Sweden, America, Norway, and many other countries, men vote more than women, the better educated more than the less educated, urban residents more than rural, married persons more than unmarried, those between 35 and 55 more than those who are younger or older, higher status persons more than lower, and members of organisations more than non-members.² The more open the class structure of a society, the more politically apathetic its working class. In a study of an American community it was found that the less involved in community activity the individual, the less likely is he to vote.³ Family togetherness is evident in voting patterns,⁴ since voting turnout tends to be a joint household activity, with the members either voting or staying home as a unit.

Voter apathy is popularly decried but apathy may under some circumstances be interpreted as a sign of group cohesion and consensus. Voter apathy may indicate that it does not make much difference one way or the other to the non-voters how the election comes out. On the other hand, a high rate of participation can be indicative of cleavage and the assumption of polar positions.⁵

When citizens vote, what factors influence their preferences? Some of the social correlates are presented in Fig. 33. From this it can be seen that certain membership groups, especially reference groups, are highly influential in political choices. An additional important finding is that individuals who are downwardly mobile as well as those who are upwardly mobile tend to vote conservative.⁶ Apparently declassed persons are moved by remembrance of things past and are more likely to vote the way their fathers did than the way their co-workers do. Curiously, in Europe the women are preponderantly conservative, but in the United States they generally

¹ A. H. Birch, *Small-Town Politics: A Study of Political Life in Glossop* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959).

² Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man, the Social Bases of Politics* (New York: Doubleday, 1960).

³ Philip K. Hastings, "The Voter and the Non-Voter", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 62, pp. 302-7, November, 1956.

⁴ William A. Glaser, "The Family and Voting Turnout", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 23, pp. 563-70, 1959-60.

⁵ Lipset, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-3, 216-19.

⁶ Lipset, *op. cit.*

vote no differently from men, for reasons which are not clear. The socially deprived tend to show political negativism and are "agin" what is, as indicated by research on local referendums.¹

FIG. 33.—Social Correlates of Political Preference.

(Data from Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee; *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954.)

THE GROUPS STUDIED

Place: Elmira, New York, thought to be a "typical" town (moderate size, reasonable economic stability and political party balance, typical ethnic composition.)

Date: 1948

Size of sample: More than 1,000

Method: Panel (interviewing and reinterviewing, before and after the presidential campaign between Truman and Dewey)

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH POLITICAL PREFERENCES

Union membership:	Members vote more Democratic than non-members of the same occupation, class, education, age or religion. The more interaction with other union members, the more Democratic the vote.
Socio-economic status:	Higher socio-economic status groups vote more Republican than lower.
Religion:	Catholics vote more Democratic than Protestants regardless of class or national origin. Catholics closely identified with their religion vote Democratic more than Catholics not so identified. The difference between Catholics and Protestants in voting is strongest among older people.
Ethnic group:	White native-born Protestants vote Republican more than do minority ethnic groups. The more closely members of minorities identify with their ethnic groups, the more Democratic their vote.
Social mobility:	Children who have achieved upward social mobility over their parents are more often Republican.
Primary groups:	There is a high degree of agreement, approximately 90 per cent, on political preference within the family. Voters predisposed to either major political party have more friends in the same party.

¹ John E. Horton and Wayne E. Thompson, "Powerlessness and Political Negativism: A Study of Defeated Local Referendums", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 67, p. 485, March, 1962. Also, Edward L. McDill and Jeanne Clare Ridley, "Status, Anomia, Political Alienation, and Political Participation", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 68, pp. 205-13, September, 1962.

The findings of investigation show that only two to three per cent of the population are involved in influencing the vote. That organisation can be effective in getting out the vote is something known to politicians. Investigation shows that precinct captains who are well integrated into their social milieus of their precincts were the most effective workers for their parties. In the presidential election of 1956 in a mid-western industrial city, the increment to a party from the best, as compared to the worst, precinct workers amounted to about 5 per cent, an important margin of difference.¹

Social conditions for a stable Democratic Society. There is special interest in considering the specific requisites for democracy and the social conditions that support it. The requisites are set forth by Max Weber as (a) a value system allowing the peaceful "play" of power through such instruments as political parties and a free press ; (b) the periodic award of effective authority to one group or one set of officeholders ; and (c) the existence of other sets of leaders aspiring to hold office.

Conditions associated with stable democratic systems are industrialisation, urbanisation, literacy, education and wealth. These factors are highly intercorrelated and are also highly correlated with stable democratic systems.² If a new nation is interested in developing a democratic tradition, it would do well to promote industrialisation and education. Some of the new nations recently added to the United Nations have adopted the forms of democracy but their recent emergence from a peasant or tribal past poses difficulties in the way of realising quickly their democratic aspirations. Industrialisation and education are important because they are related to effectiveness ; they provide the means for satisfying the basic interests of most of the members of the society, or of the most important groups in it. They also support the legitimacy of the system, the idea that the existing political system is the most appropriate one.³

Some social trends in modern times, such as big government and rapid change, make governing difficult for democracies, and are an invitation to move towards rule without consulting the people, which we call dictatorship.

Some trends facilitate democracy. Such, for instance, are the rapid communication inventions. The public sample poll is also an invention of great potential usefulness in quickly familiarising the leaders, both executives and legislators, with what the people think. The sample poll, being small, always has an error, but that error can be measured if the sampling is done scientifically, which is not always the case. But this social invention is in its infancy and may be

¹ Phillips Cutright and Peter H. Rossi, "Grass Roots Politicians and the Vote", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 23, pp. 171-9, April, 1958.

² S. M. Lipset, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

³ S. M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy : Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 53, pp. 69-105, 1959.

expected to evolve. It shows up at times the ignorance of the people. For instance, 64 per cent of those who had not gone to high school did not know that the term in the House of Representatives is 2 years ; 52 per cent of the farmers had never heard of the Marshall Plan after it had been discussed for six months ; and as late as 1945, 59 per cent of the population would not say that they knew what TVA was.¹ Also a random sample of population is often not as good a source for determining public opinion on social issues as are certain organisations which generate and mould opinion, such as a chamber of commerce or a trade union congress.² The mistakes in prediction of presidential elections have been due not to the fault of the instrument but to its faulty use.³

SUMMARY

Although the act of governing others is a natural phenomenon, government as a social institution is not. Governing is involved in the domination of the inferior by the superior, and the weak by the strong, and occurs throughout the animal world. Government, however, refers to an organisation which maintains order for the whole group. Such an organisation is lacking not only among animals but also among peoples with the simplest material culture.

There is small need for a special institution of social control among primitive hunters, since there is little disorder among them. The routine of everyday living, elaborated and sustained by the folkways, makes for social regularity and stability. So, too, does the leadership supplied mainly by the older men. The groups are very small, which means that public opinion can operate effectively as a regulatory force. Disorders which do occur are handled by organisations such as the family, the clan, and the various associations, the primary functions of which are not governmental.

There is not a uniform development of government for all cultures. Hence it is not possible to trace the evolution of the state, except for a particular people. What may be shown, however, are the principal factors which are correlated with the development of government. Such are the presence of dominant personalities, war, surplus wealth to make war worth while, conquest, tribute, classes, and slavery.

Whereas early government was concerned with small, homogeneous, stationary societies, modern government involves a complex, rapidly changing society in a large area. This has resulted in an enormous expansion of the scope of the state, especially in its functions relating to social services, production, and war.

Democracy, favoured by mass-production, communication, and the growth of cities, is suited to slow deliberative action and is sorely beset by the complexity and instability of modern life. Although the power of the people in a democracy is always available as a check against abuse, still the situation is such that the interests of the people are often subordinated to those of party cliques and special pressure groups ; and in times of crisis when speedy

¹ Lindsay Rogers, *The Pollsters* (New York : Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1949).

² Herbert Blumer, "Public Opinion and Public Opinion Polling", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 13, pp. 547-9, October, 1948.

³ Philip Hauser, *Statement Before Congressional Committee on Public Opinion Polls*, U.S. Bureau of the Census ; also, "Report of the Committee on Analysis of Pre-Election Polls and Forecasts", *Social Science Research Council Release*, December 27, 1948.

action is required, the democratic processes are suspended and are replaced by processes similar to those of the totalitarian state. Still, stable democracy is reinforced by industrialisation, urbanisation, wealth, education, and literacy.

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. What organisations maintain order, deal with crime, and enforce discipline among the lower hunting cultures?
2. What was the relation between property and power in feudal society?
3. Give a brief outline of Wittfogel's theory of the rôle of bureaucracy in oriental societies.
4. What is Michel's "Iron Law of Oligarchy"?
5. What light do recent studies throw on the problem of inner-party democracy?
6. Is there a "ruling class" in contemporary Britain?
7. Give a brief account of the political evolution of the Greek city states.
8. Compare the relations between property and power in feudal and oriental societies.
9. Discuss the use made by Max Weber of the concept of "charismatic leader".
10. How far is class a determinant of voting behaviour in contemporary Britain?
11. What are the social conditions necessary for a stable democracy?

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CHAPTER XIX

WAR AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The young reader will hear much more discussion of foreign affairs in his lifetime than did his parents or his grandparents. More newspaper space, more radio time, and more attention in Congress will be given to Russia, China, India, West Asia, Western Europe, the Arctic, South America, and the islands of the Pacific than formerly. The reason is that there will be more investment in these areas, more trade, more tourists, and more important matters for diplomacy. There will also be the threat of war and concern with international organisations.

In the United States the net public debt of the federal government rose during the war period from 45 billion dollars in 1940 to 228 billion in 1953, or, expressed in another way, from 26 per cent of the total production in 1940 to 74 per cent of the production of 1953. In Europe and Asia the vastness of destruction in ruined cities is incalculable.

Sociology has a contribution to make to this problem ; for international relations are the relations of groups, large political groups which we call nations or states. These relations vary from generation to generation and from century to century because culture changes. Culture and group are the subject matter of sociology. Then, too, war is a special illustration of conflict, and peace is a type of accommodation. Conflict and accommodation are general phenomena. The warrant for singling out war for special consideration is of course the immense social importance of this institution.

CONFLICT BETWEEN GROUPS

Let us begin with fundamentals. Basic to intergroup relations is the idea of contact. The Iroquois in 1400 could have no relations with the Ainu, for there were no contacts between America and Japan. But in the 1940's the United States can fight the Japanese on the other side of the earth because contacts are possible. Wars may now be worldwide.

A further idea is that there is no common governing authority over independent political units in conflict. There is no single overall military force to keep order. Any law that governs the relationships between such independent political units is supported by custom or agreement, rather than by power.

Another observation is that though wars differ, all wars are organised fighting sanctioned by the authority of the group. Whether they be civil wars, raids, feuds, attacks by guerrilla bands, by pirates,

or by segments of the group, they are called wars if the fighting is organised and sanctioned.

The nature of wars is affected by the size of the groups and by the integration of its units. When small bands of Crow Indians fought the small bands of the Dakota, necessarily the organised effort was different from that when Germany fought France. When states are loosely integrated, small segments of one state may fight small segments of another.

A final concept is that both wars and states evolve. The fighting of a small war party of Murngin with stone implements over stolen women is simple and crude indeed, as compared with the later wars of the United States, which were fought in the air, on land, on sea, and under the sea. In the future, wars may utilise gas, bacteria, plant hormones, and radiation, as well as explosives.

THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS FOR WAR

Must we always have War because of our Biological Nature? No less keen an observer than Freud remarked that war resulted from man's innate destructiveness, and Darwin saw in war a natural response on the part of the group whose survival is endangered.

The view of war as an expression of the biological nature of man is to be considered in the light of the discussions of Chapters III and IX where we learned that man is not imperiously governed by instinct as are the insects and lower vertebrates, but has a biological nature that is flexible, hence readily moulded by culture.

If wars were determined by our biological inheritance, then one might expect that all peoples would have war ; but there are several peoples who have never been known to have a war. The Greenland Eskimos, for instance, are familiar with murder, and experience anger and hate ; but when Rasmussen tried to explain to them that the countries from which he came engaged in warfare, the Eskimos were baffled and could not understand why one community would want to exterminate another.

Furthermore, though wars may be frequent among nations, they do not occur periodically as do rhythms of hunger and sex. Sweden was at one time in nearly continuous war, but she has not engaged in a war since 1815. The biological nature of the Swedes could not have changed in that period.

To be sure, man has a biological nature which makes human warfare possible ; but it does not make warfare inevitable. Man is capable of becoming belligerent, and when frustrated may show aggression. But a person may learn not to fight. Frustration leads to aggression especially when the habit of being aggressive has been established. The most effective procedure for securing highly aggressive behaviour is to give the animal success in fighting.¹

¹John Paul Scott, *Aggression* (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1958).

If man lacked aggression, perhaps there could be no such behaviour as war. But human war is not a simple manifestation of animal anger. Indeed, in modern times nations must resort to conscription to get an adequate army. In World War II the closer the American soldiers got to the enemy lines, the less personal hostility they felt towards the fighters on the other side.¹

We conclude that war, which is intermittent in human societies, is not explained by inherited biological nature, which is a constant from one nation to another and from one century to another. Biology does not tell us why we went to war against Germany in the twentieth century and not in the nineteenth, or why we fought Germany and not France.

An important distinction affecting war is the difference between unarmed conflict and armed conflict. The absence of violence does not necessarily mean the existence of harmony. The central problem in containing conflict is the avoidance of violence and not the repression of all differences of interest and belief between groups.

The best approach to the study of war is to seek an explanation in terms of culture, and in that particular part of culture which concerns the relations of groups, i.e. political units, one with another. War is to be seen as a special aspect of "international relations".

EARLY WARFARE

Among Primitive Peoples. Our inferences about early wars, before written history, are drawn from what we know about wars among preliterate peoples in relatively recent times. Before considering primitive warfare, the reader will do well to remember that there are several thousand different preliterate peoples—according to one's definition of the term *people*—and that their conditions of life differ greatly. But this heterogeneous multitude of people is homogeneous in certain regards such as illiteracy, small size of communities, and simple implements of stone and metal. It is for this reason that when we compare them with modern societies we are sometimes justified in lumping primitive peoples together.

We would expect primitive warfare to be crude, since this is the usual initial condition of a new invention or social organisation.² For instance, the war parties are small, 10 to 50 men, 100 being exceptionally large.³ Only a few peoples such as the Ashanti of Africa—a rather warlike continent—maintain armies.⁴ As to the frequency of wars among primitive peoples, it is not possible to give a measure.

¹ Samuel A. Stouffer *et al.*, *The American Soldier*, vol. II (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1949), Chap. III.

² Among some lower hunters, religious organisation and marriage systems are far from crude, but probably among them religion is far advanced, even though their material culture is simple.

³ Harry Hoijer, *The Causes of Primitive Warfare* (Unpublished master's thesis, University of Chicago, 1929), p. 2.

⁴ Melville J. Herskovits, *Man and His Works* (New York : Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1948), p. 344.

In A. L. Kroeber's *Anthropology* the word war does not occur in the index nor as a heading of a paragraph or section. Yet nearly all primitive peoples have had some experience with group fighting, though the Veddas of Ceylon and a dozen or so others are reported not to engage in wars.¹ Wars among the simpler peoples often are caused by intruders from territory where resources are scarce. Such wars are rather like raids and involve surprise attacks ; since reprisals may continue back and forth, they also suggest feuds.

The foregoing remarks serve only as the briefest introductory comment on primitive wars, for we do not wish to tarry over primitive warfare longer than to learn what lessons it may have for us or to see what characteristics appear to be common to war in general.

Traits of Primitive Warfare found in Modern Wars. The first characteristic of the interrelations of "states" in early times is a suspicion of outsiders. Attitudes of hostility towards outsiders are common to primitive groups who all have a strong "we" feeling, whether it be called patriotism or not. The brotherhood-of-man doctrine does not generally extend beyond one's own people.

A second characteristic is that glory is an accompaniment of primitive wars. The brave warrior is accorded great honour ; and much group prestige results from successful raids. Since small communities with little property esteem name and reputation greatly, the glory to be gained in war may serve to encourage warfare, offset no doubt by hazard and hardship.

Religion is tied closely to primitive warfare.² The aid of religious beings is sought with a good deal of ceremonialism. "God is on our side," but his active help is sought. Among primitives, apparently, religious sanctions are not required for the moral justification of war.

Contacts are a necessary basis in determining who fights whom. Thinly scattered peoples are in general said to be less warlike than those who live close together in densely settled areas,³ though there are exceptions in the case of a very weak people living in contact with a very strong one.

Retaliatory wars are mentioned frequently in the literature. These raids occur intermittently but they may continue through the years between ancient enemies. It is as though the attacks recur through their own momentum, each group trying to add to its glory and to wipe out humiliation.

The features of the war pattern of primitive peoples which have been described above are found in all stages of culture.⁴

¹ Maurice R. Davie, *The Evolution of War* (New Haven, Conn. : Yale University Press, 1929), Chap. iv.

² Maurice R. Davie, *The Evolution of War*, Chap. vii.

³ Harry Hoijer, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

⁴ These observations are drawn in large part from the analyses of Hoijer and Davie, in the books cited ; from the writings of Robert Lowie on the Crow Indians ; and from Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, 1942) ; as well as from various monographs on preliterate peoples.

WAR IN HISTORY

The conditions of Warfare at the beginnings of History. Developments in transportation lead to contacts between groups, and group contacts lead to friction. About the time writing was developed, which signalised the beginning of history, there were several significant developments in transportation, involving the boat, the horse, and the pack animal. The range of contacts of peoples was greatly extended, especially along rivers and coasts, and over plains and semi-deserts. Friction often was the result.

Contemporaneous agricultural development made larger populations possible, especially along the waterways where the advantages of trade and division of labour increased the local food supply. The developing inventions meant more property which may have served as a stimulus to war.

Early cities felt the need of protecting the sources of their food supply and of guarding the routes of transportation, and accordingly maintained armed forces.

The Amount of War. Professor Sorokin has counted 967 major interstate wars in the history of Greece, Rome, and certain European countries from 500 B.C. to A.D. 1925.¹ These countries engaged in some war in each of about 50 per cent of the years. But less than one-half of the total number of years was spent in war since many wars lasted less than a full year. Since 1750 the United States has been involved in 12 wars, and has also engaged in more than 170 distinct military campaigns.²

The record of most countries contains many wars : in Austria, in 40 per cent of the years of her history there were wars ; in Britain, 56 ; in France, 50 ; in Germany, 28 ; in Italy, 36 ; in the Netherlands, 44 ; in Poland and Lithuania, 58 ; in Russia, 46 ; and in Spain, 67.³ Probably the peoples in these countries consider themselves peace-loving and think that they fought for defence or for justice, and that their enemies were aggressors. The above statistics do not tell us who were the righteous and who were the wicked.

WAR AND THE GROWTH OF STATES

States are getting larger and fewer. The evolution of states has been towards an increase in size. At the dawn of history, independent political units with control over a given area were, for the whole world, to be measured by the thousands if not by the tens of thousands.

¹ P. A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, vol. III, "Fluctuations of Social Relationships: War and Revolution" (New York: American Book Company, 1937), p. 283.

² Quincy Wright, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 636, 650, 655. War is defined as all hostilities recognised as states of war in the legal sense, or which involve more than 50,000 troops. Some lesser occasions not recognised as legal war are included if they lead to important changes, such as territorial transfers.

³ Sorokin, *op. cit.*, p. 352.

In 1962 the United Nations had a membership of 110. The total territory of the earth remains the same. So the states are growing larger.

This process has depended upon the evolution of the transportation inventions. A state which depends upon human legs for its transportation must necessarily be small. With the horse, the automobile, or the railway, the state may be larger. But the influence of the transportation inventions on the size of states is neither immediate nor simple.

Conquest precedes Expansion. Given transportation inventions, how do states become larger? Sometimes states have been united by marriage of their rulers. Occasionally states have agreed to lose their identity in a larger state with a new name, as was the case with the thirteen British colonies along the Atlantic seaboard of America. But even in the union of territory by marriage of rulers or by consent, the purpose may be to gain more military strength either for offensive or defensive operations. Larger unions have often resulted from several states consolidating against a common foe. Thus wars helped to unite separate states into the United States and separate states into modern Germany.

The transportation inventions favour military conquest. They transport military forces and supplies, and in the case of the boat and the horse, even become actual military weapons—a navy and cavalry. With these may go differentials in new weapons, in metals and explosives, and in population increases because of new agricultural inventions and favoured trading positions. These differentials mean that one country becomes much more powerful than a neighbour, whose weakness invites attack. Thus England conquered American Indians, Australian natives, and the peoples of India.

Assimilation follows. In the extension of political authority over a larger territory, the forces of conquest precede the forces of assimilation. The forces of conquest rest upon military inventions while the forces of assimilation rest upon the communication and transportation inventions such as language, roads, printing presses, etc. Thus the Burgundians were conquered but not assimilated for a long time after their conquest, as shown by their insurrections, and the Irish were never assimilated by the English.

Empires are illustrations of the control which the military inventions have enabled one political authority to extend over a range of very heterogeneous peoples. Such were the Roman Empire and the British Empire. But empires cannot hold together, as the people in a village do, for there are not enough contacts in the conquered area to establish the similarities of language, custom, and law, nor are there the economic interests which make for the solidarity discussed so much by French sociologists. So, too, in areas not extensive enough to be called empires, there may be insurrections for centuries before

assimilation removes the probability of civil war. Even in the United States of America where language was the same everywhere and the customs were much the same, the economic heterogeneity almost led in the 1860's to a split of the state into two parts.

WAR AND STRONG GOVERNMENT

The second great social effect of war is the part it has played in strengthening government and extending its influence. The growth of government owes much to war.

War leaders became governmental leaders and marshalling armies gave collective experience beyond the family, farm, and village. When conquest occurred, the administration of defeated peoples and the handling of insurrections afforded administrative experience, as did the collection of revenues. In the twentieth century war still strengthens the federal government in its struggle not with powerful families or lords nor with walled towns, but with the individualism and *laissez-faire* attitudes of powerful industries.

Without War. It would be interesting to speculate whether, if there had never been war, there would have been a growth of states in size and a growth of government. Or if war were abolished, would states cease to grow in size and governments cease to grow in power?

We observe that, with the contact inventions and without war, small localisms with distinguishing features would tend to disappear and areas with the same culture would become larger. Whether this process of diffusion would be slower without wars than with them, we do not know. On the other hand the growth of political units might have been much slower, for political boundary lines are slow to change. Wars have been the most common method of eliminating them.

The growth of government might well have been slower without war; but with an increase in the size of communities and the growth of population in general and with economic enterprises too large for family control, government would have developed.

It seems clear, however, that war has speeded the evolution of states in size—though possibly not the culture areas—and has aided greatly the development of government.

THE POWERS

The Ranking of Powers. The differentials in the size of populations and also in the possession of inventions, particularly transportation and war weapons, mean that nations vary greatly in power. Through much of history, power was equated with population. But to-day mere numbers do not make a great power. The possession of the atomic bomb and ballistic missiles adds to the power of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and expanding population adds to the power of both. Where there are wars and military traditions, it is customary to measure

greatness in terms of military power, not in terms of literature, philosophy, music, and art. So nations and states are spoken of as powers.¹

Military might being what it is in a war-like world, the ranking of powers becomes a matter of the greatest international importance. The facts of international life rank the powers with as much precision as the facts of barnyard life determine the pecking order of chickens, described in Chapter XVI. At different times, Egypt, Persia, Rome, France, and Britain have been first in the power order.

Power is not only effective in the crucial test of war, but also between wars. Even when there is no war there are stakes of diplomacy to be played for. Behind this diplomacy, however, are power and the possible threat of its use, sometimes called a "cold war". There is no over-all authority to administer international law, and in practice the international courts do not handle power problems. So power counts in many decisions of peacetime regarding international co-operation, investment, trade, options, access to raw materials, etc. It is often more profitable for lesser nations to line up with a likely winner in a war, rather than with a loser.

Shifts in Power. Why does the ranking of power change? Since power is in large part a function of economic and military inventions, of population, and of location, we naturally look for answers in these factors. Because location is a constant, we cannot use it to explain the variable of changing rank. Economic organisation and inventions change more quickly and with a greater swing than population. Thus Britain's rise to power was aided greatly by the boat and the Industrial Revolution. Until the coming of the railroad, the most highly developed political economy was maritime.² About the thirteenth or fourteenth century, boats were sufficiently evolved to sail into the wind and get far away from the coast. New continents and lands with new wealth were discovered. The British had always been a sea-going people, as were the Athenians. But with bigger boats, the British went further than the Athenians who were limited largely to the Mediterranean. To maintain this position as a seapower, the British had to fight the Dutch, the Spanish, and the French.

With the Industrial Revolution came the iron-hulled steamboat³ and also the means for manufacturing the various implements and needs of war. A great differential in power accrued to the British

¹ The point is worth noting, for many who are most vocal in plans to "abolish" war are often moved by the bias of hope, which may rest upon an appeal to reasonableness. But any realistic programme to prevent wars must be discussed in terms of power. For it is power that makes wars, and to prevent them one must reckon with power.

² A. P. Usher, "The Steam and Steel Complex", in William F. Ogburn (ed.), *Technology and International Relations* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 59, 60; William H. Dean, *The Theory of the Geographic Location of Economic Activities* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938).

³ Bernard Brodie, *Sea Power in the Machine Age* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1941).

because in the nineteenth century no other state had developed the manufacture of steel to the extent that the British had. The nineteenth century, however, was a relatively peaceful century, after the Napoleonic wars ended in 1815.¹ It has been said that Britain maintained the peace, probably because few nations with needs or grievances were able to challenge her power.

In time, England lost her primacy in steel-making, for the practice spread to the United States, to Germany, to Japan, to Russia, to Belgium, and France. It is spreading now to China and India. With the Industrial Revolution came the railroad and the development of a vast amount of land trade. Thus the power differential of the states with a maritime economy was reduced.

In the United States the reaction to the blast furnace appears not to have developed aggression either during the nineteenth century or up to the present in the twentieth century. The United States had room for its growing population, an abundance and variety of raw materials, and no serious grievances against Britain.

The use of coal and the manufacture of steel spread beyond Germany into Russia as well as into Japan and the United States. The industrialisation of the Soviet Union proceeded under successive five-year plans which stressed the heavy industries, namely, those using large quantities of steel. Russia's production of steel in the middle 1930's was greater than Britain's, and three-quarters that of Germany, but only 35 per cent that of the United States.² After World War II had weakened the strictly European powers, the Soviet Union stood out as a very great world power. This was due in part to her large land armies, and also to her promise of industrialisation and a large population of perhaps 300 million in a few decades.

To-day the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are in the top rank as world powers with the smaller European countries on a different plane of power. This shift in the ranking of powers is due to new differentials in population and in the use of coal and steel, as indicated in Tables 28 and 29.

Uranium may be added as a source of energy for those areas without coal, or be added to the supply of countries with coal—one pound of uranium yielding 10,200,000 kwh of energy compared to 3.5 for a pound of coal. But uranium—the geographical distribution of which in exact amounts is not published—is not a substitute for coke. An economical method of making pig iron or steel from iron ore without using coke might advance Brazil among the powers, for Brazil has iron, water power, and a large area with a high birth rate.

NATIONAL INTERESTS

The states of the world may be viewed as a great social system (but without a common government) in which the parts—that is, the

¹ Sorokin, *op. cit.*, Part II.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 389, 772.

TABLE 28

APPROXIMATE POPULATION OF POWERS, IN MILLIONS,
ABOUT 1700 AND 1960 *

Country.	1700.	Country.	1960.
United Kingdom	8.6	U.S.S.R.	214
France	23.6	U.S.A.	181
Spain	7.2	United Kingdom	53
Prussia	5.1	France	46
Holland	1.1	West Germany	53
Sweden	1.6	Japan	93
Italy (six states)	9.2	India	433
		China (mainland)	647

* Data from Bowden, Karpovich, and Usher, *An Economic History of Europe Since 1750* (New York: American Book Company, 1937), and from the *U.N. Demographic Yearbook*, 1961, Table 1.

different states or nations—are interacting one with another. Such are international relations. The formal structures of these relations are the international bodies such as the United Nations, the International Labour Organisation, the International Court of Justice, the International Monetary Fund, on which various nations have representation, or to which they make contributions. In addition, there is the structure consisting of ambassadors, ministers, consuls, and delegates.

TABLE 29

MECHANICAL ENERGY OF POWERS *

Country.	Total Inanimate Energy Consumed in 1959, in Millions of Metric Tons of Coal.	Total Probable Resources of Coal, in Billions of Metric Tons.
United States.	1,337	2,880
U.S.S.R.	619	1,200
United Kingdom	240	172
West Germany	176	337
France	107	6
China*	370	1,012
India	56	65
Japan	90	10

* "Principally China (Mainland)." *Statistics Yearbook*, 1960, Table 121.

The functional relations of these states one to another are best seen in terms of national interests. Obviously a nation has many interests that relate to other nations. Perhaps first is avoidance of attack, or defence against military aggressions. Such interests may lead to alliances. But often throughout history, nations have profited

by conquest and the acquisition of territory, as was especially the case of European nations after the discovery of America.

A Nation needs Materials from other Countries. There are national interests other than those of military conquest or defence. Important are those of an economic nature, such as trade and investment. These are of great importance for several reasons. First is the great demand for different kinds of materials not produced in the home country, like oil, nickel, cotton, sulphur, and the desire of individual consumers for such goods as coffee, spice, silk, jewels. Specialisation in these products arises in part because of variations in climate and in the earth's surface. Extensive trade is made possible by the network of modern transportation.

The peaceful interchange of goods based upon a profitable division of labour is an attractive picture, which is marred somewhat by the intensity of competition. The serious disruption, however, comes with war. War threatens to cut off the supply of materials necessary for a nation's industry, as, for instance, machinery, or of consumer goods like coffee or petrol. To become less dependent upon other countries for such materials and goods, some countries try to build home industries, protected from competing countries by high tariffs, to produce either these goods or suitable substitutes. Even so, countries seem to become more rather than less dependent on foreign trade.

To assume some supply during war without too severe rationing, nations try to form friendly and informal alliances with other nations, who will be on their side during a conflict and supply them with the desired goods. Such informal and friendly alliances must necessarily be large for a great power, since production requires such a tremendous variety of materials. Thus there is a pressure on the whole world, including those nations that would like to be neutral, to line up on one side or another in a great war. Wars thus become world wars.

Ideological Ties strengthen Alliances. One group of nations that co-operated in the Second World War and supplied one another was the group of nations bordering on the Atlantic Ocean, sometimes called the Atlantic Community. The co-operation in times of war, and of peace, of so large a group of states is not made formally binding by a signed agreement or contract. The ties that bind are more sociological than legal. Thus one of the ties is ideological. Although these Atlantic nations are frequently called "the free world", the ideological tie that binds is in certain places (Portugal and Spain) more anti-communism than democracy. Still the alliance is strengthened by calling the enemy states "the slave world". In former times religion had a similar binding quality. Common ideologies and common foreign trade routes are often found to exist for the same group of nations.

Trade, however, is competitive and leads to rivalries. Hence trade is sometimes an obstacle to co-operation, especially when it tends to

be monopolistic. England and West Germany are competitors for markets in steel. This competition makes a problem for the co-operation needed in war. Emphasis on ideologies and on friendship helps to resist divisive tendencies of trade rivalries.

The minerals and raw materials of the Middle East and South-east Asia, such as tin and rubber, are useful to the nations of the Atlantic community; but the bonds of ideology, religion, customs, and language are not close between the nations bordering on the Atlantic and those bordering on the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Indeed the ties formerly founded on colonialism are being shattered, and the residues are proving to be sources of antagonism, as between Britain and West Asia. Russia has tried to forge ideological ties with these areas.

The British Commonwealth. The cohesion between several different and widely scattered nations is well illustrated by those parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations that have self-government. Members include the United Kingdom (England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Isle of Man, and Channel Islands), Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Malasia, Ghana and Ceylon. These countries of diverse religions and races are held together by favourable trading conditions, preferential tariffs, supplies of capital, a common language, democratic governments, and certain cultural heritages like forms of government and law. The countries making up the Commonwealth are, however, so widely scattered that defence in time of war is not easy; and there are tendencies for a country in the Commonwealth to trade outside as well as inside. Special interests of the parts of an empire tend to pull it apart. The Commonwealth may go the way of empires. It is a remarkable attempt, the first in history, to avoid such a disintegration.

The Common Market. That the British Commonwealth may fall apart is suggested by the withdrawal of the Union of South Africa. Even the trade links will be endangered if Britain joins the Common Market, a combination of countries that is on its way to becoming a third force in the world.

The Common Market (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg) may be the beginning of the United States of Europe. Europe is undertaking to do what the United States did. The United States is a Common Market—with free access to resources and free access to consumers. Before the Common Market Europe did not have free access to markets. European trade in the past was time-consuming and expensive. For example: A shipment of \$12,000 worth of materials was made from Manchester, England, to Milan, Italy, a distance roughly equal to that of a trip from New York to Miami, in the United States just a two-and-one-half-day drive. In Europe it took two weeks of paper work before the trip could begin. All through the trip there were inspections, seals, stamps and more

paperwork. The trip took eight days and it paid a total tariff of 30 per cent, plus the extra costs of eight days of road hauling. The trip cost \$5,000 in Europe, and would have cost \$650 in the United States.¹ For the past decade, these barriers between the nations of old Europe have been removed so that a new United States of Europe might be born.

Industrial production in Europe since World War II has been remarkable. By the end of the war, in 1945, because of damage or destruction, production was extremely low. Productive facilities were restored with the help of U.S. funds under the Marshall Plan. The creation of a Coal and Steel Community of Europe in 1950 gave a considerable impetus to development. In 1957 at the Conference of Rome the treaty providing for the Common Market was signed and the six nations agreed to remove all mutual barriers to trade within twelve to fifteen years. They set up common institutions—a Court of Justice, a Council of Ministers, a Parliamentary Assembly, and an Executive Commission. Great progress was achieved. In the last ten years overall wages have increased 80 per cent. Figure 34 shows the great gains in industrial production. These six countries, once separated and protected markets, are dissolving their barriers so that in a few years there will be one vast open market inside this area but with a protective barrier remaining against the outside world. For this reason, the President of the United States has obtained new authority from Congress to negotiate trade agreements.

In the new schools of Europe students are taught subjects without national prejudice, and subjects are freely discussed. The children consider themselves French and Europeans or German and European, etc., as in the United States there are Texans and New Yorkers—all Americans. A unified Europe is becoming as big as America, a community to be dealt with as an equal.²

In the relations of states to each other, then, dominant among national interests are the military needs and economic demands. Failure to recognise these is failure to understand international relations and foreign policy.

Patterns of Power. National interests tend to group powers into a pattern. This pattern is worldwide now. The raw materials of industrial production are scattered far, from Iran to India, to Indonesia, to the Philippines, to Africa, to Canada. The parts that go to make an automobile, an airplane, a reactor, a locomotive—and to run them

¹ C.B.S. Reports, "Mr. Europe and the Common Market", March 22, 1962.

² A recent stocktaking not of the Common Market nations alone but of the eighteen countries of Western Europe reports that they are now enjoying the highest standard of living in their history. By 1970 it is estimated that they will have a combined population of 320 million and a combined national product of \$342 billion—an increase of 55 per cent over 1955. J. Frederick Dewhurst, John D. Coppock and P. Lamartine Yates, *Europe's Needs and Resources* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961).




Fig. 34.—Industrial Production in Nine Western European Countries.

The six nations in the two top rows of the chart constitute the European Common Market (officially, the "European Economic Community"). Average growth in industrial output since 1953 has been more rapid in this area than in the other countries represented. The combined index for the E.C.C. in 1961 was 81 per cent above 1953. The E.C.C. may become a great political and military force. (Chart from The Cleveland Trust Company, Business Bulletin, Vol. 43, No. 10, October 25, 1962.)

—draw on many such areas. The demand is greatest in the larger nations who have the most manufacturing and who are the most powerful. Each large nation competes for friendship and influence in distant parts of the world. This competition has expressed itself, in part, in recent times in economic and military aid by the strong nations to the relatively weak. The United States, to win and to keep friends and to promote a stable political and economic order, extended net foreign grants and credits from July 1, 1945, to December 31, 1960, valued at about 75 billion dollars, a not inconsiderable sum.¹

The whole world seems to be thus dividing into two parts that are

¹ Robert E. Asher, *Grants, Loans and Local Currencies (Their Role in Foreign Aid)*, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1961), p. 121.

competing intensely. This division of the world into two parts was called bi-polar, one of the poles being the U.S.A. and the other the U.S.S.R. This phrase is more picturesque than realistic. The bi-polar concept underestimates the might and influence that lesser powers such as Germany, Japan, and France, could bring to an alliance.

Non-hostile near-by neighbours are still an asset and part of the power pattern ; yet in this age of transportation, neighbours may be in another hemisphere. Airplanes fly over border states, and inter-continental missiles are now operational, resting in their silos and already aimed at their targets. So the power pattern includes states in all parts of the world.

MOTIVATIONS OF WAR

In the evolution of states and of warfare, invention has been a variable that increased contacts, and population and wealth, and provided destructive weapons, differentially, so that there were always the powerful and the weak. But, of course, inventions alone do not produce wars—unless the will to war is constant over time and between states. It is people who use inventions to increase the size of their country and to make war. The question, therefore, is why do people use inventions to make war ? ¹

Economic Interests. The answer is to be sought in national interests which are many and varied. At times wars have been fought for tribute or for colonies. A neighbour's vineyard may be coveted. Booty may be quite varied depending on the economic system. But the cost of wars and the value of the loot cannot always be figured by strict accounting methods in advance ; and wars may last longer and cost more than expected. Wars often cost more than the economic advantages gained.² The motivation for war seems to lie more in the viscera than in the cerebellum. Pugnacity, loyalty, and gregariousness, when aroused, may drive a people emotionally to a point where a calculation of their possible economic gains is negated and the economic interests obscured.³ States will fight to maintain their empires, their colonies ; and the colonies will fight for their independence. Both ideological and prestige motives are involved along with the economic.

The perceptive student will note that conflict of interest carries the implication that the problems of war and peace are not susceptible to any once-for-all solution. Conflict of interest is a social phenom-

¹ Bertrand Russell, *Why Men Fight* (New York : Albert and Charles Boni, Inc., 1930). See M. Ginsberg, *Reason and Unreason in Society*, Chap. ix, for a penetrating analysis of the causes of war.

² Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion* (New York : G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1911, 1933).

³ See (ed.) T. H. Pear, *Psychological Factors of Peace and War* (London, 1950).

enon which is unlikely to disappear.¹ When the conflict is absolute, and the conditions of the contest are that the winner takes all, negotiations are not often useful. In a series of laboratory experiments in point, negotiations resulted in deadlock in 60 out of 62 times where one group's position must be judged better than another by the representatives of the interested groups. In such a situation, in-group loyalty prevents effective negotiation.² Many conflicts between nations are of course not absolute and may be subject to compromise.

Appeals for Popular Support. The contemplated economic advantages of war do not always, if ever, accrue equally to each of the inhabitants of the victorious nation. Often one class profits more than another, as in the case of many feudal wars. When wars are fought by other than mercenary soldiers, as by volunteers or conscripts, the methods of enlisting popular support often result in obscuring the economic objectives. Thus the American Revolution of 1776-83 was fought not only against tyranny and for freedom, but also to get more income by paying no taxes to Britain and by getting a wider market than that of the British. In rationalisations it is always difficult to draw the line between the strength of the appeal of the rationalised motive and of the underlying motive.³ The American people were fighting for freedom as well as for more income and the right to control their economic opportunities in the new continent.

Support of a war is also derived from loyalty or the identification of the individual's interest and welfare with that of the group. Since the group has so much to do with shaping personality and also affects the pursuit of economic and other interests, it is not surprising that the population will fight for their group. In fact some persons will fight with no other reason for fighting except to beat the enemy or to get the war over with, or because their buddies are fighting.⁴ Fighting for one's group, for one's country, for one's homeland may not be to prevent conquest or pillage, but for the glory of one's country or to remove the shame of defeat. The struggle between states sometimes involves matters of justice, or right, and of honour—at least on the part of one of the warring groups; and such ideals are a powerful appeal to the motives of men. To analyse the motivation of war is far from simple because of the mixture of rationalisations, ideologies, economic interests, and appeals needed to arouse popular support, as well as the motives that move those who must lead in war preparation.

¹ Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961).

² Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton, "Loyalty of Representatives to Ingroup Positions during Intergroup Competition", *Sociometry*, vol. 24, pp. 177-83, June, 1961.

³ W. F. Ogburn, "The Psychological Basis for the Economic Interpretation of History", *American Economic Review Supplement*, March, 1919, pp. 291-308.

⁴ S. A. Stouffer, *loc. cit.*

In modern nations war is generally looked upon as abnormal and undesirable and there is a widespread desire for peace. It must, however, be recognised that organisation for war can be central to a culture, in which case the abolition of warfare is disorganising or dysfunctional to the society. Thus the involuntary elimination of war and head-hunting among the Papua had serious consequences for that people, as did the abolition of warfare in Dakota society when they were forced to accept reservation life.¹

The Appeal of Security. Of the various motives for going to war special consideration should be given to the desire for security. The underlying motive seems to be fear, fear of attack. The preparation for war is furthered on the grounds of promoting security, which appeals to the whole population. This attitude exists in each of the potential opponents. As one arms, another arms. It is a race not only in arming, but also in securing aid from other peoples and in securing military bases close to the enemy. The difference between defence and attack becomes blurred ; and given national pride and group loyalty a war may be easily touched off. In this process lies the reason why some think that if we do not arm we shall not have wars. Coupled with this reasoning is the quite naive and erroneous notion that munition-makers cause wars. Also it must be remembered that weakness may invite attack. Curiously, then, the fear of conquest becomes a factor in causing wars. The need of defence is not always a rationalisation for aggression. The necessity of arming for defence is very real, as a reading of history shows. Poland was once an important nation, but Poland disappeared from the map of Europe until 1918 when other powers restored her boundaries. There are, of course, unarmed neutral states near the path of war ; but they are protected by armed nations. Also neutrality is becoming more difficult in a world integrated by much long-distance transportation.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND WAR

Social Change as a cause of War. The frequency of modern wars is affected by social change. We have seen how successively new transportation inventions have increased contacts. New developments also produce changes in differentials of power, and upset the balance of power which exists during peace. The introduction of the horse made the peoples of the plains and semi-deserts more powerful, in comparison with those in the settled agricultural villages, than they were before they had the horse. The boat and the steam engine increased the power of Britain *vis-à-vis* France. So empires and nations have risen and fallen because of social change. Shifts of strength and weakness, both relative, provide opportunities for challenge and aggression. And in the future atomic energy will bring

¹ Gordon Macgregor and others, *Warriors Without Weapons* (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1946).

new changes, as will the diffusion of the Industrial Revolution to India and China.

A great problem of any United Nations is how to change a boundary line peacefully. As the boundary lines of the year 950 and of 1450 are not suited to 1950, so the boundaries of the present will not be suited to conditions of the future. The boundaries of European states—with their barriers to the flow of trade, to the movement of exchange, to communication through diversity of languages, to the redistribution of industry, and to economic integration—seem more suited to the days of the horse than to the railroad and airplane.

Social Change as a Factor in the Cold War. Social change has been a major factor in the cold war between the super-powers. These powers vie for the allegiance and support of the uncommitted nations, most of which are so-called underdeveloped nations. Here the central problem, especially for the Western powers, has been whether to support the *status quo* in the underdeveloped countries or the forces aligned with social change. Failure to support the revolution in social expectations which characterises the underdeveloped nations in our time may easily mean the loss of their allegiance. The recognition of this fact underlies the recent American policy changes, reflected in the Alliance for Progress which focuses on the economic development of Latin America.

Social Change results from War. Social change creates opportunities for war in shifting differentials of power, but war also hastens social change. It is easy to see how war speeds change in the size of states and in the growth of government as noted previously, but it also makes trends move faster in many other fields. For instance the trend is for women to work for income outside the home. During a modern war there is a rapid increase in the number of women working for money away from home. So also the influence of war is to accentuate the increase in divorces, which is also a trend. There is more regulation and control of industry, a trend which is slow in peacetime. An increasing trend towards the welfare state is an effect of modern war. Some trends are retarded or reversed, as, for instance, the attendance in high schools and colleges. But an inventory, too long to list here, indicates that war speeds up more existing trends than it slows down.

Janowitz¹ has called attention to changes in the military establishment occasioned by the revolution in weapons and the current climate of international relations. These include a permanently expanded military organisation, maintained at great expense. A signal characteristic of this organisation is the narrowing of the gap between the military and the civilian populations, both because of the socialisation of war, which makes the civilian population vulnerable to attack and

¹ Morris Janowitz, *Sociology and the Military Establishment* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1959). Also, *The Professional Soldier* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960).

the growing need for civilian-oriented technicians in the military establishment. The structure of this establishment has changed from a continuous pyramid to a diamond-shaped hierarchy. Military types of occupation accounted for 93·2 per cent of the personnel in the Civil War and only 28·8 per cent in 1954. It is estimated that perhaps 25 to 40 per cent of the professional officer's service time is now spent in various schools and war colleges. The threat of mutual annihilation in a nuclear war has led to relatively greater emphasis by the military on deterrence. Also, modern warfare means dispersal of combat troops into smaller units which has occasioned a shift from authoritarian domination to greater reliance upon group consensus.

THE DESTRUCTIVENESS OF MODERN WARFARE

Destructive Weapons. Modern technology has expanded production magnificently and has made us richer. But technology has also increased destruction in war. The great increase in casualties at the beginning of the twentieth century as compared to 100 years earlier is due in part to an increase in the populations involved. For casualties as a proportion of population, the most reliable data are for France. The dead and wounded were less than 0·2 per cent per decade in the seventeenth century. In the Napoleonic wars they were around 1·5 per cent and in the decade of World War I, 5·6 per cent. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 did not last as long as World War I, but if it had, the percentage of dead and wounded would have been very much smaller than in the war of 1914-18. The dead in a war have usually been around one-fourth of the casualties.

Death of Civilians. A revolutionary effect of the airplane and the missile has been to bring war to civilians, old men, women, and children, in a manner not seen since the surprise attacks of American Indians. And now comes the multi-stage missile that can hit a target, say, 5,000 miles away and that travels 16,000 miles per hour. There is talk of interception, but it will prove difficult—more so, it would seem, than intercepting piloted planes. About one-tenth of the population of the U.S.A. lives in New York and contiguous territory. The large city makes a remarkable target, and for the death-dealing radiation of atomic bombs exploded in the air a city of skyscrapers is an eminently vulnerable target.

The nation with the fewest cities over 50,000 inhabitants and with large war industries located well away from such centres of concentration will, other things being equal, suffer the least civilian loss, for dispersion of population is as defensive a measure as anti-aircraft.

The Hydrogen Bomb. The evolution of science applied to war has brought the atom bomb, which was called the "absolute" weapon. But since then a vastly more destructive bomb has been produced.

To comprehend the destructive capacity of the improved hydrogen

bomb in the early 1960's challenges the imagination. Deposited on the central part of Manhattan Island, New York City, a 50-megaton bomb would destroy homes as far away as Passaic, New Jersey, and ignite fires as far away as West Point, New York. This bomb is 2,500 times as powerful as the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. It will be noted that its thermal effects far out-distance those caused by blast, and there is the additional hazard of fall-out. There is no great technical difficulty in building bigger bombs and theoretically there is no limit on the size of the bomb that can be built. The Russians have produced a 100-megaton bomb. However, the 50-megaton bomb is not proportionately more destructive than the 20-megaton bomb. Two 20-megaton bombs, dropped a few miles apart, would lead to more widespread destruction than one 50-megaton weapon. Premier Khrushchev has stated that the 100-megaton bomb could not be used in Europe because if it were exploded in West Germany or France, it would also hit East Germany and Russia.¹ The United States, he indicated, had a stockpile of 40,000 nuclear bombs.

Bombs can thus reach targets by being shot through the air for intercontinental distances. Not much is known at the time of writing, at least publicly, about defence by interception of such missiles travelling at incredible speeds. The prospect of a guided missile warfare with each side destroying each other's cities and the population therein with single-stage missiles is staggering.

PROGRAMMES FOR PEACE

The application of modern science to the goal of destruction is making war far more terrible than it has ever been. It therefore seems reasonable to think that more concern will be given to maintaining peace; though as primitive hunters men have faced death continuously and have taken many chances with hazards to life and limb through the long ages.

The proposals to prevent war are mainly psychological, military and socio-political in orientation.²

Psychological proposals. Psychological proposals aim at the reduction of international tension, on the assumption that it is difficult to make any substantial progress in developing programmes for peace in an atmosphere of intense suspicion and distrust. Such steps have been proposed as the release of political and military prisoners, the reduction of limitations on travel and commerce, and modifications of the propaganda line, all on a reciprocal basis, but with the West taking the initiative.³ Recently, telephone and telegraph lines have been

¹ *Christian Science Monitor*, January 17, 1963.

² Amitai Etzioni, *The Hard Way to Peace* (New York: Collier Books, 1962).

³ Charles E. Osgood, "A Case for Graduated Unilateral Disengagement", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, April, 1960, pp. 127-31.

established between Washington and Moscow to avoid delays in communication, with possible costly misunderstandings.

Proposals with respect to arms. The plan to propagandise for peace by emphasising the horrors of war, and by lobbying against arming, is dangerous unless such propaganda is also carried on among the peoples of potential enemy states. Britain, between 1919 and 1939, was naturally eager to maintain the *status quo* for herself and the British Commonwealth of Nations and did not want to start a war unless forced to do so, as opinion polls showed. So inadequate was her preparation that she escaped conquest by a hair's breadth. There is danger in unilateral pacifism. Arming for a war with missiles and fusion bombs will not prevent destruction of cities on both sides, but it will deter starting a war for fear of retaliation.

The limitation of armaments by agreement between potential enemies has the effect of keeping costs down and possibly of lessening the destructiveness of war. Such agreements to limit war preparation may break against national interest.

General agreements not to go to war are not binding for long. Sixty-two states had signed the Pact of Paris by 1929 and renounced war as an instrument of national policy. But in a decade the leading powers who thus pledged themselves were at war.

Specific agreements not to produce atomic bombs or other very destructive weapons are difficult to obtain and would probably be ineffective without international control and supervision.

Efforts to slow down or reverse the arms race have up to now not been successful, except for relatively short periods of time. In the past, disarmament has been followed by rearmament when national interests have clashed.

The Hydrogen Bomb and missile as a deterrent. The dreadful frightfulness of the hydrogen bomb seems at last to have impressed the effective leadership of nations. They are aware that a war with hydrogen bomb and missile will leave cities of both combatants in ruins and bring a loss of life that we can hardly contemplate. Both sides will therefore be losers. As the stockpiles of hydrogen bombs grow bigger in Russia and in the United States of America, catastrophe may be close.

It is said that in 1954 and 1955, both the leaders of Russia and of the Allies talked as if they had a tacit understanding that there must not be a war between them with hydrogen bombs. The destruction would be too great. Possibly such a tacit understanding may be more enduring than a signed declaration. On the other hand, such an undocumented understanding in 1955 may not prevent such a war in the future with these deadly bombs. There is no reliable guarantee that the fear of the hydrogen bomb will prevent a war in which they will be used. On the other hand, it does seem that these technological developments—the hydrogen bomb and the

intercontinental guided missile—may prove to be a more effective deterrent of a world war than the Pact of Paris.

Sociopolitical proposals. That codes of conduct, such as existed in dueling in Europe during the age of chivalry, may be set up in modern wars to make them less destructive seems unlikely, for rapid social change makes it difficult to establish and to maintain codes. Rather, codes are being abandoned: for instance, we kill women and children in modern wars, though we do not kill prisoners.

The League of Nations, organised in 1919, was first conceived as an effective instrument for handling the tensions between nations, and it was hoped that it would succeed in doing away with war. The argument for its effectiveness was based on the idea of collective security. But the League had no power except that of publicity and the appeal to collective security. Power struggles continued outside the League or behind it as a façade. The League did not succeed in preventing the Second World War, but inventions, social as well as mechanical, may not work the first time. Experience in international co-operation is valuable in starting and continuing a good tradition. Hence a United Nations to succeed the League of Nations is considered good experience; strengthened and used with wisdom, it may postpone war.

The United Nations would be more effective if it could assume some of the attributes of a state, which would give it the right, the power and the means to keep the peace. To achieve this end, it would be necessary to restrict somewhat the sovereignty of the member states. Such a restriction, according to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, might involve the renunciation of the threat or use of force as an instrument of policy, the reduction of armed forces and an agreement to submit certain disputes to the arbitration of an international judiciary.¹ Although there has been a reluctance to yield even a small part of national sovereignty, there has been widespread stable support of United States membership in the U.N., in marked contrast to the lack of support of the League of Nations before World War II.² This has occurred despite the Korean defeat and the rôle of the U.N. in it. This suggests the significance of the U.N. in man's evolution as a political being.³

World Government. A plan bolder than Woodrow Wilson's concept of the League of Nations is now proposed; a plan to establish a world federation of states. A federated world government to be effective government and different from a United Nations must have power as a government over its member states, which means that its

¹ U Thant, "The Small Nations and the Future of the United Nations", an address, Uppsala University, Sweden, May 6, 1962.

² William A. Scott and Stephen B. Withey, *The United States and the United Nations: The Public View, 1945-1955* (New York: Manhattan Publishing Co., 1958).

³ H. G. Nicholas, *The United Nations as a Political Institution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959).

members must surrender some sovereignty. Such a federated government would surely be difficult to set up. If only some of the states joined, it might become another great power or alliance and not a world government at all. Even so, such a large federation would be, if it succeeded, a further step in the evolution of states in size, and would be an experience in giving up some sovereignty.

The union of states into a larger state has in history been accomplished through conquest much more often than through agreement. Hence, on the basis of history and without analysis of any particular or contemporary situation, a one-world government by conquest is more probable than one by agreement. However, the future may be directed more by reasonableness and intelligence than the past has been, and with less ruthlessness.

A conquest of the world by one victorious side in a world war is, it would seem, a possibility. If Genghis Khan with horses could conquer one-fifth of the world, could not some big power with airplanes powered by a reactor producing atomic energy and travelling nonstop 10,000 miles in 10 or 15 hours, conquer the whole earth?

A conquered earth would not be a nation, though it might be an empire to be maintained by force. The growth of states in size, first by conquest and then by assimilation, has been shown to be a halting process. Empires have broken up. Insurrection, revolution and war have been the result.

Indeed we may question whether a one-world government by federation would endure and would prevent wars. In the case of the federation of states into the United States of America, a war was required to prevent disruption into two parts. Much more difficult is the assimilation into one state of all peoples with different languages, different religions, different customs, and particularly, different economic interests.¹ Even the task of accommodation is immense. The forces of integration that make a community a functioning whole are hindered by the power and selfishness of its centrifugal parts.

Before a One-world Community. Another approach to the problem of peace is to try to avoid a particular war with a specific enemy, rather than to try to abolish war in general.² The first step in such an approach is to understand those national interests of both one's own nation and the potential enemy which are likely to conflict. This is difficult, for there is much emotion and confusion woven around the issues. Nor do the peoples or rulers always act rationally in considering their national interests. Does the enemy want to expand for economic or ideological reasons, or for general security? How far will the expansion programme be pushed under varying conditions?

¹ Quincy Wright (ed.), *The World Community* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948).

² See Part IV, "The Control of War", in Vol. II of Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942).

The next concern is over the power of the adversary, and the amount of power which will be needed as a check. Good judgment is required concerning what will establish a balance and what will upset it. Herein lies the great danger in the power struggle.

There follows naturally the necessity of a policy which will be based clearly on the objectives to be set for a particular war—that is, objectives other than those aimed at winning. A calculation of what is desired from a war and what is likely to be gained is a deterrent to hasty action. Such advices as the preceding might have prevented the Civil War of 1860–5 in the United States.

Astuteness and experience are needed in carrying out such an attempt to handle the relations with a potential enemy. Hence the great need not only of astute leaders but of leaders with training and experience. Also an extensive educational programme is needed in a democracy with a literate population. Since in a democracy the leaders listen intently to the voices of the people, the people need to be well informed. This programme would seem to require that education in international relations be continuous and widespread.

The lessening of fear of insecurity is of help in preventing wars. Fear is often followed by armament and plans for defence which are not always distinguishable from plans for offence. Hence much war talk and sabre-rattling are to be avoided.

If distrust between the super-powers could be replaced by mutual trust, some of the vast expenditures for armaments could be diverted to a joint programme aimed at reducing disease, poverty and misery in the world. This is a hope that leaders on both sides of the cold war have voiced. The experience of experimental studies of groups suggests that one of the more effective means of reducing hostility is to introduce new superordinate (common) goals which involve the contending groups in activities that transcend their earlier mutual antagonisms.¹ Additional experimental work has shown that co-operative activity encourages mutual trust and competitive orientations are more likely to establish mutual suspicion.² It is interesting to consider what might be accomplished if the joint attack on some of man's basic social problems could in this way be greatly enlarged and supported. Thus aid to have-not nations for economic development could be given considerable impetus. Growing consensus about the needs of India and Pakistan indicates that realistic analysis and projections can be made. In time, similar estimates should be possible for other nations. The crude estimates of global requirements indicate that the financial burdens would be manageable if properly shared.³ If the staggering

¹ Otto Klineberg, "Intergroup Relations and International Relations", in *Intergroup Relations and Leadership*, edited by Muzafer Sherif (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962).

² Morton Deutsch, "Trust and Suspicion", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 2, pp. 165–79, December, 1958.

³ Robert E. Asher, *op. cit.*, pp. 133–4.

burden of armaments could be greatly reduced, more could be done in other directions as well.

The mass of people, however well educated, are not the best agents to conduct or participate in many negotiations and diplomatic moves which are essential to international relations and which precede wars and may make them highly probable. It takes so long to educate the people on issues that the shifts and concessions needed in negotiation cannot be made as quickly by the people as by their leaders. Negotiation and diplomacy are difficult to conduct in a gold-fish bowl. Yet on the vital matter of war and peace, the democratic process should operate. But it would seem that capable and courageous leadership is necessary where the people are inadequately informed.

SUMMARY

Man is a fighting animal but that does not make war inevitable. For wars are organised fighting sanctioned by the group, and hence the cause of wars is to be sought in group behaviour, which is learned, and in cultural conditions. If wars were biologically determined they would be periodic and present in all groups. But some groups do not fight wars, and wars vary in number from century to century. That man is a fighting animal does not tell us why we fought Germany in 1917 and not in 1907, nor why we fought Germany instead of France.

War is one of many possible relationships between states. To understand war we must understand the interrelationships of groups.

Some observations on warfare between primitive peoples are common to warfare in general: that the probabilities of war depend on contacts; that for wars, religious support is sought, that glory is an attribute of war and is a factor in its encouragement; and that retaliation is frequently found between enemies.

The two outstanding social effects of war are its effectiveness in increasing the size of states and in developing and strengthening government—two very significant results.

In the historical period, conditions favourable to aggression have been created by differentials in population caused by various inventions, and by contact inventions and military technology, which have made some states more powerful than others. The ranking of powers is influenced by these same forces.

The causes of war may be sought in (a) inventions or in (b) the motives of men who use the inventions. Thus, since war is a variable—that is, it occurs at one time and not at another—it must be explained in terms of a variable. If motives of masses of men were a constant and inventions varied, then we might seek explanations in terms of inventions. But motives of men are variables too. So we want to know the motives that make groups start wars and fight them.

The question first needs to be analysed. The groups that fight are composed of (a) leaders or instigators and (b) supporters. The motives may be different for the two. The real motives for going to war may be different from those used in getting support for the war. Selfish motives are sometimes disguised in the clothing of virtue, morals, and religion. In rationalisations there are both selfish and noble reasons, and it is difficult to say which are the more influential. In general, it is good advice to look early for an economic interest of the nations involved, or of a controlling segment of the nations.

Motives of glory, of honour, of morals, of ideologies may be involved. The desire for security is a motive of war that needs to be signalled, for it has a wide appeal and the preparation for security often proceeds in the direction of aggression. Loyalty to the group, and the identification of self with the homeland are strong motivations in supporting a war.

As science has increased production and thus has been a blessing, so also science has been applied to destruction with such increasing success that we have the atom bomb, missile, and earth satellite.

Facing such destruction, societies are expected to work harder for peace. The peace efforts are to persuade people to be pacifistic, to limit armament by agreement, to effect agreements signed by representatives of different states not to go to war, to set up an international organisation to handle tensions between nations, to organise for a one-world government, and to secure and maintain a balance of power between nations for as long as possible without going to war. In all cases, effective social action, especially in a democracy, requires a considerable and continuous education of the people in international relations.

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. Is war inevitable because of the biological nature of man?
2. What is the rôle of national interests in international relations?
3. History of the accommodation of the Scotch to the English.
4. The social implications of pacifist movements.
5. The British Commonwealth as a new form of social organisation.
6. Examine the rôle of economic factors in the causes of war.
7. What is the effect of war on the process of social change? Illustrate.
8. "Wars begin in the minds of men." Is this true?

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CHAPTER XX

RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS

What is Religion? Before we consider the sociology of religion, we should know what religion is. A definition of so rich a phenomenon as religion is likely to be bare. Indeed, some think that religion cannot be defined, but only experienced and that religious experience is beyond the power of words to describe.

Moreover, conceptions of religion differ. Most scholars define religion in such a way as to differentiate religious from irreligious men. According to this view,¹ a religious man is one who recognises the essential differences between the sacred and the profane and prefers the sacred. An irreligious man, in this view, has no sense of the sacred and believes only in a world of natural cause and effect.² For most traditional religions, the sacred is linked to the supernatural, but this link is not essential to religion, as shown by classical Buddhism which denies the existence, or at least the importance, of superhuman power. Hinayana Buddhism encourages its adherents to retire within the self and to meditate. Durkheim taught that religion is an interdependent whole composed of beliefs and rites (faiths and practices) related to sacred things, uniting adherents in a single community known as a church.³

A different view of religion is that everyone, excepting possibly the mentally defective and disordered, has a religion, which is his response to the question of the meaning and purpose of life. According to this view, there are types of religion, including the traditional transcendental churches which espouse a faith in purpose in life, not humanly derived; the materialistic religions such as communism which teach a human purpose; and other faiths such as scientism and humanism. The advantage of a broad definition of religion is that it encourages the student to observe the similarities between presumably diverse phenomena, namely the traditional faiths on the one hand and modern faiths on the other.

A definition of religion as a system of beliefs, emotional attitudes, and practices by means of which a group of people attempt to cope with the ultimate problems of human life,⁴ would probably be widely

¹ Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane* (New York: Harcourt, 1959).

² Talcott Parsons, for example, defines religion as the use of non-empirical means for the attainment of non-empirical ends.

³ Maurice Halbwachs, *Sources of Religious Sentiment*, translated by John A. Spaulding (The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962). This is a summary of Durkheim's *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*.

⁴ This is close to, but not identical with, the definition given by Milton J. Yinger, *Religion, Society, and the Individual* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), p. 9.

TABLE 30

DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION (IN THOUSANDS) OF THE WORLD'S GREAT RELIGIONS *

Religions.	North America.	South America.	Europe.	Asia.	Africa.	Australia (including Oceania and New Zealand).	Total.
Total Christian . . .	188,406	135,066	483,897	49,806	35,665	11,493	904,333
Roman Catholic . . .	109,965	132,396	243,723	37,752	23,542	2,972	550,350
Eastern Orthodox . . .	2,875	42	126,602	2,570	4,870	75	137,034
Protestant . . .	75,566	2,628	113,572	9,484	7,253	8,446	216,949
Jewish . . .	5,824	631	3,711	2,016	543	69	12,791
Muslim . . .	36	357	12,930	331,520	88,791	106	433,740
Zoroastrian . . .	—	—	—	140	—	—	140
Shinto . . .	—	—	—	51,000	—	—	51,000
Taoist . . .	15	17	12	50,000	1	8	50,053
Confucian . . .	86	95	50	300,000	8	52	300,291
Buddhist . . .	165	135	10	153,000	—	—	153,310
Hindu . . .	28	309	—	334,768	644	114	335,803
Primitive . . .	50	1,000	—	45,000	75,000	100	121,150
Others and none . . .	70,992	1,997	78,060	348,904	50,247	3,472	552,772
Grand Total . . .	264,702	139,607	578,670	1,666,091	250,899	15,114	2,915,386

* *Encyclopædia Britannica Book of the Year, 1962.*

accepted. The key word here is "ultimate". The definition also stresses the social nature of religion as the property of a group, a point emphasised by Durkheim. The social nature of religion will be documented in the discussion below.

Religion is a more complex phenomenon than is generally recognised. William James wrote of *The Varieties of Religious Experience* but few have understood that even within the same religious group there may be several distinct religious orientations. Four theoretically discrete dimensions have been identified : the ideological, concerned with what a man believes ; the experimental, having to do with his relations with God ; the consequential, which describe the ethical aspects of his relationships to his fellow men ; and the behavioural, or the performance of prescribed rituals.¹ That these are independent variables is indicated by the finding of one study that the correlation between doctrinal orthodoxy and devotionism is only about .2.² This suggests the danger of viewing religious behaviour as unidimensional.

THE BEGINNINGS OF RELIGIOUS ORGANISATION

Hazards and lack of Knowledge are the setting for Primitive Religious Life. Burials with personal property of the deceased suggest that early man may have believed in a life after death, and some of his cave paintings suggest the possession of a religion. In any case, the origins of religion trace back to men when they were food-gatherers and hunters without agriculture.

The question of the religious behaviour of the earliest men is a matter mainly for speculation. But available for scientific analysis are accounts of relatively recent preliterate societies. Although we do not know in what particulars the religious organisation of these societies resemble that of early man, there is much that we can learn from the accounts that are available to us.

It is not difficult to perceive how laden with hazards and uncertainties is the life of primitive man. There are lightning, thunder, floods, eclipses, sterility, twins, dreams, physical calamities, illness, and death. Much of the world about them is unknown. They do not know what causes these hazards and irregularities. There is much unknown even in our scientific age with its vast accumulated knowledge. We may not know why we do not succeed in business, why our marriage is an unhappy one, or why our child is a problem.

Primitive people do not know why an epidemic strikes their tribe or why a plague of locusts comes that year. But such crises may cause them to wonder why. Certainly many food-gathering peoples

¹ Charles Glock, "The Religious Revival in America", in Jane Zahn (ed.), *Religion and the Face of America* (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1959).

² Gerhard Lenski, *The Religious Factor* (Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday & Co., 1961).

with simple cultures do have an idea of a mysterious force behind these events. But when the fish do not run or when animals change their route of migration, it is not strange that sometimes the peoples, having a belief in supernatural forces, look for omens, or try to manipulate these forces.

The search for answers to the questions of the unknown—"man's quest for certainty" and the quest for meaning in life—evolved rather slowly across the ages, just as material culture evolved slowly. The answers are different in different cultures, and the reactions are different.¹

The world of ideas of primitive man. It is possible to isolate at least three poles round which different types of ideas cluster. One is the pole of fact, where is found such knowledge as that stone is hard, or that friction of dry wood will produce fire. This type of knowledge is not unlike the scientific knowledge of to-day, in that it can be used for prediction; it is based upon the fairly simple testimony of the senses. It is largely descriptive and does not reach very far into the realm of causes. There was thus a great mass of very reliable knowledge possessed by primitive man about material objects, the behaviour of man, animals, and climate, which could be more or less organised and transmitted from generation to generation. This kind of knowledge is most useful in the living of daily life. It enables one to collect and prepare food, to build snares, to leach the acid out of acorns, to poison a dart, to make a boomerang, to regulate marriage, to organise a hunting party, to avoid and settle disputes with other individuals. At the one pole, then, is this knowledge of fact.

Quite the opposite of this type of knowledge and at the other pole of primitive man's ideas, are his fantasies. The most extreme form of fantasy is the hallucination. A thirsty traveller crossing the desert sees in his imagination a pool of cool water under a palm tree, water that will quench his burning thirst.² Such visions were a characteristic of American Indian experience. Young Indians fasted for days in isolation in an attempt to go into a trance and have a vision. Sometimes similar visions were had by several individuals; these were reported and may have become part of the system of beliefs. Wishes are a common element of fantasies and if a form has been created, it may be perpetuated, as is Santa Claus, by the wishful daydreams of adults and children. The emotions behind imagination are by no means confined to such simple wishes. Some wishes are more

¹ We are told that among the Baganda " . . . the birth of twins was regarded as a most important event, for they were regarded as due to the direct intervention of the god Mukasa, and this necessitated great care and numbers of tabus, in order to retain the favour of the god. Any mistake on the part of the parents, or any sickness which befell the twins, was looked upon as the result of the god's anger, which might extend to the whole clan."—John Roscoe, *The Baganda* (London, 1911), pp. 64-5.

² See, for instance, the accounts of hallucinations in a desert recorded in Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, *Wind, Sand and Stars* (New York, 1939).

complex, like those of self-sacrifice or self-persecution. Probably some such feelings are responsible for the belief in evil spirits such as the devil and perhaps play a part in inventing him.

It must not be thought that imaginary beings are easily invented. Children are said to talk to and play with wholly imaginary playmates, but it is certainly not known that each child invents his imaginary playmate, though some may do so. Such imaginary characters, like children's games, may be transmitted from one succession of children to another. The invention of the idea of a ghost is probably as difficult as that of a mechanical invention, and there is no reason to think that the invention of mythical characters is any easier or more common.

In many primitive cultures there are beliefs about creation. For instance, among the Maori, creation was thought to be the work of their supreme being Io, who began creation in the manner described in the following poem.¹

Io dwelt within the breathing-space of immensity.
The universe was in darkness, the water everywhere.
There was no glimmer of dawn, no clearness, no light.
And he began by saying these words,
That he might cease remaining inactive.
"Darkness, become a light-possessing darkness."
"Light, become a darkness-possessing light."

The Maoris' ideas about the nature of light and the creation of the whole world do not have the same accuracy as do their ideas about the properties of the tools they have and how they are made. Accurate knowledge in this field of the origin of the earth and of light is difficult to get. Our own knowledge in this field is not yet all it should be.

Many Primitive Religious Beliefs are supposed to be of Practical help. The Hopi Indians of the United States, an agricultural people, have religious ceremonies to make the corn fruitful. So the supernatural may be related to the hunt, to marriage, to the onset of puberty, to menstruation; and may be found with the activities of the family, of chieftains, of age societies, of men's clubs. Primitive man's beliefs concern not only the explanation of inanimate phenomena and group activities; they become woven into a philosophy of behaviour in life. This relation of belief to philosophy of life is shown by the advice of a Winnebago Indian:

My son, when you grow up, see that you are of some benefit to your fellow men. There is only one way you can aid them, and that is by fasting. Our grandfather, the Fire, he who in all times stands in the centre of our dwelling, sends forth many kinds of blessings. Be sure that you make an attempt to obtain his.

Remember to have our grandfather, the war chiefs, the spirits who control

¹ Paul Radin, *Primitive Religion*, p. 265.

war, bless you. See that they have compassion on you. Then some day as you travel along the road of life, you will know what to do and encounter no obstacles. Without effort you will be able to gain the prize you desire. The honour will be yours to glory in. If reverently you fast and thirst yourself to death then these war blessings will be bestowed upon you. Yet not without constant effort are these blessings procurable. If you do not possess one of these spirits, from which to obtain this strength and power, you will be of no consequence socially and those around you will show you little respect.

Some day in life you will find yourself travelling along a road filled with obstacles and then you will wish you had fasted.

Try to be a leader of men. Yet not with the blessings of one, not with the blessings of twenty, can you go on the war-path. For that the blessings of all spirits are necessary. . . .¹

In these very interesting teachings from the older generation to the younger, it is fairly reliable advice that to overcome obstacles and to win prizes will bring honour and prestige. Such knowledge is as accurate as the knowledge that if you hit a bird with an arrow you will have meat to eat. But the belief that fasting will help you to get what you want without effort is not very reliable knowledge. It is, instead, a fantasy. Many ideas about the good life, about progress, about desirable methods of obtaining goals are, so far as their reliability is concerned, somewhat like the Winnebago faith in the blessings of the war chiefs. Here we see again how the ideas of primitive man, like those of contemporary man, may be organised round the two poles of factual observation and fantasies of the day-dreaming type.

Although belief in supernatural or ultimate power is conspicuous in religion, man works this belief into a system. That is, he elaborates his religious spirit into a religious organisation. It is with the organisation rather than the spirit of religion that the sociologist is chiefly concerned. The following discussion is devoted to the elaboration of the institution of religion in human society.

The two categories of fact and fantasy, or science and anti-science, do not exhaust the universe of types of ideas. There is a third category of ideas—the non-scientific. These are beliefs which science can neither prove to be true nor false, since they fall outside the scope of scientific competence. These include beliefs about the good, the ultimately true, and the beautiful. The basic ideas of the major religious systems fall in this category. Religion is not merely a faulty science of primitive men. While it may include this, its basic nature is something else. While such men as Durkheim, Pareto, Malinowski, and Parsons do not always agree as to the basic nature of religion, they do agree that religion represents a reasonable—though not a scientific—attempt to cope with real problems to which science cannot provide the answers.

The Nature of Supernatural Powers. Although it is clear that individuals in the simplest cultures believe in supernatural power, it is

¹ Paul Radin, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

difficult to describe their beliefs with exactness. It is difficult to describe the supernatural belief precisely because it is supernatural, that is, outside ordinary natural terms. The religions of many simple peoples are, if anything, more involved than our own, and more difficult to analyse.

The common core of all, however, seems to be the belief in a supernatural impersonal power that courses through the world and is capable of accomplishing all sorts of things not otherwise possible. *Mana* is the name which the Melanesians and Polynesians have for this power ; the Eastern Algonquins called it *manitou* ; while some of the Plains Indians referred to it as *wakan*. Although impersonal and diffused, this power is capable of entering into objects and persons, giving them properties and capacities they previously lacked. Among the Marquesans, for instance, it was felt that a man who had difficulty in retaining the tribal lore was lacking in *mana*, whereas one who was specially versed in the folklore had this facility because he had considerable *mana*. In sections of Polynesia, for example, Tahiti, the chief has so much *mana* that whatever he touches belongs to him. The idea of the divine right of kings derives from the fact that the rulers are thought to be endowed with special supernatural power.

This belief in supernatural power needs to be distinguished from another idea widely held by primitive peoples, the one that all things may be alive, that is, animated. This system of beliefs is called *animism*. Trees, rocks, and clouds, for instance, may be possessed of spirits of a more specific nature than *mana*. These spirits were apparently regarded as shadowy substances or soulstuff, and not completely material like the body itself. The Murngin, a simple people of Australia, believe that death occurs when the spirit leaves the body and returns to the totemic well from which it originally came, where all the spirits of the ancestors reside.¹ Likewise, illness is thought to be caused by the intrusion of an alien or evil spirit into the body.

The conception of disembodied spirits is very widespread. The idea could have arisen from dreams, but there are some people where the concept is little developed, though they, of course, dream. The belief in a soul or spirit which may leave the body naturally gives rise to the idea of life after death, and is the basis of ancestor worship and of the notion of transmigration of souls. There are also beliefs in specific spirits which may take definite forms. Some of these forms are deities.

There is considerable variation in the nature of these beliefs. The higher powers may be vague or specific ; personal or impersonal ; one or many ; ancestral ; anthropomorphic ; or cosmic. While most preliterate peoples have a hierarchy of lesser gods headed by an All-Father, the Kagaba of South America and the Amazulus of South

¹ W. Lloyd Warner, *A Black Civilisation* (New York : Harper & Brothers, 1937).

Africa have actual monotheism, that is, a single god as is the case in modern religion.¹

Again, most supreme deities are men ; but the chief of the supernaturals among the Central Eskimos is Sedna, a female ; and a female deity presides over the Bella Coola Indians of British Columbia.² To-day in our cultures the supreme being is less personified than in former times, yet in some primitive religions the supreme power is also a mystical force, not greatly unlike the modern concept.

The Social Usages of Religious Beliefs among Primitive Peoples are evidenced in Magic. The religion found in simple material cultures is often much like what is called magic to-day.³ We try to influence fate by avoiding the number 13 or by not going under ladders. The Hopi Indians use sticks with feathers on the end to keep the springs of water flowing. Among primitive peoples, the logic behind religious practices and magical practices is not greatly different. Religion has the greater social approval ; "black" magic is somewhat like a false religion to some primitive peoples, and is disapproved by the socially approved religion. On the emotional side magical practices are usually confined to hopeful efforts to control or to prevent certain events. Thus in imitative magic, to get rid of an enemy a small image is made of him, and pierced with a sharp instrument. Or in contagious magic, to bring rain a vessel is filled to overflowing with water. Religion, as well as magic, calls for control and protection. For instance, in the fifteenth century a common prayer in Europe was "God save us from the Devil, the Turk, and the Comet".⁴

The Early Organisation of Religion. These early religious beliefs which manifest themselves in organised magical practices, are applied throughout the various activities of man. The manifestations are found most frequently at crises : birth, death, sickness, puberty, marriage, menstruation, volcanic eruptions, droughts, and combat. Disease is particularly subject to magical rites and one may thus say that medical practice among primitive peoples is closely affiliated with religion.

Early religion is also closely related to the economic organisation. Although much gathering and preparation of food, as well as fabrication of objects, goes on day by day without reference to *mana*, a charm may be worn for luck in the hunt, and various practices are undertaken at the different seasons to make the earth fertile.

Family life is also closely related to religion. Marriage has its own ceremonies, and birth is safeguarded by magical practice. Likewise the education of youth in the folk habits and lore, although a natural

¹ Paul Radin, *Primitive Man as Philosopher* (New York : D. Appleton and Company, 1927), pp. 351, 357.

² Franz Boas, "The Mythology of the Bella Coola Indians", *Jesup North Pacific Expedition* (New York : Museum of Natural History, 1898), vol. I, Part II.

³ Hutton Webster, *Magic : A Sociological Study* (Stanford University, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 1948).

⁴ From MSS. in the Library at Cornell, as reported in the *New York Times*, January 18, 1947.

part of community life, has its religious connections. Puberty is among many preliterate people a period when the young are especially susceptible to education. This is the transition period from childhood into womanhood or manhood. Elaborate public ceremonies of a semi-religious nature which involve suffering, fasting, and the seeing of visions are performed at this time to impress the adolescent with the demands of the new life. Religion thus runs through the daily activities of early man.

A description of the organisation of early religion is not adequate without an account of the religious leader, known as the medicine-man, or shaman, the early counterpart of the priest. He ranks with the chief, or head man, as one of the early leaders, for in him is specialised the power of dealing with the supernatural. The accounts of the shaman among different peoples show him to be often neurotic,¹ and his visions and trances suggest epileptic tendencies. Although he is set apart from the other members of the group, his abnormalities have become socialised so that he is not thought of as an abnormal person to be ostracised, but as a highly useful and gifted individual. He himself seems to have special powers and is probably above the average in thinking ability, imagination, and insight. He is often paid for services in times of sickness and danger, and for his prophecies concerning the future. In addition to his religious and medical functions he also specialises in the folklore, myths, creation stories, and history of his people. The province of the shaman is the world of ideas, especially about the unknown. As the craftsman develops basketry or tools of stone, so the shaman deals with the systematisation of thought about causes and effects in the little understood phenomena as expressed in folklore and mythology.

The coming of Agriculture influenced Religious Organisation. When peoples learned to raise food instead of depending on wild sources, their life became more settled, and there was a bit more leisure. Eventually food-raising reached a point where a special class of religious leaders could be supported by the community. Shamans evolved into a priesthood, not possible among primitive hunters. With this specialisation, there was opportunity to formulate new ideas and to systematise religious thought. Religious thought became highly elaborated when the agriculture of the rich river valleys of the Nile, the Euphrates, and the Indus produced enough food to support cities, as was also the case in the semi-tropical areas of Peru, Mexico, and Central America. In all these areas there was a priestly class, who gave their whole time to religious matters.

That the evolution of religious organisation does not proceed in detail from stage to stage with regularity everywhere is shown by the

¹ Australia is an exception. Here the shaman appears to be an entirely normal but very shrewd individual. For detailed description of the shamanistic seance among the Chukchee, see Alexander Goldenweiser, *Anthropology* (New York, 1937), pp. 249 ff.

fact that some primitive peoples have monotheism, the belief in one god, while advanced groups,¹ like the Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans had polytheism, a hierarchy of gods.

The Growth of Religious Ideas. The vague ideas about the supernatural commonly found among hunting peoples became in time more specifically formulated into animistic philosophy where inanimate objects become personified. For instance, the sun bestows blessings as a person might. Animals are thought to have marvellous powers : the snake, on a hot day, may bring rain. The life of spirits outside the body is imagined, with the aid no doubt of dreams, hallucinations, and visions. The idea of ghosts, and of life after death with an abode for the spirit or ghost, is constructed. The powers of the ruling spirits are worked into the origin of things, and creations are explained. The general idea of sacrifice as a method is evolved. To placate a definite spirit, foods and living animals, and in some cases human beings, are sacrificed to it.

As the spirits become embodied and behave more or less like human beings and animals—although with remarkable powers and capacities—the religious leaders may deal dramatically with them, as when a living sacrifice is made, or a spectacular dance of the snakes is undertaken to change the weather. The myths are also dramatised, and religious practices become elaborated into dances, ceremonies, and festivals. The winter solstice in the north when the days begin to lengthen is celebrated by the religious leaders, using plants with special properties, such as mistletoe, together with offerings, prayers, and religious songs. Such has been the history of the festival now known as Christmas.

As the spirit world became more varied and definite under the formulating abilities of religious leaders, the emotional reactions of the religious members of the group changed. Fear and awe no doubt remained prominent, especially since the hazards of life continued. However, the idea of goodness became associated with the powers, especially among the agricultural peoples, in such situations as called for the fruition of crops through the production of rain and the beneficial light of the sun. When the powers of the gods reached out over creation and when they were conceived as the dispensers of goodness and the appreciators of good conduct, man's emotional responses were often those of humility, of glorification, of elation at being identified with the qualities of the gods. This attitude is very well illustrated in this hymn of the Incas :

Goldtiled thy temples
Oh ! God of the Sun !
Blood red the battles
That for Thee we've won.

¹ Paul Radin, *Monotheism Among Primitive Peoples* (London : George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1924).

Here from the High Priest Rock
 The sunrise kiss we send
 Eastward to Thy Gold-red Orb
 Rising years without end.

Ice-helmeted warriors,
 Thy Andean Peaks stand
 Ranged 'long the thousand miles
 Of thy desert lands.
 Morning and evening
 Their rose pink cloaks they don.
 Their clouds are scarfs of Thy colours,
 Oh! Mighty God of the Sun.

The Growth of Religious Organisation. The organisation of religion continued to penetrate the various other major social activities, such as family life, acquisition of food, medical practice, recreation, government, and war. In some cultures the ideas of spirit-ghosts and life after death led to a concentration of religion in the great family organisation where the patriarchal head was supreme.

Even though there grew up a priesthood that officiated at ceremonies, conducted rituals, and ministered at the various crises of life, the connection between this emerging religious-social organisation and the other institutions continued close for a time. Prayer was offered at planting, and thanksgiving at harvest time. Medical practice was often accompanied by prayer or promises of better conduct. Ethical codes were touched with religious sanctions.

Such connections with the other social organisations are found in most of the great religions of the world. The great religions of to-day have spread beyond language and national barriers and are not correlated strictly with types of culture. In India are found Buddhism, Mohammedanism, and Hinduism. In China are Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. In Japan are Buddhism and Shintoism. Mohammedanism centres round Arabia, while in Europe the religions of the Greeks, Romans, Germans and Celts have yielded to Christianity, which was brought also to America and Australia.

In all these religions there is an interpenetration of religion into the many other social institutions of the community. In the case of Confucianism, the connection is very close with the family where there is a system of ancestor worship. There also the connection with ethics is highly developed. In India, religion is bound highly to a caste system, hence definitely affects the whole range of social life.

In Europe, the connection between ethics and religion has been so intimate that many individuals consider them to be the same thing. Also in Europe during the Middle Ages, governing functions were common to both the state and the religious organisation so that the two seemed to be merged, as in the Holy Roman Empire. Indeed the

assignment either of governing functions to the priesthood or of religious functions to the chiefs has been fairly common. The church organisation took over, for instance, the governing function in many new settlements in the American colonies in the course of the westward expansion before any civil governmental machinery had been set up. The vestrymen acted somewhat as a legislature. Likewise the history of medieval Italy, Spain, and France is filled with accounts of the civil powers of popes and cardinals.

Sometimes the church becomes an important social institution apart from its governmental functions. The church in Britain and America conducts schools, provides clubs for the different age groups, distributes philanthropies, gives social entertainments, has gymnasium classes, offers dancing facilities, and often becomes the centre of the social life of the members. The Negro church in America, after the abolition of slavery, represented almost the complete organised social life of the Negroes, who were by virtue of their colour and status cut off from the other social agencies of the community. The Negro pastor became a general social leader, a sort of chief. So also in farming communities where the farms are not clustered in hamlets or villages, the church has important social functions, apart from its religious services.

Social Functions of Religion. The sociologist is interested in the social aspects of religion, including the social functions that religion serves. These are numerous and very complex. Broadly stated, religion may be said to aid in the struggle for societal survival and stability. By giving meaning to life, religion gives the members of the group a powerful purpose. Coulborn¹ has undertaken to show how a new religion in each of seven primary societies gave the members of those societies the courage needed for survival in a difficult environment. He concludes that religion played a central rôle in the formation and early development of all the primary societies: Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Indian, Cretan, Chinese, Middle American, and Andean. This rôle consisted in part in providing a set of explanations of aspects of the human condition that seem obscure, such as the fact that man is forever confronted with the Four Horsemen: death, famine, disease and the malice of other men. Religion through prayer also affords a release from tension; and sacrifice of either a physical or symbolic scapegoat provides an outlet for frustration and aggression that might otherwise hurt the group. Communion and other collective rituals, such as religious feasts, help to give the group a sense of solidarity.

Religion also functions as an important factor in social control. To certain types of social behaviour, religion imparts a sacred quality, reinforcing the idea of the desirability of such behaviour. Thus in Western society to-day, religion adds depth of meaning to marriage,

¹ Rushton Coulborn, *The Origin of Civilized Societies* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959).

and helps to conserve it, by investing it with a holy or even, as in Catholicism, a sacramental quality. To the avoidance of undesired behaviour, such as fornication, when socially tabooed, religion adds its influence through the powerful sanction of sin, as in the Ten Commandments. Moreover, Benton Johnson argues that the prevailing sociological view that the function of Holiness religion is to offer underprivileged groups an emotional escape from the realities that beset them is inadequate and that Holiness sects may function also as an agency of the socialisation of the lower class in the dominant values of American society.¹

Durkheim was among the first students of society to observe that in buttressing the social order, traditional religion reaffirms and reinforces the sense of community. Here, however, note should be taken of the important distinction made by Max Weber between priestly and prophetic religion.² Weber makes it clear that ever since about the eighth century B.C. the Western religious tradition has included a prophetic element, an element of social criticism. The Western religions of Judaism and Christianity are unique in this respect of having a more or less continuous tradition of religiously rooted criticism of the social order. This may help explain why socialism and modern reform movements originated in the West rather than the East, where conditions were much riper for reform.

Priestly religion is conservative. Towards existing institutions it takes one of three stances, ranging from sanctification through implicit acceptance, to what has been called "pseudo-transformation", the idea that, if change is needed, the social structure changes when, and only when, the attitudes and practices of individuals change.³ According to this view, religious conversion and revival are essential to the reconstruction of society. Priestly religion, in its hostility to social non-conformity, is a force for social cohesion. Viewed in the light of its function as a unifying institution, the Spanish Inquisition of the fifteenth century may be seen as a painful process of eliminating the hidden remnants of the previous regime of Moors and Jews, a counterpart of modern efforts to ferret out 5th columnists.⁴

It is a moot question whether a society can long function without religion. Primitive societies without religion have never been found.⁵ Many an anthropologist has argued that religion grows out of the

¹ Benton Johnson, "Do Holiness Sects Socialize in Dominant Values?" *Social Forces*, vol. 39, pp. 309-16, May, 1961. See Wilson, B. R.: *Sects and Society*, (London, 1961).

² Max Weber, *Ancient Judaism*, tr. by Hans Gerth and Don Martindale (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951).

³ Louis Schneider and Sanford M. Dornbusch, *Inspirational Books in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).

⁴ Will Herberg, in a panel discussion at the Florida State University, October 18, 1962.

⁵ William Howells, *The Heathens (Primitive Man and His Religions)*, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1948), p. 11.

necessities of human life and is indispensable to civilisation.¹ The Russian communists deny that traditional religion is necessary and indeed argue that it is an evil, an opiate of the people. It remains to be seen whether this is a passing viewpoint. Meantime, the Russian Orthodox Church does function, although on a restricted basis, and the new free Baptist Church is said to be making spectacular gains in the Soviet Union. Moreover, as previously stated, there are those who define religion broadly and include communism as a modern religion, albeit materialist in nature.

MODERN RELIGIOUS TRENDS

Modern religion is concerned less than primitive religions with the unknown in the world of nature and more with the unknown in the spiritual life of man. There is less emphasis on fear and more on devotion to divinity. Fewer activities of daily living are accompanied by religious ritual, but religious people to-day identify religion with high ethical conduct. The forms of belief are very different.

The Loss of Functions of Organised Religion. Recent development of organised religion has been that of differentiation from other social organisations and from other departments of knowledge. The church has become separated from the state in a number of European countries, and any connection of the two in the United States has been forbidden by law. Most secular education is no longer undertaken by religious organisations in Britain or the United States, but is instead assumed largely by the national, state, and local governments. Like education, both art and music have been increasingly differentiated from religion.

As the science of medicine has advanced, religious qualifications for medical practice have become a negligible matter, though moral qualifications are insisted upon to a high degree. The churches still undertake philanthropies and social work, but even here it appears that such services as insurance against old age, sickness, accidents, and unemployment are undertaken more readily by the state which has the support of the law and the funds of the taxpayer. Likewise in respect to the social functions, the churches must meet keen competition, particularly in cities, which house a larger proportion of the population than formerly. That is to say, certain functions previously exercised by the church are now shared by various other urban organisations such as clubs, associations, occupational organisations, and recreational institutions, which have no religious sponsorship.

History reveals, then, the transfer of group activities from ecclesiastical to civil and other non-religious agencies, a movement sometimes

¹ S. Malinowski, "Magic, Science and Religion", in *Science, Religion and Reality* (ed. by J. A. Needham), (London, 1926); and *The Foundations of Faith and Morals* (Riddell Memorial Lectures, University of Durham), (London: Oxford University Press, 1936).

referred to as secularisation.¹ Organised religion as a complex of functions has thus been reduced in size.

✓ *The Church in Urban Society.* The vast increase in cities in many lands since the Industrial Revolution has added to the secularisation movement.² Cities extend the functions of government, weaken the family as an institution, lessen the control of the church over conduct, and spread the knowledge of science. With the help of the press, radio, television, theatres, commercialised sport and entertainment, recreation and education are further removed from the influence of religion.

One hundred years ago the United States and most of the countries of the world were largely rural. It may be noted that the traditional faiths had for long centuries adapted themselves to the peasant-agrarian societies and hence were ill equipped to move into the new social order. The result was increasing dissatisfaction with the older faiths and the emergence of a whole new series of new faiths. Some of these, such as Christian Science and Unitarianism, were more like the traditional faiths. Others, such as the Ethical Culture movement, went further and still others, such as Communism and Nazism, rejected not merely the traditional theologies but the traditional ethics as well.

Towards a pluralistic America. There are, however, indications that gradually the older faiths are adjusting to the new social situation, especially in the United States, where organised religion seems to be flourishing as never before in some respects.

Lenski has advanced a number of reasons why church attendance may be expected to increase in the United States in the future. Religion, he claims, replaces ethnic group affiliation as the associational tie or reference group in mass society. Transvaluational religion teaches that the good rather than the rich will inherit the earth and be rewarded in heaven. The under-privileged in American turn to evangelical religion rather than to radical politics. American society, moreover, is tending more and more to become a middle-class society and church membership is positively correlated with social class. Church membership is also associated with amount of education, which is increasing.³

While church membership has been increasing, the denominational balance of power has shifted. Historically, the United States has been a Protestant nation. In 1776, there were probably no more than 25,000 Catholics in a total population of about four million. To-day there are more than half as many Catholics as Protestants. The nation is now religiously pluralistic. In addition to the three traditional faiths—Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, and Judaism,

¹ J. T. Shotwell, *The Religious Revolution of To-day* (Boston, 1924).

² Samuel C. Kincheloe, *The American City and its Church* (New York, 1938), Chap. IV.

³ Gerhard Lenski, *The Religious Factor* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1961).

there is a fourth group, secularism, perhaps the largest single group. Pluralism has been encouraged by the doctrine of the separation of church and state, which leaves church membership voluntary. Some observers think this freedom from governmental control has helped the church to prosper and they point of the relative stagnation of state-supported church systems in Europe.

There are various views on what has been happening to religion in urbanised, industrialised America. One provocative idea advanced by Herberg, is that the United States is becoming both more religious and more secular at the same time.¹ The evidences of a religious revival in recent decades are many, including the appreciable increase in church membership. But there is a strong ambivalence in religious behaviour. The Bible continues to be the number one best-seller but apparently many buyers do not read it. In a recent survey, 53 per cent of the respondents were unable to name even one of the first books of the New Testament. Also there are discrepancies in professed beliefs. Americans say they believe in God : 97 per cent according to one survey, 96 per cent in a second, and 95 per cent in a third. While believing in an after-life, with God as judge (73 per cent), only 5 per cent had any fear of hell. When asked, "Would you say your religious beliefs have any effect on your ideas of politics and business?" a majority of the same Americans who said they regarded religion as "very important" answered that their religious beliefs had no real effect on their ideas or conduct in these decisive areas of everyday life.

A Gallup Poll survey in Britain in 1957 found that 78 per cent of the over 20's and 62 per cent of the under 21's believed in God, while between 5 and 6 per cent said there is no God. 54 per cent of the over 20's believed in a life after death, 85 per cent thought that you need not go to church to be a Christian, and 46 per cent thought that the church should re-marry all divorcees.²

Herberg also believes that a growing trend is to see the American way of life as a religion. A manifestation of this faith is the slogan, "My country right or wrong", whereas the traditional faiths strongly support the right and condemn the wrong. There is some evidence³ that religion is becoming more like American culture. A study of undergraduate students, testing the hypothesis that among the members of the major American religious faiths secular values are superseding sacred values, found that the subjects showing high religious identification showed a high degree of secularisation in family-authority patterns and some degree of secularisation in the total value system. In keeping with the trend in modern society, the highly religious subjects reject the dominance of the father in the family.

¹ Will Herberg, *Protestant-Catholic-Jew*, rev. ed. (Garden City : Doubleday & Co. (Anchor Books), 1960), Chapters 1 and 5.

² *News Chronicle*, April 15 and 16, 1957.

³ W. Seward Salisbury, "Religion and Secularization", *Social Forces*, vol. 36, pp. 197-205, March, 1958.

The American way of life may be a religion for many but religion is a part of the American way of life. The government may not play favourites but there are religious threads in the separatist state. Examples are the chaplains in the military services, prisons, and in Congress.

The religious organisations themselves have responded to changes in American society with increased secularisation. There is more secular content in sermons, more secularised evening services which are practically entertainment, more theatrical effects, more generalised religious education in place of Bible schools. It is reported that much of what in 1900 would have been regarded as "worldliness" is now manifest in the conventional patterns of liberal religion.¹

There has been a growing interest in religion, but some ask how solid is the gain. These critics see little in the contemporary commitment that has to do with the traditional Christian witness to a distinctive and substantive faith. They see only faith in faith or religion in general. It is, they say, a faith which is governed by self-concern, one which seeks self-advantage.² This thesis gets some support from an intensive content analysis of 46 books in the "inspirational religion literature" published between 1875 and 1955. These are books which assume the validity of the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, inspire with the hope of salvation, and offer "techniques" for dealing with everyday problems. Of the 46 books, four were published prior to 1900 and 30 after 1930.³ These books emphasise mental health and peace of mind, dissipation of anxiety and guilt, self-acceptance. The doctrines, variations on the theme of faith-healing, are congenial to New Thought and Christian Science. They are also manifested in what is known as "positive thinking", a form of affirmation, of emphasising the positive and playing down the negative. In short, self-confidence in various forms constitutes a major division of the cult of faith, itself a primary form of American religion.

The reader, who is likely to be a college student, will probably have a special interest in the religious beliefs of college students generally. A survey team interviewed students on eleven campuses across the country.⁴ Of the students polled, 80 per cent felt a need for religion, but when pressed about the meaning of religion, 46 per cent meant a sincere working philosophy or code of ethics, not necessarily a religious belief. And, in spite of a widespread assertion of belief in God, only 47 per cent said they thought acceptance of the Deity is basic to a religious or ethical system. A notable characteristic of student think-

¹ H. W. Schneider, *Religion in 20th Century America* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 12.

² Martin Marty, *The New Shape of American Religion* (New York: Harper, 1958).

³ Louis Schneider and Sanford M. Dornbusch, *op. cit.*

⁴ Rose K. Goldsen, *What College Students Think* (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand Co., 1960).

ing is a strong reaction against absolutism in religion. In interpreting these findings, it is commonly acknowledged that the college years tend to be a time of doubt and realignment of religious beliefs.

The Changing Forms of Religious Beliefs. Another way in which organised religion has changed from the past is in the nature of beliefs that are held. This change is due in part to the advance of science, which has pushed back the frontiers of the unknown and necessarily modified the ritualistic and doctrinal nature of the stimuli that call forth the religious response. At one time it was not known that the earth was round, and religious leaders believed it was flat. Now, priests and preachers in general no longer believe that the world is flat, since by travelling round it they have proof that it is not so. Copernican astronomy, long rejected as incompatible with Scripture and Aristotelian cosmology, is now taken for granted.

The forms of religious belief have undergone many changes in the past in different religions. Religious belief has held that it is harmful to eat the meat of any animal with a cloven hoof; and many religions have believed that property buried with the dead would be useful to them in after-life.

Though the church can and does adjust to changing beliefs, the adjustment is often difficult and comes but slowly.¹ The Copernican doctrine that the earth moves round the sun, and not the reverse, was vigorously opposed by religious authorities before it was finally accepted. Galileo, on pain of torture and death, was forced to recant his theories concerning the natural world. More recently the theory of evolution, with its teaching that man has slowly emerged from an animal ancestry, has been bitterly opposed by fundamentalists as contrary to the Biblical teaching concerning the special creation of man; the teaching of evolution has been prohibited in certain localities. An increasingly large number of religious people, however, take the modernist position and see in the facts of organic evolution nothing inconsistent with a belief in God and progress.

The forms of religious belief have always been linked with the state of knowledge. The two fields, belief and knowledge, impinge on one another. As knowledge has changed, the forms of belief have been readjusted. Old forms have been given up and new forms added. Some of our best students of astronomy are the most devout religionists.² They know the locations of the stars, their distances from the earth, their motions, and their sizes. In all their study of the stars they have not been able to see the heaven that was once believed to be up there, yet their religious faith is unshaken. Only the form of belief is changed by science, not belief itself. Indeed, many religious thinkers claim

¹ A. D. White, *History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom*, 2 vols. (New York, 1897).

² See articles by A. S. Eddington, Sir James Jeans, Albert Einstein, and others in *Has Science Discovered God?* edited by Edward H. Cotton (New York, 1931).

that the essence of religion is not the form of the belief, but the nature of religious experience. Religious experience may at any one time be linked to a particular belief, such as ancestor worship in China, but religious experience is fundamentally independent of any particular belief.

Is the need for Religious Experience diminishing? It is thought by some students of the subject that religion is enhanced by insecurity and weakened by security. The religious life of primitive men is considered generally to be more pervasive than that of modern men in part because the life of primitive people is usually more precarious. Swift argues that whatever decreases insecurity, even a Kosher delicatessen store, is anti-religious in its effects.¹ Religious behaviour may increase in time of crisis, as in greater resort to prayer, but if succour does not come to the supplicant, he may turn away from religion. This may be the implication of the finding of a study of Lutherans that those who feel they have experienced unusual difficulties with respect to sickness, death, or finances show a marked drop in church attendance. This contrasts with the situation among Catholics where similar crises are associated with increased church attendance.² Except possibly for the threat of nuclear war, there would appear to be more economic and physical security in modern industrial society than in earlier society.

On the other hand, there appears to be more psychological insecurity at present than in times past. The modern city sometimes brings a loneliness in the midst of thousands of fellow beings more intense than that felt by the hermit. A lonely person once said, "A pane of glass separates me from reality." Reality was there, he could see it, but he could not become a part of it. This may help to explain why there has been such a vogue of books on peace of mind in our time. To the extent that there is more anomia in modern mass society than in earlier folk society, the need for the comfort of religion may be greater. In any case, though the conditions of life change, the basic mystery of the meaning and purposes of life remains and with it the utility of religion.

The Changing Social Teachings of the Church. One aspect of the church which may be singled out for special discussion is the ethical function. Nearly all organised religions sanction codes of conduct that guide the individual along the path of rectitude. Confucianism in its original form was essentially a system of ethics. The great prophets of Israel made the search for justice the heart of Judaism. Fealty to Jahveh, they said, meant doing one's duty towards one's fellow man, the rituals of sacrifice and ceremony being

¹ Arthur L. Swift, "Religious Values", Chapter 12 in *The Family: Its Function and Destiny*, rev. ed., edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959).

² Gerhard Lenski, in *The Lutheran*, February 19 and 26, 1962.

subordinate to the ethical motive. "I hate, I despise your feasts and I take no delight in your solemn assemblies; though you offer me your burnt offerings and sacrifices I will not accept them, neither will I regard the peace-offerings of your fed beasts."¹ Rather, "let justice flow like a river, and righteousness like a mighty stream".² "What doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?"³

While there seems to be little tendency for ethics to leave the church,⁴ the problem is rather one of kind. What kind of ethics shall the church teach? Religion generally assumes moral jurisdiction over the conduct of the individual. But should the church also presume to advise the right thing to do on social questions? If it is a sin for an individual to injure the health of a little child, is it any less a sin to employ little children for long hours at labour in factories, if such employment injures their health and retards their physical growth? Is it proper for religious bodies to take a stand on child labour legislation on the basis of right and wrong?

In general the practice is for the church so to instil religion in the individual that he will, as an individual, act rightly in regard to a social question. Thus a true church member would, in his personal behaviour, take a stand against such child labour. But it is argued this is an ineffective and slow way of dealing with a social question, for meanwhile little children are suffering. Hence social questions, it is claimed, must be dealt with by collective organised effort. Collective effort can secure legislation to prohibit child labour.

Important church groups have made a variety of pronouncements on the social action that the church advocates. The encyclical letter of His Holiness John XXIII⁵ examines modern problems ranging from under-developed countries to birth control. Its main points are that the rich nations should help the poor nations of the world, that communism as a philosophy destroys individual initiative, that individuality should not be sacrificed in the process of socialisation, that fair wages should be paid and workers given shares in the company where possible, that standards of living on farms be brought as closely up to urban levels as possible, and a reminder that the Roman Catholic Church regards methods of artificial contraception as morally wrong and a claim that technological progress rather than birth control is

¹ Amos v. 21.

² *Ibid.* v. 24.

³ Micah vi. 8.

⁴ Rather there seems to be increasing emphasis on the ethical function, as established metaphysical conceptions are challenged by science, and the trend towards secularisation of group activities continues. In some systems of religious philosophy, such as ethical idealism and humanism, ethics are ascendant. The Ethical Culture Movement represents this viewpoint. [Cf. Felix Adler, *An Ethical Philosophy of Life* (New York, 1918); C. F. Potter, *Humanism, a New Religion* (New York, 1930).] Modernists also stress the ethical function of religion. [Cf. S. Mathews, *The Faith of Modernism* (New York, 1924); H. F. Ward, *The New Social Order* (New York, 1919).]

⁵ Encyclical Letter of Pope John XXIII: *Mater et Magistra*, released c. July 15, 1961.

the solution to the problem of population increase. The Protestant Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America has likewise stated their social ideals on money, the profit motive, a living wage, health of wage-earners, social insurance, hours of labour, women in industry, collective bargaining, child labour, safeguarding the family, the agricultural problem, social work, the uses of liquor and drugs, penal reform, class conflict, war, and free speech. The Central Conference of American Rabbis has in a similar manner set forth its standards of social justice on a variety of issues. Individual Protestant Churches have done the same.

In recent times, the issue of race relations has been acute and the churches have tackled the problem of racial discrimination and prejudice.

The various churches, then, have their religious principles, derived from the authoritative writings of the past, which they seek to apply to specific social action. These recommendations they are trying to build into codes of ethics applicable to modern social evils. New codes of social ethics are in process of formulation, very much as the codes of the Book of Deuteronomy must have once been formed. However, the rapidity of change to-day makes the task much more difficult, for the social problems of one decade are now not always the same as those of another.

While there are principles that guide churches in social action, their activity is conditioned by the socio-economic groups that comprise their membership. In the Protestant Episcopal Church, with a membership representing a relatively high socio-economic status, the parishioners are less receptive than the leaders to most proposals for change and reform that have come before the triennial denominational meetings.¹ If members are largely industrial workers, then the message of the social gospel will be different from that of churches whose membership is that of the well-to-do upper-middle classes.² Probably the more democratic a church is, the less likely it is to engage in crusading, except on more or less universally accepted programmes, such as peace programmes, or work for better health.

The concern of the churches with social ethics is not uniform or without opposition from within the churches. Opposed to social action by the church is a large group who believe in exclusively individualistic piety. Still others view social action with deep suspicion. The action programmes of the churches have led to the charge that social action is the means by which communists infiltrate the church. On the other hand, the idea of Christianising the social order has

¹ C. Y. Glock and B. B. Rogers, "Church Policy and the Attitudes of Ministers and Parishioners on Social Issues", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 21, pp. 148-56, April, 1956.

² M. Argyle, *Religious Behaviour* (London, 1958), examines the psychological and social factors influencing religious belief, and the changes in belief from childhood to old age.

been questioned, notably by Reinhold Niebuhr,¹ as superficially optimistic and unrealistic. According to this view, while Christian perfectionism is untenable as a ground for political action, it is "the responsibility of the Christians not to flee but to come to terms with all the perplexing issues of man's community". Others hold that progress should not be the substance of religious faith, that progress is not inevitable, and that there are no final answers to the human dilemma. Meantime, some of the content of the programme of social action for which the early crusaders fought has been incorporated into the churches which disclaim any support for "the social gospel".

SECTS AND DENOMINATIONS IN A HETEROGENEOUS, CHANGING SOCIETY

From very early times religion has been furthered by organisation. Religions all over the world are organised with leaders, churches, property, as may be seen in Buddhism, Mohammedanism, Hinduism, and Christianity. Each of these groups has a variety of special organisations. For instance, in the United States there are sixty-seven different denominations reporting more than 50,000 members.

In addition to the sixty-seven religious organisations there are 175 smaller churches with fewer than 50,000 members each. Among these, to choose a small sample, are the following: The Apostolic Overcoming Holy Church of God, the United Zions Children, the Pillar of the Evangelistic Association, the Baha'is, the Defenceless Mennonites, the Pentecostal Holiness Church, the Two-seed-in-the-spirit Predestinarian Baptists, and the Original Church of God. The growth of organised religion has proceeded, then, with much differentiation.

The presence of many different denominations and sects in a society means that the culture is differentiated into many parts, with differing group interests and viewpoints. Sects are separatist and exclusive associations of individuals who have broken away from the established church to promote their own interests. Not only are there now various sects within the Christian Church, but Christianity itself was first a sect, arising in a time of discontent and rapid change as the religion of the disinherited, that is, the poor fishermen, peasants, publicans, and outcasts. It is argued by some authorities that a sect that survives settles down to build an organisation by gaining converts, perfecting its machinery, influencing public opinion, and improving its economic status. Once established, the sect loses its militant character and becomes a denomination, continuing then in a state of accommodation to the other established religious bodies.² If its influence becomes

¹ In the Foreword to *What the Christian Hopes for in Society*, edited by W. H. Cowan (New York: Association Press, 1957).

² For fuller treatment of sects and denominations, see H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Social Sources of Denominationalism* (New York, 1929); Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, translated by Olive Wyon (London, 1931); Ellsworth Faris, *The Nature of Human Nature*, Chap. v; "The Sect and the Sectarian".

great enough, as was true of Christianity after its embrace by the rulers and the upper classes, it becomes a major church.

Anomia, entailing the separation of individuals from the traditional communal structures, is a cause of sectarianism. The economically underprivileged persons are most likely to become anomic and most likely therefore to become recruits for sects.¹

TABLE 31
CHURCH MEMBERSHIP, ENGLAND AND WALES, 1956
(000's)

Baptist Union	324
Brethren	146
Church of Wales	200
Church of England	2,923
Congregational Union	220
Methodist	744
Presbyterian	224
Religious Society of Friends	21
Roman Catholic	3,170
Union of Welsh Independents	124
Others	119
Total	8,215

Note : the criteria for membership differ between denominations. E.g. Roman Catholics include members of the Roman Catholic population of all ages.

* Carr-Saunders *et al.*, 1958, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

The argument that sects must evolve into churches if they survive and in doing so, give up their transcendental, other-worldly orientation, has been disputed. The Christian Science movement is cited as a case of a group that has moved not from sect to church but from sect to institutionalised sect, since it is claimed that Christian Science remains in conflict with the existing culture.² A closely allied observation is that most American Protestant groups have not evolved, but are still sects in orientation, that is, associations of ethical virtuosos not relying on ceremonial means of salvation.³ A weakness of the sect-church dichotomy or continuum is the assumption that the variables involved are highly interdependent and therefore highly intercorrelated. Research indicates this is not the case. As a result, we cannot predict many of the other characteristics of a given religious group when we know any one characteristic.⁴

Church Membership is increasing in the United States. The number of church members is increasing faster than the population. Within

¹ See B. R. Wilson, *Sects and Society* (London, 1961) for an analysis of the growth of three sects in Britain.

² Harold W. Pfautz, "The Sociology of Secularization", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 61, pp. 121-8, September, 1955.

³ Benton Johnson, "A Critical Appraisal of the Church-Sect Typology", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 22, pp. 88-92, February, 1957.

⁴ Gerhard Lenski, *The Sociology of Religion in the United States*. Center for Research in Social Organization, Department of Sociology, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Reprint Series No. 6.

four decades the percentage of the population claimed as church members increased from 43 per cent to 64 per cent. The upper limit is less than 100 per cent, unless infants and children are admitted to membership. The percentage of adults who are church members is much higher than 64 per cent, nearer 80 to 85 per cent. Church membership tends to increase more rapidly in times of prosperity, and the increase has been somewhat greater in the prosperous years since 1940 than in the less prosperous decade of the 1930's. War is also said to stimulate religious interest. It may also be that the use of the mass media of communication such as radio and motion pictures has been a force to increase church membership. Moreover, it is possible that a religious awakening may have occurred independent of these economic and technological forces. It is said that inactive members are kept on church rolls for a long time. But there is little reason to think that such a practice has changed in the past third of a century. Other evidence is the increased number of church buildings.

SOCIAL CORRELATES OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND PRACTICE

Whether or not it is true, as Durkheim taught, that the ultimate origin of religions is human society, it is clear that religion is a significant part of the social system. It is therefore appropriate to ask what are the inter-relationships of religion and society, with special reference to the United States.¹

Women, both in and out of the labour force, attend church services more often than men. Women of the Christian faith also express greater interest in religion. More women than men hold the conventional belief in life after death.² Women contribute relatively more money to churches than to education, and the reverse is true for men. The above report on the greater church participation of women is not true for the Jews, where tradition has it that attendance at the synagogue is primarily the responsibility of the male. As to why women are more religiously oriented than men, we may speculate that the female rôle in society is largely an expressive one, emphasising co-operation, whereas the rôle of the male is generally a competitive one, not so congenial to the teachings of religion.

Age, as well as sex, is linked to church attendance. Among Christian adults, there is no significant association of attendance with age, except that there is a marked decline in old age. Marriage and the presence of young children increase church attendance. Among Jews, the younger generation attends services at the synagogue less often than the older generation.³

¹ Unless otherwise indicated, this discussion is based on Gerhard Lenski: *The Religious Factor* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1961).

² The Gallup Poll, *Tampa Tribune*, April 15, 1960.

³ Bernard Lazarwitz, "Some Factors Associated with Variations in Church Attendance", *Social Forces*, vol. 39, pp. 301-9, May, 1961.

Church membership is associated with place of residence or type of community. A little more than half of all American Protestants live in urban areas, compared to more than three-fourths of all Catholics and nearly all Jews.¹ The improving economic status of Catholics and the superior economic status of Jews would seem to be related to their place of residence, for economic opportunities are more attractive in urban than in rural areas. An additional ecological point is that the South remains the most devout part of the United States, if devotion is measured by membership and allegiance to the church. Within each group, Catholic and Protestant, attendance at church is much lower in the rapidly growing fringe area than in the central city. This difference remains when accessibility to church and the residential experiences of the head of household are controlled.²

Church membership is also class-linked. In rank order from upper to lower class, we may list in general the membership of the Episcopal, Presbyterian, Methodist, Baptist, and Pentecostal Churches. There is also a class factor in church participation. The working classes are under-represented in the churches, but in interpreting this, it is necessary to keep in mind that these classes are also under-represented in formal associations generally. The reasons for this are primarily two: the working classes are oriented more to informal association with kin groups and it costs money to join formal associations. The working classes attend church less often than the other classes but their personal commitment is as deep and possibly deeper.³ Within the Jewish group, there are no significant associations between church attendance and education, occupation, or income.⁴

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES

Perhaps the most important question regarding religion, from a sociological viewpoint, has to do with the consequences of alternative forms of religious behaviour for society. In this connection, it is essential to distinguish consequences from mere concomitance. Examples of the latter we have just reviewed. To distinguish causation from mere correlation, not an easy task, it is necessary to show the temporal priority of the causative factor, the logical connection between cause and effect, and the absence of, say, a third factor which may be responsible for the other two.

Lenski distinguishes between associational and communal aspects of religion. The former may be measured by extent of membership and by frequency of church attendance. The later may be gauged by

¹ Donald J. Bogue, *The Population of the United States* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), p. 694.

² Basil G. Zimmer and Amos H. Hawley, "Suburbanization and Church Participation", *Social Forces*, vol. 37, pp. 348-54, May, 1959.

³ Yoshio Fukuyama, "The Major Dimensions of Church Membership", *Review of Religious Research*, vol. 2, pp. 154-61, No. 4, 1961.

⁴ Bernard Lazarwitz, "Some Factors Associated with Variations in Church Attendance", *Social Forces*, vol. 39, pp. 301-9, May, 1961.

the degree of ones association with a religious sub-community which is of course more inclusive than participation in a particular church. The significance of this identification can be seen from the finding that the more a religious group constitutes a sub-culture, the more the religion is predictive of the behaviour of the members. Thus Catholicism and Judaism are more highly correlated with family behaviour than Protestantism.¹ Again, socio-religious sub-communities rather than churches *per se* foster intolerance.

In general, research indicates that orthodox orientation tends to segregate religion from daily life, whereas devotional orientation tends to be integrated with daily life. Devotional orientation is also associated with humanitarianism.²

It is interesting to observe how religion affects economic behaviour. Involved here is the Weberian thesis that early Protestantism, by stressing salvation through personal responsibility, asceticism in the use of time and money, and hard work, was an important factor in the development of capitalism in the West. The implication that Protestantism is a factor in economic success is supported by research. A study of 9,000 adults in metropolitan Detroit in 1954-9 devised a system of handicapping which removed the effect of ascribed factors (accidents of birth) on worldly success. Using an index of achievement, the study reports a final ranking of white persons as follows, from highest to lowest: Jewish, Eastern Orthodox, Semi-Christian, Episcopal, Calvinist, Protestant (no denomination), Methodist, small sects, no preference and Lutheran (tie), Baptist and Catholic.³ The findings offer some support for a contemporary interpretation of the Weberian thesis, with some modifications. Most Protestant denominations greatly exceed the Catholics in economic standing and the ranking of the various Protestant denominations is in substantial agreement with expectations. The high achievement of the Jews and Detroiters of the Eastern Orthodox Faith is explained by historical factors, mainly that they have been cast in the rôle of entrepreneurs. Supportive findings of another study are that graduates of Catholic colleges become scientists one-sixth as often as do graduates of American colleges and universities, whereas Jews are most likely to become scientists.⁴ Catholics are as likely to attend graduate school, to choose an academic career, to specialise in the physical sciences, and to plan a life of research as Protestants.⁵

¹ Charles F. Westoff, "The Social-Psychological Structure of Fertility", *Proceedings of the International Population Conference*, Vienna, 1959.

² Lenski, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

³ Albert J. Mayer and Harry Sharp, "Religious Preference and Worldly Success", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 27, pp. 218-27, April, 1962.

⁴ R. H. Knapp and H. B. Goodrich, *Origins of American Scientists* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952).

⁵ Andrew M. Greeley, "Influence of the 'Religious Factor' on Career Plans and Occupational Values of College Graduates", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 68, pp. 658-71, May, 1963.

Weber wrote some fifty years ago and the interval since then has been one of great social change. Which of the elements of the Protestant ethic remain to-day? A partial answer is given by a study of a sample of 260 farmers divided into three groups according to the degree of importance they attached to work. The older men attached more importance to work than the younger men. The more rationally-oriented farmers laid more store by science and leisure. Why work hard in an age of automatic machines? Modern man, it is inferred from the findings, finds strength in association rather than in himself and is a shameless consumer and believer in leisure.¹

Research has also shown a relationship between degree of religious commitment and upward social mobility. Individuals reared in devout white Protestant families are more often upwardly mobile in their adult years than individuals reared in less devout white Protestant families or in Catholic families.²

The effects of religious orientation on political behaviour have also been explored. Voting behaviour is correlated with religious group affiliation, even when social class position is controlled. White Protestants in the North are largely Republican; Catholics, Jews, Negro Protestants and Southern whites are mainly Democratic. An important factor with reference to the latter is their minority-group status, which leads them to espouse the more liberal policies of the Democratic Party. To the extent that Negro Protestants approximate whites in income, they approximate whites also in social behaviour, including voting.

Religion has been studied in relation to morality. While there is some inconsistency in the findings of the various researches, in general the evidence points to the conclusion that religion has little influence on morality. Associational involvement in churches greatly affects the attitudes of members on moral issues on which the churches have taken a special stand, as drinking, gambling and premarital or extra-marital sexual indulgence. A study of American students inquired into the moral behaviour of religious believers and sceptics. The religiously-oriented students adhered more often to ascetic standards but there was no difference in the degree to which the two groups believed in the elements of common social morality, as exemplified by actions generally considered harmful to the group such as stealing and striking a person in anger. The religious and the sceptics also reported the same degree of violation of social norms.³

The foregoing evidence, concerned with the United States, indicates that religion is quite pervasive in its effects on social behaviour.

¹ Bernice Goldstein and Robert L. Eichhorn, "The Changing Protestant Ethic: Rural Patterns in Health, Work, and Leisure", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 26, pp. 557-65.

² Gerhard Lenski, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

³ Russell Middleton and Snell Putney, "Religion, Normative Standards, and Behavior", *Sociometry*, vol. 25, pp. 141-52, June, 1962.

Indeed, religious affiliation explains as much of the variance in the behaviour of Detroiters as does social class, generally considered a significant variable. This is true for such matters as attitudes towards work, views on foreign affairs, civil liberties, the welfare state and the race issue, as well as for more overt behaviour, embodied in size of family.¹ In one study, precision matching was used to test whether religious differences in fertility result from socio-economic differences between the major religious groups. The groups were matched on duration of marriage and five socio-economic characteristics. With these controls, most of the Protestant-Jewish differentials in fertility disappear, but those between Catholics and Jews are not reduced. The distinctly Catholic fertility pattern cannot be explained by the socio-economic characteristics considered.²

The foregoing analysis relates to the behaviour of individuals. It is important also to consider the general or over-all impact of religious organisation on society. One observation, of some significance, is that a single homogeneous religious system in a society is a unifying force. Most simple societies, such as tribal societies, have only one religion. Modern society, on the contrary, is heterogeneous as to religious systems and this heterogeneity introduces the element of conflict. Conflicting religious institutions may divide a complex social system.³

Studies of church attendance in Britain estimated that between 8 per cent and 15 per cent attend church once a week or more. As in America, church attendance increases in the higher social strata, and is greater among women than men. Compared with 1851, there has been a marked decline in attendance, when a census showed that about 58 per cent of those able to attend did so.⁴

UNITY AND CO-OPERATION IN RELIGIOUS ORGANISATION

It would seem that there are enough religious denominations to meet the various belief needs of the people. But the question has arisen as to whether the forces of evil might not be better attacked by a concerted effort among all the various churches. Leaders of the churches have appreciated the advantages of a united front, and know that in union there is strength. The Roman Catholics are strongly united. In England the National Council of Evangelical Free Churches, which dates back to the late years of the last century,

¹ Gerhard Lenski, *op. cit.*

² Ronald Freeman, Pascal K. Whelpton, and John W. Smit, "Socio-economic Factors in Religious Differentials in Fertility", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 26, pp. 608-14, August, 1961.

³ Allan W. Eister, "Religious Institutions in Complex Societies: Difficulties in the Theoretic Specification of Functions", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 22, pp. 387-91, August, 1957. Vol. XII, No. 3 (1956) issue of *The Journal of Social Issues* is devoted to the topic, "Religious Conflict in the United States".

⁴ Carr-Saunders *et al.*, 1958, *op. cit.*, Chap. xviii. See also M. Argyle, *Religious Behaviour*, and B. R. Wilson, *Sects and Society*.

provides for united action on behalf of Nonconformist Churches. It takes action with regard to morals in civic and public life generally and deals with such questions as peace and war, social and trade ethics, gambling or immorality in the state and the nation generally. In recent years the various branches of English Methodism have reunited, and there have been many instances of even wider co-operation. The Free Churches and the Church of England have taken a common stand on many points, the Jewish community has also repeatedly declared its solidarity over specific issues, and the Anglicans have also made approaches to the Eastern Orthodox Church. During the war, the Protestant Churches of Southern India have actually gone far towards complete amalgamation.

Complete mergers of denominations, while rare, have occurred in a few cases. In 1925 the Methodist, Presbyterian, and Congregational Churches of Canada formed the United Christian Church of Canada. In 1929 the Congregational and Christian Churches of America united, and the Methodist Episcopal Church and the Methodist Episcopal Church South have merged once more after their long split over slavery. The word "ecumenical" has lately been revived in connection with efforts to increase the sense of fellowship and unity among Christians the world over. In 1938-9 ecumenical meetings were held at Oxford, Edinburgh, Madras, and Amsterdam, the latter attended by representatives of seventy-one national groups. In 1938 a conference at Utrecht drafted a plan for a World Council of Christian Churches and by September, 1939, fifty-four national churches had voted to co-operate. In 1962, the first Oecumenical Council in 100 years convened in Vatican City, and—for the first time also—delegate-observers from numerous Protestant and other bodies were present.

COMPETITION FROM NATIONALISM AND IDEOLOGIES

The religious leaders sense the need for unity, for they have competitors for the devotion of mankind in nationalism and communism. Indeed, there are some students who think that nationalism is a religion, and others who think the same of communism.

Are Nationalism and Communism Religions? If religion is an attitude towards a superhuman power, then nationalism or communism can only be a religion if they are superhuman powers. Since both the state and communism are organisations of human beings, they do not seem to be superhuman. They are, however, endowed by their followers with very great powers, which appear at times to be mystical if not superhuman. Thus it was claimed by ardent nationalists, as in Nazi Germany, that man exists for the state rather than the state existing for man. So to communists, the "cause" is seen as a great force shaping the course of history. The answer to this question of whether such ideologies are religions seems to depend upon the conception of the term "religion".

But if it is agreed that the essence of religion is religious experience, then the emphasis is not so much on a conception of superhuman as on religious experience. Religious experience may be quite varied. But prominent among these experiences are those of worship, loyalty, ecstasy, self-sacrifice, and identification. Somewhat similar experiences are those of devoted communists and also of patriotic nationalists. In experiences, then, some ideologies resemble those of traditional religions.

Similarities exist also in external characteristics such as rituals and ceremonies.¹ Something like holy writings exist in communism and nationalism. The attitude of communists towards the writings of Karl Marx is like that of Christians towards the Bible. Lenin is equivalent to a saint in Russia. There are national shrines, as, for instance, tombs, to which people make pilgrimages, just as the Christians go to the Holy Land or the Mohammedans to Mecca. There are national holidays and religious holidays. To nationalists the power of the state is supreme, as is the power of God to religionists. Both punish, the one heretics, the other traitors.

But there are differences. There is little concern in nationalism with the "unknown", nor is reverence in nationalism of a particularly mysterious nature. So there are grounds for those who do not think such ideologies are religions. But the reader should recall that to the followers of a particular religion, all others are false religions, though they are still religions.

Once before nationalism rose to great heights, assumed the proportions of a religion, and opposed the constituted religious authorities.² This was during and following the French Revolution. It was proposed that the new religion of nationalism be called *La Patrie*. The revolutionists saw in it not only a regeneration of France, but of the human race. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen was called the national catechism. The new constitution was the holy writ. There were civic baptisms, civic marriages, and civic funerals. The great church of Saint Genevieve became the National Pantheon. Since 1793 nationalism has dropped back to smaller proportions in the life of the French people, but it left its mark on religion in France. The church lost much of its power and influence because of this burst of nationalistic religion.

Whether nationalism and communism are religions or not, they do offer competition to established religions for the loyalty of subjects. For in nationalism and in communism are found experiences that compete with religious experiences.

¹ Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926).

² *Ibid.*, Chap. 4.

SUMMARY

Perplexed and sore beset because of a world he does not understand, man in his quest for certainty turns to religion, a complex of beliefs, emotional attitudes, and practices, regarding the ultimate meaning of life. These vary in different cultures. Primitive man tends to react to the unknown with fear, he invests the universe with a mysterious supernatural force (*mana*), and he regards all matter as animistic or alive.

Belief in supernatural power is elaborated into a religious organisation. Ideas are developed respecting the nature of this power, the methods of acquiring it, the beings who possess it, and the appropriate regard in which they are to be held. Appropriate rituals are established, and special leaders are developed for the religious life, although there are at first no separate religious groups. The religious complex is, moreover, tied up with the rest of human experience so that religion affects familial, educational, governmental, recreational and social activity. A distinguishing trait of primitive religion is its social pervasiveness.

The social functions of religion, highly important and complex, include the provision of goals and means for promoting group survival and stability. Religion as a form of social control reinforces social norms by investing them with a sacred quality. Religion as a fellowship of believers also reinforces the sense of community.

Although moderated somewhat as religion became more specialised, such connections of religion with other social organisations continued until relatively recent times, when the vast increase in cities resulting from the Industrial Revolution accelerated the trend towards secularisation. Modern religion also differs greatly from early religion in laying less emphasis on fear and more on devotion, and in being less concerned with the unknown in nature and more with the unknown in the spiritual life of man. The need for religion continues to be great, as the essential mystery of life remains and as psychological insecurity appears to be at least as great in modern urban industrial society as in the earlier agricultural society. Although science with its new knowledge about man and nature may require certain modification in the forms of religious beliefs and practices, only the forms are changed and the need for religious experience continues. Since about 1890, and after the extensive diversification of sects and denominations, the Protestant church has sought to increase its organisational strength through the unity movement, which has become especially active in response to the growing threat of nationalism. Religion in America, while increasing in organisation and formal strength, appears to have become more secular in content. Religious affiliation may explain as much of the variance in social behaviour as does social class.

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. What are the social functions of religion?
2. How is magic connected with religion in primitive cultures? How do the two differ at present?
3. Is there any relation between the type of religious practice and the level of material culture of a people?
4. In what ways has the Church adjusted itself to modern life? In what ways has it failed to do so?
5. What is the effect of scientific knowledge on religious ideology and practice?
6. Has the need for religion declined?
7. Give an account of communism as a religion.

8. Examine the rôle of Christianity in its influence on (1) the position of women in society, (2) the institution of slavery, (3) war.
9. What are the doctrines of the churches in Britain to-day on the question of divorce? How far have these influenced legislation?
10. Has there been any relation between radicalism and the growth of religious scepticism since 1800?
11. Examine the relation between religion and economic behaviour in England in the nineteenth century.
12. Explain and discuss Max Weber's views on the rôle of religion in the evolution of modern capitalism.
13. Give an account of Freud's views on the psychological functions of religion. What social data would you look for to test his assertions?

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CHAPTER XXI

THE FAMILY

The family to-day seems to be a troubled institution. The divorce rate is high, the number of separations is large, and illegitimacy has increased. These facts are disturbing to many persons, because the home is the place where the personal and social virtues are developed. The type of citizen one becomes is related closely to the type of mother, father, and home life one has.

The present status of the family is the end-result of a long historical process ; the modern scene cannot be understood without some knowledge of what has gone before. Moreover, it is helpful to inquire how variable and flexible the family has been in earlier periods and in different cultures ; such knowledge may throw some light on the probable future of the institution, suggesting the limits of its ability to change to meet changing conditions. A study of the family in the earliest hunting cultures, and what changes occurred in it as the material culture developed into our present civilisation, will afford a better understanding of family life to-day and its possible changes in the future.

THE BEGINNINGS OF FAMILY ORGANISATION

What the Family Is. When we think of a family we picture it as a more or less durable association of husband and wife with or without children, or of a man or woman alone, with children. The sex and parental functions are distinctive of the family. They constitute the primary *raisons d'être* of the institution and are common to the family in all cultures. The primary personnel of the family consists of mates and their offspring.

The family, however, is not necessarily limited to these individuals and functions. It may be much larger and may include, for example, grandparents, relatives, in-laws, and grandchildren, all forming a unit which is sometimes called a household. The structure of the family is not fixed ; it varies in different cultures, as will be shown below. Likewise the functions of the family are flexible. The family may do few or many things. In addition to the functions mentioned above, the family may provide economic services for its members, it may help to educate them, give them religious guidance, furnish recreation, protect them against dangers of various sorts, and provide affection and social intercourse. It is important in appraising the significance of the family in any culture to ascertain what functions are performed and to what extent they are exercised. The family may thus be interpreted in terms of its varying structure and functions.

The Early Family. The family is found in every hunting society known to us, no matter how simple its material culture. Unlike the state, church, or even village, the family is present everywhere among these simple peoples. It generally consists of a male, one or more females, and children, with perhaps a relative or so. The husband is a hunter, the wife prepares food, and the women and children help to gather wild vegetables, to dig roots or to pick berries.

What the family was like before culture was this far advanced is a matter of speculation. However, we know that a more or less durable union of male and female exists among the primates. Where the primates live in bands, the bands consist of several family groups that forage together for food, keeping generally out of one another's way, except for occasional fights over females.

The broad outlines of the history of the family do not suggest any great evolution such as we find in material culture, which moved from broken stones to elaborate engineering ; or even such as we find in government, which grew from simple leadership to the great nationalistic state. The early family group seems to have many resemblances to the modern family in its small size and limited economic and social functions. Still, the family is not a static institution. Although there has been no evolution in a linear direction from the simple to the complex, the family has varied greatly in different cultures. Some of these variations may now be considered.

VARIATIONS IN FAMILY ORGANISATION

THE SIMPLE, INDEPENDENT FAMILY

The most common form of the family among hunting and gathering societies is much like our own, an organisation built round the nucleus of husband and wife and offspring. Each family is an independent economic unit and has a corporate existence distinct from that of other units of the same sort. In some cases additional members, such as relatives, may be added to the family circle, but there is no formal connection of the simple biological family with any larger organisation.

The stability of such a family is, however, limited in duration. It is formed at marriage and is dissolved at death. There is thus a disruption at this time of the economic and social functions, and the institution has to start all over again with the marriage of the young, who are more or less inexperienced. Where property is involved, some continuity is had by rules of inheritance. But on the whole a small group of father, mother, and children is not the most efficient unit for performing certain economic and social functions.

THE CONSANGUINEOUS FAMILY ORGANISATION

The biological family of parents and children is not the only form of family organisation. Very common among primitive peoples is a

family where the central core is the relations of blood kin, of brothers and sisters, or of parents and offspring. The bonds between these seem almost stronger than that between mates. It may be noted that the blood relationships have certain special elements of stability. The children have been brought up together since birth. They are a direct continuation of the same family and their number need not be limited to two. In other words, it is quite possible to think of the functioning family as organised round a centre of blood ties, such as between brothers and sisters, or parent and children, rather than round husband and wife. Where the functioning group is based upon blood ties, it may be referred to as a consanguineous family organisation.¹

There are, of course, marital groups in such a family, but they are subordinate to the blood group. The marital bond may be minimised to the point where one of the mates and his or her kin are not recognised for certain social purposes, such as inheritance or religious rituals. That is to say, a system of unilateral kinship generally obtains among primitives, descent being traced either through the mother's line or the father's, but not through both. A matrilineal consanguineous family consists of a woman, her children of both sexes, the children of her daughters, of her daughters' daughters, and so on. The woman's husband does not belong to the group, but belongs instead to his mother's family. Where descent is patrilineal, the consanguineous family consists of a patriarch, his children, and the children of his male descendants through males.

The marital tie is minimised among preliterate by the common practice of having one of the mates take up residence at the home of the other's people. Where the husband goes to live with his wife's family, the system is known as matrilocal residence ; its opposite is patrilocal residence. All cultures which trace descent through males are apparently patrilocal. If descent is traced through females, the residence may be either matrilocal or patrilocal. Probably somewhat more than one-half of all preliterate societies are patrilocal, but the proportion is difficult to fix, for in some cases there may be a combination of practices or even a movement from one to the other.

The consanguineous family is strong where the husband comes from another village to live with his spouse and her people. An individual is very close to his group where everybody not only knows him but knows everything about him. Under such a condition banishment is one of the worst possible punishments. There is no place to go except among an alien people who do not readily adopt strangers. When marriage occurs between members of two different villages, one of the persons is an outsider and his position in the household is much like that of a relative who comes to live with a married couple to-day ; he becomes a part of the family but not the most essential

¹ See Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York, 1936), Chap. x.

part. In matrilocal marriages, the mother's brother sometimes bears a closer relation to the children than does the father, and it may be the uncle rather than the father who administers the punishment, if there be punishment to inflict. In some functioning households of primitive peoples the marital aspect of the family is not necessarily the most important factor.

EXOGAMY AND ENDOGAMY

Why is there among some peoples a prescription that they must marry outside their group—a practice known as exogamy? Its origin is not definitely known, but there are certain situations that make the system understandable. The practice of marrying outside the group is compatible with the prescription against incest which exists in every culture. Incest is, however, variously defined by different peoples. The marriage of mother and son is universally prohibited; and with rare exceptions, the same is true of the union of father and daughter. In a few cases, as in ancient Egypt and Peru, brothers and sisters married, mainly in the ruling class. This occurs in part because of the idea that the ruling class is divine or when it is desired to keep the blood pure. There is evidence that during the Roman period in ancient Egypt brother-sister marriages occurred among commoners with some frequency. A proffered rationale is that the system served to maintain property of the family intact and prevented fragmentation of an estate through laws of inheritance. Usually this functional requirement is offset by the greater need to maintain clearly differentiated rôles within the nuclear family or to establish co-operative alliances with other families.¹

The prescription of marriage within a particular group, or endogamy, may exist along with exogamy, as may be seen in the United States to-day in the case of state laws which forbid the marriage of first cousins (exogamy), yet require marriage with someone of the same race (endogamy).

The taboo against marriage of close relatives is sometimes extended so far as to forbid the marriage of members of the same clan. It should be recalled that when the material culture is very simple, the groups are quite small, sometimes numbering no more than twenty or thirty persons, and comprise only a few families. Among these peoples the system of kinship reckoning is not the same as ours. Lowie² cites various systems of kinship reckoning:

In certain systems, blood-relatives are classed according to generation regardless of nearness of kinship and of their maternal or paternal affiliations. . . . [The Hawaiians] apply a single term, *makua*, to both parents and to all

¹ Russell Middleton, "Brother-Sister and Father-Daughter Marriage in Ancient Egypt", *American Sociological Review*, pp. 603-11, October, 1962.

² Robert H. Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology* (New York, 1917), pp. 102, 109-111. By permission of Peter Smith.

their parents' brothers and sisters, sex being distinguished only by qualifying words meaning "man" and "woman". All related individuals of one's generation are classed as brothers and sisters, certain distinctions being drawn according to the age of their parents relatively to that of one's own parents and also according to the speaker's sex, but none resulting from the differences in nearness of kinship. The children of all these brothers and sisters are classed with one's own children, and *their* children with one's grandchildren, while a single term embraces grandparents and all related members of their generation.

[The Zulu] man and woman call all the brother's and sister's children their sons and daughters without distinction, and the children of their father's sister are classed with one's brothers and sisters.

Kinship may be extended to all the families who belong to the same group. As the bands grow larger the kinship terms persist, as does language in general, and all those in the enlarged group are designated as kin, although not necessarily related by blood. Technically a clan is an exogamous unilineal descent group but in reality the sanctions against intermarriage may go beyond this group. In traditional China, individuals with the same surname could not intermarry, although the original clan connection, if any, might be remote.

FORMS OF MARRIAGE

A distinction must be made between the preference in a society for one system as against another, and the ability of individuals in that society to exercise that preference. Strictly speaking, monogamy is a system that enjoins the marriage of one male and one female; in such a system no other arrangements are sanctioned. But monogamy is permitted in societies where other systems are preferred. Where a material consideration must be given for a wife, or where she is not of much economic value after marriage, most men cannot afford a number of wives. Thus, while the Koran permits a man to have four wives, few Mohammedans are able to avail themselves of this privilege. In Egypt in 1947, those married to more than one wife were only 3.8 per cent of all married men; in Iraq, 9 per cent.¹ Still, there are found among lower hunters a large number of strictly monogamous cultures, as in the Pygmy tribes.

While monogamy is the most widely practised form among pre-literate, the most widely favoured system is polygyny, the marriage of more than one female to one male. That this should be so seems curious to some observers, who point out that it runs counter to the approximate equality in number of the sexes. The sex ratio, which is about 100 females to 100 males by middle age, may be disturbed by various situations, however. One of these is the hazardous life among hunters. The loss of life among males at adolescence leads

¹ M. Kamel Nahas, "The Family in the Arab World", *Marriage and Family Living*, vol. 16, p. 295, November, 1954.

to a slight excess of women. In 1805, among 23,000 Plains Indians in America, there were only 44 males to 100 females.¹

While an excess of women would facilitate polygyny, it must not be thought that the system requires any such condition. An extreme illustration of this is to be found in Australia, where older men appropriate many of the women of the community, forcing some of the younger men to go elsewhere for mates. It would seem that the natural desire of man for variety was asserting itself here, but this aspect is not of the greatest importance, since it is usually possible for primitives to enjoy an ample sex life without bearing the responsibilities of marriage. Additional wives are taken because they give a man prestige, much as do material possessions in our own society.

Much more rare is the system of polyandry, the marriage of more than one male to one female. This plan is found among the Todas of Southern India, where it takes mainly the fraternal form. In this case, a group of brothers share a wife; in the non-fraternal type the wife makes the rounds of the different settlements where her husbands live, spending a certain length of time with each. Some one husband will by an established ceremony be chosen as the child's legal father. It is interesting to note that, while biological paternity is not emphasised, legal or social paternity is.

Some writers mention group marriage as a fourth system, but it is doubtful if a real instance of it can be established as the modal type in any society. It may have existed at one time in the Marquesas Islands, but it is not practised there now. Where it occurs it seems to be a temporary or transitional arrangement. The Indian government has lately sought to suppress female infanticide among the Todas, with the result that an equality in the numbers of the sexes is being established. Consequently brothers may now take collectively a number of wives. But this would seem to be a makeshift arrangement pending the completion of the process of readjustment to new conditions.

Group marriage is to be distinguished from promiscuity, for it proceeds under community sanction and control. Sexual licence among married preliterates is seldom found in any disorganised sense, although it is quite common among young unmarried persons. Wife-lending by agreement, or exchange of partners, is sometimes allowed, but such practices are not disruptive forces and occur usually under special conditions. Even where variety and experimentation are permitted, there is an orderliness of family life.

THE STATUS OF WOMEN

An excess of women and polygyny may mean an inferior position of women in the family, but not necessarily so. Indeed, a man's first

¹ Clark Wissler, "Changes in Population Profiles among the Northern Plains Indians", *Anthropological Papers* . . . (New York, 1936), vol. xxxvi, part 1, p. 43.

wife may request him to take a second wife to help with the work. Also in polygynous families the wives may band together in an argument with the husband and thus lend strength to their position.

The fact that a man marries to get more labour and that the marriage is validated by the payment of material consideration suggests the idea that women may be considered as property. This is hardly the case, however, for though wives may be bought, they are never sold. Wife purchase is not quite the same thing as a horse trade, but is more closely related to the system of gifts. In a primitive culture a father may get property when a daughter marries, but he may give property when his son marries. Property considerations often enter into marriage, especially where the family performs economic functions of magnitude. The whole system affects also the stability of marriage, since in certain cases of separation there may be a return of property. Marriage is more stable where there are such property considerations. Even to-day in Western Europe and in America marriage often involves gifts, dowries, and property settlements.

The position of women in families usually depends to a considerable extent on the economic functions they perform. In a horticultural society the work is in good part done by the women and their status is relatively high. However, in herding cattle or in dealing with large animals, domesticated or wild, men have a very essential economic assignment, and their position is as a rule relatively higher than that of women. The husband is more likely to go to live with his wife's people in a hoe culture, while a woman is more likely to live with her husband's people in a cattle culture. These correlations are not perfect, for various other factors may modify such a relationship between cultural traits in a given area.¹

DIVORCE IN PRIMITIVE CULTURE

Among preliterates there is considerable variation in the degree of marital stability. Some of the simpler hunting peoples, as for instance the Veddas of Ceylon, do not allow divorce at all. In general, however, marriage is more flexible, and separation and remarriage are permitted. When divorce is frequent, the breaking and forming of new families is more likely to occur among the younger adults. No statistics have been collected on this point, but ethnological field workers observe more stable marital unions among the older families in a culture where divorce may be common among the younger members. The divorce procedure itself is likely to be very simple. A Zuni wife who no longer wishes to keep her husband indicates her decision by placing his personal belongings at the entrance of the house ; when he returns from work and sees his things, he takes the hint and returns to his parents' home. In the case of a consan-

¹Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples* (London, 1930).

guineous family, like that of the Zuni, divorce is not serious in its effects on the children, since the larger family organisation remains intact and the children continue to have the influence and association of the other adult members of the group. For this reason and others, divorce is probably more common among preliterates than it is in modern society. While divorce is made easy, it is not encouraged, for divorce always disturbs some important family functions. The more numerous and significant the social and economic functions of the family, the more serious becomes the disruption of marriage.

THE FAMILY IN THE HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY

THE DECLINE OF THE CONSANGUINEOUS FAMILY

As plough culture replaced hoe culture and cattle were kept on the farm, the rôle of the husband became quite important in the family economy and he seldom went to live at the home of his bride. Mates were now chosen more often from among the boys and girls of the same community. The young couple set up a home in the same village from which they both came, or the bride went to live in the home of her husband. The family took on the pattern found in historical Europe and colonial America.

THE INCREASED PROMINENCE OF THE ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS OF THE FAMILY

Under the plough and cattle culture the economic functions of production seem to have been suited fairly well to the conjugal family. The system gave rise to a highly developed household economy which existed in Europe through the Middle Ages into the nineteenth century. The same type of family is also found widely distributed in Asia. This household economy was developed chiefly in villages round which agriculture was practised, or in the open country where the farms were scattered, for only a very small percentage of the population lived in cities. With the advent of the plough and the domestication of cattle the various handicrafts became much more highly developed, and the economic functions assumed an even more important rôle in family organisation. Such things as the grinding of grain, preparation of soap, moulding of pottery, fabrication of leather, construction of furniture, and concoction of medicines were done at the homestead, by members of the household. These families were thus largely self-supporting.

In developing a variety of important economic activities, the household had become a significant business enterprise. The wife was like a business partner, and if she was industrious, thrifty, and a good manager, a man would be loath to lose such an economic asset. It might be difficult to secure another, and it was almost impossible for a man to run a household without the help of a woman. If a wife

were put aside by her husband, she would return to her family or marry again, for there were no occupations for her to follow outside the family organisation. The effect of the exercise of these economic functions was to make the marital relationship stable.

THE CORRELATION OF THE SIZE OF FAMILY AND SIZE OF ECONOMIC UNIT

It is natural to think of a farm as being run by a family. The size of the farm is very well fitted to the size of the family. If the size of the family determined the size of the farm, there could never be a very great inequality in the distribution of wealth. But there are ways whereby a wealthy farmer can have more land than a single




FIG. 35.—Relation of Size of Farm and Size of Family.

Where wealth is measured in farm land, one way of obtaining the necessary labour is to increase the size of the family. Note the remarkably close adjustment of size of farm to size of family in this particular locality in China. From Buck, *Chinese Farm Economy* (University of Chicago Press).

family can cultivate. One way is to rent land to tenants, another is to own slaves. In the Middle Ages, the rich lord had serfs. To-day the more prosperous farmer hires labour and acquires more machines. These different social arrangements call for some institutions, such as serfdom, slavery, or wage systems. Failing these, or in company with them, the family tries to stretch its size to enable it to till more land. This is true to a certain extent for the sharecropper in the cotton belt of the Southern United States to-day, or for the peasants of Central Europe. A large number of children is the most natural way to achieve this result. Abraham, a rich farmer in Biblical times, was in favour of large families. But the family may also be augmented by

keeping the married sons at home and bringing in daughters-in-law, and even their relatives. The family may expand laterally, which is the custom in China. In Europe and America, we are more familiar with the vertical expansion, grandparents, parents, children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren, referred to in ancient law as the five-generation kindred.

THE SUBORDINATE RÔLE OF AFFECTION IN THE CHOICE OF A MATE

In the household economy, contracting a marriage meant an emphasis on its economic aspects, that is, on property settlements and on the work habits and skills of the prospective mates. A man looked for a good housekeeper and a woman for a capable provider.

The fact that a man would choose a bride primarily on the basis of economic considerations seems strange in a day when romantic love is taught by the films and popular literature to be the sole basis for the choice of a mate. For an agricultural handicraft economy such as existed in Biblical times, the virtues of a good wife are set forth in the following chapter from the Book of Proverbs : ¹

Who can find a virtuous woman ? for her price is far above rubies. . . .
 She seeketh wool, and flax, and worketh willingly with her hands.
 She is like the merchants' ships ; she bringeth her food from afar.
 She riseth also while it is yet night, and giveth meat to her household,
 and a portion to her maidens.
 She considereth a field, and buyeth it : with the fruit of her hands she
 planteth a vineyard.
 She layeth her hands to the spindle, and her hands hold the distaff.
 She maketh fine linen, and selleth it ; and delivereth girdles unto the
 merchant.
 She looketh well to the ways of her household, and eateth not the bread
 of idleness.
 Her children arise up, and call her blessed ; her husband also, and he
 praiseth her. . . .

A good marriage was thought to be one in which the capabilities of the young couple were high, rather than one where the love element was strong. While love was regarded as a desirable factor, it was not considered important enough to be the sole basis for marriage. It was assumed that after marriage affection and congeniality would develop to the degree that they are found in later married life in marriages contracted on the basis of romance. Where marriages were arranged by parents, however, the wishes of the young pair were usually ascertained and respected.

THE SUBORDINATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE FAMILY

When families are centres of affection between mates, parents, and children ; when they are the greatest agency in society for the economic functions ; and where families become attached to so stable a property

¹ Proverbs xxxi. 10-31.

as land, it seems natural that the family reputation should be very significant in determining status. The family name becomes important for business and for property arrangements, and wealth is associated with the family and household rather than with the individual. The belief in the biological inheritance of social gifts and graces is another factor that tends to accentuate the family name. The status of the family may become so important that it overshadows the individual, who tends to be identified as some family's son or daughter, not as a personality in his or her own right.

THE HOME AS THE CENTRAL SOCIAL UNIT

Another observation concerns the importance of family life itself in agricultural societies. The villages in which most families lived were small, and there were few other houses than those occupied by families. Accordingly, the home tended to become the centre of various kinds of activities : social, educational, recreational, and even religious. Churches were sometimes built, but there were no factories, stores, or offices. Only occasionally was there a clubhouse. By comparison with these other agencies the home ranked as a very important institution. While community undertakings, ceremonies, and holidays might compete with the activities centred in the home, even then the participation was usually on a family rather than on an individual basis.

THE MODERN URBAN FAMILY

The Consanguine Family declines. The consanguineous family tended to disappear, especially in the Western world, and the conjugal family became the predominant type. In the early pre-industrial cities, the extended families continued, mainly among the small upper class ; but in the twentieth century, as industrialisation proceeds in formerly agrarian societies like China and India, the family of kinfolk is giving way to the small independent family. The small extended family, or stem family, may still be the most common type of family in India and Japan, even in the cities,¹ but, with urbanisation, the percentage of independent families increases.

As villages on the water highways grew into cities, the situation was not quite the same for the family. The city family was not identified with the land and subsistence production, as was the agricultural family. The city family tended to specialise in such undertakings as blacksmithing, making wheels, and weaving cloth. There was need for labour in such undertakings, but not so much for family labour as for individual labour. The system of apprenticeship enabled a family to draw young labour from other families. Later, wages were paid. The work was done in the household ; the wife's duties were

¹ Sidney M. Greenfield, "Industrialization and the Family in Sociological Theory", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 67, pp. 312-22, November, 1961.

still housekeeping. The early city family was based upon the agricultural family with some modifications.

THE TRANSFER OF ECONOMIC PRODUCTION FROM THE HOME

Industrial organisation eventually outgrew the family. The steam boiler was too big for the home and the power generated required more space for the machinery. The factory instead of the homestead became the unit of production. The factory was too large to be manned by even a very large family.

The process of the transfer of economic functions from the urban family to outside agencies has gone quite far in the past century and has left now chiefly cooking, the care of the house, laundering, and some sewing in the urban family. Even portions of the latter functions have been transferred, as for instance baking of bread to the bakery, cooking of lunches to restaurants and canteens, some laundering to outside laundries, and much sewing to various types of factories. The transfer process is not yet finished. Men's functions were among the first to leave the homestead as farming was given up. Women's more varied household duties have been transferred more slowly. In the agricultural family the process has not gone so far.

THE REDUCTION IN THE SIZE OF THE FAMILY

One important result of this change has been a diminution in the size of the household. The family is now shaped more closely than ever before around the marital pair. The economic activities of the family no longer require the assistance of relatives and married

TABLE 32
SIZE OF PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS IN ENGLAND AND WALES *

No. of persons.	Households—per cent.		
	1921.	1931.	1951.
1	6.0	6.7	10.7
2	17.7	21.9	27.7
3	20.8	24.1	25.3
4	18.6	19.4	19.0
5	13.9	12.4	9.6
6-7	15.4	11.4	6.2
8-9	5.7	3.2	1.2
10-	1.9	0.9	0.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

* From Carr-Saunders *et al.*, 1958, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

children, hence there is no longer any need for their presence in the household.

Table 32 shows that in 1921 and 1931, three-person households were the largest group, while in 1951, two-person households were the most frequent. Single-person households had increased from 6.0 per cent in 1921 to 10.7 per cent of all households in 1951.

This decline in the size of the household may be due in part to the improvement in housing conditions and the reduction in overcrowding, especially since 1931. But it is also due to the contraction




FIG. 36.—Stages in the Family Cycle in the United States.

Increased longevity and decreased fertility of couples mean that more husbands and wives have to adjust to the empty nest. In 1890 the death of the father usually occurred about two years before the last child married and left home. In 1959 the average couple had 16.5 years together after the last child married. (Adapted from Paul C. Glick, David M. Heer, and J. C. Beresford, "Family Formation and Family Composition", in M. B. Sussman, *Sourcebook in Marriage and the Family* (Boston 1963).

in the biological family. The average age at marriage is now less than it was fifty years ago, but they had more children—an average of 5.9 in 1870, compared with about 2.2 to-day. This decline in family size, plus the increase in longevity, means that there are more households with few or no children.

However, this contraction in household size does not necessarily imply a decline in the importance of the extended family, the wider kinship group which includes grandparents, brothers and sisters, and related near kin. There is evidence that kinship is still significant in the older working class areas of large cities. Young and Willmott have shown that mothers still play an important part in the lives of their daughters, and there is frequent contact and mutual aid between

members of the extended family. Such contacts, however, declined as the families were broken up by removal to the new housing estates outside London.¹

THE PROMINENCE OF THE AFFECTIONAL FUNCTION

With the parental function being reduced by birth control, the time spent in rearing children is on the whole relatively little. About 50 per cent of modern urban families in the United States have no children living at home. Many of the economic functions have been transferred to non-family establishments so that the economic functions left are few. The same is, of course, true of the educational, religious, recreational, and protective functions; the prevalence of schools, churches, governments, and commercial recreational agencies attests to this. As a consequence many families have as their main function that of providing affection between the mates.

In the light of the foregoing, it is to be expected that in marriage to-day the affectional element would be emphasised to the extreme. No doubt the romantic side is emphasised also because of the postponement of marriage by many young men and women in the cities to a point beyond that found among primitive peoples generally. The fact that the cultural age for marriage occurs much later than the biological age serves to stimulate the love emphasis. It seems to be agreed that nowhere in the world has romantic love been so emphasised in initiating marriages as in the United States to-day.

In addition to stressing the personality relationships of husband and wife, the small family system emphasises the rearing of the young children. To be sure, the educational function of the family has, in part, been shifted to the state through the creation of the state schools and the passage of compulsory school attendance laws. Yet the very early years are spent almost exclusively in the family, and even when the children are of school age the family protectorate over them still continues.

These intimate functions are seriously affected by the mobility of the population. The average family in a very large American city moves approximately every two years, though the figure must be lower in Britain. This condition, while of some consequence to the parents, is even more serious for the uprooted children. Indeed, in some cases children are deprived of vital social contacts not only in the community but in their own homes as well. The occupational situation of many fathers is such as to require, if not actual travel away from home, then at least a good deal of daily travel between home and place of employment.² In such families, the children, especially when they are little, are often denied much contact with their fathers.

¹ M. Young and P. Willmott, *Family and Kinship in East London* (London, 1957).

² Cf. Kate Liepmann, *Journey to Work* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1944).

RÔLES IN THE MODERN FAMILY

The new conditions have also worked to change the status of husband and wife in the marriage relationship. In an agricultural society, as was pointed out, the family is an economic organisation. Like all economic enterprises, the farm family needs a head. Man generally assumes the leadership, since his services are more important. Besides, the economic leadership of women is always disturbed by the fact that they bear and rear the children. In the modern city, on the other hand, the economic functions of the family are less significant and, accordingly, the need for leadership and control is not so great. Wives may work outside the home for pay. In 1955 in the United States about one-third of married women was so employed.

There has been a marked increase in the proportion of married women who are gainfully employed, from 9 per cent in 1921 to 21 per cent in 1951. This is partly due to the younger age of marriage, but Table 33 shows that the increase is also marked among the higher

TABLE 33
PERCENTAGES OF MARRIED WOMEN EMPLOYED OUT OF ALL
MARRIED WOMEN IN SPECIFIC AGE GROUPS *

Period.	Age Groups.		
	20-25.	25-35.	35-45.
1911	12.9%	10.6%	10.6%
1931	19.2%	13.8%	10.5%
1951	37.8%	24.5%	25.0%

* From D. V. Glass, "Changes in Fertility in England and Wales", in L. Hogben (ed.), *Political Arithmetic* (London, 1938), p. 204, and from one per cent sample Census 1951, General Register Office, Table II-3, H.M.S.O., 1952.

age groups.¹ This increase in the paid employment of married women may well encourage a relationship of greater equality between the sexes.

In spite of the persistent lag in the laws discriminating against women, there has been a substantial modification of the former patriarchal control. A century ago, a married woman could not sue alone; she could not execute a deed without the concurrence of her husband. In many respects she lost at marriage the power of personal independence and altogether that of separate action in legal matters. She lost the entire control of her personal property as long as the

¹ See Myrdal and Klein, *Women's Two Roles* (1956), for a full discussion.

marriage continued. The personal property of the wife went to her husband at marriage to dispose of as he pleased. He also had the right to control her real property and to take the profit from it. To-day women have a right to the control of their own property and unmarried women can enter into contracts. The right of fathers to sole guardianship of their children has been changed. Women have the vote, serve on juries, have protection against exploitation in industries. They can go to college and some can become lawyers and doctors. They have associations of their own. The family was the unit under the old system and man was the head. Now the members of the family tend to be individuals before the law, and custom is giving women many rights.

In the cities in Western industrial society, patriarchalism in the classical sense appears to survive mainly in the upper classes. This

TABLE 34

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MARKED PATERNAL OR MATERNAL AUTHORITY, BY SOCIAL CLASS, COLOGNE, GERMANY, 1955 *

Social Class.	Type of Authority.	
	Paternal.	Maternal.
Upper class	53	0
Upper-middle	30	16
Middle-middle	25	10
Lower-middle	8	34
Upper-lower	19	32
Lower-lower	25	29

* René König, "Family and Authority: The German Father in 1955", *The Sociological Review*, vol. 5, No. 1 (New Series), July, 1957, pp. 123-4. Keele: University College of North Staffordshire.

is indicated by the findings given in Table 34 showing the proportion of families by social class with pronounced paternal or maternal authority in Cologne, Germany, in 1955. It will be seen from these data that the usual pattern of domestic power is equalitarian, except for the upper class, where a bare majority of the families showed a paternal power structure.

Rôle conflicts in Marriage as Sources of Discord. The changes in the rôles of men and women precipitated by modern industrialisation and urbanisation have not occurred uniformly. There are still many who believe that woman's proper place is in the home and not in the labour force, especially if she is married and has a husband who can support her. In a recent survey ¹ of high school students in Gainesville

¹ Raymond Payne, "Adolescents' Attitudes Towards the Working Wife", *Marriage and Family Living*, vol. 18, pp. 345-8, November, 1956.

and Hall County, Georgia, most of the girls indicated that they expected to work after marriage, and most of the boys stated that they disapproved of working wives. Although there is more unreality in the boys' than in the girls' responses, and experience will doubtless bring some changes in viewpoint, the differences are so great as to indicate potential difficulty on this score in the years ahead. When husbands and wives grow up together in a stable society, where rôles are clearly defined, they are likely to come to marriage agreed on what each expects of the other. In a changing society there is greater likelihood of disagreement. A husband with traditional orientation, possibly because his mother played a predominantly if not exclusively domestic rôle, envisions his wife doing the same, whereas a husband with a progressive or developmental viewpoint can see his wife in a non-domestic as well as a domestic rôle. Changes have occurred in many family rôles other than the occupational one, including the religious, educational, recreational, political, and sexual.

The Working Mother. One of the more significant developments of recent decades has been the increase in working mothers. This has been occasioned mainly by the greater labour force participation of married women, many of whom are mothers. The 8 million working mothers with children under 18 years of age in 1960 compares with 4.6 million in 1950 and 1.5 million in 1940. Almost one-third of all mothers with children under 18 were in paid employment in 1960, compared with about one-fifth in 1950 and about one-tenth in 1940. About 2,898,000 working mothers in 1960 had children under six, or about one in three working mothers.¹ There is special interest in the working mothers of pre-school children because public opinion is opposed to such employment,² presumably mainly because of possible unfavourable consequences for the children.

The chances that mothers with children under six will be in the labour force if they are living with their husbands is about one in five, as compared with two in five for mothers who are widowed, separated, or divorced. As expected, more mothers work outside the home when the family income is low than when it is high. But mothers who have attended college are more likely to work than those with less schooling, especially in families with incomes under \$6,000 a year.

No meaningful differences have been found between the children of working and non-working mothers, when other factors are controlled. There may be some but they have not been demonstrated. Problems associated with maternal employment are in general more likely to be found in the husband-wife relationship than in the mother-child or mother-community relationship, perhaps because the husband-

¹ *Who Are the Working Mothers?* Leaflet 37, Women's Bureau.

² Hortense M. Glenn, *Attitudes of Women Regarding Gainful Employment of Married Women* (Doctoral Dissertation, Florida State University, 1958).

wife sector involves changes in the power structure. Employed mothers seem to have higher self-esteem as persons but feel more inadequate in particular domestic rôles.¹

There has been some research into the factors influencing married women's actual or planned participation in the labour force.² It appears that the decision to combine the rôle of housewife and mother and the rôle of paid worker is influenced by the following factors, ranked in order of importance, from the most to the least important : (1) a positive attitude towards her work on the part of the husband ; (2) employment in an occupation before marriage requiring high educational achievement or specialised training ; (3) employment for a time after marriage ; (4) achievement of a high professional level or specialised training ; (5) acceptance by husband of an obligation for child care and household chores ; (6) children of school age.

MODERN DIVORCE

Rôle conflicts in marriage produce discord and lessen affection. Divorced couples hold more divergent conceptions of the rôles of husbands and wives than do married couples.³ Formerly the family was held together by many different bonds—economic, religious, protective, and the like. These ties are still present but in modified and weakened form, and the family depends for its integration mainly on the affectional tie. All things equal, one bond does not hold as firmly as several. With the weakened bonds, the family falls apart more often, and there is more divorce. One theory of why there has been an increase in divorce is that there has been an increase in rôle conflicts, leading to more unhappiness. Another theory is that, whether there has been an increase in marital unhappiness or not, the decrease in family functions means there are fewer restraints or ties. The increase in divorce in the last half century or so has been widespread and sharp, as shown in Fig. 37.

The affectional bond is often very strong at the inception of marriage, but it does not always endure. When it breaks, married couples tend to separate from each other. Yet observation suggests that all discordant couples do not separate. Some remain together in spite of their difficulty. In a word, while dissatisfaction with marriage is obviously the fundamental cause of separation and divorce, the process is facilitated or hindered by other factors, several of which may be indicated.

¹ F. Ivan Nye and Lois W. Hoffman, *The Employed Mother* (Chicago, Ill. : Rand McNally, 1963). See especially Chap. 27.

² Mildred W. Weil, "An Analysis of the Factors Influencing Married Women's Actual or Planned Work Participation", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 29, pp. 91-5, February, 1961.

³ A. H. Jacobson, "Conflict of Attitudes Towards the Rôles of the Husband and Wife in Marriage", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 17, pp. 146-50, April, 1952.

Two such factors affecting the stability of marriage are the age, and the number of children, of the married pair. In America, most marital disruption occurs among those who have been wed a relatively short time. Two-thirds of all divorces go to those who have been




FIG. 37.—The Worldwide Increase in Divorce.

Since the increase in the divorce rate is not limited to the United States but has been worldwide, it seems probable that a set of common factors is involved. Under the influence of increasing industrialisation and urbanisation, the family in many different lands has lost traditional functions, notably those of economic production and protection, which helped greatly to hold the members of the family together. There may now be more affection between mates than in former times, but affection is often less enduring than economic interdependence was in former times.

married less than ten years. This is to be expected, since youth is the mating time, and the chances of remarriage are greater, especially for the female. Married couples are held together by children, although probably less so than is popularly supposed. In 1958 in the twelve divorce-registration area states, only 40.2 per cent of the divorces involved couples with no children; another 22.0 per cent

involved couples with one child.¹ Divorces are concentrated in the early years of marriage before there is much childbearing. If it were possible to hold duration of marriage constant and to allow for separations as well as divorces, the relationship between family disruption and childlessness would probably not be striking.

Another factor affecting the stability of marriage is the type of community in which the family lives. In cities the divorce rate is much higher than in rural regions. This condition is due in part to the fact that in small places the inhabitants are personally acquainted and see each other face to face often during the week. The opportunity for the opinion of others to play a part in regulating a person's conduct is much greater in such a primary group than in a city, where there is much more chance of anonymity and freedom from the social pressure that exists in smaller communities. Moreover, on farms women are an economic asset, adding to the production, and their economic value is utilisable directly in the family. Marriage is more prevalent in farming districts and divorce less common. Though the city woman who works for pay outside the home is an economic asset as truly as is the farmer's wife, her economic activity is independent of the family life, and her economic situation may even favour separation.

Still other factors affecting the incidence of divorce are occupation and education. Men in the middle and upper economic strata have a relatively low divorce rate. They also tend to have a high amount of education. "These facts suggests that circumstances which encourage persons to continue successfully through high school or college and to postpone marriage past teen age also discourage them from dissolving their marriages by divorce."²

In recent decades, the number of children affected by divorce has risen more rapidly than the number of divorces. Also the number of children does not affect the speed with which a divorcee remarries.³ If these trends continue, children may not be so great a deterrent to divorce in the future as in the past.

The pattern of divorce in Britain, however, is somewhat different. Unlike America, nearly two-thirds of all divorces go to those who have been married more than ten years. Moreover, the proportion of divorces granted to those whose marriages are of less than five years' duration has decreased from an average of 14.6 per cent for 1899-1930 to 10 per cent for 1951-4. But there has been a slight increase in the numbers of children involved in divorce. For 1926-30, 28 per cent of divorces went to persons with two or more children, compared with 34 per cent in 1951-4.⁴ However, in two-thirds of all cases,

¹ "Marriage and Divorce Statistics", *Vital Statistics of the United States*, 1958.

² Paul C. Glick and Hugh Carter, "Marriage Patterns and Educational Level", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 23, pp. 294-300, June, 1958.

³ W. J. Goode, *After Divorce* (1955).

⁴ O. R. McGregor, *Divorce in England* (London, 1957).

there are less than two children involved—and some of these may be grown-up.

Finally, mention may be made of religion as a factor influencing the stability of the family. Some religions permit separation but not divorce, forbidding a second marriage. Other churches deplore the breaking of the marriage tie, but condone it under a variety of circumstances. The stability of marriage is often affected by the sensitiveness of the individuals to the opinion of their church. The church attitude itself, however, is affected by the various social forces that are changing the family.

An interesting recent trend is the increase in the rate of remarriage of divorced persons. About three-fourths of persons getting a divorce between 1943 and 1948 had remarried by 1948, and for those divorced in the period 1934-43 about six-sevenths had remarried.¹ Also the proportion of remarried women among those previously widowed or divorced was about one-sixth greater in 1940 than in 1910.² The gains were especially great at the younger ages. Divorce is always a serious matter, but its disorganising effects are less when it is followed by remarriage. The increase in divorce is publicised, but the increase in remarriage is less well known. Yet the latter is highly significant, because it shows that the dissatisfaction is not with marriage but only with a particular marriage. High divorce rates are usually coupled with high rates of remarriage and it is the latter which help to keep societies stable.

The divorce rate tapers off in the later years of marriage but apparently so does marital happiness. More exactly, there is an apparent tendency for American marriages to deteriorate with the passage of time. Although there is no evidence for a national sample, the evidence based on a probability sample of Detroit wives is clear as to "the corrosion of time".³ Young wives turn to their husbands unusually often both for sympathy and to express anger, but as time goes on, their dependence upon husbands in this manner is replaced by such alternatives as God, housework and other people. Whereas happiness declines, understanding increases. The longer couples live together, the more perceptive they generally become of one another's feelings and wishes, and the more accommodating they become to each other.

Significance of Divorce Statistics. These facts are sometimes interpreted to point to the increasing instability of the modern family. It is true that a larger proportion of marriages are legally terminated to-day than 50 years ago. But this does not permit any conclusions as to the relative stability of a marriage judged by other criteria.

¹ P. Glick, *Am. Soc. Review*, vol. 14, p. 730, December, 1949.

² Metropolitan Life Insce. Coy., "The Frequency of Remarriages", *Statistical Bulletin*, January, 1949.

³ Robert O. Blood, Jr. and Donald M. Wolfe, *Husbands and Wives: The Dynamics of Married Living* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1960).

Moreover, separation orders are also indices of the legal stability of the family. If these are added to divorce figures, and allowance is made for population changes, the rate of legal termination of marriages has increased by about four-fold over the last 50 years, compared with a thirty-fold increase in divorce petitions taken alone. However, 93 per cent of marriages still do not end in divorce.




FIG. 38.—Divorce by Occupational Level.

The numbers at the ends of the black bars show the percentages of a sample of 1,434 Philadelphia divorces, 1937-50, whose occupational class is shown at the left of the chart. Thus 5 per cent of the 1,434 divorces were granted to proprietors. But we need to know the percentage of the proprietors in the total labour force. This percentage is shown for 1950 by the number at the end of the grey bar, 10.8; and, for 1940, by 10.6 at the end of the light bar. The proprietors thus had fewer divorces than they would have had, if divorces had been granted them in proportion to their number in the labour force. Likewise the professions had fewer divorces. But the semi-skilled had more than their share. The percentages for the remaining classes were the same as their representation in the labour force. The dictum that desertion is the poor man's divorce is not supported by recent studies. (Data from William M. Kephart, "Occupational Level and Marital Disruption", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 20, pp. 456-65, August, 1955.)

PERSONALITY FORMATION IN THE MODERN FAMILY

As has been suggested, the remaining functions of the family are chiefly personality-forming functions. These are of two types. One has to do with the relations of husbands and wives and the other with the relations of parents and children. The major problems of the present-day family are (1) to make happy husbands and wives, and (2) to produce wise parents who will provide a happy and wholesome childhood for their young.

THE PREVALENCE OF HAPPY MARRIAGES

Several attempts have been made to measure the incidence of marital happiness. One method consists in asking married persons how happy they are ; another in getting ratings from close friends of the married couples. All such inquiries show a large percentage reporting themselves as happy, only a small percentage as unhappy. For instance, in a study by Burgess and Cottrell,¹ only about one-fifth of the marriages are reported as unhappy or very unhappy, while about two-thirds are said to be happy or very happy. In a similar study, Terman² gives much the same distribution. Terman introduced two more terms in his ratings : extraordinarily happy, and extremely unhappy. It is interesting to note that 30 per cent report themselves as extraordinarily happy and less than 1 per cent as extremely unhappy.

FACTORS IN MARRIED LIFE PRODUCING UNHAPPINESS

It is commonly said by those who have looked closely into the experiences of divorced persons just prior to the breaking up of the marriage that sex difficulties between mates are always, or nearly always, present in divorce. But such a statement tells us little since a divorce means that sex relations have probably been terminated at some prior time. Furthermore, sex among human beings is not a simple physiological reaction relatively unaffected by learning, as it is among rats, but instead is conditioned by experience and a large variety of social and cultural factors.³

If there is failure in the sex aspects of marriage, this failure may be due to psychological and cultural factors that impinge on sex and disturb its operation. Sex maladjustments of an organic nature are rare. Burgess and Cottrell report that "with the majority of couples, sexual adjustment in marriage appears to be a resultant not so much of biological factors as of psychogenetic development and of cultural conditioning of attitudes towards sex".⁴ A somewhat similar position is taken by Levy⁵ and by Harriet Mowrer,⁶ who see the sexual side of marriage as largely a matter of personality adjustment between two individuals. According to this view, personality is regarded as generally the most crucial single factor in marital adjustment. Personality is, of course, a complicated set of habits that serve to make us either integrated, nervous, or psychotic.

¹ Ernest W. Burgess and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage* (New York, 1939), p. 34.

² Lewis M. Terman, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness* (New York, 1938).

³ A. C. Kinsey et al., *Sexual Behaviour in the Human Male* (London, 1948).

⁴ E. W. Burgess and L. S. Cottrell, Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 347.

⁵ John Levy and Ruth Monroe, *The Happy Family* (New York, 1938).

⁶ Harriet Mowrer, *Personality Adjustment and Domestic Disord* (New York, 1935).

PERSONALITY OF HAPPILY MARRIED PERSONS

Personality is a vast area, only partly charted, and much too complex to be described in a few paragraphs. However, Terman¹ has tried to describe how the many different personality habits affect happiness in marriage. He summarised his findings in popular terms as quoted below. His summaries as thus expressed are necessarily approximate, since they are not in the precise language of science.

Happily married women, as a group, are characterised by kindly attitudes towards others and by the expectation of kindly attitudes in return. They do not easily take offence and are not unduly concerned about the impressions they make upon others. They do not look upon social relationships as rivalry situations. They are co-operative, do not object to subordinate rôles, and are not annoyed by advice from others. Missionary and ministering attitudes are frequently evidenced in their responses. They enjoy activities that bring educational or pleasurable opportunities to others and like to do things for the dependent or under-privileged. They are methodical and painstaking in their work, attentive to detail, and careful in regard to money. In religion, morals, and politics they tend to be conservative and conventional. Their expressed attitudes imply a quiet self-assurance and a decidedly optimistic outlook upon life.

Unhappily married women, on the other hand, are characterised by emotional tenseness and by ups and downs of moods. They give evidence of deep-seated inferiority feelings to which they react by aggressive attitudes rather than by timidity. They are inclined to be irritable and dictatorial. Compensatory mechanisms resulting in restive striving are common. These are seen in the tendency of the unhappy wives to be active "joiners", aggressive in business, and over-anxious in social life. They strive for wide circles of acquaintances but are more concerned with being important than with being liked. They are egocentric and little interested in benevolent and welfare activities, except in so far as these offer opportunities for personal recognition. They also like activities that are fraught with opportunities for romance. They are more inclined to be conciliatory in their attitudes towards men than towards women and show little of the sex antagonism that unhappily married men exhibit. They are impatient and fitful workers, dislike cautious or methodical people, and dislike types of work that require methodical and painstaking effort. In politics, religion, and social ethics they are more often radical than happily married women.

Terman² states his theory, for which he has some evidence, as follows :

Our theory is that what comes out of a marriage depends upon what goes into it and that among the most important things going into it are the attitudes, preferences, aversions, habit patterns, and emotional-response patterns which give or deny to one the aptitude for compatibility. In other words, we believe that a large proportion of incompatible marriages are so because of a predisposition to unhappiness in one or both of the spouses. Whether by nature or by nurture, there are persons so lacking in the qualities which make for compatibility that they would be incapable of finding happiness in any marriage. There are others, less extreme, who could find it only under the most favourable circumstances ; and still others whose dispositions and outlooks upon life would preserve them from acute unhappiness however unfortunately they were mated.

¹ Lewis M. Terman, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-6.

² Terman, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

An alternative theory holds that what matters more for marital adjustment than particular traits of personality, good or bad, is the compatibility of the mates. There is evidence that in the process of mating itself, a selective factor is operative. Mates tend to choose each other on the basis of complementary emotional needs.¹ What difference such selection makes for marital happiness has not been carefully studied, although it would seem to be important. An interesting study of college couples who were seriously considering marriage compared measures of need complementarity and value consensus over a seven-month period. Consensus was found to be significantly related to progress towards marriage only for the short-term couples, and complementarity for the long-term couples only. These findings suggest that a series of "filters" operate in mate selection. Early in the relationship, social status variables serve as a set of filtering factors. Somewhat later consensus on values comes into play, and still later, need complementarity.²

PREMARITAL TRAITS THAT FORESHADOW SUCCESS OR FAILURE IN MARRIAGE

The traits that make or mar happiness in marriage exist in some degree in individuals before marriage. Where "in-laws" and family finances are sources of friction, they will be more disastrous with some types of personalities than with others; and personalities are in large measure already formed by the time marriage is contracted.

Outstanding among the results of several investigations is the conclusion that a happy childhood in a home of happily married parents is conducive to a successful marriage. This conclusion is reported by Burgess and Cottrell, Terman, Popenoe,³ and Schroeder.⁴ Also, most investigators find that education in high school and college helps to make marriage a success. This conclusion was reached by Burgess and Cottrell, Schroeder, Katherine Davis,⁵ and Hamilton.⁶ Burgess and Cottrell report that happiness in marriage is more likely to be found by men and women who are well socialised as young people; who participate in the activities of clubs, church and school; and who have many friends. Benson⁷ finds that common interests of a familistic sort, as in home ownership and children, are associated with marital

¹ Robert F. Winch, *Mate-Selection* (A Study of Complementary Needs) (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958).

² Alan C. Kerckhoff and Keith E. Davis, "Value Consensus and Need Complementarity", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 27, pp. 295-303, June, 1962.

³ Paul Popenoe, "Marital Happiness in Two Generations", *Mental Hygiene*, vol. 21, pp. 218-31, April, 1937.

⁴ Clarence W. Schroeder, *Divorce in a City of 100,000 Population* (Doctor's Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1938).

⁵ Katherine B. Davis, *Factors in the Sex Life of Twenty-two Hundred Women* (New York, 1929).

⁶ Gilbert V. Hamilton, *A Research in Marriage* (New York, 1929).

⁷ Purnell Benson, "The Interests of Happily Married Couples", *Marriage and Family Living*, vol. 14, pp. 276-80, November, 1952.

happiness, whereas certain interests which married couples may have in common but which are not familistic, like card-playing, are negatively associated with marital adjustment.

THE PERSONALITY OF CHILDREN

Some observers consider that the proper rearing of children is a more important objective of the family than is that of providing happiness for the mates. It is generally agreed that the early years are the most formative of personality. These early years are spent largely in association with parents, nurses, brothers, sisters and playmates who have connections with the family. Hence, the family environment is most important in making the personality of the adult what it is.

The Terman theory of factors in marital happiness lays great weight on genetic factors and/or elements of basic personality structure established in early childhood. In either case, the traits are difficult to change and remain relatively fixed in most instances. That they can often be changed is shown, however, by clinical studies of psychoanalysts and other counsellors. Rogers reports that clients successfully using non-directive therapy made significant, measurable gains in maturity whereas a matched group not exposed to such therapy showed no change. Other studies show that rôle-playing focused on aspects of interpersonal competence resulted in appreciable increases in such competence.

CRITERIA OF A GOOD FAMILY ENVIRONMENT

How can we ascertain the marks of a good family environment in our present-day society? One promising method is to compare the home background of well-adjusted and poorly-adjusted children. Clearly a good home is one that produces the former, and not the latter. Terman in his marriage study, for instance, found that a child's chances of achieving a happy marriage are much greater if his parents have been happily married. Also favourable for marital happiness is a close affectional relationship of the child with his parents, evidenced on the one hand by the absence of serious conflict between parent and child, and on the other by the child's sharing of confidences with his parents. In another study,¹ a high degree of correlation was found between the behaviour adjustment of 33 nursery-school children and the marital adjustments of their parents. For instance, of 22 couples who were poorly mated, 20 had children who were poorly adjusted; whereas of 11 couples who were well mated, 10 had children who were also well adjusted. A good family environment for children, then, is one that provides an emotionally satisfying relationship with parents, based on affection and protection. Under-protection and

¹ Dorothy Walter Baruch, "A Study of Reported Tension in Interparental Relationship as Coexistent with Behaviour Adjustment in Young Children", *Journal of Experimental Education*, vol. 6, pp. 187-204, December, 1937.

under-affection lead to feelings of insecurity, which in turn sometimes cause the child to resort to anti-social behaviour as a means of compensation. For example, a comparison¹ of delinquent and non-delinquent children from the same family showed that the former were those who for one reason or another had failed to develop an emotionally satisfying relationship with their parents. External family situations, such as change of residence and employment of mother, do not affect a child's feelings about himself as much as do the kinds of relationships he has with his parents, specifically his feelings about whether his parents are too strict with him, expect too much of him, treat other members of the family better, and have qualities that he does not admire.²

Praise and blame, like affection, are powerful instruments in shaping personality. A number of studies show that the good family environment provides steady moderate discipline, rather than either of the two extremes, that is harsh discipline or no discipline at all. Terman found that the type of home discipline which most tends to be associated with marital happiness is that which is described as "firm" but not "harsh". The harsh type of discipline characterises the so-called authoritarian household, while the firm is more often associated with the democratic or equalitarian household. In one study³ it was also found that poor parental discipline, taking the form of extensive criticism, was associated with poor adolescent adjustment. Criteria of a good family environment reported by this investigation are: little parental criticism; absence of nervousness in both parents; frequent confidences between parents and children; some physical expression of affection; and common family activities.

THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY

The review which has just been given of the different functions of the family found in the various preliterate cultures and in the historical period shows that the family has changed a good deal in the past and has assumed many different forms and functions. The family has proved to be a very resilient and flexible institution. Despite radical changes in form and function, the family has continued to exist in every society known to us. The craving for affection and the need of rearing children have undoubtedly been fundamental factors in making the family an omnipresent and enduring social institution.

What has been happening in recent years is the decline of the family as an economic institution, with consequent loss of many social functions. These social functions of the family have by no means

¹ William Healy and Augusta Bronner, *New Light on Delinquency* (New Haven, 1936).

² Don C. Carter, "The Influence of Family Relations and Family Experiences on Personality", *Marriage and Family Living*, vol. 16, pp. 212-15, August, 1954.

³ Ernest W. Burgess, *The Adolescent in the Family* (White House Conference on Child Health and Protection, III A (New York, 1934), p. 274).

entirely disappeared, but relatively there has been a great decline. So great has been the change that young people to-day think of the family chiefly as an institution for the provision of marital happiness and the rearing of children. These functions of the family need more study. It seems altogether probable that further study will reveal knowledge that will make it possible for the family to be a source of greater happiness for all its members. In the past, students of the family have focused their attention primarily on the economic and social functions and have made little effort to solve in a scientific way the vital problems of personality.

Of the many different forces that will play upon the family in the future, three are likely to be rather important. These are the uses of electricity in the home, scientific discoveries in biology and chemistry affecting sex and reproduction, and discoveries in the psychology of the learning process.¹

Electricity brings power back into the home. It will not bring back much production into the home because of the economies of mass production in factories. But electricity will strengthen the home functions of recreation and education through radio, television, facsimile transmission, phonograph, electric wire recorder, motion pictures, electric workshop, and so on. Electricity also brings many conveniences for the yard, library, playroom, dining-room, and kitchen.

Advances in our knowledge of the physiology and chemistry of the human sexual and reproductive systems have great significance for the family in the future.² Armed with the contraceptive pill, scientists continue their quest for a contraceptive vaccine which could have great implications for the size of family, especially in overpopulated areas, as well as for marital relations. Other discoveries make possible the more effective promotion of fertility among married couples previously sterile. Advances in artificial insemination and the preservation of germ cells may give a new fillip to the lagging cult of eugenics. New knowledge regarding the sex hormones and nutrition has potentially great value for control of the ageing process.

The third force likely to influence the family of the future is the discoveries in science relating to the learning process. Many attributes of the family affect happiness, but it is generally agreed that affection, which is closely related to sex, is of great significance. Sex, which has long been a matter under taboo, is now much more in discussion and print and is likely to be the subject of further research, especially in that phase that relates to affection. Discoveries in this area may affect profoundly the happiness of mates.

¹ W. F. Ogburn and M. F. Nimkoff, *Technology and the Changing Family* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1955), Part III, "What of the Future?"

² M. F. Nimkoff, "Technology, Biology, and the Changing Family", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 57, pp. 20-6, July, 1951. Also "Biological Discoveries and the Future of the Family: A Reappraisal", *Social Forces*, vol. 41, pp. 121-8, December, 1962.

In the past, societies have been characterised quite generally by a single prevailing type of family organisation. But at present many different types of family organisation exist, a situation which may be expected to continue in the future. Mowrer¹ lists in the city to-day the paternal family ; the maternal family ; the equalitarian family ; conventional and unconventional ; and the filiocentric family. The rural family is quite different from the urban family, and the village family is somewhat different from both, though it tends to resemble the urban family more than the rural family. A question has been raised whether a new type of family is developing on the urban fringe, with emphasis principally on play.² Broken families and families without children differ greatly from unbroken families and those with children. There is some evidence that the value system of American parents is changing as the economic system moves away from its traditional entrepreneurial base towards more bureaucracy. Fathers employed in entrepreneurial jobs tend to encourage in their children self-control, self-reliance, and an active, manipulative stance towards their environment, whereas fathers in relatively large bureaucratic organisations more often encourage traits of impulsiveness, accommodation and other-directedness in their children.³ Thus continued diversification of family life is to be expected in our complex, rapidly changing society.

SUMMARY

Although the family is based on sex and parental functions and is therefore rooted in the biological nature of man, the family in human experience is always a social institution governed by cultural norms. Thus the folkways dictate whether polygyny, polyandry, or only monogamy is permissible ; how and with whom marriage may be contracted ; and how it is to be organised and dissolved.

Our review has shown that there has been no unilinear evolution of the family from the simple to the complex. Family life to-day is not greatly unlike early family life in its small size and relatively high mobility. Even so, the family has varied greatly. The modern family stands in marked contrast to the earlier agricultural family with its numerous, important economic functions—an almost completely self-sustaining business enterprise. Under these conditions, marriage is favoured since a wife is needed on the farm, and children are useful workers. The efficiency and suitability of mates is emphasised over affection as a basis for marriage. The home becomes the central social unit in the community, and the family becomes the principal factor in determining the status of individuals.

With the growth of industry and the rise of cities, family life undergoes profound changes. The economic functions are largely transferred to outside

¹ Ernest R. Mowrer, *The Family* (Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, 1932), p. 96.

² E. Gartly Jaco and Ivan Belknap, "Is a New Family Emerging on the Urban Fringe?", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 18, pp. 551-7, October, 1953.

³ Daniel R. Miller and Guy E. Swanson, *The Changing American Parent : A Study in the Detroit Area*. New York : John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958.

agencies, and the family declines in economic significance. A wife is no longer automatically a worker and an economic asset as before, but may now be an economic liability. Hence, the economic motives for marriage, long characteristic of the institution, cease to be prominent. Children also are expensive, so with the aid of contraception the family tends to be much smaller. With the large-scale transfer of traditional functions to outside agencies and the reduction in the size of the family, increasing emphasis is placed on psychological values such as affection, companionship, and emotional security. This situation, in turn, has the effect of stimulating research in the field of personality and interpersonal relations. While the intensification of research along these lines in the future is likely to provide new aids in strengthening the personal side of family life, the extension of electric power into the home may increase the economic and recreational functions of the family as well. In contrast with the family of the past, that of the future will probably also be more highly differentiated.

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. What are endogamy and exogamy? How do you account for these practices?
2. Why is the family a universal social institution?
3. How does the urban family differ from the rural?
4. Examine the significance of divorce statistics as an index of family stability.
5. Examine the evidence for the view that the modern family is unstable.
6. In what ways has industrialisation affected the structure and functions of the family?
7. How would you account for the increased employment of married women in the labour force?
8. Give an account of the main changes in the position of women in the last hundred years.
9. Examine the factors affecting illegitimacy rates.
10. Examine the causes and consequences of the emancipation of women.
11. What is known about the social consequences of (a) the increase in divorce, (b) increased employment of married women?

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CHAPTER XXII

THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF INSTITUTIONS

INSTITUTIONS AS PARTS OF A SOCIAL SYSTEM

Wherever there is a whole with related parts, there is a system, such as a clock, a human body, a family. Society, a nation, a city, a village—all are social systems. So also a part of society itself may consist of sub-parts and hence be a social system. We may consider the following institutions, family, church, government, economic organisations, and associations, as a whole cluster of institutions ; and if they are connected, they are then a social system. They are all interrelated. For instance, the family in the United States is generally formed by a marriage in a religious ceremony. The members of the family work in factories, offices, and stores. Their dwelling is regulated and protected by government, and the members may join a country club.

The adjustment of parts is necessary for a successful Social System, which should be in balance. The interrelationship of institutions is another illustration of adjustment, a *sine qua non* of social order as well as of physical survival. In this case, the adjustment is one of one social institution to another rather than the adjustment of an individual to his environment. Thus in a state where married women in cities cannot own property, as was the case in England through much of the nineteenth century, there is a maladjustment between the family and government. The test of this maladjustment is the injustice to the individual married woman, yet the maladjustment arises from the fact that the law is not adapted to the family, especially when wives are employed and may be separated and divorced from their husbands.

This idea of adjustment of the parts of society gives rise to the concept of balance. The idea of balance is brought into relief when a change occurs that disturbs an interrelationship. The emphasis is then on the imbalance which is to be corrected. Thus, concerning married women and property, when farming was a joint economic enterprise between husband and wife, who were considered as one, the old common law did not divide property but put it all together for the joint business, and a balance existed between the family and the law. It was a change, which took married women out of the home and put them to work elsewhere, that disturbed the balance. The imbalance was corrected by a change in the law.

The fall of the Roman Empire has been attributed to many causes, which generally indicate an imbalance. Perhaps the imbalance most commonly mentioned is that between the agricultural production

available and the governmental structure. The fall of the Mayan state before the coming of the Spaniards was due to an imbalance between the resources that went to support the high development of art and science and those which went to support the military part of the government.

In a society long stationary, the various social institutions are usually in balance, each being adjusted to the other. In a changing society there is likely to be an imbalance, as when the British withdrew from India, or when the United States military forces occupied Japan. The restoration of equilibrium after a change may, of course, bring about a better balance than existed before the change. Such may be the case in India.

Differing interrelationships of parts are called Patterns. The interrelationships among the institutions of society, whether they be in balance or out of balance, are generally quite intricate and differ from time to time and from area to area. These intricate arrangements of relationships may be referred to as patterns, very much as the arrangements of the parts of a watch assume a pattern.

For instance, in subsistence agriculture the pattern of institutions is quite different from what it is in a city. The family work on the farm in the country, while in cities they work away from home in various occupations. The government touches the family and business institutions in cities with regulations and aids in a greater variety of ways than it does in rural areas. There are many more associations and clubs in cities than in farming areas.

As to why patterns of institutional relations vary, there are many causes. Among the nonliterate peoples without much use of inanimate energy, important are climatic and geographic conditions which affect food supplies. Another important factor in the patterns of social organisation is density of population—high in cities, low in semi-arid regions. Many more institutions are possible and needed in cities. But underlying density of population are technology and nature. The institutional arrangement at the United States air base at Thule in northern Greenland is very different from that of the Eskimo who lived there before the coming of the air forces. Yet the climate is the same. Technology makes the difference possible. Certainly material culture is a pivotal point around which many different institutional patterns are built.

FUNCTION

In the discussion of institutional relationships in terms of linkage and balance and pattern, the language has been largely that of structure. For instance, in thinking of the relationship of family and church, there comes to mind the conception of a family as a group consisting of husband, wife, and children attending church, a place where people come to worship on Sunday. The family and the church are structures.

The significant relationship between church and family, however, is not between the two structures but between the activities of these structures, which we call functions.

Thus one interrelationship of church and family has to do with education. Shall the children be educated in schools supported from public funds without any religious education given, or shall the children go to church schools where the doctrines of a particular religion are taught? Whatever the answer, the important relationship lies in the activity rather than in the structure. It is the actual teaching of children that is the issue.

What one Institution does affects what other Institutions do. The interconnection of institutions is best seen from the point of view of function rather than of structure, for the correlation of the different parts of culture is a functional one. The relationship of schools to industry in modern society is a matter of the functions performed by industries and the functions the schools exercise in equipping the young for earning a living in industry. If the major industry is agriculture, the family may do most of the educating for the future vocation of the youth. If, however, factory production utilising mechanical power prevails, as it does in modern urban life, the school rather than the family may take over the educational function of training for work. Similarly, the family and the church are interrelated. The church may perform the marriage ceremony and have a great deal to say about whether or not the tie may later be severed. The church and the family may share in the education of the children. In other ways as well, the family and the church are interconnected. The various institutions are all related to one another in the functions they perform.

The same Institutions may have different Patterns of Relationship under various circumstances. In England the government gives financial support to the Church of England, and the ruler of England is the head of the church. In the United States, the government is forbidden to support any organised religion. In France the church and state, once united, are now separated.

That such unique configurations can exist among the same set of social institutions is based in part on the fact that there is not necessarily close correlation between the form of an organisation and its functions. This point is important and needs to be further considered. A committee, for example, may do a great many different things. It may legislate, execute, or judge, on a variety of matters. The committee organisation may be the same in each case, yet its functions vary widely.

A less general illustration may be cited. The Pueblo Indians have a very elaborate ritual used in trying to get rains and to increase the fertility of the land. Their neighbours, the Navaho, have taken over some of this culture pattern but use it largely for an entirely different

function, the curing of disease. The organisational structure is the same in both cases, but not so the function.

Function changes more frequently than Structure. The modification of the function of an institution while its structure persists is a very important aspect of cultural evolution. Structure does not usually change as often as function. This may indicate the difficulty of making or inventing a new social structure. This phenomenon is sometimes called cultural inertia, but undoubtedly there is inertia in respect to functional change also. Structure changes less frequently because there is less need for change ; as has been shown, the same structure can often serve many purposes. In any case, the persistence of structure while its functions change often misleads observers, who see the persisting structures more readily than the changing

THE CELEBRATION OF THE WINTER SOLSTICE IN ENGLAND	
1000 B.C.	The emphasis of the Druids was on the rites of the evergreen mistletoe
500 B.C.	Fires and light—burning of the Yule log to celebrate the return of longer days
100 B.C.	Feasting became the predominant feature
1000 A.D.	A church celebration emphasising the nativity of Christ
1600 A.D.	Masquerading and dancing became so prominent that they were later forbidden by the Puritans
1700 A.D.	Children's activities were featured
1900 A.D.	Development of the commercial function

FIG. 39.—Persistence of Structure with Change of Function.

functions. But despite the variations both in structure and in function, the persistence of the major institutions in all cultures and at all times is particularly to be noted.

The Persistence of Major Institutions. Institutions persist because they have one or more essential functions which endure over the years. Such institutions in small communities, and often in large ones, take on many additional functions. This has been illustrated, for instance, in the chapters on the church and the family.

It is important to note, moreover, that the secondary functions of an institution may be modified and even curtailed, but they are not as a rule lost altogether. This can be seen, for example, as regards the church and its educational function. Education is not as significant a church activity at present as it has been in the past. There have been times when the church had a virtual monopoly over formal education. To-day the state schools exercise this prerogative. Despite

this fact, the churches still carry on educational activities of various kinds. The same situation exists for the family and its recreational function. But the family, even now, takes care of the play needs of very little children. The coming of television strengthens the recreational function of the family. In the same way it could be shown that other functions have not been completely lost but only transferred in part.

In a word, institutions share functions. What makes institutional patterns different at various times and places is differences in emphasis and degree in the performance of certain functions.

THE TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS

One of the striking characteristics of our age is the shifting of functions from one institution to another. Particularly noticeable is the use of special purpose associations which may be said to perform some of the functions performed by the major institutions. The bridge club which furnishes recreation by playing cards renders a function formerly supplied by the family or the more general club. The bridge club may perform the function better or differently, but it is still a card-playing function or recreation. Other associations are concerned with hobbies, professions, types of recreation, or specialised functions derived from the major groupings of the economic institutions. These single-interest associations are made possible by larger population aggregates and by the differentiation and specialisation which has naturally attended the growth of culture. While these minor associations have arisen to compete with the large institutions, the latter have experienced in modern times a great deal of shifting of functions among themselves, some institutions losing and others gaining ground.

This shifting of functions is shown by a consideration of four major social institutions, the family, church, industry, and government. Prior to the past few centuries in Europe, the first two institutions, family and church, were dominant and performed a very large number of services for mankind.

Transfer of functions from the church. The Roman Catholic Church in the Middle Ages was a truly remarkable institution. Its many different functions were outlined in the chapter on "Religious Institutions."

Of all these functions associated with the church a few centuries ago, only a small percentage remain to-day. State and church are now divorced in most countries. Education has come to be concentrated more and more in state schools and in private schools free from religious control. The church is no longer the aid to the arts that it was. Medical practice is now undertaken by private associations or is organised by the state. Although some social work is carried on by religious organisations, especially by the Roman Catholic Church in the United States and by the synagogues, the larger volume of

social work is done by the government, national and local, and by private subscriptions outside of the church. For centuries the church has been experiencing a shift of many of its functions to other organisations.

The loss of Functions by the Family. Like the church, the family has been seeing its functions transferred to other institutions. Most important is the loss of economic production. A few centuries ago the family organisation, that is, the household, was the factory of the time. Nearly everything that was produced was produced by the family. But production began to leave the household centuries ago. Metal-working and pottery-making were specialised outside, as were also the production of certain luxury goods. Then came steam which required a larger building than the home. To the factory went spinning, weaving, furniture-making, production of leather goods, and the fabrication of men's clothing. Some cooking has gone to the restaurant, the canning factory, the delicatessen store, and the soda fountain, while most baking is done in bakeries. The family living in an apartment in a modern city engages in little economic production except for processing food and cleaning house.

Concomitantly the family has lost other functions, notably the education of the children which has passed in large part, for children over five years of age, to the school. Whereas formerly the household and the homestead were the school where the young learned most of what they needed to know, the school-teacher has now become a part-time substitute or rival of the parent.

Also, the family formerly exercised a considerable protective function. The husband protected his wife and children from robbers or wild beasts. A dependent relative was protected by the family, especially in the case of a female who had few outside occupations open to her. Finally, the young protected their parents when they became old. These functions have been transferred in large part to the state, which has an army, police, and old-age insurance. The law will not permit a parent to possess a revolver without a licence, and the modern husband is more helpless against a robber than he was in earlier times against wolves. Indeed the state with its child labour and compulsory school attendance laws has stepped in to protect the children against their own parents.

Another function of the family was that of providing leisure-time activities, since there were few places of commercialised recreation in farming communities. The home was the place for entertaining, for visiting. But now cinemas, parks, playgrounds, athletic fields, clubs, bowling greens, billiard rooms, race tracks, motor-cars, and the city streets provide attractions which take the members of the family away from the home for amusement. The development of recreational agencies has diminished the proportion of amusements furnished by the family.

THE TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS TO GOVERNMENT

In the Middle Ages government in the small local community needed little machinery. Government in larger areas covered chiefly the provinces, over which a nobleman ruled. In wartime he exercised a good deal of authority. In recent times, particularly in the twentieth century, local and central governments have been extending their activities into a great variety of fields. Government, either of cities or of the whole nation, has taken over the functions of education, health, insurance, policing, furnishing relief and work to the unemployed, and providing recreation, caring for functions which were formerly performed by the family or the church. With regard to industry, governments now regulate those industries the price of whose products is of great concern to many other businesses and to a large body of individual consumers. Such businesses are railways, electric light, gas, and water companies and banks. Modern government also exercises certain controls over industry in the protection of workers concerning such things as accidents, sanitation, the work of children and women, and sometimes wages and hours of work. The state, excepting the socialistic type, has not gone extensively into the field of production, although most governments undertake some slight production of goods. The state has no such dominant control of functions regarding production as the family possessed in the period of domestic economy, but even so, it seems fair to say that many functions of control and regulation of industry have been transferred from the family to the state.

THE ADDITION OF FUNCTIONS TO INDUSTRY

Although the functions of industrial organisations are largely economic, in some instances where stores or factories engage in welfare work they may assume some educational, health, or protective functions. Again, certain industries or groups of them take on quasi-governmental functions. Many industrial plants, transportation companies, mines, banks, and stores employ private guards who behave much as public police do. In certain American mining towns the company police become an organisation of considerable importance in the lives of the miners. Industries also maintain lobbies around legislative assemblies in order to secure favourable legislation.

Changing Functions from Village to City. Villages and cities are called communities rather than institutions. But they may be looked at from the point of view of institutions, for communities are collections of institutions. Such a view is important, for we all live in large or small communities. Formerly and throughout history and the agricultural era, nearly everyone lived in villages. Now in the Western world large proportions of the population live in cities, as shown in Chapter XII. During the agricultural era the local

community was small, a hamlet or village, and was characterised by very little formal government. In contrast to the situation in the large city to-day, the problems of government were not great. Everybody knew everyone else and what he had in the way of property. So even if one citizen stole from another he could not use property without everybody knowing it. This would not be true for outside robbers, of course. Each person also knew what the other persons did, hence behaviour was under close scrutiny of neighbours. Gossip and the value of reputation were most excellent policing devices. The village was thus a "face-to-face group" that regulated a good deal of activity without the use of any appreciable amount of governmental machinery. Much education of children and the formation of their personalities resulted almost automatically and unconsciously from the play of children in villages and from the operation of various group pressures regarding conduct.

In a large city the citizens do not know one another, even close neighbours. The population moves frequently—approximately every two years in the large cities of the United States. Hence there is much anonymity of behaviour. Criminals find a large city the best hiding place. Police and government regulations regarding cleanliness, health, and traffic, are developed to provide services that are rendered more or less automatically and unconsciously by the group forces of the small community.

In both hamlet and metropolis the interdiction of bad conduct is a function of the community, but the organisation for controlling such conduct has changed as the community has grown from small to large.

SHIFTS OF FUNCTIONS BETWEEN INSTITUTIONS

This brief review of the four major social institutions during the past few centuries in the Western world shows that the family and church have been losing functions from their complex of activities. On the other hand, two others, industry and the state, have been adding to their functions. The church has yielded functions in large part to government, while functions of the family have been shifted to both the state and industry. The functions of the village as a face-to-face group persist in villages still, but in modern cities these automatic community functions have given way to formal government.

NEW INSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS

In the immediately preceding paragraphs it was shown how social evolution has shuffled functions and redistributed them among four important social institutions. Institutions have risen and fallen in the long course of written and unwritten history as they have gained or lost functions.

But the gain and loss of functions by institutions is not wholly a

matter of shifting functions back and forth between them. For new functions are added and old ones lost. The family in the Western world no longer practises infanticide. That function has not been transferred to any other institution ; it has been abandoned. So also the family no longer manages slaves ; slavery has been prohibited. That function has been lost to the family, not transferred.

Similarly, institutions have acquired new functions. The state has added the function of regulating communication by wireless. Even in the United States where broadcasting is commercial a large number of regulations have been ordered by the Federal Communications Commission. This function did not exist before the creation of this commission and naturally could not have existed before the invention of wireless.

Another useful idea in the conception of institutional change is the growth of function. When this is what one is interested in, then there is not so much concern about the transfer of functions, or the division of the field between the different institutions, as there is in the new functions viewed in detail. Thus, if there is interest in the regulatory function of the state in regard to human welfare, then the regulation of prison labour, the safeguarding of machinery, or the prohibition of child labour are seen as new functions rather than as transfers.

The conclusion of this analysis is that in modern times many functions have been shifted away from the family, church, and local community to the state and industry and that the latter two institutions have experienced a great increase in functions, many of which when viewed in detail are seen to be new functions.

PRESENT INTERDEPENDENCE OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

In a changing society the interdependence of social institutions has a good deal of practical significance, for a change in one institution may affect other institutions. Some special clusters of interrelationships need to be mentioned because of their great importance at the present time. Some of these are the interrelations of social institutions with the business cycle, the city, war, and technology, and also the interrelations of the state and industry. Chapter XXIV, "Social Effects of Innovation", will discuss the interrelations of technology with the various parts of culture. Chapter XII, "Communities", showed how various social institutions within the community are affected by variations in the size of the community.

This matter of the interrelationship of institutions is an important part of sociology. Each of the special social sciences, such as economics and political science, deals with only one set of institutions. These special social sciences do not treat adequately the interconnections of institutions. Anthropology does this for the simple cultures but not for modern society. History generally concerns itself with unique

events rather than institutions, hence not much on the interrelationship of institutions comes from the pens of historians. There is a need, therefore, for a sociology which shall be an over-all social science to the extent at least of treating in a broad way these interconnections of the various social institutions.¹

THE INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS ²

Economic institutions vary not only as they develop or degenerate over the years—as the factory system has grown and trade guilds have declined—but they have short-time variations which are called *fluctuations*. These fluctuations alternate between prosperity and depression and are referred to, not with much accuracy, as business cycles. In the paragraphs immediately following, we shall see how these variations in economic institutions cause variations in other institutions, thus demonstrating the interdependence of institutions.

As regards the family, the business depression lowers the marriage rate, the birth rate, the divorce rate.³ Severe depressions seem to increase the illegitimate birth rate ; to cause a higher unemployment rate among men than among women ; but to increase the unemployment rate more for married women than for single women ; and probably to prolong the period of parental responsibility for children.⁴ As to desertions and separations, there are no data available, but one may gather that they are affected by depressions also. The poorly integrated families suffer from the shock of depression more than the well integrated.⁵ Families on relief move much more often than non-relief families.⁶ Sample data suggest that the authority of the husband tends to suffer as a result of the depression.⁷

The church does not escape the influence of depressions either. The Methodist and Congregational Churches have had a greater gain in membership in depressions.⁸ Church attendance in the Congregational Christian Churches increased slightly during the depression of the early nineteen-thirties. The various activities of the churches appear to have suffered during the depression of the early nineteen-thirties. With declining income and with building debts that did not

¹ William F. Ogburn and A. Goldenweiser, *The Social Sciences and Their Interrelations* (Boston, 1927).

² Based on American data. For a study of unemployment in Britain, cf. Pilgrim Trust, *Men Without Work* (London, 1936).

³ William F. Ogburn and D. S. Thomas, "Influence of the Business Cycle on Certain Social Conditions", *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, vol. 18, pp. 324-40, September, 1922.

⁴ S. A. Stouffer and Paul Lazarsfeld, *Research Memorandum on the Family in the Depression* (New York, Social Science Research Council, 1937).

⁵ Robert C. Angell, *The Family Encounters the Depression* (New York, 1936).

⁶ R. S. Cavan and K. H. Ranck, *The Family and the Depression* (Chicago, 1938).

⁷ Robert and Helen Lynd, *Middletown in Transition* (London, 1937), and Mirra Komarovsky, *The Unemployed Man and His Family* (New York, 1940).

⁸ George P. Davies, "Social Aspects of the Business Cycle", *Quarterly Journal of the University of North Dakota*, vol. 12, pp. 107-22, January, 1922.




FIG. 40.—Effects of Depressions on Society.

Social conditions change with the fluctuations of the business cycle. Having a business depression is like dropping a bombshell in society. There is hardly an institution or a custom that is not affected, showing very clearly the interrelationship of the economic factor with social conditions. The above chart shows a few such relations. The above business cycle is computed by averaging the business cycles from 1870 to 1920 in the United States for five periods: namely, the peak of prosperity, the half-way point in recession, the peak of depression, the half-way point in recovery and the peak of prosperity. Data from William F. Ogburn and Dorothy S. Thomas, "The Influence of the Business Cycle on Certain Social Conditions", *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, September 1922.

decline, the situation was not very favourable for expansion of activities.¹

Governments are affected by depressions, especially if the depression is severe. In the depression of the nineteen-thirties, the difficulty of raising money by taxation in local governments caused curtailment of some functions, especially in education. Economy programmes became popular, but new obligations were assumed, particularly in the care of the unemployed. This obligation was too heavy for most local governments, and it was transferred in large part to the government. The government also put forth efforts to lessen the shock of the depression and to bring about a revival of business. New boards and commissions were appointed to deal with problems of the depression.

These data indicate only certain major influences of the business cycle on certain social institutions. The minor influences which have in general not been studied so thoroughly are much more numerous. For instance, one study has listed in the neighbourhood of 100 possible influences of business depressions upon education, such as changes in curricula, personnel, legislation, salaries, building, and attendance.²

Variations in the economic organisation affect not only these major social institutions in countless ways, but also many social activities.³ Crime tends to increase during depressions. Death rates are lower. Suicides are more frequent. Strikes are fewer. There is less drinking of beer and whisky. The activities studied indicate that the economic institution is closely connected with many parts of culture. But the available studies probably indicate only a very small fraction of the total influences.

THE PROBLEM OF GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY

We have just seen that variation in economic conditions causes changes in the family, the church, the government, and many other institutions. Of these interrelationships of institutions, a major issue in our present age is : what shall be the relationships between government and industry? The chief concern regarding the relations of government and industry is the shift of production from industry to the state. This is the problem raised by socialism.

Government Aid and Regulation. Industry, as the reader knows, was at one time under the control of the family. But it grew too big for the family and prospered as an independent social institution relatively free from control by any other institution. This condition of freedom is variously called *laissez-faire* or free enterprise. But no institution exists alone, free of any interrelationship with other institutions.

¹ S. C. Kincheloe, *Research Memorandum on Religion in the Depression* (New York, 1937).

² The Educational Policies Commission, *Research Memorandum on Education in the Depression* (New York, Social Science Research Council, 1937).

³ William F. Ogburn, "The Fluctuations of Business and Social Forces", *Social Forces*, vol. 2, pp. 1-21, January, 1923.

Industry has become increasingly interrelated with government, rather than with church or family.

This interrelationship was at first of a twofold nature. Industry depended upon government for aid, and government attempted to regulate industry. The problem really became one of struggle for power, rather than one of transfer of functions. For if government was to aid industry by establishing a tariff, or by supplying stable money, or by protecting investment in other countries, or by giving subsidies to railroads or airlines, it was desirable for industry to have some power over government, at least in those areas with which industry was concerned. On the other hand, if monopolistic industries of the type essential to all others, such as railroads or electric power companies, charged higher prices to get more profits at the expense of the other industries, it was necessary that the prices of these monopolistic utilities be controlled. The family or the church was not in a position to control industry. Government was the only institution that could do it. The government early began regulation to protect its citizens, as in the employment of children and of women, and in the requirement of safeguards over dangerous machinery. Governments in the United States owned some industries such as the supply of water to residents of cities. In other countries, governments came to own the railroads, telegraphs, and telephones.

At the same time that government was extending its regulatory functions, industry was making gains and extending its influence over government in areas such as those dealing with the tariff, taxation, and subsidies for railroads and agriculture. This struggle in democratic countries was in part a struggle for the votes of the citizens. As a part of its campaign, industry has undertaken to provide welfare work, such as pensions, insurance, and health and recreational facilities.

In this struggle for power there entered a new factor—war. For the War of 1914-18 and that of 1939-45 both affected greatly the relations of industry and government. In the United States, and in other countries, industry and government co-operated quite smoothly in trying to defeat the common enemy. But in this co-operation the seat of power shifted quickly to the government, since it was natural for the government to direct the war. Furthermore, government bureaus and departments were a major purchaser of the products of industry; hence the government acquired power quite readily. The government restrictions, by rationing and otherwise, on the production of electric refrigerators and other commodities for the home were not a particular hardship on the industries involved, for there were enough orders for war equipment to pay them for the loss.

War may be viewed as a special form of crisis, of which a severe business depression is another kind. In crises governments assume more power and extend their functions. During the depressions of

the 1930's, the federal government in the United States greatly increased in power and in functions in combating unemployment, distress in agriculture, etc.

After the war was over, the government of the United States withdrew from most of its wartime control and direction of industry. Rationing and price control were abandoned even when the supply was short and the result was a rise in prices. But the withdrawal was not all the way back to the ante-bellum conditions. Governmental control over credit was greater than formerly. In the special case of atomic energy, the government was in production. It also extended its control over housing in postwar years. In Europe, the withdrawal of government from industry was generally less than in the United States.

Governmental Ownership of Industry. The rise of government and of industry and the decline of the family and the church are the outstanding institutional trends since the Middle Ages. The problem of the relation of these two growing major institutions—government and industry—is one of the great problems of our time. By "our time" is meant the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, and possibly the twenty-first century.

Russia, after the violent Bolshevik revolution of 1917, committed herself to the governmental ownership of an industrial establishment which was not large, for the U.S.S.R. was an agricultural country. With successive five-year plans, production has been magnified under governmental ownership and direction.

In Britain following the close of World War II, the government acquired the telecommunications, coal, electricity, and transport in 1945; and the banks and aviation in 1946. With these and the "nationalisation" of the steel industries, about 20 per cent of British industry was governmentally owned.¹ The acquisition was by purchase. This governmental sector in the economic system was reduced, upon the election of the Conservative Party to power, by the return to private ownership of the iron and steel industries and road transport. Television broadcasting was also set up under private control. At the same time the government developed plans for building atomic reactors for the production of power for private industrial use.

The achievements or failures of government-owned industry in Britain were not spectacular one way or another. The evidence is still debated by those who favour government ownership and those who oppose it. The trial was, however, an important experiment by a highly industrialised nation with a long democratic tradition and with a relatively high plane of living for employees.

In Sweden a system has evolved in which partial, or occasionally complete, government ownership is often combined with private

¹ Herman Finer, "Planning and Nationalisation in Great Britain", *International Labour Review*, vol. 57, pp. 157-86, March, 1948; 283-99, April, 1948.

operation. The part ownership is in shares of stock. Industries in the system are iron mines, forests, hydro-electricity, radio, liquor, transport, and telephones.

In China, the victory of the Communists in the civil wars in 1949 brought a programme for governmental ownership of industries ; but at first the lack of personnel and experience among the Communists left much of the operation of industries temporarily in private hands. Later, governmental ownership of industry was greatly extended, and the government—after dispossessing the large landowners—aided in setting up large co-operative farming units, embracing over 92 per cent of the farms. At the present time, nearly 90 per cent of the Chinese people are agriculturists,¹ and the city populations are largely engaged in trade. But in the future an increasing proportion of China's economic activities will be in power manufacturing, because China has both coal and iron. The Chinese have a tradition of some governmental enterprise as shown in the construction by the government of the Great Chinese Wall and of extensive irrigation works. There is also prestige in governmental employment. Since large private industries are few, a strong sentiment in China against their ownership by the government does not exist.

India's great need is capital to industrialise and to increase consumption. Governmental ownership or heavy taxation is more likely unless investment from outside sources can be had. The pressure is strong towards enlarging the governmental sector in industry. In her second five-year plan, India expected to contribute 8 or 9 per cent of her gross national product to improvement, while China contributed 22 per cent. India has expectations of some private investment.²

The United States has the least governmental ownership of industry. The most conspicuous examples are the ownership of hydro-electric power in the Tennessee Valley and the ownership of the production of atomic energy. The industrial achievements of the United States are impressive, as are also those of Western Europe.

The economy of the United States, a blend of private and public enterprise, has been called a *mixed economy*. The increasing rôle of government in economic affairs has been stimulated by the revolution in technology, the burgeoning exigencies of defence, and trade developments resulting from world-wide industrialisation. Government serves increasingly as a regulator of the economy, leading to what a top labour leader has called a "state-steered economy".³ Thus the

¹ Gerald Winfield, *China : The Land and the People* (New York : William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948).

² For an interesting account of the race between Communist China and democratic India to industrialise—a race of great potential significance to the world—see Wilfred Malenbaum, "India and China : Development Contrasts", *Eastern Economist Pamphlet*, No. 35, New Delhi, India, 1956.

³ Joseph A. Beirne, *New Horizons for American Labor* (Washington, D.C. : Public Affairs Press, 1963).

federal government increasingly intervenes in significant labour-management disputes. Government also functions more as an operator, financier, and purchaser. Governmental purchases of goods and services at federal, state and local levels in 1962 ran at an annual rate of 116 thousand million dollars or substantially more than one-fifth of the gross national product. About 20 per cent of all wealth in the United States is publicly owned.¹ Yet ownership in some ways is more democratically distributed than before, with some 17 million private citizens shareholders in private corporations. Although the American economy is mixed, the mixture consists of four-fifths private enterprise and one-fifth governmental ownership.

An important point is that government is a big underwriter of research and development, the key to economic growth. The federal research expenditures for fiscal 1963 equalled \$12.3 thousand million; ten times the sum spent in fiscal 1950, and twice the amount put into research by private industry, universities, foundations and other non-profit organisations. Most of the research, however, is farmed out to private laboratories.²

The tendency for governments to take over the function of large-scale production, particularly in important utilities and key industries, seems to be growing over the world, although private ownership is statistically predominant. How far this tendency will go, or whether it will increase, slow down, or be reversed, is not, of course, known.

The economic tests for the success or failure of "the production state" will be the rate of production, the provision of new capital, the creation of new inventions, the assumption of risks, the meeting of consumer preferences, and the elimination of the inefficient.

On the social side, the question arises of possible loss to the individual of freedom and of initiative since the tendency of government in production is to be authoritarian and unresponsive to consumers' wants.

A transfer of productive functions from industry to government does not occur smoothly. There is a struggle for power; for those who possess economic functions have power.

The "welfare state"—the government which does much in public welfare work for its citizens—is not to be confused with the "socialistic state", which is one where government owns the means of production. The socialistic state will probably be a highly developed welfare state; but so may a private capitalistic state with few productive functions, though industrial taxpayers may resent the payment of taxes for this welfare work.

¹ Robert J. Lampman, *The Share of Top Wealth-Holders in National Wealth 1922-56* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 8.

² A. H. Raskin, "Our Economy: Mixed and Mixed-Up", *The Reporter*, October, 1962, pp. 27 ff.

SUMMARY

The parts of a culture are interrelated somewhat like the parts of a clock, and not like a handful of coins. This interrelationship is well shown by the dramatic changes that take place in many parts of society during a war or during a business depression. Social institutions, which are important parts of a culture, cannot be understood fully when considered separately. Their interrelationships make a culture pattern, which varies in different areas and at different times.

For this reason the history of an institution such as the family does not show the same course of change for every people. Different societies have different technologies, different sex ratios, different-sized communities, etc.; hence the family institution, influenced by these different factors, follows a somewhat different course in its development in different areas. But because of the special influence of the factors of material culture and size of population, there are uniformities in some institutions as they are found among low hunting cultures, high hunting cultures, hoe cultures, plough cultures, and mechanical power cultures.

The major institutions, such as the family and government, which are found nearly everywhere, have not just one function, but many. As the culture pattern changes, a function may shift from one institution to another. Thus to-day the care of the old is being transferred in part from the family to government. In modern times, many functions of the family and of the church are being transferred to the government, to industry, or to special-purpose organisations such as the school. Also new functions that did not exist before may be added to an institution. Thus government will either own or regulate the production and use of atomic energy.

As a result of these transfers and additions, government and industry are expanding greatly. At the moment, there is much discussion about which functions will go to government and which to industry. This is the issue of socialism. For instance, will government undertake production of electricity, or leave it to private industry? Also, though the increased social control by industry and government has diminished our freedom, the decreased social control by the church and the family has increased it.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Why may an institution persist even though it loses many of its functions?
2. Which major social institutions have been losing functions? Which have been gaining?
3. Which is changing more rapidly, the structure or the functions of (a) the state, (b) the church, (c) the family?
4. Examine the relations between education and social class in England since 1870.
5. Analyse the relation between class and power in any advanced industrial society.
6. What are the relations between (a) property and class, (b) property and power in contemporary England?
7. Compare the social functions of religion in feudal, nineteenth-century, and modern England.
8. To what extent is it possible to speak of a distinctly middle-class and working-class family?

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PART VII : SOCIO-CULTURAL CHANGE

Forty-five years hence, business will be different from what it is now. Government is also due to make important changes. Even religion and the family will not remain the same during this period. We know they will change because it has been shown in the preceding section (Part VI) that these major institutions are changing more rapidly now than before.

Since cultural and social systems are in process of rapid change, we want to know why they are changing, and what are the processes of change. In 1906 Rivers¹ wrote a book describing the culture of the Todas, a people of India whose livelihood comes from the buffalo. In the appendix to this book there is an account of the culture of the Todas three hundred years earlier, written by a Portuguese missionary. It shows that very little change had taken place in three hundred years among the Todas. In the community where the reader lives, however, there have been tremendous changes in three hundred years. Why has there been so much change in Britain and so little among the Todas?

In Part VII an attempt is made to supply the answer, in so far as research has made it possible to do so. Chapter XXIII traces the processes by which cultural and social systems grow and the manner in which they develop. There are forces that impede social change as well as those that foster it. When changes occur, their significance lies, of course, in the effect they have on social life. That changes in one part of culture may be followed by changes in other parts may be obvious; not so evident are the manner in which influence is exerted and the profound degree of the effects, as will be brought out in Chapter XXIV, "The Social Effects of Innovation".

The direction of social changes is of great importance. Change is inevitable, but it is not always favourable. There are forces at work in every society leading to the breakdown of the established organisations and to the disruption of their functions, producing what are known as social problems. The disruption of the economic organisation, for example, brings unemployment and economic misery. The nature and operation of some of the factors responsible for such disruption are considered in Chapter XXV, "Social Disorganisation". Concomitantly, however, certain counter-forces are operative in the community. These forces effect working adjustments which permit the group to carry on. Unemployment, for instance, is countered by relief, insurance, vocational training, and other aids. Many individuals in modern society are interested not only in easing the strain so

¹ W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas* (New York, 1906).

that social life may be maintained, but in improving it as well. The idea of social progress is thus introduced. The question of whether man can build a better world in which to live is a fundamental one. It is, considered, along with other problems of social reconstruction, in the concluding chapter of the book, "Society and Adjustment "

CHAPTER XXIII

PROCESSES OF SOCIO-CULTURAL CHANGE

If you stand on the top floor of a skyscraper and look down on the roaring city below, you will see buildings, buses, ships, cars, railways, telephone lines, bridges, stores, libraries, colleges, churches, factories, theatres, and homes. There is, however, much more to a city than the material things that meet the eye. There are also distinctive patterns of social structure, simple and complex, reflecting the organisation of social rôles, norms, and values. If, being curious, you should ask how this socio-cultural complex we call a city came to be, the answer you would probably get is that it was all created out of the brain cells in the mysterious grey matter that fills the skull of egotistic man. This is a deceptive answer, for these things were not created all at once. Even though the city may have been a barren plain two hundred years ago, it required a half-million years, more or less, to create what you see below. For the structures that fill a city rest on some inventions made many thousands of years ago, such as the screw and the lever, which were devised in the Ice Ages or earlier.

HOW CULTURE GROWS

Culture Accumulates. Such a long period of growth means that culture accumulates. The city spread out around the skyscraper exists, then, because culture accumulates. The early toolmaker who flaked stone by pressure improved on the method of flaking by percussion. To his improvement were added successively, after a long interval of years, methods of pecking, grinding, chiselling, and boring. Eventually bone was used for making tools; antlers and ivory were added to the stock of materials. Then came the hammering of the metals which are found in the pure state, such as copper and gold.

TABLE 35
NUMBER OF PATENTS ISSUED IN THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE PLOUGH SULKY *

Years.	Cumulative Frequency.	Years.	Cumulative Frequency.
1855-9	. . . 35	1895-9	. . . 499
1870-4	. . . 64	1900-4	. . . 515
1875-9	. . . 195	1905-9	. . . 530
1880-4	. . . 359	1910-14	. . . 541
1885-9	. . . 439	1915-19	. . . 546
1890-4	. . . 483	1920-3	. . . 549

* Adapted from F. Stuart Chapin, *Cultural Change*, p. 359.

To these were added, comparatively recently, the reduction of ores by fire to get the pure metal, like iron, or to make alloys like bronze. Thus culture slowly accumulated.¹

Growth by Addition. The principle of the growth of culture is the same as that of all growth. If the number of new elements added exceeds the number of old elements lost, there is growth; otherwise culture either remains stationary or declines. This is the way the body of a child grows, through the addition of a number of new cells greater than the number that die. In the case of culture, the new element that is added is termed an invention when it first appears. After it is in use it is referred to as a culture trait. In ordinary usage an invention is regarded as something mechanical, an object made of some solid substance. But the term may be extended to include social inventions, for example, a new organisation like the juvenile court, or a new folkway like dancing the tango. There are other inventions in the non-material culture, such as the essay in literature.

Relatively Few Elements are Lost. Once an invention is made and its usefulness demonstrated, it is not likely to be lost, because language enables the art to be transmitted from one generation to another. Still, there is no gainsaying the fact that some losses do occur. Ancient methods of making stained glass are said to have been lost.² The making of armour is another example, and still another is the Egyptian process of embalming. These losses are slight, however, compared to the whole stock of human cultures.

The use of bone implements was added to the stone cultures, but the metals in large part rendered both the stone and bone implements obsolete. In a similar manner motor-cars have displaced horses in city streets.

Accumulation in Non-material Culture. The process of accumulation is easily seen in material culture, but its operation in the realm of non-material culture is not so obvious, except in the case of scientific discoveries. Among customs and ceremonies and many other traits of non-material culture, the replacement ratio may be higher than it is with inventions in the material culture or scientific discoveries in the non-material sphere. Although it is possible that in earlier times new customs and rituals were elaborated to an even greater degree than material inventions, such is not the case to-day.

The principle of the accumulation of the social heritage means that the people born to-day in a modern city come into an inheritance far richer than that possessed by those born a century ago. A hundred years hence our descendants will inherit material culture that has grown by accumulation to a size much beyond that which we inherited.

¹ N. C. Nelson, "Prehistoric Archaeology", Chap. v in Franz Boas *et al.*, *General Anthropology*, 1939.

² John Beckman, *A History of Inventions, Discoveries and Origins* (4th edition, revised and enlarged) (London, 1846), vol. 1, p. 137.

THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTINUITY

The growth of culture cannot be appreciated without recognising that every new culture trait is the outgrowth of existing culture traits. Thus the industrial union of workers, as illustrated by the Congress of Industrial Organisations in the United States, developed out of the experience of trade unions, as illustrated by the American Federation of Labour, that is, the organisation of workers by trades. Trade unions based upon common skills evolved from the guilds in the Middle Ages, existing long before the modern factory system. The guilds were grouped by trades based upon skills but were not employee organisations. The trade guilds in turn came from associations of merchants formed in early cities for mutual protection particularly against aggression by feudal barons and their followers. These several social inventions did not spring full-blown out of nothing. Rather they represent a succession, one growing out of another.

Inventions, both mechanical and social, often appear to be wholly new. They are, however, only partly new. Much of their composition consists of old elements, as in the above illustration of labour unions.

This principle of continuity lends significance to the old adage "there is nothing new under the sun". A visitor to Paris sees the Arc de Triomphe, that magnificent and incomparably beautiful arch erected to celebrate the victories of Napoleon, and is moved to comment on the artistic creativeness of the French people. But the French did not create such a monument out of nothing. Further travels to other European cities show that many of them have beautiful arches. The Romans constructed them nearly ten centuries ago. The Greeks, we are told, festooned the gates to their walled cities to celebrate the return of their victorious soldiers. Triumphal arches have a history.

Invention, then, is a step in evolutionary development. Any inventor who makes a significant improvement does so by virtue of the fact that he is standing on the shoulders of a huge giant, the human race since the beginning. "If I saw farther," said Isaac Newton, "'twas because I stood on giant shoulders."

THE PRINCIPLE OF CROSS-FERTILISATION

The new element in an invention or discovery in one field is often the result of the union with an idea from another field. Thus Darwin's theory of natural selection was an application in biology of an idea from sociology. Darwin was impressed by Malthus' discovery of population pressure on food supply resulting in a high death rate. This idea, applied to the struggle for existence in the plant and animal world, resulted in the idea of selection of the fittest to survive.

Cross-fertilisation has long been recognised as a source of new ideas. Unfortunately, students sometimes keep the ideas they learn in sociology classes restricted to that field, and the ideas they learn in

biology classes within the confines of that discipline. The departmental divisions in universities and colleges often erect barriers round each discipline which are a hindrance to the free flow of ideas from one subject to another.

DIFFUSION

The new ideas for inventions may come not only from different parts of the same social heritage, but also from different cultures. The transference of culture traits from one area to another or from one part of culture to another part is called diffusion.¹

Few Locally Invented Elements in a Culture. In any given area, the number of locally invented elements is only a small fraction of the total culture. This fact is shown in a vivid manner by Linton,² who traces the origin of certain culture traits with which an American comes in contact as he starts an ordinary day.

Our solid American citizen awakens in a bed built on a pattern which originated in the Near East but which was modified in Northern Europe before it was transmitted to America. He throws back the covers made from cotton, domesticated in India, or linen, domesticated in the Near East, or wool from sheep, also domesticated in the Near East, or silk, the use of which was discovered in China. All of these materials have been spun and woven by processes invented in the Near East. He slips into his moccasins, invented by the Indians of the Eastern woodlands, and goes to the bathroom, whose fixtures are a mixture of European and American inventions, both of recent date. He takes off his pyjamas, a garment invented in India, and washes with soap invented by the ancient Gauls. He then shaves, a masochistic rite which seems to have been derived from either Sumer or ancient Egypt.

Returning to the bedroom, he removes his clothes from a chair of southern European type and proceeds to dress. He puts on garments whose form originally derived from the skin clothing of the nomads of the Asiatic steppes, puts on shoes made from skins tanned by a process invented in ancient Egypt and cut to a pattern derived from the classical civilisations of the Mediterranean, and ties around his neck a strip of bright-coloured cloth which is a vestigial survival of the shoulder shawls worn by the seventeenth-century Croats. Before going out for breakfast he glances through the window, made of glass invented in Egypt, and if it is raining, puts on overshoes made of rubber discovered by the Central American Indians and takes an umbrella, invented in south-eastern Asia. Upon his head he puts a hat made of felt, a material invented in the Asiatic steppes.

On his way to breakfast he stops to buy a paper, paying for it with coins, an ancient Lydian invention. At the restaurant a whole new series of borrowed elements confronts him. His plate is made of a form of pottery invented in China. His knife is of steel, an alloy first made in southern India, his fork a medieval Italian invention, and his spoon a derivative of a Roman original. He begins breakfast with an orange, from the eastern Mediterranean, a cantaloupe from Persia, or perhaps a piece of African water-melon. With this he has coffee, an Abyssinian plant, with cream and sugar. Both the domestication of cows and the idea of milking them originated in the

¹ A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology*, Chap. viii, "Diffusion", pp. 194-215. (General statement with illustrations.)

² Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York, 1936), pp. 326-7.

Near East, while sugar was first made in India. After his fruit and first coffee he goes on to waffles, cakes made by a Scandinavian technique from wheat domesticated in Asia Minor. Over these he pours maple syrup, invented by the Indians of the Eastern woodlands. As a side dish he may have the eggs of a species of bird domesticated in Indo-China, or thin strips of the flesh of an animal domesticated in Eastern Asia which have been salted and smoked by a process developed in northern Europe.

When our friend has finished eating, he settles back to smoke, an American Indian habit, consuming a plant domesticated in Brazil in either a pipe, derived from the Indians of Virginia, or a cigarette, derived from Mexico. If he is hardy enough he may even attempt a cigar, transmitted to us from the Antilles by way of Spain. While smoking he reads the news of the day, imprinted in characters invented in Germany. As he absorbs the accounts of foreign troubles he will, if he is a good conservative citizen, thank a Hebrew deity in an Indo-European language that he is 100 per cent American.

Most of the social heritage of colonial America was brought there from England, Spain, and other European countries. Some items of the social heritage, such as the potato, maize, types of cooking, and methods of warfare were contributed by the American Indian, though this fact is not generally known. England and France derived much of their culture from Italy. Italy, in turn, borrowed from the Greeks. It was once thought that Greece created her culture, but now it is known that the Greeks borrowed a great deal from Crete, and that Crete got hers, in large part, from Egypt. Egypt has been shown to be greatly indebted for her culture to the valley of the Euphrates. And now connections are being made between the Euphrates and India, and between India and China. Clearly there has been a vast amount of borrowing of culture by one region from another.

Isolation a Deterrent to Diffusion. That a culture in a given locality grows largely by what it imports from other areas is shown by the backwardness of regions that are relatively isolated from other culture areas. These are found in out-of-the-way islands and mountain sections. In some of the mountains of the southern Appalachians in Kentucky, North Carolina, and Tennessee, the handicrafts are practised as they were in colonial days before the coming of steam, though not quite to the same extent. Some of the families in these regions make nearly everything they consume.¹

It must not be thought that the culture in such mountain communities is necessarily retrogressive. These peoples have simply not gone forward as rapidly as do those that are in close contact with other groups. The latter can take advantage of each other's inventions, and need not depend merely on inventions they make themselves.

THE RATE OF CULTURAL GROWTH

The Growth of the Superorganic was incredibly slow in its Early Stages. The reference to the lagging development of the social heritage of

¹ United States Department of Agriculture, *Economic and Social Problems and Conditions of the Southern Appalachians*, Miscellaneous Publication No. 205 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1935).

isolated peoples brings to the fore the important question of the rate at which culture grows.

We have very little evidence to tell us about the growth of culture before the last ice age. Only stones survive. Even bones disappear, except in a few cases. As far back as a half million years ago men or men-like animals were using two kinds of stone implements, probably for digging roots or shaping wood. One type is called the core ; the other is the flake which came from the core. The core was a hand axe, and is almond-shaped like the two hands with palms placed together. These cores are found widely scattered over the world, and there were variations from area to area. Over a period of 400,000 years they became longer and more oval shaped and were flaked all over. The flakes underwent a great improvement in shaping in the period between the second and third glacials. They were shaped with a flat straight edge. Afterwards, over the next 200,000 years there were further improvements.

Evidences of fire, as in hearths of caves, go far back to the cave near Peking, where a human species with a small braincase, *Sinanthropus*, lived. In Europe there are abundant evidences of fire in the habitations of Neanderthal man during the last ice age.

As the flakes off the core stones became more diversified, the use of the core declined. Towards the close of the Old Stone Age (paleolithic), the variety of flakes lessened, and more small flakes were used. The reason probably was that the small flakes with an excellent cutting edge were set in a base. Thus we see flakes replacing cores, and small flakes reducing the variety. These changes are measured in terms of tens of thousands of years.

Later the Superorganic grew rapidly. Following the paleolithic ages came the mesolithic with use of more bone and ivory, and a further reduction in the flakes. Again a substitution of new inventions for older ones. This mesolithic material culture in Europe was much like that of the Eskimos in the nineteenth century before contact with Europeans.

Following the mesolithic period came the neolithic, about eight thousand years ago in South-western Asia. Smooth polished stones were substituted for some of the roughly chipped stones. Shortly thereafter came copper and bronze and then iron. In modern times there is a bewildering variety of metals and alloys in use.

To attempt to give a quick view of the growth of culture, or even material culture, from stones and bone and metals is quite inadequate. This inadequacy of stone culture to indicate the whole culture is well illustrated by the neolithic culture. The most significant development of neolithic times was not the polishing of stone, but the raising of food, both animal and plant, instead of hunting for wild food. It is this discovery that gives rise to the phrase, "the neolithic revolution".

This quick view of the growth of material culture shows (a) an

accumulative process, (b) a partial substitution of the new for the old, and (c) an acceleration of the accumulative process through invention and increasing rapidity of change. In the beginning of the Pleistocene age, changes were measured, it seems, in hundreds of thousands of years. In later paleolithic times, in tens of thousands; in neolithic, in thousands of years; and in modern times, in decades or annually.

Lowie¹ has expressed this change in the rate of accumulation in the following metaphor:

We may liken the progress of mankind to that of a man of one hundred years old, who dawdles through kindergarten for eighty-five years of his life, takes ten years to go through the primary grades, then rushes with lightning rapidity through grammar school, high school, and college.

CAUSES OF CHANGES IN RATES OF GROWTH

Relation between Existing Knowledge and Rate of Invention. One cause of the growth of culture is the functional relation between the existing body of knowledge and the rate of invention. Any invention depends for its inception upon the existence of elements that make up the invention. The invention of the aeroplane depended on the knowledge of the internal combustion engine. The invention of calculus depended on a knowledge of analytical geometry. So also shaping a stone by flaking depended on a knowledge of breaking a stone by striking.

Indeed, an invention may be further defined as a combination of known elements into a new element. The telegraph is a combination of battery, electro-magnet, and wire. Pottery is a combination of clay, water, heat, colours, and other things. Since an invention is made up of existing elements of knowledge, any particular invention can be made only if the elements which go to make it up are known.

Figure 41 shows how six important inventions were combined into one to produce the motor-car. The six underlying inventions were the petrol engine; the container for the liquid fuel; the running gear and accompanying mechanism; the intermediate clutch; the driving shaft; and the carriage body. Fig. 41 also shows how the internal combustion engine in turn was a combination of still other inventions that preceded it, such as the principle of compression, the electric spark and gap, and the water-jacket cooling system. This combination of known elements to create a new invention is not confined to material culture; it is characteristic of social inventions as well.

The cave man was an infrequent inventor, and at least one reason for this was that he had so little knowledge and there were so few cultural elements out of which to make an invention. Modern man is a frequent inventor because he has so much knowledge, especially in such fields as mathematics, physics, chemistry, and other sciences,

¹ Robert Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology* (New York, 1917), p. 78.

and there are so many elements of culture which he can put together into new combinations. Modern man would be a greater inventor




FIG. 41.—Mechanical Invention as a Combination of Known Elements.

The motor-car was made up of a few important existing inventions, as shown in the above chart. Thus the new grows out of the old. From F. Stuart Chapin, *Cultural Change* (New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, 1928), p. 336.

than the cave man even if they both had the same inherited mental ability, because in modern times there is more accumulated knowledge.

THE EXPONENTIAL PRINCIPLE

The facts of the growth of culture conform to the general theory that a positive correlation exists between the number of mechanical




Fig. 42.—Social Invention as a Combination of Known Elements.

The antecedents of the White Paper on Social Insurance (Cmd. 6550 & 6551), 1944. No attempt has been made at giving a complete guide to the provisions outlined in the White Paper or to their history. The diagram shows the first adoption of the various principles in Great Britain and their antecedents, if any, abroad. Dotted lines represent the vaguer relationships. (Prepared for the English edition by W. L. Luetkens.)

inventions made at any given time and the size of the existing accumulation of old material culture. In paleolithic times, the accumulation was small, and the inventions were few. But some inventions were added, so the number of cultural elements grew. As the accumulation became larger, more discoveries were made and the stock of existing knowledge piled up faster. The speed seems to have been accelerated so that the movement became faster and faster as the body of knowledge got larger and larger.¹

This general description conforms to the exponential curve, like that for the growth of compound interest. The amounts of interest if plotted in a chart would show an increase each year a little larger than the increase the year before and hence the curve would be concave. We call it an exponential curve because the formula, $P_n = P_0(1 + r)^n$, for computing compound interest has an exponent, n .

In a similar manner, if one culture had 10,000 elements and produced one invention in a given time, then a culture with 10,000,000 elements would produce 1,000 inventions. Even if the rate continued the same, the added inventions, like the interest in compound interest, would become greater and greater with each successive unit of time and would thus follow a concave curve such as that shown in Fig. 43.




FIG. 43.—Important Inventions and Discoveries from A.D. 1000 to A.D. 1900.

In the early centuries of the last millennium less than ten important inventions and discoveries were recorded, while in the last century there were more than two thousand. Even if a number of the important inventions of the early years were omitted, there still is a remarkable acceleration of growth. These inventions and discoveries are, of course, only one phase of culture, but they suggest a process of growth for all culture. Compiled from L. Darmstaedter and R. Du Bois Reymond, *4000 Jahre Pionier-arbeit in den exakten Wissenschaften*, J. A. Stargart, Berlin, 1904.

¹ William F. Ogburn, *Social Change* (New York, 1922).

The Exponential Curve only an approximation. The foregoing statement of the growth of inventions at an exponential rate because of an accumulation like that of compound interest is an abstraction based upon the relation of the size of the accumulation at any one time—sometimes called the cultural base—and the number of inventions made. The exponential principle is an example of a mathematical model.

The reason the exponential curve is only an approximation is that there are other factors, such as the demand for invention, and possible variations in inventive ability, which cause the rate to fluctuate.

One qualification is that not all inventions are of the same significance as possible components of other inventions. A dynamo is much more important in stimulating other inventions than is a fountain pen.

Another qualification is set by reality. For instance, the number of ancestors of an Englishman living in 1950, according to an exponential formula expanding in the series 2, 4, 8, 16 . . . , would have been at the time of William the Conqueror, around 2 billion. Yet the total population of Britain at that time was less than 2 million. The "reality" that depressed the exponential increase in ancestors was inbreeding and the size of the island. Hornell Hart¹ has made extensive studies of growth curves of economic and social phenomena for the United States and for Europe, and finds a large proportion of his curves are like Pearl's. They go up like a concave curve for a while and then flatten out, making a curve like an elongated capital S that leans forward. Hart concludes that cultural phenomena grow in a series of surges, one S curve following another. The series of surges suggests that the growth of culture is cyclical—fast, slow, fast, and so on. But the point here is that no exponential curve can continue indefinitely, except in the mind of the mathematician. Reality, one way or another, bends it.

We have been speaking of the growth of the superorganic as a whole. When we break it into parts, there are other qualifications to its exponential growth.

We may divide culture into two parts: material culture, such as mechanical inventions; and non-material, such as social institutions and ideologies. Most of the observations made by measurement have been of material culture, such as the number of patents. Hence we do not have as good evidence that the non-material culture grows by the exponential curve or that its growth in modern times is at as great a rate. Certain types of social researches seem to grow exponentially, but there is some doubt about the rate of growth of other social phenomena, as, for instance, religious rituals in recent times.

¹ Hornell Hart, *The Technique of Social Progress* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1931); *Can World Government Be Predicted by Mathematics?* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Edwards Brothers, 1943); "Logistic Social Trends", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 50, pp. 337-52, March, 1945; "Depression, War and Logistic Trends", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 46, pp. 112-22, September, 1940.

We may also divide culture into parts geographically. Thus there is a culture in Japan and one in Greece. The growth in any particular area when there is a good deal of contact with the outside is not alone from the cultural base in that area but by diffusion from outside. When inventions come in from the outside, the rate of growth may still be exponential, but at a faster rate than if the inventions came solely from the accumulation within that area. Thus Japanese culture grew very rapidly by importing inventions from the west after 1854, when Commodore Perry broke down Japan's commercial seclusion. The inventions, social and mechanical, which are imported are, of course, unequal. Some are important and some not; thus the growth may be by surges.

This factor of the culture base—the existing accumulation of materials, knowledge, and ideas—is of very great importance. But it is not the only factor. There are two others: demand and inventive ability.

The Factor of the Demand for Inventions. Necessity is said to be the mother of invention. Yet necessity does not always produce an invention. The American Indians had perhaps a greater demand for medicine than their white successors. Yet the Indians developed only one or two useful herbs—quinine, for instance. They did not have the accumulation of knowledge to make the desired medical discoveries. Again, one may argue that the need for a mechanical cotton-picker was as great as the need for a cotton gin; yet there was more than a century between the two inventions. We need very much a social invention to control the use of the atom bomb, but it has not yet been made.

Demand as distinguished from need does, however, often account for the kinds of inventions made. The Pueblo Indians value the dance very highly, as do many primitive peoples. They have, as a result, a great variety of dance forms and practices. The Australian aborigines turned their attention to religious practices, and religious rituals proliferated.

On the other hand, our cultural base is now so large, and we have so much in the Western world with which to invent, that invention is often the response to need. Thus when we needed to dispel or overcome fog over airports, there appeared rather quickly twenty-five different¹ ways of doing it. On the other hand, we have not yet discovered a cure for cancer, though there is great demand for such a cure.

Mental ability as a Factor in Inventions. In addition to demand and to the cultural accumulation, a third factor in invention is mental ability. It is necessary to distinguish between inherited mental capacities and learned abilities. It is assumed that some individuals

¹ S. C. Gilfillan, "The Prediction of Inventions", Chap. II in *Technological Trends and National Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 22.

have a greater native capacity to invent and others less, much as some persons are tall and others short. The distribution of most biological phenomena, simple or complex, is in the form of a normal frequency distribution. If the inherited inventive capacity of a large number of persons could be measured and plotted on a curve, it would be bell-shaped with those of average capacity in the middle, much as in the case of the distribution of stature. If a position in the upper half of the curve were the sole prerequisite to being an inventor, then there would be in the United States 95,000,000 potential inventors. If, however, inventors should be found only in the upper tenth of the scale, then in the United States there would be 1,520,000 persons with the requisite inherited mental power.¹ It is concluded therefore that in most large populations of the same race there is a surprisingly large number of individuals with inherited capacity sufficient to be inventors.

Yet the number of inventors is small. The reason is that all the individuals with sufficient inherited capacity are not trained to invent; nor does society encourage invention on the part of all those who are properly trained. Thus, in anthropology, there are numerically few research workers who are making scientific discoveries. Theoretically, if inventors are found in the upper half of the curve of mental ability in the United States, there might be 95,000,000, so far as inheritance is concerned. But the time and money required to produce Ph.D.s in anthropology cut the number down, and then the demand for anthropologists is relatively so slight that society will support only a few. So it is in other fields. Besides, there are things for men to do other than the making of inventions.

In any large population, then, the scarcity of invention is due to lack of attention given to invention, rather than to a scarcity of inherited ability. Since the inherited bases exist, invention could be stimulated by more educational training and application. One hesitates to attribute the scarcity of invention per capita in one country as compared with another to lack of inherited mental ability. The number of inventions per capita is very much greater in Switzerland than in Iran; ² but the reason is not likely to be found in the variations in the inherited mental ability of the two peoples, who belong to the same race, though to different sub-races.

THE GROWTH OF CIVILISATIONS

Readers who are curious to know how our civilisation came to be, will find the explanation in terms of the principles of invention

¹ W. F. Ogburn, "The Great Man Versus Social Forces," *Social Forces*, vol. 5, pp. 226, December 1926. These numbers are simply the area of a segment of the normal frequency curve, the total area of which is the total population of the United States.

² S. C. Gilfillan, "Inventiveness by Nation", *Geographical Review*, vol. 20, pp. 301-4, 1930.

and accumulation set forth in the preceding sections of this chapter. These same principles help to explain not only the evolution of the superorganic as a whole, but also the evolution of parts of culture and of cultures in particular areas. In explaining a particular culture such as that of Greece¹ or particular parts of culture such as political organisation, the additional principles of diffusion and of adjustment, discussed more fully in succeeding chapters, will also be helpful.

Before discussing the explanatory factors of social change in




FIG. 44.—The Commonness of Inherited Inventive Ability.

The black area represents 0.8 per cent of the total area under the curve, and the shaded and black areas together represent 6.7 per cent of the total area. If a biological trait of inherited mental ability were measured on a line from the least to the greatest, then the people of the mental ability represented by the upper tenth of the line would constitute about 0.8 per cent of the total area. If hereditary inventive genius occurred only in the upper half of the normal curve, then in a country like the United States, with its 190,000,000 people, there would be 95,000,000 inventors. If such genius existed only in the upper tenth of the range, there would be about 1,520,000 inventors. If a position in the upper quarter of the range of inherited mental ability were required, then there should be about 27,000,000. Clearly, other factors besides inherited mental ability enter into becoming an inventor.

particular culture areas or in parts of culture, it is desirable to consider a few introductory concepts.

What is Civilisation? Writers have many different concepts of civilisation. The authors of this book think of civilisation as the recent development of the superorganic since approximately the time of the inception of a cluster of significant inventions including writing, the use of metals, the invention of the wheel, and the domestication of cattle and horses. This concept is much the same as that of those who base civilisation on civil organisation as contrasted to clan or

¹ No culture is to be explained fully and in detail without a great deal of research, and even then the data may be inadequate, as in earlier cultures such as Persia. But the factors of invention, accumulation, exponential growth, diffusion, and adjustment can be developed into a probable explanatory hypothesis.

kinship organisation. Civil organisation was found more commonly in large towns which accompanied the important cluster of inventions just cited. However, A. A. Goldenweiser¹ made the word *civilisation* more or less synonymous with *culture* and applied the term to non-literate peoples.

Others reserve the word *civilisation* for some selected part of a culture. Thus Brooks Adams² thinks of civilisation as being essentially a highly developed political organisation. His concept implies order maintained over an area by governmental power. Thus the decay of civilisation would be the weakening of a government's ability to maintain order and system in a political state.

To Arnold Toynbee,³ a civilisation is essentially a religious and ethical system holding sway over an area often larger than a state or nation. Such a system is unified by customs, institutions, and ideologies.

Oswald Spengler⁴ emphasised the creative aspect of a culture in such fields as art, philosophy, scholarship, and music in connection with the government of the state.

These writers, along with many others, confine the term *civilisation* to only a part of culture, such as government, art, ethics, or religion. Whatever the part of the superorganic that is selected, it is not treated objectively but is endowed with values and rated, for example, as higher or lower. These values are often contrasted with those of savagery or barbarism. Thus to Pitirim Sorokin, the important values of civilisation are what he calls sensate and ideational values, which often alternate in a culture area through long stretches of history.

These selected parts of culture, called civilisation, are, of course, different from culture as a whole. The concept of civilisation as a set of ethical values is different, too, from an objective concept of culture. The whole culture of a people at any one time is a particular configuration of its parts: material culture, family organisation, economic organisation, political organisation, custom, religion, philosophy, science, art. The patterns which these make are highly varied. India, China, Egypt, Greece, Rome—all had different configurations.⁵

THE GROWTH OF SOCIETIES

Sociologists take a special interest in social change, that is, change in social structures. These structures range from simple dyads such

¹ A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilisation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1922).

² Brooks Adams, *The Law of Civilisation and Decay* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1943).

³ Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1947).

⁴ Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1939).

⁵ A. L. Kroeber, *Configurations of Culture Growth* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1944).

as friendships and monogamous marriages to complex societies. In recent years the evolution of traditional agricultural societies into modern industrial systems has received special attention, for practical as well as theoretical reasons. This is the phenomenon of the so-called underdeveloped nations and their ambitions to become fully developed, an important problem for international relations in our time. The sociologist is interested in the processes of change involved in the transition from one type of society to another. The great desire of underdeveloped nations to raise their living standards quickly, often referred to as the revolution in social expectations, results from the marked advances in communication and transportation in our time and from the competition on the part of the rival super-powers for support of the non-committed nations. Decreasing social isolation is a major characteristic of our time, whether it be between nations or between communities within a nation.¹

The term *underdeveloped area* is loosely used to characterise an area with a low level of economic development, a per capita income of 100 dollars being frequently given as the cutting point. On the basis of this criterion, the degree of urbanisation and the proportion of the labour force engaged in non-agricultural occupations, one study designates 1.6 thousand million or two-thirds of the world's population as underdeveloped countries.² These are mainly in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia.³ Their political systems have certain common features: they are mixed in character, with central structures of government mainly modern in form but both modern and traditional in methods of implementation; they lack integration because of a decisive accent on communal reference groups such as tribes, races, or religions; and they are characterised by a wide gap between the élite (leaders) and the masses.⁴

Traditional society has been characterised by various students as folk, *Gemeinschaft*, sacred, and non-literate. High birth rates and high death rates maintain a population balance. Property is mainly in land and communication is oral. Transitional society, by contrast, is illiterate. There is a population imbalance because, while deaths are controlled, births are not. Modern society is urban, *Gesellschaft*-oriented, secular, literate. Low birth and death rates keep the population in balance. Property is in money and communication is via mass media, oral and written. A high empathic capacity is the predominant personal style only in modern society

¹ The Plainville of 1955 is much more a part of the mainstream of American life and culture than that of 1940. Art Gallaher, Jr., *Plainville Fifteen Years Later* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).

² Eugene Staley, *The Future of Underdeveloped Countries* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954).

³ Lyle W. Shannon, *Underdeveloped Areas: A Book of Readings and Research* (New York: Harper and Brothers), p. 11.

⁴ Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960).

because here one must deal with unfamiliar people in unfamiliar situations. A study of social change in the Middle East gives Iran, Lebanon and Turkey as cases of traditional, transitional and modern society, respectively.¹

The secular evolution of a modernising society shows three phases.² First comes urbanisation. About 10 per cent of the population must be urbanised before "take off" occurs. Accompanying the urbanisation is literacy on a small scale, needed to maximise or rationalise urban development. Then comes the growth of the mass media, a process which accelerates the literacy. The critical optimum is said to be 25 per cent of the population urban, after which urbanisation no longer plays a determinant rôle, since literacy can be exported to the hinterland without the further growth of cities. A high literacy rate in turn raises the rate of participation in all sectors of the social system, especially the political sector. Middle Easterners in this survey who were modernists said they were happier than did those who were traditionalists.

The Sources of Social Change. The presumed determinants of change have been sought both in factors external to the social system and in internal or immanent factors.³ Claims for certain alleged external factors, such as climatic trends and biological characteristics, considered as sole determinants have been abandoned because they are long-term, change very slowly and cannot account for the more rapid social changes measured in decades. More realistic external sources of change are inter-system sources, reflected in the process of cultural diffusion and acculturation. As to internal causes of change in social systems, there is a wide range of possibilities: inconsistencies between ideal values and patterned social behaviour, variation resulting from uncertainties in socialisation, rôle ranges and deviations, are strains inherent in all systems. As to the latter, these may be occasioned by demographic imbalances in the short run and by growth of population in the long run. Scarcity situations, in goods, services, time and loyalty, may play their part in change. Then there is the inevitable conflict between normative alternatives. Value dissensus is an ever present fact of life.⁴ Another observation is that organisational change may be advantageously viewed in terms of dialectics: a solution of one set of problems gives rise to a new set.⁵ A closely allied theory is that of immanent change, the idea that social systems, somewhat like the human body, are subject to growth and decay;

¹ Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society (Changes in the Middle East)*, (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1958).

² *Ibid.*

³ Wilbert E. Moore, "A Reconsideration of Theories of Social Change", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 25, pp. 810-18, December, 1960.

⁴ Melvin Tumin, with Arnold S. Feldman, *Social Class and Social Change in Puerto Rico* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961).

⁵ Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, *Formal Organizations* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962).

as Sorokin¹ has observed, all systems (not just the capitalist) bear the seeds of their own destruction. As an example, he notes that the change from the Ascetic Ideational system to the Active Ideational is inevitable with institutionalisation; converts to the movement are not likely to be as ascetic as the original members.

An additional interesting internal source of change is the type of leadership in the society. An impressive example in Turkey was the great leader, Atatürk, who was perceptive enough to encourage economic development within a comprehensive social matrix. Thus he degraded the fez and the veil, publicised his own portrait in formal Western attire, simplified the national language, established Peoples' Houses and put radios in them so that he could get his ideas to the people. Within this matrix he built factories and roads. The élite may promote change, as in Japan, and as among the Maori, where rapid economic development was achieved without significant change of social structure.²

Leaders are important in influencing the route and pattern of industrialisation,³ but this should not cause us to lose sight of the fact that technology is the principal key to modern society. A central question in Social Science is this: is the moral order a result of techniques by which a people gains a livelihood or is the ethos the cardinal causative factor of the character of the total culture? A recent study, by a variety of statistical measures, reports that both technology and ethos are the two most influential factors, and that there is a consistent, although slight, advantage in favour of technology.⁴ The gross national product in the United States increased fivefold between 1890 and 1950 as the result of a twofold increase in population and a threefold rise in labour productivity, because of new machines and improved techniques of organisation, marketing and the like.⁵ A money economy in the form of wage labour and cash crops is a potent source of change in traditional society. It weakens the traditional rural co-operative work patterns by leading to more discrimination in the use of labour and the hiring of fewer, more hard-working peons.⁶

¹ P. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*. One-volume edition (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1957).

² Bert F. Hoselitz, *Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1960).

³ Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop, Frederick H. Harbison and Charles A. Myers. *Industrialism and Industrial Man: The Problems of Labour and Management in Economic Growth* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960). In addition to types of élites, this major study traces the nature of industrialism to the inherent logic of industrialism, the stage of development, and the cultural inheritance.

⁴ Alvin W. Gouldner and Richard A. Peterson, *Technology and the Moral Order* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1962).

⁵ S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), pp. 107-10.

⁶ George M. Foster, *Traditional Cultures: and the Impact of Technological Change* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962).

Processes of Social Change. In an earlier section of this chapter, processes of cultural change were identified as accumulation (continuity) and diffusion. Essentially the same processes are operative in social change, although the terms used by sociologists to describe the processes are often different from those used by anthropologists. Thus Parsons, Smelser and others have developed what are called differentiation models of social change. According to this view, new subunits develop to perform already existing functions in a more specialised manner. Thus there is leadership in the rudimentary primitive band, as in the head of the family. As the group develops, headship becomes more specialised as a separate function in such a political leader as the chief. Recently, a complementary model to social differentiation has been proposed, a so-called epigenesis or accumulation model, which describes social units which acquire new subunits that perform new functions. An example is international unions or systems that become supranational communities, such as the European Economic Community. In differentiation, old structures are proliferated; in epigenesis, presumably, new structures are created.¹ The distinction is reminiscent of the distinction made earlier in this chapter, between old and new elements in innovations.

The differentiation model has been applied to industrialisation and to the study of underdeveloped countries.² With regard to the former, Smelser has traced the sequence of events by which production and society were revolutionised in England in the eighteenth century. He shows how market pressures resulting from successful British wars and treaties and a greatly expanded foreign market led to dissatisfaction with some aspects of the system of production. There was a shortage of cotton yarn. The spinning wheel and distaff could not keep pace with the loom. Also the masters were unable to control the workers under the "putting out" system. He shows how at first there were undirected or misdirected symptoms of disturbance, using the poor as scapegoats, blaming them for the inefficiency. Then came holding operations, such as mediating conflicts through the courts, and encouraging inventions, which came in due course: the spinning jenny, the water frame, the mule, the power loom, the steam engine. The lines of differentiation in industrial structure were mapped out. Then came the phases of implementation, and routinisation, as the new methods and practices were integrated into the social system. Concomitantly came the structural differentiation of the family system. The economic rôle of the family head became more specialised. Limitations were placed on child

¹ Amitai Etzioni, "The Epigenesis of Political Communities at the International Level", *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 68, pp. 407-21, January, 1963.

² Neil Smelser, *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959). Also "Toward a Theory of Modernization", in Amitai and Eva Etzioni, eds., *Social Change: Sources, Patterns and Consequences* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).

labour. The education of children was split off in part from the home.

Industrialisation takes different forms, and proceeds at a different pace, in different societies because of variations in cultural history and the mediating rôle of distinctive configurations of social institutions. Industrialisation developed more extensively and rapidly in Japan than in China in part because the Japanese family system was more conducive to such change than the Chinese.¹ The organisation of the Japanese factory differs from that of the American in important respects, a notable one being that a Japanese entering employment in a factory is likely to make a lifetime commitment, with the management in turn assuming a paternalistic interest in him.²

While the structures of industrial societies differ in certain particulars, they also have some common elements. So too they have a standard set of social consequences, some of which have been detailed in earlier chapters.³

The Ranking and Comparisons of Cultures. When is a civilisation great? The answer depends upon the values that each individual uses in his concept of greatness. To some the civilisation of the United States is great because of its mechanical power. To those who value art or music, religion or philosophy, it is quite inferior to many earlier cultures.

We do rank cultures sometimes on the basis of the efficiency of some one achievement, as for instance, the tools of production. Thus there are hunting cultures, hoe cultures, plough cultures, and cultures based on mechanical power. Carleton S. Coon⁴ has a very useful ranking on the basis of complexity.

Societal complexity appears to be a unidimensional phenomenon. As a result, it is possible to compare one society with another as to degree of complexity, according to whether or not they possess one or more of the following characteristics: (1) a written language; (2) full-time bureaucrats unrelated to the governmental head; (3) formal education with full-time specialised teachers; (4) full-time specialised priests; (5) crimes punished through governmental action, and (6) real money. According to these criteria, the following societies among others were ranked in order of complexity, from highest to lowest: Korean, Hopi, Balinese, Lepcha, Thonga, Yurok, and Hottentot.⁵

¹ William J. Goode, *The Family as an Element in the World Revolution* (Institute of Life Insurance, 488 Madison Avenue, New York 22, New York).

² James G. Abegglen, *The Japanese Factory: Aspects of Its Social Organization* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1958).

³ Chapters XVI and XVII.

⁴ *A Reader in General Anthropology* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1948).

⁵ Linton C. Freeman and Robert F. Winch, "Societal Complexity: An Empirical Test of a Typology of Societies", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 62, pp. 461-6, March, 1957.

For a number of states we have been able to make a ranking on the basis of education, length of life, and newspaper circulation, as shown in Fig. 45. The twenty-four nations for which data are available were ranked and then divided into four groups. The darker the shading in the figure, the lower is the rank in average expectation of life at birth, in newspaper circulation per capita, and in the percentage of children in secondary schools of appropriate ages for attending such schools. The extent that the rankings are similar can be measured by a coefficient of rank correlation which is of the order of 0.8 for the correlations of the various rankings with the per capita consumption of inanimate energy, and also with the per capita income. If data were available for rankings in painting, music, poetry, crime, or even happiness, the rankings might not be so similar.

These remarks are pertinent to a comparison of civilisations. Was the civilisation of ancient Greece greater than that of Greece to-day? If creativeness in art, government and philosophy be the test, perhaps so. If the measure be the accumulation of culture traits perhaps not, for the accumulation is very large to-day. A school child to-day can do problems in mathematics that Aristotle could not do. It is much easier to multiply 10357×625 than to multiply MTNH by XKN.

The comparison of the same culture at different times is often confused with the ranking of a culture at any one time in competition with other cultures. The culture of the Italian peninsula, for example, occupied first rank for a long time. Although the culture of that area is now far from first place, it is not inferior to what it was when it held top rank. These considerations of the rank and comparison of cultures are necessary to an appreciation of the growth of particular cultures.

The Growth of particular Cultures. A particular culture grows by invention and accumulation as does the superorganic as a whole; but the inventions often come into the area by diffusion, and the new, imported inventions in turn require adjustments which result in further innovations.

Ancient Greece was very favourably situated for importing bronze, iron, the wheel, the domesticated horse, the alphabet, and the sailboat—all of which were important inventions occurring about that time. Travels to other lands brought new ideas about religion, art, customs, and government. The distances to the lands with these important new inventions were not great for the boat and horse. Taken over by Greece, the inventions in turn modified the existing ideologies and material culture. The adjustment to these innovations and inventions meant many new inventions and creations by the Greek people.

In such a situation, with so many significant inventions and ideas to be imported from near by, a culture around the Aegean Sea would probably have grown just as rapidly if the native peoples had been black, yellow, or red instead of white.




FIG. 45.—Civilisations Ranked by Different Indices.

The index of energy is the per capita consumption of energy from mechanical fuels and waterpower from Dewhurst, *America's Needs and Resources*, pp. 1099, 1100. Income is per capita income in U.S. dollars, from Dewhurst. Education is the number of pupils enrolled in secondary schools divided by the number of youths in the population 14-17 years of age, compiled from the *United Nations Statistical Yearbook and Demographic Yearbook*, 1955. From the same source come the figures for expectation of life and the per capita number of copies of newspapers, issued at least four times a week and of varying numbers of pages. The data are generally from around 1950-3.

Creativeness, which is often acclaimed as the test of a "civilisation", comes no doubt from many causes, but a significant factor is the presence of new inventions which stimulate other inventions. Thus, adoption of the new inventions of steel and steam in a country with coal and iron means that wooden hand tools will be replaced by larger metal ones run by mechanical power. The result will be much creativeness in material culture. The United States is such a country. In a similar way the Renaissance experienced a burst of creativeness in non-material culture because of the diffusion of stimulating ideas from the cultures of ancient Greece and ancient Rome, and because of trade with the Near East.

Various theories have been presented to explain the growth of particular cultures. Toynbee emphasises the psychological factor in the growth of a civilisation. He sees the environment presenting a challenge. Some peoples respond to it constructively, others do not. The building of a culture rests therefore, according to Toynbee, on the moral qualities of a people. Spengler thinks the creative civilisations run a cyclical course somewhat inevitably after the manner of the seasons of the year. Sorokin sees an alternation of two principles throughout history in different cultures, the pursuit of goals of the senses and the pursuit of goals of the spirit. Brooks Adams places his emphasis upon the economic factor in the growth and decline of civilisations. These writers are dealing with valuations and selected parts of culture, whereas we are discussing the whole culture of a people or an area.

RESISTANCES TO THE GROWTH OF CULTURE

We have spoken as if inventions are readily adopted when available. So they appear to be when time is telescoped across the perspective of history and social evolution. But in a close-up view of any one time in history, we see that the adoption of inventions is resisted by many, often bitterly. This point will be interesting to those who are engaged in social movements to improve our culture. New ideas meet with opposition. Thus the Dyaks were accustomed to felling trees by peeling them down strip by strip, and when shown the quicker and better method of cutting in a V-shaped notch with an axe were unwilling to make the change.¹ Pasteur's discovery of germs as a cause of disease was bitterly opposed by the medical profession for a long time. Harvey's discovery, in the first part of the seventeenth century, that the blood circulates was strongly opposed, especially by the physicians and scientists of the time. Harvey claimed that no man over forty accepted the doctrine of the circulation of the blood when it was first presented.² At least twenty anatomists wrote against it.³

¹ R. R. Marett, *Anthropology* (London, 1912), p. 184.

² Robert Willis (tr.), *Introduction to the Works of Harvey* (London, 1847), p. xlvii.

³ Bernhard Stern, *Social Factors in Medical Progress*, p. 47.

The use of coal was prohibited in England in the reign of Edward I, and a citizen was tried, condemned, and executed for burning "sea cole".¹ A bill was introduced in the House of Commons at the instance of the British Admiralty forbidding the use of steam power in the British Navy.¹ That there was opposition to such useful inventions as railways, motor-cars, and the telegraph is surprising, yet such was the case.

That social inventions meet with opposition is well known. In Britain opposition to woman suffrage lasted half a century. It required decades until legislation to limit hours of work and provide for factory inspection was adopted. The opposition to simplified spelling is still effective, though attempts to launch it have been made by so influential a person as a president of the United States.

It is a curious phenomenon that some of the greatest blessings of the human race should have been bitterly resisted, at times with the spilling of blood, before humanity was allowed to profit by them. One wonders whether to-day there may not be blessings which we reject. Will the opposition to Freud prove to be as misguided as was the opposition to Pasteur? Will psychoanalysis prove of benefit to mankind as was the germ theory of disease? The question arises whether the opposition to health insurance to-day is comparable to the opposition to workmen's compensation a generation ago. Where we take our stand on social change is seriously significant.

There is, though, another side to this opposition to social change. We have so far spoken of the resistance to benefits proposed for us. But not every proposal is an unqualified good. However, some analysis of the causes of resistance to change may help us to be more intelligent in our attitude towards specific proposals. Some of the major resistances to change will be listed and discussed.

Intolerance of Early Inadequacies and Imperfections. Of the thousands of inventions that are recorded and never adopted, many are inadequate, for one reason or another. Some break too often and too easily when used by the average consumer. Such was the case with the early telegraphone, which recorded dictation on a spool of magnetised wire. Sometimes repairs are difficult to obtain because of the special skills needed, as with certain mechanical computing machines. Some new inventions have disadvantages, such as too much noise or vibration, that are not compensated for sufficiently by the advantages they possess.

Social inventions may have imperfections too. The single tax, a plan proposed by Henry George to raise all revenue from taxes on land, is clearly unsuitable for governmental revenues given the current pattern of values in the United States. During both World Wars and during the depression of the 1930's, the White House mail

¹ Bernhard Stern, "Resistances to the Adoption of Technological Innovations", *Technological Trends and National Policy*.

was clogged with proposals for social and mechanical inventions, practically all of which were worthless, to save the country in these crises. There is still a great deal of debate, and no proof, concerning how well or how badly socialism will work.

Opposition to Inventions causing Serious Social Dislocations. Some parts of culture are so closely interrelated that an invention changing one part may mean a wholesale change in the other parts. For example, the narrowness of a railway car has been criticised, both for a Pullman car, a sleeping car, and for certain uses as a goods truck. Yet to introduce a coach twenty-five feet wide would necessitate widening the rails. This would have to be done for all lines, or nearly all, because of the need of transferring coaches. If the lines were widened, all equipment built for the present track would have to be scrapped. Changing the speed of trains causes dislocations as truly as changing the size of the coach. Lord Stamp¹ said :

One may consider the analogy of a railway system which has evolved, partly empirically and partly consciously, as a co-ordinate whole. Suddenly, the customary speed is radically changed, and then it may be that all the factors are inappropriate—distance between signals, braking power, radius of curves, camber or superelevation, angles of crossings, bridge stresses. The harmony has been destroyed. . . . The analogy for the social system is obvious.

Another proposed innovation is a calendar with the same number of weeks in each month. Such a calendar was achieved, it may be noted, by the Mayan Indians before the coming of the white man. Modern industry would like such a calendar. It would mean, however, a readjustment of scheduled holidays, and many religious authorities object to changes in the dates of the holy days. A new calendar would also make the reading of history more difficult, and for a time complications and confusion might occur in changing from one calendar system to another. Hence the adoption of such an invention means a weighing of the advantages against the amount of disorganisation that might result.

THE DIFFICULTY OF ADOPTING A SUBSTITUTE FORM

To use old forms is easier than to make or adopt new ones, and there is in every culture a tendency for old forms to persist. Such persistence of the old is, of course, an obstacle to change. Thus the festival at the winter solstice, called Christmas by us, was a pagan custom in northern Europe before the coming of Christianity. Christianity did not invent a new type of celebration, but rather took over an old existing form with its mistletoe, evergreens, system of gifts, feasting, masks, and songs, adding to it the birthday idea, with ritual, songs, and other accessories indicative of the Christian religion. It might not have been difficult for the Christians to invent a new festival,

¹ Josiah Stamp, *The Science of Social Adjustment* (London, 1937), p. 52.

but it would have been more difficult to get the new ceremonial adopted than to change the old one that was already in existence. The difficulty in making a social invention may not be as great as the difficulty in getting it diffused.

Cultural Forms serve More than one Function. This resistance to change on the part of a cultural form seems, upon further analysis, to rest on the fact that the form may serve more than one function. Thus Christmas serves a social and commercial purpose as well as a religious one. It is an occasion of festivity on approximately the darkest day of the year, signalling the fact that lighter, brighter days are coming. Hence the function of festival-making causes it to persist, even if the religious function is changed or dropped. Again, the use of mistletoe was to the Druids religious as well as decorative. The decorative function causes it to persist, even after its major function of religious worship has been lost.

ECONOMIC COSTS

Economic Costs. In modern times, to launch a mechanical invention or a social one costs money. To bring about the adoption of national compulsory health insurance will cost large sums of money. A company may spend £100,000 to advertise a toothpaste before putting it on the market. Hence the mere cost of promoting inventions and social reforms is an obstacle to their adoption.

The staggering cost of adequate economic development in underdeveloped countries is a good case in point. They need capital for housing, hospitals, roads, schools, irrigation, sanitation systems, factories, shops, farm equipment, power plants, oil refineries, and so on. In the United States, government, industry and agriculture have invested about \$9,000 per capita to provide the standard of living that exists. In the European Common Market, the investment is about half that amount. There are 1,250,000,000 people in the 100 countries that Paul Hoffman names as underdeveloped. To raise the level of development to about one-quarter of ECM, one billion dollars of capital is needed. This is 250 times the total United States aid programme of 4 thousand million dollars a year.¹ When these facts are recognised, it is clear that it is easier to promise a utopia, as the communists do, than it is to deliver.

Habits. It is a truism of psychology that habits persist unless new drives break them. So old habits present obstacles to the adoption of innovations. Particularly is this true of old people whose drives

¹ U.S. private capital expenditures abroad amount to twice as much as the total of U.S. government economic assistance. M. J. Rathbone, "Development of Nations", a talk at Lafayette College, Easton, Pennsylvania, October 26, 1962. Paul Hoffman's appeal is for \$8 billion over each of seven years to raise the income level of developing countries sufficiently to offset the inroads of hunger, disease and ignorance. Paul G. Hoffman, *World Without Want* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).

are usually receding and who are generally conservative. Also, research shows that what is traditionally learned and internalised in infancy and early childhood tends to be least amenable to change in contact situations. Kinship and rôle conceptions, learned early, resist change, whereas age-grade and religious practices, learned late, are more responsive to change.¹

Conservatism of Old People. The children of immigrants learn the ways of the new country better and quicker than do the old people. The children do not have such deeply entrenched habits that interfere with the acquisition of new ones. Habit comes from repetition of an act; repetition makes the doing of an act easier. This ease results from the fact that energy flows more readily along nerve paths when the connections have already been made in a co-ordinated system, than when a new path must be established.

The views of the old people often represent opinions formed many years ago, opinions which have not changed with the changing times. To the question: "If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for President, and he happened to be a Negro, would you vote for him?" 48 per cent of respondents 50 years of age and over replied "no" compared to 34 per cent of those 21-29 years old.² In an earlier poll, 31 per cent of the older people were opposed to birth control, as compared with 12 per cent of the young.³ As regards the question, "do you believe in divorce?" 40 per cent of the old voted "no" and only 25 per cent of the young.⁴ It may be that the old are nearer right than the young, but with that question we are not concerned. The point is that the opinions of the old are nearer to the general opinions of a generation or so ago, and not as much like those of the present as are the attitudes of the young. The greater conservatism of older people is also shown by the fact that they stay with a particular political party, such as the Democratic or Republican, more consistently than do the young. Younger voters change party lines more readily.⁵

Fear of the New. Uncertainty about the new and how it will work out is found in cultures earlier than those of the Western world of the twentieth century. Modern attitudes are more hospitable to the new. There are still many who have the fear of aeroplane travel, hardly justified by the statistics of accidents. In earlier cultures, the attitude of religious Islam is definitely hostile towards the new in science. This attitude is shown in the following letter written by a Moslem in response to a request for information about his community:⁶

¹ Edward M. Bruner, "Cultural Transmission and Cultural Change", in *Social Structure and Personality*, by Yehudi A. Cohen (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston).

² *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Spring, 1962, p. 148.

³ *Ladies Home Journal*, March, 1938, p. 14.

⁴ *Ibid.*, February, 1938, p. 14.

⁵ From unpublished data in the possession of the authors.

⁶ William I. Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins* (Boston, 1902), p. 170.

My Illustrious Friend and Joy of my Liver :

The thing which you ask of me is both difficult and useless. Although I have passed all my days in this place, I have neither counted the houses nor inquired into the number of inhabitants ; and as to what one person loads on his mules and the other stows away in the bottom of his ship, that is no business of mine. But above all, as to the previous history of this city, God only knows the amount of dirt and confusion that the infidels may have eaten before the coming of the sword of Islam. It were unprofitable for us to inquire into it. . . .

Listen, O my son ! There is no wisdom equal to the belief in God. He created the world and shall we liken ourselves unto Him in seeking to penetrate into the mysteries of His creation ? Shall we say, Behold this star shineth around that star, and this other star with a tail goeth and cometh in so many years ? Let it go, He from whose hand it came will guide and direct it. Thou art learned in the things I care not for, and as for what thou hast seen, I spit upon it. Will much knowledge create thee a double belly, or wilt thou seek paradise with thine eyes ?

The meek in spirit,

Imaum Ali Zado

It is clear that such an attitude towards science will be an obstacle to its development.

Reverence for the Past. Another attitude unfavourable to change is reverence for certain conditions of the past. In general we tend to remember more of the things that are pleasant to contemplate than of the things that are unpleasant to recall.¹ We forget bills more readily than we forget cheques. Names associated with unpleasant experiences are forgotten more readily than names associated with pleasant conditions.² Selection favours the past. This factor is more or less constant over the years except that there is more opportunity for it to operate when conditions are changing. But this tendency may vary from one institution to another. The home and fireside are usually very pleasant to remember, and this remembrance operates to conserve the family.

Sentiment is definitely built up around institutions to which loyalty is felt. Such is the case with government.³ The Constitution of the United States is revered, as are the views of national heroes. Hence there is a definite resistance to change in governmental patterns. In time of crisis such as wars, depressions, or revolutions, the forms are changed quite rapidly, but otherwise the resistance to change is impressive.

Vested Interests. There is still another type of attitude that has proved very effective in resisting change. It is the attitude of self-interest on the part of those who derive differential advantage from the *status quo*. For instance, the construction of railways was opposed by

¹ H. C. Carter, H. E. Jones, and N. W. Shock, "An Experimental Study of Affective Factors in Learning", *Journal of Educational Psychology* (vol. 25, pp. 203-15, March, 1934), show that pleasant words are more easily learned and retained than are unpleasant words.

² Sigmund Freud, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (London, 1914).

³ B. Stern, *Social Factors in Medical Progress*, Chap. xi.

the owners of canals who derived an advantage from the existing situation and feared they would lose by the competition of the railways. Favoured groups who probably stand to lose by change have been called "vested interests" by Thorstein Veblen.¹ Their opposition to change rests in their selfishness. For instance, in the United States the free delivery of mail to farmers was for some time opposed successfully by the owners of public houses, who liked the idea of the farmer coming to town for his mail. He might stop for a drink at the corner public house or the one on the outskirts of town, usually called "the last chance". Studies made of opposition to change reveal one of the most frequent and powerful obstacles to be that of the "vested interests".² This is also the common conclusion of reformers.

It is to be noted that the vested interests are not all motivated by a desire for financial gain. The quest for power or prestige are also motives. Changes in the curricula of universities are generally not favoured by those teaching established subjects. Organised orthodox psychology is hardly cordial towards experiments in psychic phenomena. It is to be noted, too, that self-interest seeks change when it is favourable as truly as it opposes change when it is unfavourable. The lobbies maintained around legislative halls to favour or oppose legislation show this to be the case.

The number of vested interests in society is often quite large. In addition, they possess considerable power because of their position, so that they are a formidable opposition to change. In a democracy with the device of voting, there is provision for the orderly registration of opinion on the party in power or on particular proposals. But often no such provision for voting exists; or even when it does, the vested interests have a differential advantage in the use of propaganda, because of their preferred position. In opposing a measure, the vested interests seldom give the true reason for their action, which is that they would lose money, power, or prestige. Their motives are disguised. For instance, the following selection from a flowery southern orator seems to rationalise the use of child labour in the cotton mills:

Here will be found a never-failing asylum for the friendless orphans and the bereft widows, the distribution of labour and the improvements in machinery happily combining to call into profitable employment the tender services of those who have just sprung from the cradle as well as those who are tottering to the grave, thus training up the little innocents to early and wholesome habits of honest industry and smoothing the wrinkled frown of decrepitude with the smiles of competency and protection.³

In modern times when social movements are organised to effect

¹ Thorstein Veblen, *Vested Interests and the State of the Industrial Arts*.

² See Bernhard J. Stern, *Social Factors in Medical Progress*, and "Resistances to the Adoption of Technological Innovation", in *Technological Trends and National Policy*.

³ Quoted by Ellen Wetherell, "Among the Cotton Mills", *International Socialist Review*, vol. 14, p. 416, 1913-14.

a change, as for instance the abolition of child labour, a great deal of organised effort is needed. Those engaged in the process of reform are impressed with the will power, effort, and determination required. This necessity is due to the fact that the vested interests become organised, too, and offer effective resistance. The opposition of vested interests becomes a matter of great concern and appears in the drama of social conflict to be the arch-enemy of the changes proposed.

The observations reported in the preceding paragraphs are supported in part by the findings of research, based on a review of more than 500 studies having to do with the factors in the diffusion of innovations.¹ Some of the major conclusions are as follows : a crisis stresses the relative advantage of an innovation and influences its rate of adoption ; the relative advantage of a new idea, its complexity, and its compatibility, as perceived by members of a social system, affect the rate of adoptions ; earlier adopters are younger than later adopters.

RATES OF CHANGE IN MODERN CIVILISATION

The preceding survey of the processes of cultural evolution leads to a consideration of social change in modern times. What will be the probable rapidity of change in the future ?

High rate of innovation a Cause of Rapid Change. In seeking to determine whether changes will continue in the future, it is well to begin by a study of the causes of change. A primary cause is the making of inventions, mechanical and otherwise, and secondarily, the diffusion of inventions already made. In none of the modern countries does the upward trend of mechanical invention give any indication of stopping or even of slowing down.

For the non-material culture, there is no index of change as good as patents are for the material culture. It is therefore difficult to predict about social inventions. However, it should be noted that many social inventions are precipitated in the non-material culture by inventions in the material culture. Dangerous machinery is a cause of the social invention of workmen's compensation insurance. A continuance of mechanical invention, therefore, will in itself produce further changes in the realm of the non-material culture. In addition, social inventions will be produced which are not immediately and directly dependent on technology, and which in turn will have social effects and lead to other social inventions. Thus the invention of corporate economic activity led to the invention of limited liability.

There are a number of lesser situations affecting the rate of inventions. Much scientific discovery and inventing requires scientific training and occurs in specialised laboratories. Perhaps a smaller proportion of inventions is now made by the lone inventor or by the mechanic in the course of his work than in earlier times. It is said

¹ Everett M. Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations* (New York : Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).

that of all inventions and improvements made a smaller percentage is patented now than formerly. But of this we are not certain. Corporations are setting aside larger research funds. Advertising of new products and shortening rates of obsolescence encourage inventing. Policies of government towards research are also influential. Social inventions are encouraged as we become more accustomed to rapid change and as resistances to change weaken. Executives of social, economic, and political institutions can do much to speed innovation.

Probability of Continued Rapid Change. It is interesting to speculate on whether or not mankind's appetite for inventions may be satiated. There are some who think that men have about all they want in material goods, and that there is no further need for invention. No doubt some men in ancient Egypt would have felt the same way, yet many new inventions have been made since the Ptolemies. Indeed, the variety of man's detailed wants seems limitless.

SUMMARY

The evolution of culture until some time in the ice ages depended upon the biological evolution of men. From the middle of the last ice age, the evolution of culture depended upon four factors—invention, exponential accumulation, diffusion, and adjustment—much as biological evolution depends upon mutation, natural selection, and heredity.

The accumulation factor is especially important. We invent more now than did Cro-Magnon man of the last ice age because we have more accumulated knowledge and a greater stockpile of tools with which to invent, and probably not because we have any more inherited mental ability.

The rate of invention is affected by factors other than the accumulated pile of knowledge and tools. Demand and mental ability are also factors. Demand or social evaluation gives direction to the inventive effort, which is, for instance, sometimes directed towards the material culture, sometimes towards the arts, or sometimes towards religion. Inherited mental ability, as measured by a proportion of the area of a frequency curve, is probably roughly constant over the years and hence not an important factor in explaining the growth of culture.

The exponential growth of culture is an ideal statement, which in actual life has many qualifications. Particularly, the growth is likely to slow up from time to time, yielding some irregularities.

Culture actually grows in particular areas. In modern times, these are generally called nations or states. Anthropologists have traditionally shown the most interest in cultural change. Sociologists on the other hand have been primarily interested in social change, that is, change in social structures. This interest has been expressed recently in the study of the factors involved in the transition from one type of society to another, especially from traditional to modern society, as in the case of the evolution of so-called underdeveloped countries. In this evolution, the early rôles of technology, urbanisation, literacy and type of leadership are influential. Social evolution occurs in part by means of a process of continuing social differentiation—the increasing specialisation of already existing structures and functions, and in part by the creation of new structures and functions.

The adoption of innovations is often resisted for a time, particularly by the vested interests that are likely to lose their preferred position by the use

of the innovation. Vested interest groups also will urge the adoption of an innovation if their position is thereby strengthened. The resistances to innovation are many and varied, and account for the inertia of culture.

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. What do you understand by "tradition"? What part does it play in social change?
2. What is the part played by culture contact and diffusion in cultural change?
3. A comparative study of the theories of culture of Toynbee, Spengler, and Sorokin.
4. Examine the influence of interest groups in any one field of social policy.
5. Examine the problems involved in the classification and comparison of civilisations.
6. Make a case study of the resistances to social change in any one field of social policy.

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CHAPTER XXIV

THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF INNOVATION

Invention and discovery are significant characteristics of our age. It has, indeed, been called the "mechanical era", the "age of power", the "scientific age". This very conspicuous feature of our times, technology, is changing very rapidly. The horse is being replaced by the motor-car, and now the aeroplane is being adopted. Radio, television and cinema have been added quickly. Such technological developments are not without social influences. That is, inventions either instigate social changes or encourage them. For instance, broadcasting has influenced the style of oratory and affected the method of political campaigning. This chapter, then, deals principally with technological changes and discoveries in applied science as causes of social change.

THE MANNER OF TECHNOLOGICAL INFLUENCE ON SOCIETY

DISPERSION, OR THE MULTIPLE EFFECTS OF A MAJOR MATERIAL INVENTION

An important invention need not be limited to only a single social effect. Sometimes it exerts many influences which spread out in different directions like the spokes of a wheel. Thus the radio influences entertainment, education, politics, transportation, and many other types of activity. The following list ¹ of social effects of the radio in the United States gives a picture of the many different ways in which a single invention may influence society. As the reader will see, nearly all the items enumerated have their exact parallel in British or any other Western society.

I. ON UNIFORMITY AND DIFFUSION

1. Homogeneity of peoples increased because of like stimuli.
2. Regional differences in culture become less pronounced.

¹ President's Research Committee on Recent Social Trends, *Recent Social Trends* (New York, 1933), pp. 153-6. It should also be noted that "In some cases the effects may not be easily apparent, because obscured by other more powerful forces operating in the opposite direction. As an illustration, the radio, through the broadcasting of educational matters and current events to adults at home, is said to lessen the differences that often appear between parents and their children because of the fact that their respective educations have differed greatly. This influence, a very small one, may possibly be quite obscured by opposite forces such as growing compulsory attendance for more school hours and more particularly by the increasing number of children who go to high school. . . . An invention may have effects in opposite directions. For example, the radio has caused a revival of old songs, but it has greatly popularised new songs also. It may improve diction and pronunciation yet at the same time encourage certain types of localisms in pronunciation" (pp. 152-3).

3. The penetration of the musical and artistic city culture into villages and country.
4. Ethical standards of the city made more familiar to the country.
5. Distinctions between social classes and economic groups lessened.
6. Isolated regions are brought in contact with world events.
7. Illiterates find a new world opened to them.
8. Restrictions of variation through censorship resulting in less experiment and more uniformity.
9. Favouring the widely-spread languages.
10. Standardisation of diction and discouragement of dialects.
11. Aids in correct pronunciation, especially foreign words.
12. Cultural diffusion among nations, as of United States into Canada and vice versa.

II. ON RECREATION AND ENTERTAINMENT

13. Another agency for recreation and entertainment.
14. The enjoyment of music popularised greatly.
15. Much more frequent opportunity for good music in rural areas.
16. The manufacture of better gramophone music records encouraged.
17. The contralto favoured over sopranos through better transmission.
18. Radio amplification lessens need for loud concert voices.
19. Establishment of the melodramatic playlet with few characters and contrasted voices.
20. Revival of old songs, at least for a time.
21. Greater appreciation of the international nature of music.
22. Entertainment of invalids, blind, partly deaf, frontiersmen, etc.
23. With growth of the reformatory idea, more prison installations.
24. Interest in sports increased, it is generally admitted.
25. Slight stimulation to dancing at small gatherings.
26. Entertainment on trains, ships, and motor-cars.

III. ON TRANSPORT

27. Radio beams, enabling aviators to remain on course.
28. Directional receivers guide to port with speed and safety.
29. Aid furnished to ships in distress at sea.
30. Greater safety to aeroplanes in landing. Radio system also devised now for blind landing.
31. Chronometers are checked by time signals.
32. Broadcast of special weather reports aids the aviator.
33. Brokerage offices on ships made possible.
34. Receipt of communications *en route* by air passengers.
35. Communications between aeroplanes and ships.
36. Ships directed for better handling of cargoes.

IV. ON EDUCATION

37. Universities broadcast classroom lectures.
38. Broadcasting has aided adult education.
39. Used effectively in giving language instruction.
40. Purchasing of textbooks increased slightly, it is reported.
41. Grammar school instruction aided by broadcasting.
42. Health movement encouraged through broadcast of health talks.
43. Current events discussions broadcast.
44. International relations another important topic discussed, with some social effects, no doubt.
45. Broadcasting has been used to further some reform movements.
46. The government broadcasts frequently on work of departments.

47. Many talks to mothers on domestic science, child care, etc.
48. Discussion of books aids selection and stimulates readers.
49. The relationship of university and community made closer.
50. Provision of discussion topics for women's clubs.
51. Lessens gap schooling may make between parents and children.
52. New pedagogical methods, i.e. as to lectures and personality.
53. Greater knowledge of electricity spread.
54. The creation of a class of radio amateurs.

V. ON THE DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

55. Wider education of farmers on agricultural methods.
56. Prevention of loss in crops by broadcasting weather reports.
57. Education of farmers on the treatment of parasites.
58. Market reports of produce permitting better sales.
59. Important telephone messages between continents.
60. Small newspapers, an experiment yet, by facsimile transmission.
61. News to newspapers by radio broadcasting.
62. News dissemination in lieu of newspapers, as in British General Strike.
63. Transmission of photographic likenesses, letters, etc., especially overseas where wire is not yet applicable.
64. Quicker detection of crime and criminals, through police motor-car patrols equipped with radio.

VI. ON RELIGION

65. Discouragement, it is said, of preachers of lesser abilities.
66. The urban type of sermon disseminated to rural regions.
67. Services possible where minister cannot be supported.
68. Invalids and others unable to attend church enabled to hear religious service.
69. Churches that broadcast are said to have increased attendance.
70. Letter writing to radio religious speakers gives new opportunities for confession and confidence.

VII. ON INDUSTRY AND BUSINESS

71. In industry, radio sales led to decline in gramophone business.
72. Better gramophone recording and reproducing now used.
73. Lowering of cable rates followed radio telegraph movement.
74. Point-to-point communication in areas without wires.
75. The business of the lyceum bureau,¹ etc., suffered greatly.
76. Some artists who broadcast demanded for personal appearance in concerts.
77. The market for the piano declined. Wireless may be a factor.
78. Equipment cost of hotel and restaurant increased.
79. A new form of advertising has been created.
80. New problems of advertising ethics, as to comments on competing products.
81. An important factor in creating a market for new commodities.
82. Newspaper advertising affected.
83. Led to creation of new magazines.
84. An increase in the consumption of electricity.
85. Provision of employment for 200,000 persons.

¹ An organisation that provided speakers for local meetings.

- 86. Some decreased employment in gramophone and other industries.
- 87. Aid to power and traction companies in discovering leaks, through the assistance of radio listeners.
- 88. Business of contributing industries increased.

VIII. ON OCCUPATIONS

- 89. Music sales and possibly song-writing have declined. Studies indicate that broadcasting is a factor.
- 90. A new provision for dancing instruction.
- 91. A new employment for singers, vaudeville artists, etc.
- 92. New occupations : announcer, engineer, advertising salesmen.
- 93. Dance orchestras perhaps not increased but given prominence.

IX. ON GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

- 94. In government, a new regulatory function necessitated.
- 95. Censorship problem raised because of charges of swearing, etc.
- 96. Legal questions raised beginning with the right to the air.
- 97. New specialisation in law ; four air law journals existing.
- 98. New problems of copyright have arisen.
- 99. New associations created, some active in lobbying.
- 100. Executive pressure on legislatures, through radio appeals.
- 101. A democratising agency, since political programmes and speeches are designed to reach wide varieties of persons at one time.
- 102. Public sentiment aroused in cases of emergencies like drought.
- 103. International affairs affected because of multiplication of national contracts.
- 104. Rumours and propaganda on nationalism have been spread.
- 105. Limits in radio wave-lengths foster international arrangements.
- 106. Communication facilitated among belligerents in warfare.
- 107. Procedures of the nominating conventions of political parties altered somewhat.
- 108. Constituencies are kept in touch with nomination conventions.
- 109. Political campaigners reach larger audiences.
- 110. The importance of the political mass meeting diminished.
- 111. Presidential " barnstorming " and front porch campaign changed.
- 112. Nature of campaign costs affected.
- 113. Campaign speeches tend to be more logical and cogent.
- 114. Appeal to prejudice of local groups lessened.
- 115. An aid in raising campaign funds.
- 116. Campaign speaking by a number of party leaders lessened.
- 117. Campaign promises over radio said to be more binding.
- 118. High government officers who broadcast are said to appear to public less distant and more familiar.

X. ON OTHER INVENTIONS

- 119. Development stimulated in other fields, as in military aviation.
- 120. The vacuum tube, a radio invention, is used in many fields, as for lowering lifts, motor train controls, converting electric currents, applying the photo-electric cell, as hereinafter noted. A new science is being developed by the vacuum tube.
- 121. Television was stimulated by the radio.
- 122. Developments in use of gramophone stimulated by the radio.
- 123. The teletype is reported to have been adapted to radio.
- 124. Amplifiers for radio and talking pictures improved.
- 125. Geophysical prospecting aided by the radio.
- 126. Sterilisation of milk by short waves, milk keeping fresh for a week.

127. Extermination of insects by short waves, on small scale, reported.
128. Body temperature raised to destroy local or general infections.
129. The condenser with radio valves used variously in industry, for controlling thickness of sheet material, warning of dangerous gas, etc.
130. Watches and clocks set automatically by radio.

XI. MISCELLANEOUS

131. Morning exercises encouraged a bit.
132. The noise problem of loud speakers has caused some regulation.
133. A new type of public appearance for amateurs.
134. Some women's clubs are said to find the radio a competitor.
135. Late hours have been ruled against in dormitories and homes.
136. Humour as a mode of expression perhaps hampered in broadcasting.
137. Growth of suburbs perhaps encouraged a little bit.
138. Letter writing to celebrities a widespread practice.
139. Irritation against possible excesses of advertising.
140. Development of fads of numerology and astrology encouraged.
141. Motor-cars with sets have been prohibited for safety, in some places.
142. Additions to language, as "A baby broadcasting all night".
143. Aids in locating persons wanted.
144. Used in submarine detection.
145. Wider celebration of anniversaries aids nationalism.
146. Weather broadcasts used in planning family recreation.
147. Fuller enjoyment of gala events.
148. Home duties and isolation more pleasant.
149. Widens gap between famous and near famous.
150. Creative outlet for youth in building sets.

SUCCESSION, OR THE DERIVATIVE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF A SINGLE MECHANICAL INVENTION

When an invention has an influence on some institution or custom, the influence does not stop there but continues on and on, each influence succeeding the preceding one like links in a chain. The influence of the cotton gin in the United States was first to increase the planting of cotton, since it could be processed more quickly and with less labour. Seeding the cotton, a very tedious operation by hand, was the neck of the bottle, so to speak. The production of cotton could not be increased without more labour, so additional Negroes were brought from Africa and slavery grew very rapidly. The increase in slavery was a derivative influence of the cotton gin, a second link in the chain. The increase in slaves and in the power of the agricultural South, when cotton was king, led to the American Civil War, the third derivative influence of the cotton gin. The influence of the Civil War has extended even into the twentieth century.

This illustration needs examination. It should be noted that the cotton gin was not the sole determining cause of the increase of cotton production. Great Britain was clothing a large part of the world from her textile mills; hence developing commerce was a factor in the increase in cotton. But the gin made the supply of cotton more readily available. In other words, the variation in technology,

through the addition of the gin, influenced the increase in cotton but was not necessarily the sole cause of its increase.

In attempting to get a correct picture of the influence of invention, it should thus be noted that a given invention is often only one of several factors producing a particular result. The increased leisure of women may have been occasioned in part by the invention of the tin opener, but it was also affected by the gas stove, the electric washing machine, and many other inventions. It is common knowledge among sociologists that a social phenomenon is almost never produced by one factor alone. In turn, the primary result of an invention is itself only one of many factors producing the secondary derivative influence, and so on. In this manner the force of any particular invention becomes spent in time, much as the force of a billiard ball in motion is dissipated as it strikes another ball, which in turn strikes another.

Yet it is important to note that, while such may be the case with one invention, it may not be so where thousands of inventions are involved. In seeking to account for all the changes now taking place, it would be a mistake to neglect the accumulative effects on society of these derivative influences of inventions. There are many thousands of inventions adopted every year and their cumulative influence is significant in producing the thousands of minor variations and changes taking place in our civilisation.¹

CONVERGENCE, OR THE COMING TOGETHER OF SEVERAL INFLUENCES OF DIFFERENT INVENTIONS

The effects of a number of inventions sometimes accumulate in the same place and thus bring together their respective influences. For instance, the following inventions very probably contribute to the decrease in the birth rate : the factory machines, the school, the block of flats, the motor-car, the cinema, child labour laws, and compulsory education. While the effect of any one of these inventions is scarcely discernible, the combined effect may be appreciable.

This combining of influences is a very common phenomenon. The growth of suburbs is the result, not of the car alone, though it is a significant influence, but also of the electric railway, the steam railway, the telephone, the radio, the cinema, and, in the United States, the chain store. These are all very different material objects and have different uses, yet all are centred on one result, namely, the creation of suburbs, whatever may be the other purposes they serve. It is as though the influence of a variety of inventions were poured into one groove. This grooving of the influences of many inventions seems to be caused by demand. Human beings wish to live in suburbs, where there is more space but where they are still near to the advantages of the great cities, and this desire provides the dynamic directing force.

¹ *Recent Social Trends*, Chap. III, "The Influence of Invention and Discovery".

In the previous chapter it was shown that social demand helps to bring inventions into being. It is now seen that social valuation determines also the social uses to which inventions are put. The purpose of the inventor of the motor-car was not to create suburbs, nor was that the aim of the maker of the telephone. But the social forces have grooved the uses of these innovations to aid the development of residences on the borders of great cities.

A famous illustration of the converging influences of inventions concerns the settling of the dry treeless area between the Mississippi River and the Rocky Mountains. Pioneers, accustomed to the woodland culture of the East, settled on the Pacific Coast before they settled the Great Plains. The convergence of two new inventions, barbed wire and the six-shooter revolver, and one old one, the windmill, made it possible to settle the Great Plains. Webb, to whom we are indebted for the appreciation of these technological factors in building up this area, shows that the six-shooter enabled the pioneers to defeat the Indians; barbed wire broke down the open range into individual farms, and the power of the windmill provided food for a larger population.¹

The Derivative Effects of Converging Material Inventions. In a previous paragraph it was shown how a single invention has a derivative effect. In a similar manner a group of converging inventions may jointly have a derivative effect, flowing from the one direct effect of the converging cluster. The derivative effects of such a converging cluster may be very significant. Thus the modern city is the more or less direct effect of many manufacturing, transportation, and communication inventions; but the city is the cause of countless numbers of social changes. It increases crime, diminishes the family, takes away functions from the church, increases the activities of government, and changes the nature of politics. All these may be said to be derivative effects of the transportation and manufacturing inventions, though directly they are the effects of cities. Clusters of inventions, like the power inventions, converges on some social product, much as the sand in an hour glass converges on the narrow middle neck, from there to spread outwards again.

The connections between the converging inventions and the diverging social effects are not always noted by observers. That crime is a phenomenon of city life is more easily recognised than that it flows from the power inventions that made the cities. Likewise, if suburban life causes a greater separation of the husband and father from the family circle and thereby accords more leadership to the wife and mother, this fact should be traced back to the newer transportation and communication inventions of the twentieth century which produced suburbs and separated residence from place of work.

¹ Walter P. Webb, *The Great Plains* (Boston, 1931), pp. 169-79.

THE ADOPTION OF INVENTIONS

Social Changes are Proportional to the extent of Adoption of an Invention. The existence of one typewriter in a business office did not create a class of female typists working away from home. The adoption of typewriters by thousands of businesses was necessary. Since social changes depend not merely on the existence of an invention but on its extensive use in an area, we should in looking for causes of social changes consider not only the creation of inventions, but also the extent of their diffusion.

Inventions not only spread over an area but they may be withdrawn. They may be withdrawn not completely but in part, or their use may be lessened. An invention which has been abandoned may be reintroduced. Thus the striking together of two hard objects to obtain fire was abandoned about a century and a half ago. But recently this invention, in somewhat modified form, has been reintroduced in the pocket lighter, which, however, uses oil or its derivative instead of tinder. The revival of an old invention is, in its effect, somewhat like the creation of a new invention.

Sometimes the decreasing use of an invention and an increasing use of it alternate rapidly. An illustration is the organisation of the college curriculum. In the nineteenth century, the organisation was based on required courses. Then with the twentieth century came the elective system, but in the middle of the century there has been a revival of the system of required courses. Fashion is notably oscillating in women's dresses and figures.

Sometimes the extension in the use of a cultural form or its abandonment is exceptionally rapid. This effect will be discussed in the next paragraphs.

The Spiral. When the supply of money is increased faster than the production of goods, prices rise. The rise in prices creates a demand for more money, which the banks sometimes issue. This additional increase in money raises prices again. The new rise in prices may lead to still more money. This phenomenon is called the inflation spiral. An analysis of this phenomenon follows.

In a previous section of this chapter dealing with succession, we showed that a change often produces a series of derivative changes, (1), (2), (3), (4), and so on. But in the case of the spiral, the derivative effect of (1) on (2) is turned back on (1).

Sometimes more than two elements, such as money and prices, are involved. An illustration of more than two elements can be seen in the rise in the status of Negroes.¹ A lessening of discrimination against Negroes (1) as resulting, say, from a court decision, which is like an invention in non-material culture, may increase their wages

¹ Gunnar Myrdal, *Development and Underdevelopment* (Cairo: National Bank of Egypt, 1956).

(2) by extending employment, increase their education (3), and improve their housing (4). But a raise in wages lessens discrimination, increases education, and improves housing, while better education raises wages, lessens discrimination, and improves housing. And improved housing affects the other three factors.

Gunnar Myrdal has signalised this process and calls it "a circular cumulative accelerating process".¹ The effects of the process accumulate, and the social changes are accelerated. This spiralling social system of factors affecting the status of Negroes brings improvement much more rapidly than would occur were the process not circular. Thus we have the analytic basis for the old adage "Nothing succeeds like success", as Myrdal remarks.

The spiralling of social changes may mean also that China and India will industrialise rapidly. Myrdal thinks that the social systems of developed countries are spiralling more rapidly than those of unaided underdeveloped countries and that hence the gap is widening between the developed and the underdeveloped countries.

There are many reasons why a spiralling process slows down. One reason is that the spiralling social system is not a closed system free from outside influences. The elements in a system are generally related not only to each other but also to elements outside the system. Thus the wages of Negroes cannot be raised indefinitely, for they are related to the general wage level, to the economics of business, and to the productive requirements of the nation. So also the education and housing of Negroes are tied to a number of outside factors.

The interconnection of a spiralling social system with outside factors slows down the spiralling and will eventually bring it to a stop. This delaying effect of interconnecting linkages also produces lags.

INNOVATIONS IN NON-TECHNOLOGICAL CULTURE

Social Inventions. Social changes are often merely variations in existing practice. Thus the motor-car may increase the tendency for summer hotel guests to remain for short stays. The change is to produce a variation in length of visit of summer hotel guests. No new thing is created, though this change in the nature of tourist trade may have radical effects upon the summer hotel business.

Social Inventions Resulting from Mechanical Change. On the other hand the variation in society caused by a mechanical change may be sufficiently great to justify the assignment of a new name to the social effect. Thus travellers always have stopped overnight or longer at camps; yet the motor-car in increasing this tendency has produced a variation in the camp sufficiently different to be called the "tourist camp" and to justify the characterisation of it as a social invention. Invention is commonly associated with material objects. That there

¹ *Ibid.*

are inventions which are not mechanical but social is indicated by the following random sample of social inventions.¹

Bonus to wage-earners	Flag day	Proportional representation
Boycott	Group insurance	
Chain store	Holding company	Research Institute
Charity organisation	Investment trust	Rochdale co-operative
society,	Instalment selling	Rotary club
Civil service	Juvenile court	Seminar
Clearing house	Legal aid society	Social settlement
Correspondence school	Lockout	Summer camp
Day nursery	Matrimonial bureau	Universal suffrage
Esperanto	Minimum wage law	

Inventions, other than Social, in the Non-Material Culture. Social inventions and mechanical inventions are not the only ones. Thus the novel is an invention which is neither social nor mechanical. It is an invention in literature, as cubism is an invention in painting, as the symphony is in music. Other examples are the alphabet, Esperanto, decimal point, intelligence test, minimum wage law, patent, piece-rate system of payment, and a visa. Scientific discoveries in applied science, such as a radio beam, often lead so directly to mechanical inventions, or have such other close resemblances to them, that by convention they are treated together, even though a discovery in applied science is in non-material culture.

In the following paragraphs we shall inquire whether the social effects of non-material inventions, particularly social inventions, follow the same patterns as those of mechanical inventions.

THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF SOCIAL INVENTIONS

The causes of social change are, of course, not confined to mechanical invention and discovery in applied science. Social inventions cause social changes, too. Such indeed is the purpose of social legislation, if a law of this type may be called a social invention. A graduated income tax has the social effect of redistributing wealth.

Convergence. If the tax is sharply graduated and is supplemented by social legislation giving benefits to the less wealthy in the form of social insurance, then the effect is to take money from the rich and give it to the poor. In this case there are two or more social inventions converging to effect the result of redistributing wealth. Similarly, another pair of social inventions, child labour laws and legislation making school attendance compulsory, have changed the family functions by reducing the control of parents over their children. In these cases, there is the phenomenon of convergence.

Succession. The influence of a social invention extends also into derivative effects, like the links of a chain. The effect of the prohibition of the sale of intoxicating liquors in the United States from 1919 to 1934 was not confined to altering the drinking habits of the

¹ *Recent Social Trends*, p. 162.

population. The force of this innovation continued until criminals developed a highly organised business based on gang warfare. As a secondary derivative effect of prohibition, there were repercussions on the courts, on prisons, and on politics.

Dispersion. That a social invention may have many influences extending in different directions, like the spokes of a wheel, is illustrated by war. In the World War of 1914-18 the war establishment in the countries of the combatants influenced the whole range of social institutions. There was hardly an industry that was not affected. Farmers felt the shortage of labour. Women went to work outside the home as never before. The marriage rate and the birth rate were lowered. The curricula of schools and universities were changed; news was censored. Money was worth less than it had been before. The influences of war and war preparations extended outwards in many directions throughout the social realm. It may be concluded, then, that social inventions are much like mechanical inventions in the effects they have on society.

Social Inventions as a Source of Technological Inventions. Social inventions also cause mechanical inventions. It has been shown: (a) that mechanical inventions cause social inventions; (b) that social inventions bring about other social inventions; and (c) that mechanical inventions lead to the development of other mechanical inventions. It is also true (d) that social inventions cause mechanical inventions. For instance, the new building codes in New York City restricting the height of buildings, and providing for more light, led to a new type of tall building construction that tapers off to a point, somewhat after the manner of a pyramid. Another illustration is the machine that grades examination papers. The invention of the "true-false" type of examination, when used on a large scale, led to the invention of a mechanical grader.

That changes in social conditions bring about mechanical inventions is another proof of the old adage that necessity is the mother of invention. The social inventions named in the preceding paragraph developed needs for mechanical inventions. New social needs due to social changes are indeed a greater cause of mechanical invention than are specific social inventions. Thus war has been at various times in the past a developer of mechanical invention.

In discussing further the interrelations between social conditions and mechanical inventions, we may note that we readily find many more social conditions arising from mechanical inventions than mechanical inventions resulting from social conditions, unless social conditions are defined loosely as any human need. The relative ease with which social conditions can be traced to technological changes and the relative difficulty in finding mechanical inventions due to social changes is an empirical observation that is important for an understanding of why the superorganic changes.

PRIORITY IN SOCIAL CHANGE

It is clear that social conditions bring about mechanical inventions and also that mechanical inventions cause changes in social conditions. But it is desirable to know which sequence is the more common. Although comprehensive generalisation on this point has not been established, a recent pioneering study¹ offers a promising method for assessing the differential influence of various factors in a system and of determining causal priority. Using factor analysis with a sample consisting of 71 primitive or pre-industrial societies, the researchers report that while technology alone does not determine all other relations, technology is most important of all the factors influencing socio-cultural outcomes. Technology accounts for more of the socio-cultural variance than any other factor, although the normative factor runs a close second. This evidence tells us what the magnitude of influence is but it does not tell us the direction of the influence. Causal priority is assumed for the factor, technology, because it is relatively more autonomous.

If technology is of primary importance in accounting for variance at the level of primitive society, technology may be assumed to be at least as important in modern society.

Priority of Mechanical Inventions as Causal Factors. By using the method of priority and sequence a good deal can be learned about how much mechanical invention influences social change. The invention of barbed wire preceded the breaking up of the cattle country of the Great Plains into small farms. The sequence alone, of course, does not establish a causal relation. The events of to-day precede all those of to-morrow, but every event to-day is not a cause of every event to-morrow. The causal connection must be established aside from priority. In the case of the barbed wire, historical research shows the prohibitive cost of wooden fences in a treeless country and demonstrates the enormous sale of barbed wire to fence off the farms. "Barbed wire made the hundred-and-sixty-acre homestead both possible and profitable on the Prairie Plains."²

The problem is complicated where there is a long chain of causes and effects. Thus, in the series D, e, F, G , it is noted that D , a social invention, is influential in producing e , a technological invention, which in turn has an effect on social condition F , and so on. To pick the mechanical invention e out of this series and say that it influences F or G seems arbitrary. Why not start with D , the social invention, and say that it causes a mechanical invention and later social changes? The justification for singling out any one item in such a series is its importance in reality, not in a schematic arrangement.

¹ Alvin W. Gouldner and Richard A. Peterson, *Notes on Technology and the Moral Order* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962).

² Walter P. Webb, *The Great Plains* (Boston, 1931), p. 318.

There are, of course, illustrations of social inventions which are as definite and specific as mechanical inventions. During World War I the farmers in the United States as elsewhere were called upon to help feed the soldiers in Europe, which led to the ploughing of many new areas of land which continued to be cultivated when the soldiers returned to the soil, which in turn led to an agricultural surplus and to the depression of the nineteen-twenties. The war is specific and definite, hence the connection of the agricultural depression with war can be readily traced. If all social changes were sharp, new, definite, and precise, it would be easier to identify them as causes of further social changes.

In a schematic sense, as suggested in the series of letters listed before, there is no such thing as an origin, if the question of degree be omitted. Any one change that may be chosen was set in motion by something else, which was also in motion, and so on back to so-called ultimate causes. Similarly for changes in the social heritage as a whole, priority may not be assigned either to the material culture or to the non-material culture, for changes in the non-material culture may be influenced by changes in the material culture, which were previously due to changes in the material culture, which were previously due to changes in the non-material culture, and so on. When all the interconnected parts of a culture are in motion, and each part exerts a force on some other part, the origin of the motion cannot be located. A major limitation of general functionalism as a social theory is that it does not provide for any distribution of emphasis in the interpretation of social change.

Influence of Ideas and Ideologies. Since all social change takes place through the medium of ideas, there naturally arises the question, whence came the ideas and what are their influences? In answering these questions it may be stated, for the purposes of analysis, that there are two extreme types of ideas, those that centre round facts and material objects, and those that centre round fantasies.¹ Ideas of the latter kind may originate from man's aspirations, fears, or other emotions; such ideas are called beliefs. Such was the idea that the world would come to an end a thousand years after the birth of Christ, a belief not closely related to fact. On the other hand, ideas may originate from observation of phenomena, as in the case of knowledge of how to navigate a boat. Still other ideas are mixtures or approximations of the two types. Indeed, ideas of fact and of fantasy are probably the extremes on a scale of ideas with various gradations between. An example of an idea between fact and fantasy is the central idea in the *laissez-faire* doctrine of the functions of the states. Many individuals want to believe that government is best which governs least, and that the economic forces are self-adjusting as they supply our needs. Hence to such individuals this social philosophy

¹ Carl G. Jung, *The Psychology of the Unconscious* (London, 1927).

of *laissez-faire* is wishful thinking. On the other hand, many governments have done reasonably well by following a policy of modified *laissez-faire*. So some ideas are based partly on wishes and partly on observation. To sharpen the presentation, the two extremes of ideas, namely those originating from accurate observation of phenomena and those arising from subjective emotions, will be spoken of as though they were different types rather than the two ends of a series.

As to the influence of ideas, wherever and however they may originate, the material world is more likely to be influenced by factual and observational ideas than by beliefs. Material culture does not bend easily to ideas of the fantasy type. For instance, in the strenuousness of modern civilisation, man may occasionally be appealed to greatly by the idea of living the simple life. However much the desirability of this type of life may be preached, it is rather difficult in these days of watches and modern commercial competition for many people to return to the simple life. Nor, to cite another illustration, does admiration for the old type of family life bring it back in the face of factory production and the apartment house.

Ideologies of the fantasy type do, of course, affect the material culture. Wishful ideas about national glory may cause a small nation to engage extensively in military preparations. Such ideas may steer the nation away from the advantages of free trade and cause it to adopt high tariffs and other policies that favour factories and chemical industries. The ideas of race held by the National Socialists of Germany have no basis in scientific anthropology or biology, yet they played a rôle in building up a self-sufficient economy in material goods.

A somewhat similar point may be made regarding the Marxian ideologies used in the origin of Soviet Russia. These ideas have had a great influence on social organisation during the brief period of the existence of the Soviet Union. How this organisation will be modified by social forces in the future is a question. The influences of these ideologies on technology are less apparent. They have led to the adoption of the machine techniques of mass production, as have also the ideologies of fascism and *laissez-faire* capitalism.

INFLUENCE OF TECHNOLOGY ON SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Social institutions in general are the special province of sociology, rather than of the other social sciences. Hence the subject of change in social institutions needs especially to be discussed. The great social institutions are rather stable organisations lasting over long periods of time and found in nearly all cultures. They are not likely to be modified greatly by a single invention. Dramatic or profound modifications in such great institutions require the influence of clusters of inventions.

Industry. Perhaps the most striking change in modern times is the change in economic organisation, seen in the virtual creation of modern

production and distribution by the power inventions and various power-using machines made from the metals. Industry has been taken from the household and new types of economic organisations have been set up, such as factories, stores, and banks. The inventions of the factory and railway grouped industry into huge closely packed cities; now the motor-car and electricity are tending to scatter industry, especially the lighter types which can readily use the lorry, away from the centres of big cities.

Family. Modern technology, in taking industry from the household, has radically changed the family organisation. It has placed man's work, except in agriculture, wholly away from the homestead and has removed nearly all woman's economic duties except cooking, house-cleaning, and a little sewing and laundering. The inventions affecting the birth rate are reducing the size of the family, and both the above-mentioned sets of inventions are increasing the number of divorces and separations and rendering marriage more unstable.

Church. The church has been least affected by modern inventions, although the church is much less a central comprehensive social organisation in modern municipalities than it was in rural districts several generations ago. The church has, moreover, been profoundly affected by discoveries in science, which have changed attitudes towards religious rituals and creeds.

State. The modern state has been influenced by two sets of inventions, the production inventions and the communication inventions. Power production meant the transfer from the family to the state of such functions as the protection of the aged through old-age insurance, and provision for the young through schools, child labour laws, health measures, and juvenile courts. The transportation inventions meant the growth of the area covered by the state. They meant an interpenetration of economic life, and with the printing inventions, helped build up group solidarity. Nationalism, moreover, is now being encouraged by the chemical inventions. Finally, these same transportation and communication inventions are leading to a shift of functions from local government to the central government of the whole state. It is evident that the great social institutions are affected by changing technology.

Custom and Attitude. Institutions also have important psychological aspects, and personal reactions vary, as can be seen in politics, in family life, among employees and employers, in the church, and in the community. The psychological aspects of modern institutions are not, however, so much the causes of institutional change as they are the result of the changes caused by technology. For instance, the employer and the employee in the days of the handicrafts had a personal relationship because they knew one another well and understood fully the requirements of the tasks undertaken. These psychological attitudes did not change into misunderstandings, lack of sympathy, strikes and

boycotts, and thus lead to large-scale industry adopting modern technology. Rather, the technology developed the large-scale industry and the present psychological attitudes of employee and employer resulted. Hence characteristic institutional behaviour follows changes instigated by technology.

SUMMARY

Mechanisation is one of the most striking and pervasive phenomena of our times. Unfortunately, its study has been neglected by the social sciences, which have not sufficiently recognised that while technology itself belongs to the field of the natural sciences, its far-reaching effects on social life make it a vital subject for study by the social sciences.

This chapter has undertaken to show something of the effect which advances in mechanisation and applied science have had on modern social life. The numerous direct social effects which a major material invention may have were illustrated by the case of the radio, for which over a hundred immediate significant consequences were indicated. Moreover, it was shown that the first social consequences of an invention continue to move outwards like ripples in a pond. In the case of the cotton gin, it was seen that, apart from its immediate effect of increasing the amount of cotton planted, it played a significant rôle in causing the further growth of slavery, and later the Civil War. While these derivative effects become increasingly attenuated the further they extend, they are of great significance because of the tremendous number of inventions adopted every year.

When the effects of a number of inventions converge, their influence is even more noteworthy. This was shown for the city, which is essentially the direct result of the manufacturing and transportation inventions. And as in the case of single inventions, clusters of inventions have significant derivative influences; the city, for example, fosters crime, suicide and divorce.

Technology produces social change, but it also may produce social inventions. Occasionally a single material complex is responsible for a new social element, as in the case of the motor-car ushering in the tourist camp. But generally a number of material inventions converge to yield a new social invention, as was shown to be true for social insurance. Social invention, however, need not depend on material elements but may develop independently. Examples given included the Australian ballot, the boycott, and Esperanto. Such social inventions, like mechanical ones, also have social effects, which may carry on, as well, into derivative effects. Both mechanical and social inventions are thus important factors in social change. The former, however, tend to be more definite and specific, can be dated, and thus are more readily identified as origins of change. Technology accounts for more socio-cultural variance than any other factor and causal priority is assumed for it in social change because it is relatively more autonomous than the normative factor.

All social change takes place through the medium of ideas. Some ideas flow from observable facts and others from fantasies, while still others represent a combination of the two. Material culture is influenced largely by the first type, while such aspects of the social heritage as literature, art, religion, and social philosophy may conform to the second type, or to a blend of the two.

Particularly noteworthy is the influence of technological change on the great social institutions. Modern industry is seen to be the virtual creation of the power inventions and the various power-using machines made from

the metals. Some of the derivative effects of the economic changes have been great, as in the case of the family. Dramatic, too, have been the effects of certain inventions such as the effect of contraception on the birth rate and on morality. Religion has been least affected by material developments, since its essential concern is with non-material values, but even here doctrines have been radically affected by scientific discoveries. Next to the economic organisation, the state has been most strongly influenced by changing technology, principally by the production inventions and by those of communication. These have helped to extend both the area of the state and the scope of its functions.

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. Sketch the multiple social effects of television, using the account of the radio given in this chapter as a model.
2. How have various social inventions changed the functions of the family?
3. What are some of the social effects of the social invention of old age insurance?
4. Can the effects of an invention be fully anticipated? Why?
5. In the light of our present knowledge, what are the probable social consequences of automation?
6. What changes have taken place in the occupational structure of Britain during the last hundred years as a result of technological change?
7. What social factors influence the rate of technical change in industry?
8. Examine some of the ways in which technical change has influenced industrial relations.

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CHAPTER XXV

SOCIAL DISORGANISATION

This chapter on disorganisation is placed in the section on social change rather than in the section dealing with the organisation of society. The reason is the thesis of this chapter: that social disorganisation is caused by rapid and extensive change.

THE CONCEPT OF DISORGANISATION

Examples of Organisation. An organisation is an articulation of different parts with various functions to perform. The human body is a beautiful illustration of organisation. There are organs for the intake of food and air and for the excretion of waste. The circulatory system feeds all cells of the body and the nervous system stimulates and controls the activity of the various parts and of the whole. Organs of sight, hearing, taste, and smell are so placed as to provide reaction and movement. The whole is in balance.

The life of a city is likewise excellently organised. In the hours before dawn, the food to be distributed begins its movement in lorries and milk wagons from central markets and terminals to retail distributors and to homes. The transportation system swings into operation in time to carry the workers to factories, stores, and offices. The amount of transportation available bears an approximate relation to the number of people seeking it. When the lunch hour arrives there are restaurants and eating places for all. The amount of food on hand is more or less what will be demanded and a certain balance is struck. The goods to be sold are on the shelves and the raw materials are in the factories. Each person knows his job and is there to do it. The whole is demobilised in an orderly manner from dusk to midnight.

What is Social Disorganisation? The disorganisation caused by a flood or the invasion of a city in war may be so great as to be called a disaster. But there are not just two extremes, order and no order. There are degrees of orderliness. The great majority of cases of disorganisation are not the severe types produced by floods or wars, but mild like that of a strike which disrupts production briefly or a traffic jam that merely lessens temporarily the efficiency of movement. The range of the phenomenon studied in this chapter is over a continuum from very slight disorganisation to total disorganisation.

To examine the concept of social disorganisation further, we refer the reader to Chapter XV, where we discuss social organisation. To recapitulate in a few sentences, we there showed that an organisation is an orderly relationship of parts. But the significance of this orderly arrangement of parts lies in what it does. Thus a factory is an

organisation for the purpose of production. Its primary function relates to outside organisations such as merchants and railways.

But a factory is also composed of internal suborganisations, as, for instance, a department of sales, one of accounting, and one of supply. Another function of a factory, as a social system, is then to maintain a balance among its suborganisations or parts. This equilibrium of parts means a synchronisation or integration of functions. Thus buying supplies must be articulated with manufacturing and manufacturing must be co-ordinated with selling. Disorganisation is a disturbance of the balance existing in the functioning of parts. The criterion of disorganisation is function, what is done or not done. Thus a typewriter may write well or badly or not at all, because of an imbalance in the functioning of its parts as, for instance, in the ribbon or keys.

Disorganisation does not always involve Morals. When we say that one make of typewriter writes the best, this statement is not a moral evaluation. It simply denotes a technical performance in comparative terms. The technical performance of a social organisation can be appraised without any moral evaluation, as we do in the case of a typewriter. Thus one factory is more efficient than another in the quantity or quality of the goods it produces.

But in society we are often not content in making only a relative comparison of performance. We often find it necessary to appraise a performance as morally good or bad. Thus when soldiers turn their backs and run in the face of enemy fire the performance is inefficient, but we also appraise it morally. The word "bad" may mean either evil or inefficient.

The distinction between the two meanings is important for methodology. Whether a function is technically efficient can often be determined objectively by measurement to the satisfaction of two persons who differ widely in their emotional subjective biases. In the case of a strike by labour, its efficiency may be acknowledged by radical or conservative; but morally it may be deemed good by radicals and bad by conservatives. There is no objection as such to judging acts morally. But it is most important to distinguish between questions of fact, which are the proper sphere for science, and questions of value or judgment.¹

Some of the disorganisation discussed as social problems and called immoral may be the result of efficient functioning of an organisation but disorganising to society, as in crime, labour problems, and race relations. A border raid may be efficient but disorganising to the community.

Social versus Personal Disorganisation. We consider social disorganisation as disorganisation within customs, institutions, groups, communities, and societies. But social disorganisation always involves

¹ See: Ginsberg, *Sociology*, pp. 27-37.

persons, for institutions and customs are the behaviour of persons and persons compose groups, communities, and societies. Disorganisation occurs also in norms, which are standards of personal behaviour. In disorganisation, too, old rôles may be of little guidance and persons may be required to play new rôles. Indeed some social scientists¹ say social disorganisation always brings personal disorganisation, since a person is a social creation and his "self" a social product. In the case of family disorganisation resulting in divorce, there is obviously some personal disorganisation.

In dealing with social disorganisation in this chapter, we shall treat the strained or disrupted connections within an organisation or between organisations. We realise, of course, that the importance of organisation and disorganisation lies ultimately in their effect on people. Yet a phenomenon like the death rate can be treated statistically without personalising it by case histories.

EQUILIBRIUM AND CHANGE

The relationship between the parts of a social organisation reaches in time some degree of stability, unless the introduction of some important innovation produces a change which breaks the stability.

Social Equilibrium: is it stable or does it fluctuate around a point? Among sociologists, there is some controversy as to whether there is a stable equilibrium in society or whether there is fluctuation around an equilibrium point. Parsons sees society not as a perfectly articulated organic system in complete control of its internal processes and mechanisms but rather as a loosely organised and varied collection of systems and sub-systems, each of which may have its own special internal problems and equilibrium tendencies, and each its own allowable degrees of freedom or limits of tolerance. This view conceives of society as a congeries of conflicting forces, resulting in diverse states of tension.² In support of these divergent viewpoints, there is unfortunately little in the way of data.

Societies differ with respect to degree of stability and degree of change, although there is probably none which is completely stationary and entirely stable.

Contrasting Characteristics. There are certain characteristics of a stationary society that are different from those of a changing one.³ For instance, in a stationary society parents know with much more certainty what sort of occupations and lives will be the lot of their sons and daughters and grandchildren than do parents in a changing society.

¹ See the writings of Charles H. Cooley and Ernest R. Mowrer.

² Edward C. Devereux, Jr., "Parsons' Sociological Theory", in Max Black (ed.), *Social Theories of Talcott Parsons* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961), pp. 33-34.

³ William F. Ogburn, "Stationary and Changing Societies", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 42, pp. 16-32, July, 1936.

A stationary society is one where there is no notion of progress or of reform. These are great goals in a changing society. In a stationary society, the hopes of humanity centre round such interests as marriage and children, a good food supply, and a heavenly abode after death, rather than round improving living conditions here and now. Interest centres upon changing the characteristics of individuals as they grow up into men and women, rather than upon changing environment. The emphasis is on individual ethics rather than on social ethics.

Experimentation has long ceased in a stationary society. Trial and error have already occurred before the society became stationary, and the best practices have been agreed upon, that is, the best in view of existing equipment. The attitude is expressed by the remark, "we do it that way because it has always been done that way". In modern society something new is constantly occurring, and the attitude is, "there is always a better way". In a changing culture the dividing line of political opinion tends to be that between radicals and conservatives.

A stationary society favours the elders, who become wise by years of observation on conditions that do not change, while a changing society favours youth. The young workers who are equipped with the most recent and advanced techniques readily displace those who are older. It is interesting to note, too, that the age of workers in the old occupations in the United States to-day, such as blacksmithing, is much greater than in new occupations such as those concerned with electronics.

In a stationary society rules of behaviour can be formulated successfully in great detail, because conditions do not change. What to eat and what not to eat can be prescribed because the food supply remains the same and no new knowledge will come in, let us say, about chemicals or vitamins. The conditions for marriage and divorce can be laid down with exactness for future generations. A stationary culture is one where there may not be just ten commandments but thousands of them. It is a culture of custom, of moral codes, of manners, of respect for the law.

On the contrary, when conditions are rapidly changing, a rule as to how to behave for one period will not apply to the next, for conditions will be different. "Early to bed and early to rise" is an essential maxim, for instance, when there are animals to be fed. The wisdom of the adage is less apparent when there is intellectual work to be done which may be accomplished best in the late evening. Morals that will carry through changing conditions must of necessity be very general, such as "the greatest good to the greatest number", a maxim too general in fact to be of any help to a non-intellectual person. Without the guidance of specific rules, the individual is thrown back on an analysis of consequences. Thus, moral codes,

and laws also, tend to lose the respect they command in more nearly stationary eras.¹ The dominance of the folkways and mores so well described by Sumner is greatest in societies, unlike our own, that are not changing or are changing very slowly.² It is concluded then that social change alters the nature of society from what it is when conditions are stable.

The Integrated Culture Pattern of a Stationary Society. In the preceding chapter the influence of social change in general on different customs and institutions has been noted. There remains to be discussed the effect of social change upon the total culture, that is, upon the pattern made by the different parts of culture when fitted together as they always are.

Adaptation of New Culture Trait to Old Patterns. Before proceeding to discuss the pattern of cultural relationships, however, it is desirable to make a few observations on the method whereby any new element is assimilated into the culture. Usually a new element is experimented with. Individuals react to it in different ways. As a simple illustration, the toothbrush may be cited. At first teachers in nurseries and schools taught that the movement of the brush in use should be horizontal. Later, vertical or rotary movements were suggested. There were combinations of movements for various parts of the oral anatomy. Moreover, not every individual uses the brush in the same way. The variety of methods of using a toothbrush runs into the scores. Hence various types of toothbrushes may be invented to facilitate the different methods. There have, indeed, been 713 patents granted on the toothbrush in the United States. Clearly, the period of adoption of the toothbrush has been one of trial and error. Eventually, the less desirable ways will become obsolete. One or more preferred ways and types will be chosen and there will be no further experimenting.

Somewhat the same procedure occurs whenever a culture trait is adopted, whether it be the cultivation of maize, or a new religion. The adult education movement as it is adopted in different countries must be modified to fit the existing educational and occupational systems. In Scandinavia it is being adopted in a different way from that in the United States. In Sweden there is less high-school education and more co-operative activity than here. Hence co-operatives there furnish adults some of the subjects taught in high schools here.

There is, however, a period of trial and error, with modification to some extent of both the culture traits adopted and the culture traits to which they must be adjusted. It takes some time to make the adjust-

¹ Eleanor Rowland Wembridge, *Life Among the Lowbrows* (Boston, 1931), p. 247.

² How rapid cultural change produces a condition of "normlessness" (*anomie*), has been effectively shown by the French sociologist, Emile Durkheim, in *Suicide* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952).

ment. In our own culture, for instance, street and road conditions have not yet become adequately adapted to the motor-car.

The trial and error method of adapting a new culture trait into the culture pattern seems to lead to what is considered a progressively better adjustment. For instance, in adjusting compensation to those injured by dangerous machinery in the United States, the first attempt was to employ the old common law on liability; the second attempt was to develop new laws on employers' liability; and the third trial yielded workmen's compensation insurance, an improvement on the other procedures; and now workmen's compensation is being improved.

In an old society which is receiving few new elements of culture, and hence is nearly stationary, the experiments with formerly new traits may be assumed to have been carried through and the best choices made. The "best" adjustments to the existing culture traits have been worked out. In a long-established culture, then, it is a fair assumption that there is a more harmonious adjustment of the different parts of the culture than in a society where there are newly adopted parts of culture.

The change occurring in a society or organisation when a new element is introduced is only appreciable when the new element is a significant innovation, invention, or culture trait. A minor improvement in, say, an invention (though sometimes improvements are called minor inventions) is not of enough importance to produce much change. An important new trait is a force which is likely to disturb the pattern of balance already worked out. Changing societies are then likely to be societies with social problems and maladjustments even though the changes are desirable. Urban society may be desirable, but it has not been with us long enough for the family, the church, and other institutions to achieve the best possible adjustment to it.

The Integrated Culture Pattern of a Stationary Society Exemplified. An instructive illustration of a stable society is afforded by the natives of Hawaii in the long period of their history before the coming of the white man.¹ The island was perhaps first inhabited about A.D. 500, and for five hundred years thereafter it enjoyed undisturbed isolation from the rest of the world, for not until the eleventh and twelfth centuries was the land invaded again by Polynesians. Five hundred more years elapsed before the first white men arrived. For approximately a thousand years the island culture was almost completely free from outside influence and disturbance, with the result that a particularly satisfactory cultural adaptation was achieved by the natives. The island resources were limited, but not unduly so; hence they permitted an adjustment without struggle. The native diet of pork, coconut, breadfruit, bananas, and sweet potatoes was

¹ Andrew W. Lind, *An Island Community* (Chicago, 1938), Chap. v.

adequate and well balanced. The natives were splendid of physique, their good health being the subject of frequent comment by observers. The two-thousand-mile sea barrier served as a defence against microbes hostile to man elsewhere ; cholera ravaged Europe and Asia, but was inert by the time it reached the island. The long period of isolation allowed the natives to establish immunity to the diseases they already had when they first came to the island. As a result, the population grew to between 300,000 and 400,000, where the number was stabilised. The picture of Hawaiian society before the advent of the white man is, then, one of balance and adjustment.

This harmonious situation was disturbed by the arrival of Captain Cook and his sailors in 1778. The long-established equilibrium was upset and a period of disorganisation initiated. The natives were ravaged by the diseases of the white man, particularly by the venereal diseases. Alcohol was a negative influence, as was also the introduction of firearms, for the latter made warfare more deadly and played a prominent part in bringing about the decrease in the number of the natives. Within a century and a half, the native population was reduced to but a tenth of what it had been before the white man came. Further cultural innovations likewise proved disturbing, notably the substitution of an economy based on trade for the existing subsistence economy. The effect of the impact of white culture upon that of these Polynesians was, then, to upset the existing balance and set revolutionary and disorganising changes in motion.

Is the prevailing Organisation the most effective ? A casual visitor to a nearly stationary culture will have many suggestions for improvement. These suggestions will often be good ; but they nearly always call for some new invention, mechanical or social. Thus the agriculture of Pueblo Indians could be improved with irrigation, fertiliser, insecticide, and hybrid seeds, all new inventions to the Pueblo Indians. The claim for efficiency in a stationary society is based on existing culture traits, without the addition of new ones. Given the cultural traits which they have had for a long time, stationary societies are likely to have developed the most efficient integration of their cultural traits.

This statement is a theory, rather than demonstrated knowledge, since not all nearly stationary societies have been studied to test this theory.

However, anthropologists who have learned the language of such peoples and are familiar with their value systems and culture patterns generally report favourably on the adjustment of their culture traits one with another.¹

Improvements may overshadow Disturbances. Reformers initiating improvements focus on the improvement rather than on any disorganisation that may result because the old equilibrium is upset.

¹ Edward Sapir, "Culture: Genuine and Spurious", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 29, pp. 401-29, January, 1924.

Thus malaria may be abolished by the introduction of new discoveries and this certainly seems desirable. But, when praising such an achievement, nothing is said of the disturbed balance of the birth rate and the death rate. The lowered death rate may lead to an increase in population which presses on the food supply and lowers the standard of living.

Some improvements appear to be wholly desirable because they help to restore a balance that has already been disturbed. The growth of cities with urban banks and other urban economic institutions has disturbed the financing of agriculture as it existed before there were many cities. Thus co-operative rural credit institutions help to restore a financial balance.

However, it is superficial observation not to look for some disorganisation, however slight, when an improvement is made. For instance, when Burma and Ceylon won their independence from Britain, the resulting freedom from imperialism was hailed. Yet the tension between the freed local groups within these countries increased in competing struggles among them and led to open violence in Burma. It was the researches of the Hammonds as published in their *The Village Labourer* which showed the disorganisation that came with the introduction of factories. F. H. Giddings used to call this phenomenon "the costs of progress".

UNEQUAL RATES OF CHANGE IN A DYNAMIC SOCIETY

A stationary society that begins to change does not experience the same degree of change in all its parts at the same time. The introduction of the gun and the horse among the Red Indians changed their method of procuring food and their method of warfare,¹ but among most tribes the religion was not so soon affected by missionaries from the whites. Neither were changes so rapid in the other social institutions.

In the parts of our own culture, the degrees of change are unequal. Technological changes in chemistry and electricity are just now very rapid, more so than changes in the production of power and in the construction industries.² Laws tend to change rather slowly, while the courts by their use of precedent in deciding cases make the laws even more resistant to change. Religious creeds also resist change, at times rather successfully. There has been little recent change in musical instruments, particularly the violin. Industrial organisation, management, and labour are changing rather rapidly. The parts of civilisation move forwards or backwards, then, at very different speeds.³ Indeed, it would be difficult theoretically to conceive of a culture where the different parts all changed at the same rate.

¹ Clark Wissler, "The Influence of the Horse on the Development of Plains Culture", *American Anthropologist*, vol. 16, pp. 1-25, 1914.

² *Technological Trends and National Policy*, National Resources Committee (Washington, 1937).

³ "Committee Findings", *Recent Social Trends*.

If the different parts of society were disparate, quite unrelated to one another, there would be no special concern with the varying rates of speed of the different parts. For instance, grand opera is not very closely related to the mechanisation of the cotton culture. A change can take place in either without affecting the other very much. On the other hand, the rearing of children is closely related to the employment of women in industry. A change in one will effect a change in the other. If, then, the parts of society are not wholly separated but closely correlated, the unequal rates of change are of great importance.

*The Socio-Cultural Lag.*¹ The strain that exists between two correlated parts of culture or society that change at unequal rates of speed may be interpreted as a lag in the part that is changing at the slowest rate, for the one lags behind the other. For instance, in the United States, cities with increasing population have fewer police per 10,000 inhabitants than cities with decreasing populations.² The growing cities do not expand their police forces fast enough; the decreasing cities do not reduce theirs soon enough. The change in the number of police lags behind the change in the population. This relationship is expressed diagrammatically in Fig. 46.




FIG. 46.—Schematic Diagram of the Socio-Cultural Lag.

The population of a city changes at point *a*, but the number of police does not change until some time later when point *b* is reached. Before point *a* occurs, a more suitable number of police exists for the population, but between points *a* and *b* there are fewer or more police in relation to the population; while after point *b* is reached the number of police is changed to be in harmony with the change in population. To be sure, the population may not change very sharply at point *a* and the adaptation of the police to population may be more continuous.

The degree of adjustment between the two variables before, between, and after the dates of change is not always easy to prove.³ In the foregoing illustration, it is not difficult to show that on the average a certain ratio of police to population is desirable. There are objective criteria in dollars and in crimes. Furthermore, a large city needs no different ratio of police to population than does a metropolis. It has been shown that there is no correlation between the rate

¹ William F. Ogburn, *Social Change* (New York, 1922), Part IV.

² William F. Ogburn, *Social Characteristics of Cities* (Chicago, 1937).

³ James W. Woodward, "A New Classification of Culture and a Restatement of the Cultural Lag Theory", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 1, pp. 89-102, February, 1936.

of crime in cities and the rate of growth, when the police per 10,000 population is held constant.¹

It is not difficult to reach a conclusion about whether the degree of adjustment between dates *a* and *b* on the diagram is less than before *a* or after *b*. The maladjustment between the number of police and the number of inhabitants, after the number of inhabitants has changed and the number of police has not (as shown between points *a* and *b* in Fig. 46) is evidenced not only in crime rates and in traffic violations, but also in municipal expenditures for other needs such as hospitals. For these criteria, objective measures in terms of efficiency could be had if there were time, money, and personnel to make the computations. On the basis of such knowledge, the citizens could choose for themselves the ratio of police to population that they desire. The average ratio in a number of cities whose population is neither increasing nor decreasing is probably pretty close to the number desired by the citizens, taking all the above-mentioned choices into consideration.

In a similar manner, the more efficient adjustment could be shown (after point *b* in the figure) when the number of police has been increased or decreased in accordance with the population increase or decrease.

The Concept "Lag" may suggest Values. The term *lag* is commonly used in at least two different senses. One is the time interval between the introduction of an innovation in society and its "complete" adoption. The other is the time interval between the occurrence of a change in variable *A* and the occurrence of a change in correlated variable *B*. As an example of the former, the United States Public Health Service has issued a brochure entitled *The Costly Time Lag Between Discovery and Use of Medical Knowledge*.² Every year, 40,000 cancer deaths occur which could have been prevented; 20,000 persons die each year from preventable attacks of rheumatic fever and rheumatic heart disease, etc. The second use is exemplified by the relationship already discussed between the changes in size of cities and the number of police per 10,000 population.

The use of the concept *lag* may or may not imply value judgments. The example of the first use given above implies that it is desirable to stay well and to survive. In the second example, there is no value judgment, only the objective observation that the ratio of police to population tends to lag behind changes in size of cities. If, however, there is the implication that a lag suggests the need for action of some kind, as indicated below, this involves a value judgment.

The Concept "Lag" suggests Action. The word "lag" implies that the proper course of action is to catch up the lag in the variable that has not changed or that is changing more slowly, so that it will be

¹ William F. Ogburn, "Factors in the Variation of Crime among Cities", *American Statistical Association Journal*, vol. 30, pp. 12-34, March, 1935.

² U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961.

in better adjustment with the variable that has changed. The number of police should be changed to be in proper ratio to the population. It is not very practicable to force the inhabitants of a city to depart and live elsewhere until the proper ratio with the number of police is attained. Nor can fast-moving dangerous machinery be abandoned to bring back the days of small hand tools when accidents were fewer. The change has already taken place in the first variable, so adjustments must be made in the second variable to the new conditions. If the change in the variable precipitating changes in other variables could be foreseen and prevented, then the maladjustment could be avoided. But such a course of action requires a high degree of planning and control. The truth and the seriousness of the lags due to prior changes in science is admitted when it is suggested that a moratorium on mechanical invention be declared until the lags of society have caught up;¹ but so far the suggestion has not been acted upon.

Advancing Technology and Lagging Social Institutions. The suggestion of a moratorium on natural science is evidence of the recognition that technology often changes first, to be followed later by its social effects. Such was the conclusion of the preceding chapter, where some theoretical argument was furnished to support this very common observation. It is concluded, therefore, that the many and frequent technological innovations of our modern age, by occurring prior to the social changes they precipitate, are the causes of many cultural lags in society.

Some of the significant technological developments and inventions that are producing cultural lags in contemporary society are the telephone, motor-car, wireless, cinema, power-driven agricultural machines, printing, photography, alloys, electric transmission lines, electrical goods, welding, chemical uses of cellulose, coal-tar products, chemistry of foods, the aeroplane, air-conditioning, artificial lighting, contraceptives, slot machines and television. These are resulting in a terrific impact on society, its social institutions, its customs, and its philosophies. The result is an enormous accumulation of social lags.

One possible lag in particular may be mentioned. It is the lag in adjusting to the atomic bomb. The adjustment may mean not using it. But if so, adequate international organisation must be set up to prevent its use, or the adjustment might be to fight no more wars. Should the bomb be used in future wars, then possible adjustments would be (1) military defence of cities against air attack, a defence which will be very difficult if not impossible to perfect; or (2) the dispersal of population outward from the cities, which is almost impossible to carry out thoroughly. The evidence since Hiroshima and since the stockpiling of fusion bombs has indicated that a lag in adjustment occurred which may be very tragic indeed.

The fact that technology is at present so powerful a cause of cultural lags, and consequent social disorganisation, does not deny that other

¹ Sir Josiah Stamp, *The Science of Social Adjustment* (London, 1937).

variables such as social inventions or population changes are creating lags also. In fact, the lag of social changes behind technological progress is simply a special case of the general phenomenon of unequal rates of change of the correlated parts of culture.

Normative Conflict as a Source of Disorganisation. An additional major source of disorganisation is the conflict of groups with incompatible values, especially in such a complex modern industrial society as the United States, composed of heterogeneous ethnic, religious and economic groups. It is generally agreed, for example, that the organisation of education in the United States is inadequate, at least in terms of number of teachers and classrooms. The financial burden of meeting the need is unevenly distributed among the states, with some low per capita states having high ratios of school-age children to total population. A possible solution, namely federal aid to education, is hindered by a controversy involving conflict of values, as to whether federal aid should or should not go to parochial schools. There are, moreover, those who oppose federal aid to education as a matter of principle, on the ground that education ought to be the function only of the states and local governments.

Conflict of Ends and Means as a Source of Disorganisation. Still another theory of the determinants of disorganisation lays stress, not on the conflict of goals, but on the conflict of goals and the means for achieving them. Both theories were treated in an earlier chapter where disorganisation was viewed from the standpoint of the deviant individual.¹ There it was reported that the behaviour of some juvenile gangs can be interpreted in terms of norms, such as the approval of fighting, which are part of the culture of certain ethnic groups in American cities, but not sanctioned by American society as a whole or the dominant elements in it. The alternative theory, advanced by Merton, stresses the differential access which these groups have to the dominant goals. According to this view, these groups share the dominant goals but, lacking the means for achieving the goals by legitimate means, resort to illegitimate and illegal means, resulting in vice, crime and other expressions of social disorganisation.

SOME EXAMPLES OF SOCIAL DISORGANISATION

It may be helpful to present in the remaining paragraphs a number of examples of social disorganisation and to consider the determinants involved in each case.

Unemployment, one of the most serious of modern contemporary social problems, is evidence of social disorganisation, not so much because to be unemployed and without money is a tragedy, though it certainly is, but because large-scale unemployment reveals that the organisational adjustment between population and industry is not a good one. One type of unemployment to-day results clearly from

¹ Chapter XI.

unequal rates of change. New inventions take jobs away from men before new jobs are created. Also, much unemployment to-day is caused by business depressions, which arise because production moves faster than purchasing power. Unemployment, then, represents changes in business conditions which come more quickly than changes in population.

Family Disorganisation. There can be some family disorganisation in a stationary culture of a primitive people. A lazy husband may not provide enough food and clothing for his family, or the affectional bond between mates may be weakened or broken by the entrance of another contender. These problems may be due to the difficulties of original nature in making a proper adjustment to the cultural requirements. In modern times this difficulty of adapting our biological nature is in evidence, but there is also family disorganisation due to unequal rates of change in different parts of the social heritage. Prior to power machinery, the agricultural family was bound together not only by affectional functions but also by others, such as the protective, educational, recreational, religious and especially the economic. Members tied together so closely by these bonds would not become disunited easily; divorce and desertion were relatively rare. But with the transfer of the economic functions to the factory and store, the others were also transferred in large part away from the family, excepting the affectional one and the education of little children. Family members are now held together largely by one tie only, the affectional one, which seems to be rather brittle. The obvious result is more divorce and more separation of mates. The new economic situation has changed the family, but adjustments in family ethics, education, and status have lagged, with resulting social maladjustments.

Poverty. Want is often listed in books on social disorganisation or social problems, sometimes on the theory that society does not function well if the inhabitants are poor or destitute. But that poverty is in part caused by unequal rates of change was argued by no less a figure than Malthus, who based his explanation on the fact that population increases according to an exponential law which is inevitably faster than the increase of the food supply, which grows by arithmetic progression. This explanation is applicable only to non-commercial farmers who have no practice of birth control. There are much fuller explanations of poverty, but many may be traced back to rates of increase of population. Variations in income due to fluctuations in business, and the very uneven distribution of income, are also causes of poverty.

Crime. This major manifestation of social disorganisation is perhaps due more to normative conflict and the conflict of means and ends than to unequal rates of change. Crime reflects failure in the socialisation process, failure on the part of individuals to internalise

the norms of society, which condemn crime. Crimes against the person are widespread even in most primitive societies where crimes against property are rare. This suggests perhaps the difficulty of adapting man's original nature to culture. Still, this adjustment between original nature and culture is affected by changing situations. For instance, the majority of crimes to-day occur in cities. Large aggregations of population due to the power inventions have come into existence faster than have moral and physical agencies of control. It will be very difficult ever to bring the agencies of control of crime to the point where there is as little crime in cities as in small rural communities. The greatest number of crimes to-day are crimes against property, which have increased most rapidly in modern civilisation.

Race Conflict. The difficulties races have in living together or in dealing with one another vary according to the situation and the peoples concerned. It may be noted at once that, in almost all cases, the contacts which bring out the friction are due to the transportation inventions which have thrown the races into close contact. Technology changes first, and the adaptation of the races to these changes occurs much later. However, the rôle which transportation plays in forcing races into relations with each other is not a particularly helpful point in dealing with the problem. Other analyses may be more useful in effecting improvements, such as those dealing with the factors of ignorance, competition, and discrimination. Race prejudice is a matter of attitudes, which are often thought to be amenable to education; and the usual approach to the question concerns changing attitudes. The key to race relations is thus in the value systems and premises of the individuals concerned. The inventional factors, like modern transportation, that bring these race prejudices to the fore are not appreciated because they are not easily changed and hence have little to do with improved adjustment.

Labour Problems. One final illustration from the field of sociology may be cited. Labour problems of modern industrial life are due to unequal rates of change in labour organisation on the one hand, and in the organisation of management and technology on the other. Until the past three decades, since labour organisation had grown less rapidly, the swifter organisation of industry had resulted in great pools of power. The maladjustment was largely on the part of labour. Such is still the case in many industries.

On the other hand, labour organisations have multiplied since the late 1930's and the war years, so that in some sections of economic life, particularly where small businesses operate, labour organisation has outstripped the organisation of industry. Such is the case in various garment trades and in some small towns. A stable balance would reduce these tensions evidenced in strikes, lockouts, friction in the plant, etc.

It is thus clear that many of our most important social problems can be traced to the unequal advance of different parts of our civilisation. Sometimes this explanation is very useful in suggesting aspects of the problem that are subject to remedy, as in the case of family disorganisation and the position of women. In other cases, for instance that of race conflict, unequal rates of change and lags are a part of the explanation but are not particularly illuminating as to remedies. However, the theory is valuable in showing that the foundation of much contemporary social disorganisation lies in the irregular changes of our civilisation.

SUMMARY

When the usual or normal functions of a mechanism are interrupted or impaired, it is said to be disorganised. Social disorganisation refers to the disruption of the functions of some social unit such as a group, an institution, or a community. The appraisal of disorganisation is in terms of the way the mechanism works; hence the existence of disorganisation can be determined more or less objectively. On the contrary, quite subjective are such considerations as whether or not the organisation itself is socially desirable and whether or not its disorganisation is a bad thing. Matters such as these are determined by the consensus of group opinion.

This chapter has been devoted to considering the basic causes of social disorganisation. One was shown to be the maladjustment of man and culture to the natural environment, particularly certain extraordinary manifestations such as epidemics, floods, and earthquakes. Another cause is normative conflict and still another, disjunction between dominant goals and the means available for achieving them. An additional cause, treated more fully in this chapter, is the stress caused in correlated parts of culture when they change at unequal rates of speed. Social disorganisation thus results from conflict between the basic factors in human experience, that is, between geographical influences and culture, between heredity and culture, and between the various parts of culture.

The last-mentioned cause of social disorganisation has been stressed in this chapter because of its great significance for contemporary society. The geographic cause is more prominent in the case of cultures less advanced than our own which are lacking in adequate controls. The social disorganisation produced by unequal rates of cultural change, however, is peculiarly a phenomenon of dynamic, modern society. In a stationary society, there is a more harmonious adjustment of the parts of culture, an adjustment which has been worked out over a long period of time.

When culture begins to change, the modifications do not occur evenly in all parts of the social heritage. Some parts change faster than others. When the different parts are interrelated, the varying rates of change produce a strain between the unequally moving parts. The part that is moving at the slower rate of speed constitutes the culture lag. Since the other part of culture has already changed, as a rule the most practicable method of effecting a better integration between the two parts is to make some adjustment in the part that is lagging. Modern technology is changing at a rapid rate and creating important social changes, with which our social institutions have not yet caught up. Analysis of important modern social problems, such as unemployment, poverty, and family disorganisation, shows that much

of our contemporary social disorganisation issues from the irregular changes of our culture

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. What do you understand by "social disequilibrium" and "social disorganisation"?
2. Examine critically Durkheim's views on the distinction between "normal" and "pathological" in society.
3. Illustrate the idea of "dysfunctional" elements in society.
4. Give a critical account of the hypothesis of "cultural lag".
5. How far can such contemporary social problems as poverty, unemployment, divorce, and crime, be taken as indices of social disorganisation?
6. Examine the adjustment of the educational system to social change during the last 50 years.
7. How far has the modern family adjusted to the social changes of the last 100 years? Examine in particular the rôle of married women in the family and society.

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CHAPTER XXVI

SOCIETY AND ADJUSTMENT

SOCIAL PROGRESS

THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

Man has evolved to his high estate from lower orders. To many of us progress seems inevitable, and is taken for granted. However, this interpretation may be questioned. Our country is richer now than it was a century ago, but is the acquisition of wealth progress? We move about the world in faster time, but does this bring more happiness or health or comfort or peace of mind? Visitors from the older civilisations of the East or the lesser civilisations of outlying regions marvel at our material achievement, but often question whether it really represents progress. In short, there can be much difference of opinion about what progress is.

These comments make clear the advisability of differentiating between evolution and progress. Evolution is merely change in a given direction. When we speak of biological evolution we refer to the emergence of certain organisms from others in a kind of succession. In the case of cultural evolution, as was seen in earlier chapters, every new invention has a history; that is to say that it grows out of and is dependent on certain previous inventions. Evolution describes a series of related changes in a system of some kind. The reference is to an objective condition which is not evaluated as good or bad. Progress, on the contrary, means change for the better, and hence must imply a value judgment.

The Subjectivity of Values. It is not possible to speak of progress without reference to standards, and standards are eminently subjective. For value, like taste, there is no measuring stick. *De gustibus non disputandum est.* A particular change in culture may seem to be progress to one person; to another it may seem retrogression, because they have different values.

Progress in Technology. In the case of technology it can be said without contradiction that there has been progress from the age of the stone club to the age of steel alloys and of mechanical power. What is meant here, however, is not a moral evaluation, but simply a description of the fact that tools have become more varied and efficient. The reason that we may so confidently say that there has been progress in toolmaking is that tools are judged by a measurable function, such as cutting. There is nothing subjective about our evaluation of the efficiency of this process. If, however, our judgment passes to an appraisal of the influence of tools on society in regard to

some special effect that cannot be measured, as, for instance, on the sum of human happiness, a definite conclusion cannot be reached.

Can Millions of People be Wrong? The agreement of many persons on a value does not determine the issue. When large numbers of individuals have values, individual differences tend to be ironed out and the consensus of opinion comes to have greater weight than any one individual's opinion. Consensus, however, is open to the same subjective influences and rationalisations as an individual's values. Consensus of opinion is inconstant. This point was developed more fully in an earlier chapter, where it was shown that nearly every value which we cherish to-day has been condemned by some other people or at some other time, and that those that we condemn to-day have been highly praised by others. The persecution of witches was once held to be desirable and was in line with progress according to the general opinion of the time. To-day the burning and hanging of witches would be differently regarded.

The Question of Universal Values. It may be asked: Are there not some values that have been held good in all cultures at all times? While no one has ever taken a census to find out, it would be possible to go through the histories and the ethnological monographs in search of values that are common to the peoples whose cultures have been recorded. If this were done, the findings would no doubt have to be stated in very abstract terms.¹ "Thou shalt not steal" is a commandment common to many cultures. Yet, when the abstract term, stealing, is applied to concrete situations, the guidance of the generalised commandment is not very helpful. The Blackfoot Indians praised stealing from the enemy, as have many other peoples. Slaves often steal from their masters and among themselves the practice may not be held bad. The same comments may be made upon the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill". War and legal hanging are both considered necessary at times, and each results in loss of life. Again, the goals of progress are sometimes stated in such abstract form as the attainment of "the greatest good or the greatest happiness for the greatest number". But even though such desiderata be held in many cultures over a long period of time, they indicate neither what actions are to be taken to secure these ends, nor when these ends are attained. Conceptions of happiness differ as do ideas of what is good for a people. In a word, while it may be possible to formulate conceptions of progress or valuations of change which apply to all time, the statements are too general to afford definite and sure guidance in specific situations at different times and in different cultures. The general goal of "true social co-operation" has been posited by Hobhouse² as a basis for determining progress. As another illustration, C. M. Case³ has

¹ John Dewey and James H. Tufts, *Ethics* (New York, 1908).

² See L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, pp. 152-3.

³ C. M. Case, *Social Process and Human Progress*, Chap. iv.

argued for the criteria of utilisation, equalisation, and appreciation. While such general principles do not afford specific guidance, they nevertheless serve as tools to be used in thinking out the course of action we wish to pursue.¹ Conceptions of progress, like general ethical principles, are of great value.

Tests of Group Welfare. There have been various recent attempts to formulate more specific tests of group welfare, such as longevity, mental health, amount of leisure time.² But it would be a mistake to think that these values have universal acceptance. For instance, our own society places a high value on longevity, and great efforts are made to extend the length of life. This is not so true, however, in societies where suicide is institutionalised, as it formerly was in the Indian practice of suttee. Much the same observation may be made concerning mental disorders. As was shown in a previous chapter, the psychotic individuals in some societies are esteemed rather than pitied.

Progress as Movement towards a Definite Objective. It might seem to the student that the preceding paragraphs have analysed progress away. But such is not the case. For most persons there is such a thing as progress. It is a movement towards an objective, thought to be desirable by the general group, for the visible future.

When considering social progress, it is well to note the time and place qualifications. Thus, in our society the abolition of child labour is deemed a step in the direction of progress. This aim may not be desirable in other cultures, and we do not know whether it would be what we would want a thousand years hence.

Even though we cannot find a definition of progress that fits all societies at all times, why can we not remedy the present-day conditions that mean ten million sufferers from syphilis?³ Even though we may not all agree on what social adjustment is, may not some of us work to prevent another war like that of 1914-18, which resulted in more than thirty-five million casualties;⁴ or like the one which began in 1939, whose final cost will not be known for years?

SOCIAL CONTROL AND PLANNING

The Task of Directing Social Change. The analysis to this point has shown the subjectivity and variability of goals, and the difficulty of determining whether complex social changes are in the nature of progress.⁵ Because values are subjective, many social scientists dismiss them summarily and give them no consideration whatsoever.

¹ Dewey and Tufts, *op. cit.*

² Cf. Hornell Hart, *The Technique of Social Progress*; also J. K. Folsom, *Culture and Social Progress* (New York, 1929), Chap. v, "A Proposed Barometer of Welfare".

³ S. W. Becker, *Ten Million Americans Have It* (Philadelphia, 1937), p. 9.

⁴ *World Almanac*, 1935, p. 944.

⁵ See A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress* (New York, 1918), especially Chap. vii, "Criteria of Progress".

This is an attitude apparently appropriated from the natural scientists, who deal with things that do not possess values. In the case of human beings, however, it must be recognised that all groups set up values which are of the greatest significance for social life. The fact that consensus is subjective does not mean it is insignificant; quite the contrary, it influences human experience profoundly at many points. While it is probably not for the sociologist as a scientist to set up values, it is quite within the province of the sociologist as a human being to have values and to work for them. It is also important for him to recognise the values which are set up by the consensus of groups. Human values are, to the scientist, a system of data to be considered objectively like all other phenomena.

Since there is a consensus of opinion on goals in every society, the questions arise: In terms of his own goals, what can man achieve? What goals can he attain? What control can actually be exercised? We have learned to control quite effectively the disposal of garbage, the burning of buildings, the pollution of the water supply. The activities of a modern city reflect an enormous amount of control. Much has been done to control the plagues that once worked such havoc. Yet man has not been able to control crime as he wants to do. It is clear that, while there is some control in human affairs, there are practical limits to the extent of control. The fact that we can control the disposition of garbage does not justify us in thinking we can control evolution. Important, then, is the inquiry to which we turn, a consideration of the measure of control man now possesses.

Leadership and Control. Before taking up the discussion of man's control of social change, it is desirable first to make certain observations concerning leadership which may throw some light on the problem in hand, for control is generally effected by or through leaders.

While the power of the leader is generally appreciated in bringing about social change, there is insufficient recognition of his limitations. It is most important in dealing realistically with leadership to dismiss once for all the current fantasies and daydreams so widely prevalent. We tend to overestimate the originality, initiative, and even ability, of the leader. We are much inclined to hero-worshipping, a trait that may have been inculcated in us as children in admiration of, and affection for, our parents and elders who could do so much that we could not. Once this pattern of reaction has been set up in our personality, the leader simply becomes a conditioned stimulus in the place of the parent.¹ Furthermore, it is to the advantage of leaders to encourage the attitude of hero-worship on the part of their followers. It is natural that leaders should claim victories. Presidents of the United States have often taken credit for prosperity when it was due to favourable rainfall in the wheat and maize belts or to the discovery

¹ William F. Ogburn, "The Great Man versus Social Forces", *Journal of Social Forces*, vol. 5, pp. 225-31, December, 1926.

of gold mines. It is natural, therefore, that Presidents are blamed for business depressions, which they also play little part in making.

While the popular view is that the leader makes the times, a realistic view emphasises the exact opposite. There is some reciprocal action, but it is interesting to note that leaders have a way of arising in times of crisis. A general could hardly be a great man without a war. Leaders of governments during wars tend to be great, for they then have more opportunity for great achievements. It is difficult for a Prime Minister to be a great man unless some great crisis occurs in his administration. These remarks in no sense deny leadership. They are intended merely to provide a realistic conception of the leader in an attempt to find out what can be done to control social change, in contrast to the story-book conception of great men. Leadership is necessary in any directing of social change, but it is also very definitely limited by the determinism of social forces.¹

THE REALISTIC APPROACH TO CONTROL

Despite the limitations of leadership, and the difficulty of deciding on goals, societies do undertake to control change. We now turn our attention, therefore, to a consideration of man's power to control his destiny. Here again, it is necessary to differentiate between what is fantastic and what is practical. We may wish to build a bridge across the Atlantic Ocean from New York to Liverpool, but such a wish is the stuff of which dreams are made. We are familiar enough with engineering to realise that it is not practical at the present time. But somehow in the realm of social progress we have our daydreaming and social engineering all mixed up. We may wish to abolish war. What seems simple for the person appears likewise easy for society. But such tasks are as difficult as building a bridge across the Atlantic. Many still believe in miracles in the social world, though the idea has been abandoned in medicine and physiology. Some day war may be abolished ; but, if so, the task will have to be approached with full consideration of materials, ways and means ; that is, it will be achieved, not by the mere magic of wish fulfilment, but by the techniques of social engineering.

Since the world is governed by social forces, and not by mysterious leadership, a practical rule is to try to figure out first what is likely to happen as a result of the social forces. Do the social forces favour or oppose the proposed change ? This question, if properly envisioned, takes the issue out of the world of fantasy and puts it into the world of reality. After this question has been answered to the best of our knowledge, then and then only is it good practice to ask another question : What can we do about it ? To ask what can be done to bend the direction of the social trend is a more realistic approach than

¹ "The leader is a cause, but, like all causes we know of, he is also an effect." Charles Horton Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York 1922), p. 357.

to start with the idea that we can do anything we want to do, if only we have enough faith and will. We proceed to ask what is likely to happen in our changing world, with reference to the three factors, natural environment, biological heredity, and culture.

FACTORS BASIC TO GROUP LIFE

Problem of Man's Control over Natural Environment. The measure of man's control over the natural environment was set forth in an earlier chapter,¹ and hence need not here be considered at length. Man has achieved some remarkable controls, such as the creation of artificial climate in houses. The natural environment itself has been altered by such things, among others, as deforestation and reforestation, the filling-in of swamps, and the diverting of rivers into new channels. In other cases, more numerous perhaps, man has not controlled natural environment but only its effects. This has been accomplished by such inventions as clothing, the umbrella, housing, and air-conditioning. It may be concluded that "man has broken down some geographical difficulties . . . improved the bearing of other conditions, and settled down to the endurance of still others".²

Problem of Control over Biological Man. Human heredity is likewise relatively stable. For a whole people, biological selection is measured in hundreds of years, and mutations perhaps in thousands. There has probably been no significant biological change in man's hereditary endowment for perhaps ten thousand years or longer.³ The creation of mutation by X-ray recently in the fruit fly is not specific, and results in defective genes; it is of no value at present for the purpose under consideration. Heredity is the great stabilising force. The facts, then, give no encouragement to man's dream of evolving soon into a superman, a dream which has so intrigued romantic minds. On the other hand, it is comforting to think that the possibilities of degeneration are also remote.⁴

While the course of change in biological man may be modified over long periods of time, the likelihood of modification in the immediate future is not great. While our knowledge of the laws of heredity has advanced remarkably within the past twenty-five years, our ignorance of the genes possessed by different family lines is still great. Biological stocks have risen and fallen in the past, but the selection was not consciously planned or executed by man. It would seem that the best prospect for eugenics in the near future is the denial of offspring to persons obviously carrying certain defective genes. As

¹ Chapter IV.

² Isaiah Bowman, *Geography in Relation to the Social Sciences* (New York, 1934), p. 118.

³ Edwin Grant Conklin, *The Direction of Human Evolution* (New York, 1921), p. 59: "There can be no doubt that human evolution has halted, either temporarily or permanently . . ."

⁴ See Herbert S. Jennings, *The Biological Basis of Human Nature* (New York, 1930), Chap. x, "What Can We Hope from Eugenics?"

was pointed out in another place,¹ this type of negative eugenics may prevent to a small extent the appearance of defectives, but the achievement will not be great because most defective genes are recessive and it cannot be told in advance whether an individual carries them or not. It is well to bear in mind, however, that research in genetics during the next hundred years or so may radically alter the eugenics programme as it exists to-day.

Even if the knowledge requisite for changing biological heredity were available, there would still remain the problem of control. Man has so far not viewed the eugenics programme with favour, as judged by achievements. The programme has met with indifference or actual hostility. The sterilisation programme, for instance, has on the whole failed to win popular support. It will be necessary to develop a different consensus on the part of the group if eugenics is to prosper. Such a new attitude is, of course, not impossible.

The prospect is much better of improving individuals biologically during their lifetime. This programme does not involve the manipulation of the factors of heredity. Also, the process must be repeated in the case of each generation. The programme calls for improving the environment in which the body grows. As was shown earlier, the control of disease, especially during the early years of childhood, has already led to an improved human constitution. Superior feeding, due to the knowledge about vitamins and minerals, has also contributed to this end.² Further gains along these lines may be anticipated. It may be concluded that, at the moment, the process of growth of the individual holds better prospects for human improvement than does the process of heredity in breeding.

Problem of Control over Culture. We come now to the realm of the superorganic, where changes have been occurring most rapidly. These changes have taken place, not through changes in man's biological nature, but through the addition of inventions, both mechanical and social. These have become numerous and frequent in modern times because of the accumulative nature of the superorganic.

Is it possible to control inventions? Raymond Fosdick³ raises an even graver question. He asks, "Can the old savage be trusted with the tools which he has created?" Or one may ask, will man with an atomic bomb behave less destructively than a chimpanzee with a stick of dynamite? It certainly does not seem practicable for man to control his inventions on a large scale, although certain individual, major elements may be regulated. It is conceivable that the introduction of the mechanical cotton-picker might be controlled, or even

¹ Chapter III.

² For further discussion of these points the student is referred to E. V. McCollum *et al.*, *The Newer Knowledge of Nutrition*, 5th edition (New York, 1939), Chap. xxxviii, "Diet in Relation to Healthful Longevity".

³ Raymond D. Fosdick, *The Old Savage in the New Civilisation* (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1928), p. vi.

the incéption of a war. But would it have been possible to control the effects of the invention of the steam engine, which created cities and influenced family life, business, government, and religion so profoundly? Certainly not. Can the Orient stop the importation of Western culture? Is China free to import or not to import the mechanical inventions and social systems of the Western world, as it is sometimes claimed? These questions suggest the magnitude of the task.

For all this, it is to be noted that the production of more useful inventions, social or mechanical, or the crushing out of harmful ones, does not represent complete control over the superorganic. The reason is that inventions not only have immediate uses; they also have derivative and latent effects throughout the superorganic. The two conditions are different and must be kept distinct.¹ The stimulus that leads a man to produce a useful invention is its immediate use. He wants to make more yards of cloth with a new weaving machine run by steam. He does not realise it will have the social effect of increasing divorces. The problem of the control of social change resolves itself largely into the problem of the control of the effects of inventions.

Before these social effects can be controlled, they must first be anticipated.² We are far from showing such foresight in our present civilisation. Social effects are generally not only not anticipated; they are not recognised even when they come, and they are heeded too late.

This discussion has so far been concerned with the possible control of mechanical inventions and their social effects. The same analysis holds for the control of social inventions and their influences on society. It was difficult to foresee a recent social invention, the totalitarian state, as exemplified by Fascist Italy. This invention is certainly difficult to control. Once in operation, the effects of the totalitarian state on personality and behaviour, on customs and manner of life, are impossible to control. Again, if we cannot control war, how can we expect to control all its many social effects? So, too, the business depression cannot as yet be prevented, nor can we control the social effects of the business cycle. Indeed, we do not even know as yet what all of the effects are, although we have experienced some very severe depressions. The prediction of the social effects of social inventions is, then, as difficult as in the case of mechanical inventions.

No doubt this problem of predicting effects of inventions, like other problems, would yield results if it were studied more. But few scientists are seriously trying to find what will be the future effects of the new technologies; instead we spend much time in analysing past

¹ For fuller discussion of the distinction between the immediate uses of an invention and its social effects, both direct and derivative, see Chapter XXIV.

² National Resources Committee, *Technological Trends and National Policy* (Washington, 1937).

history, which does not repeat itself in an age of change. The human race is like the passengers in a bus with seats turned so that they always look backwards. The driver too looks backwards while the bus hurtles ahead across the open country through the mist at terrific speed. It is preposterous to talk seriously about controlling social change when so few are looking ahead for the derivative influences of inventions.

The Adjustments at Points of Strain. It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that to boast about controlling social evolution and directing the course of progress is much too grandiose, though to do so is quite in keeping with man's ego and dreams. Man cannot control geographical conditions, he cannot control biological evolution, and he cannot at the present time control the superorganic. What can he do? We need not answer, as the ancients did, by comparing man to "the fly who, sitting on the axle of the chariot wheel, said, 'What a dust do I raise!'" Man's will and wish do play a part in the course of change, even though the rôle is, as far as we can see, a more modest one than is generally supposed.

Even if natural environment, culture, and heredity cannot be controlled as we would like, the conclusion need not be discouraging. Indeed, if we could control them, that fact might be discouraging, since our knowledge of the ends to which we might direct the changes is so meagre and unsatisfactory. The really urgent need for control is at certain critical points in these three great areas where they impinge on each other. We cannot control the whole geographical environment, but we can control the floods of the Ohio River, a focal point where the superorganic and the inorganic worlds are not well adjusted. Fortunately, it is just these critical sectors that are amenable to control. Many of them are within reasonable reach of man's abilities. The places where control is most needed are generally those that are the most susceptible to practical social engineering. These are the areas where social problems are said to exist, and vigorous efforts to solve them will often meet with success. The practical need, then, is not so much for control over the basic processes of change as it is for control over the focal points of strain which these processes produce.

The Basic Factors and Social Adjustment. This book has dealt with certain basic factors in the social life of man: culture, heredity, geographic environment, and the group. These phenomena have been analysed and their functioning has been described. In this closing section we have discussed these factors from the point of view of change and in this closing chapter we have been concerned with whether the course of the changes in these factors is one of progress. It seems impossible to find agreement or a scientific answer as to what progress is for a very long period ahead or for a great variety of cultures, though there are a number of general statements of goals that are helpful as tools in trying to direct a particular change in a progressive way.

The four factors dealt with in this book can be used as the basis for a unifying conception. This systematisation rests on the idea of change and the idea of adjustment. All these factors are in a process of change, though the changes in natural environment and in hereditary evolution are very slow. The superorganic and the types of social structure which it fosters are in modern times changing very rapidly. Since these factors are all correlated, but are changing at unequal rates of speed, there naturally arises the question of whether these changes lead to good adjustments or to maladjustments. This concept of adjustment among changing factors was developed in the preceding chapter where it was observed that the different parts of the socio-cultural system change at unequal rates of speed. It is possible to use this concept of harmonious adjustment among the changing factors of nature, man, culture, and group as a tool of guidance in control. In any given culture, collective action on a social problem can in many instances be taken, with a view to working out a more harmonious adjustment of the several factors involved.

Nearly everyone would like to lessen the amount of illness, which is an unsatisfactory adjustment between biological man and his environment. We work hard at programmes of public health and at the development of scientific medicine. Mental disorders are largely a maladjustment between our inherited nature and the superorganic, and few there are who would not want a better adjustment. Soil erosion is by common consent an unfortunate adjustment between nature and the superorganic.

For hundreds of thousands of years man was adjusted to an environment which called for muscular activity in the open air and the consumption of certain types of foods. Since this type of life existed for such a long time, it must be assumed that man achieved a fair measure of adjustment to it.¹ But now, suddenly, the superorganic has produced cities, a radically different type of environment. Is man well adjusted to sedentary life indoors and to long hours at monotonous repetitive tasks? Does the cave man live satisfactorily in the modern city? It is theoretically possible for the changed superorganic to have brought about an environment to which man is better adapted. He may, of course, be better adapted to the factory machine than to the sabre-toothed tiger. But the question is a permanent one, for the problem of adjustment between man and his culture will always exist.²

Attempts to control change and to secure better adaptations can be made through reform movements which initiate changes of a slow, evolutionary nature. But sometimes the changes come precipitately in revolutions. These two methods of change occupy our attention in the next section.

¹ G. T. W. Patrick, *The Psychology of Relaxation*.

² John Dewey, "The Interpretation of the Savage Mind", *The Psychological Review*, vol. 9, pp. 217-30, May, 1902.

RAPIDITY OF CHANGE

Reform and Revolution. In a relatively stationary society, when adjustments are once made they are more or less abiding. In a changing society such as ours, however, such is not the case. New conditions bring new problems and further need for readjustment. In a changing society there are usually numerous reform movements; that is, organised attempts to change the type of control employed in critical situations.

Reform movements go through a series of steps or periods somewhat as follows, although the order is not invariable. First the need for the change is recognised, usually by a few individuals. They agitate for reform. If their propaganda is successful, it results in a growing public awareness for the need for the change. At this point the programme may be more definitely formulated and an organisation set up. Then follows the second period, one of campaigning, with special effort being made to bring pressure to bear upon those individuals and agencies that play strategic rôles in the situation. If the reform movement is successful, its programme is established and, in the third period, becomes part of the accepted institutional set-up. In due course, new dissatisfaction may arise, and the cycle may be repeated. Since reform movements are in the nature of social inventions, they are subject to the same tests as inventions in general. That is, their success depends on whether or not they fit into the folkways, suit the public mood, and are workable. Equally important, reforms must reckon with the opposition of the vested interests, the groups that stand to lose something if the change is effected.

Revolution is a rapid change of some magnitude in culture. The term revolution as generally used refers to a rapid, widespread change in the political organisation of a society. Apart from the sudden and extensive political changes, a governmental upheaval may have little social significance, as in certain Latin-American countries where frequent governmental changes have occurred by violent means but without much effect upon other aspects of community organisation. This type of revolution, which has been called "revolution from the top", involves seizure of power by a small, well-organised group, usually a military group. The first stages of the coup generally involve seizure of police and military establishments. "Revolutions from the bottom" are based on mass movements.¹

Where the social effects of political revolution are more impressive, the revolution usually represents an attempt to adjust a long-standing lag in the economic sector. Such a revolution is to be explained in terms of unequal rates of change in correlated parts of culture. Owing to changes in the economic organisation, wealth concentrates in the hands of the few, while the condition of the poor grows more wretched,

¹ Felix Cross, *The Seizure of Political Power in a Century of Revolutions* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958).

resulting in great unrest among them. The situation calls for some change in the system of control, in order to ease the strain. Owing to the blind resistance of the ruling classes, however, no such changes may be permitted. A situation of this sort may go on for a long time, so that the strain becomes very great.

Deep and widespread frustration is a necessary but not sufficient condition for collective action of a revolutionary type. There must also be hope for improvement through collective action.¹ A fruitful source of such hope is improvement itself. As conditions improve for a group, the members may aspire to an even better state of affairs.

SOCIAL PLANNING

A movement which has recently come into great prominence is that known as social planning. It differs from reform in a number of respects. While reform is remedial and corrective, planning is preventive and constructive. A plan is laid out as an achievement to be made in a certain length of time. The emphasis is on the practical rather than on aspirations of the fantasy type. Various specialised planning bodies have been quite successful in looking into the more immediate future and in planning for such practical considerations as educational facilities, electric power, and flood control.² Emphasis has been on the practical side in successful planning.

Planning has the virtue of looking ahead, which is essential in a changing society. Unless there is what Comte called "prevision", it is idle even to talk of control. Earlier sociologists, like Spencer, believed control was neither possible nor desirable.³ Spencer taught that the social heritage grows according to fixed, ineluctable laws and that interference usually makes things worse. Comte, on the contrary, believed that man had the power to look ahead and to control his destiny.⁴ Later this idea was brilliantly developed by Ward,⁵ who used the phrase, "social telesis", meaning societal self-direction. While Ward was unduly impressed with man's intellectual powers and exaggerated greatly the amount of control possible, he nevertheless did perform a valuable service in stressing the possibility and importance of looking and planning ahead.

Of course, it would be good to know all the very long-time trends, but in our ignorance it is possible to act with a vision that extends only

¹ R. H. Turner and L. M. Killian, *Collective Behaviour* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1957).

² See National Resources Board, *State Planning, Review of Activities and Progress* (Washington, 1935).

³ Herbert Spencer, *First Principles* (London, 1862); and especially *Man versus the State* (London, 1884).

⁴ Auguste Comte, *Positive Philosophy* (London, 1875-90), Martineau translation, vol. II, p. 73.

⁵ Lester F. Ward, *Applied Sociology* (Boston, 1906); also *Dynamic Sociology* (New York, 1898).

for a few hundred years or even for just the lifetime of our grandchildren. The further a trend line is extended forward into the unknown, the more inaccurate the forecast. In fact, a great extension is usually worthless. It may be wise to establish parks and playgrounds in a certain section of the city even if we do not know whether the city will be in existence ten thousand years hence or what the distribution of the population will then be. Man's vision is too limited to plan for eternity. More often than not, however, it is possible to act successfully in accordance with short-time advances. Most social or national policies are framed on this basis.

The prerequisites to effective planning are said to include the following : (1) The existence of a modern as opposed to a traditional society, including a monetised economy, considerable urbanisation, a technical and scientific intelligentsia, and a well-ordered system of public administration. (2) The existence of an adequate system of information-gathering and analysis. (3) The existence of favourable public attitudes towards planning. (4) The existence of progressive economic and political leadership.¹

Economic development is a process. What is appropriate at one stage may not be as appropriate at another. The emphasis on capital and technical assistance, which is so strong in the plans of many under-developed nations just making the transition from traditional to modern society, is more appropriate at a later stage of development than at the beginning. More important at first are the development of responsible organs of public administration and an educated élite, followed by popular enlightenment. When these conditions exist, more efficient use is generally made of capital and technical assistance.²

Furthermore, to carry out a plan successfully often requires a high degree of organisation, as in the case of the army. A high degree of organisation means discipline and loss of liberty. Hence planning is opposed by those who lean towards *laissez-faire* as a social policy. "Democratic parliamentary government cannot plan, it can merely improvise",³ unless it is willing to delegate considerable authority to the executive. Concentration of authority is needed for the successful formulation and prosecution of a plan. Otherwise the programme is likely to be subject to fluctuations and modifications, as the result, for instance, of the pressure of interests that are powerful and that stand to lose by the new programme. A great change in a heterogeneous society such as ours is certain to be inimical to the interests of some established groups, no matter how beneficial it may be for the people as a whole.

Despite this and other opposition, however, the planning move-

¹ John Friedmann, Introduction to "The Study and Practice of Planning", *International Social Science Journal*, vol. XI, No. 3, 1959.

² John Kenneth Galbraith, *Economic Development in Perspective* (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1962.)

³ Sir Arthur Salter, *The Framework of an Ordered Society* (London, 1933).

ment has been gaining ground. The great debate about planning is no longer concerned with the questions as to whether it is possible or whether it can be reconciled with democracy, but rather with the question of how planning may be improved. Planning is inherent in the conception of modern society.

Planning is likely to develop in many different sectors of the advancing superorganic, which after all is very complex. Practical plans are likely to be many and heterogeneous, dealing with manageable problems for a near future. While concern with ultimate goals for the whole of civilisation continues, the practical work will go forward in many areas from day to day, with efforts to plan a little ahead for the particular problem. There will be plans that are not in line, and movements will develop for co-ordination, which will be greatly needed. There then will be a swing of emphasis to progress on the grand scale, to be followed in turn by a demand for a more specific practical plan. The whole process will thus go forward, and, if success follows, perhaps practical plans in the years to come will be more comprehensive and better integrated than it is possible for them to be at the present time.

QUESTIONS FOR STUDY

1. What possibilities for control over biological man does the eugenics programme offer to-day?
2. Examine the process of reform as illustrated by the history of the treatment of the mentally disordered.
3. "The Idea of Progress." Examine briefly some of the main views that have been held on this subject.
4. Explain and compare the concepts of "social development", "social evolution", and "social progress".
5. Examine the problems involved in the investigation of moral progress.
6. What do you consider to be the rôle of sociology in social planning?

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